


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Explaining the History of
AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS

★ Second Edition ★



Edited by
**Michael J. Hogan and
Thomas G. Paterson**

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Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations

SECOND EDITION

Originally published in 1991, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* has become an indispensable volume for teachers and students in international history and political science, and general readers seeking an introduction to American diplomatic history. This collection of essays highlights the conceptual approaches and analytical methods used to study the history of American foreign relations, including bureaucratic, dependency, and world systems theories, as well as corporatist and national security models. Along with substantially revised essays from the first edition, this volume presents new material on postcolonial theory, borderlands history, modernization theory, gender, race, memory, cultural transfer, and critical theory. It seeks to define the study of American international history, stimulate research in fresh directions, and encourage cross-disciplinary thinking in an increasingly transnational, globalizing world.

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SECOND EDITION

Edited by

MICHAEL J. HOGAN

Ohio State University

THOMAS G. PATERSON

University of Connecticut



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Preface to the Second Edition

When we first wrote this preface more than ten years ago, we struck a defensive tone that now seems inappropriate. We noted that academic critics had repeatedly denounced the history of American foreign relations as a backwater of scholarly inquiry. According to the familiar indictment, scholarship in the field was dominated by an ethnocentric point of view, mired in detail, short on synthesis, and desperately in need of new directions. The tale of woe reminded us of the Maine farmer who was asked if a recent hurricane had damaged his barn. "Don't know," he answered. "Haven't found it yet." Even then, however, historians of American foreign relations were developing fresh topics, mining foreign archives, and applying new methods. Some were trying to reconceptualize the field, while others were exploring new ways of thinking about older approaches. What was true in 1991, moreover, is still true today. Indeed, over the last decade the study of American foreign relations has enjoyed something of a renaissance, so much so that it has required a new edition, and major revision, of this volume.

As was the case with the first edition, the essays that follow are not intended to rehash old debates or rebut specific critics. Nor are they designed as historiographical surveys of the literature. Instead, they present some of the new topics of inquiry and some of the innovative analytical approaches that have emerged in recent years. They are offered here in an effort to define the field, point research in fresh directions, and stimulate cross-disciplinary thinking about "U.S. international history" or the "history of American foreign relations." We think these phrases, rather than "diplomatic history," best capture the nature of the field described in the following essays, although we did not seek to impose them on our authors, whose contributions, for the most part, use all three phrases interchangeably.

Most of the essays in the original edition first appeared in *Diplomatic History* and the *Journal of American History*, and some of these are republished in this edition as well. We asked each of the authors to revise and update his or her work, and we also commissioned many new essays, including pieces by Nathan Citino, Frank Costigliola, Nick Cullather, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Kristin Hoganson, Gerald Horne, and

Robert Schulzinger. In the process we relied on the help and good advice of friends and colleagues, two of whom deserve special mention. Frank Costigliola provided invaluable suggestions and worked with Thomas Paterson to revise his essay from the first edition, and Jennifer Walton, a graduate student and research assistant at Ohio State University, did a terrific job coordinating the revisions.

Earnings from the sale of the second edition, like the first, will be contributed to the Lawrence E. Gelfand–Armin Rappaport Fund maintained by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. We invite others to contribute to this fund, and we especially thank the authors in this volume for making their own contribution to the Gelfand–Rappaport Fund by waiving the usual publication or republication fees.

We are very pleased to rededicate this volume to Lawrence E. Gelfand and Ellis W. Hawley, and to the late Armin Rappaport. As our graduate directors many years ago, they first introduced us to the exciting ways of thinking about the history of American foreign relations and its relationship to other fields. We owe them debts that can never be repaid.

MJH

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Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan). He has also edited *Cold War Critics* (1971), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory* (1989), and *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations* (2000, with Dennis Merrill). With Bruce Jentleson, he served as senior editor for the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations* (1997). His articles have appeared in the *American Historical Review*, *Journal of American History*, and *Diplomatic History*, among other journals. He has won a Guggenheim fellowship, directed National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars for College Teachers, and is a past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. In 2000, the New England History Teachers Association awarded him the Kidger Award for excellence in teaching and mentoring.

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Introduction

MICHAEL J. HOGAN AND
THOMAS G. PATERSON

World War I helped to spawn the first generation of specialists in the history of American foreign relations, most of whom had been trained originally as political historians. Influenced by that training, as well as by the war, these scholars soon created two distinct approaches to the study of American foreign policy. The nationalist perspective of Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dexter Perkins stressed the continuities in American diplomacy. These scholars celebrated the growth of American power and the creation of an American diplomatic tradition marked by such hallowed principles as those embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. Although not indifferent to the domestic influences on American foreign policy, they concentrated primarily on state-to-state relations, placed American diplomacy in an international, usually European, setting, and often conducted research in foreign archives that established a high standard for subsequent scholars.¹

From the start, however, Charles Beard and other progressive historians challenged the nationalist perspective.² The scholars in this school were less enamored of multiarchival research and less inclined to focus on

1 For overviews of the field, from which this essay borrows, see Alexander DeConde, *American Diplomatic History in Transformation* (Washington, DC, 1976); John Higham, *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965); Charles Neu, "The Changing Interpretive Structure of American Foreign Policy," in *Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy*, ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus, OH, 1971), 1–57; Jerald A. Combs, *American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations* (Berkeley, 1983); Michael J. Hogan, ed., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (New York, 1995); and Michael J. Hogan, ed., *Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941* (New York, 2000). For the nationalist perspective see Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York, 1936); idem, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (New York, 1935); idem, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1949); Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826* (Cambridge, MA, 1927); and idem, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867* (Baltimore, 1933).

2 See Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *America in Midpassage* (New York, 1939). For further discussion of the progressive school, as well as citations to the literature, see Neu, "Changing Interpretive Structure," 16–21.

state-to-state relations. They searched instead for the intellectual assumptions that guided American policymakers and for the domestic political, economic, and regional forces that shaped their diplomacy. Because these forces varied with historical circumstances, the progressive historians saw change rather than continuity, conflict rather than consensus, as major features in the history of American foreign relations.

The two approaches of these early scholars influenced later generations, as did such international developments as the rise of Fascist aggression and the outbreak of World War II, the Holocaust in Germany and the atomic bombings of Japan, the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. These dramatic developments contributed to a pervasive sense of disillusionment, to a pessimism about the future, and to a tragic view of life in an age dominated by war, revolution, and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. These themes were commonplace in intellectual circles generally and even began to influence the thinking of Bemis, Perkins, and other scholars among the founding generation of diplomatic historians. Although their writing on early American diplomacy had often been marked by an unbridled optimism, they grew increasingly disillusioned with the unfolding record of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. They also became more critical of the influence that public opinion and partisan politics exerted on policymaking, and more pessimistic about the ability of decision-making elites to understand, let alone to control, an international system that was increasingly complex and dangerous.

This critical, sometimes pessimistic, tone became one of the hallmarks of the realist historians who dominated the writing on American foreign relations in the 1950s and into the 1960s. Led by George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and others, realist historians, much like the nationalist school of an earlier day, were concerned primarily with the state, with state policymaking elites, and with the use of state power to advance the national interest.³ Their work tended to downplay the internal sources of American diplomacy that had preoccupied the progressive historians, although it did not ignore the influence of public opinion, partisan politics, and misguided idealism. The realists, in fact, often heaped the blame for failed policies on the shifting moods of an uninformed public, on partisan rivalries, and on befuddled legal and moral precepts that blinded political leaders to the nation's real interests. Informed by these failures, realist historians touted the need for policymaking by professional elites who

3 For a sample of the original works of the realist scholars see Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951); Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, 1948); and idem, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York, 1951).

stood above the crowd, who were unimpeded by the pressures of electoral politics, and who were guided instead by a disinterested expertise. These elites, argued the realists, were more likely to understand the architecture of global balances, contending alliances, and competing national interests that marked the world after 1945. They were also more likely to devise rational strategies that ensured the nation's security and fulfilled its weighty responsibilities as a world power.

The tendency of realist historians to celebrate elite management, draw lessons from the past, and write in prescriptive terms made their work particularly appealing to official Washington, as did their celebration of power and their focus on geopolitics and grand strategy. As Stanley Hoffman once pointed out, realism provided American leaders in the early Cold War with an "intellectual compass." It helped them to "excoriate isolationism," to "justify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs," and to "rationalize the accumulation of power, the techniques of intervention, and the methods of containment." What the realists offered, Hoffmann concluded, "the policy-makers wanted."⁴

Yet the realist historians also made important contributions to the study of American foreign relations. To be sure, they were largely indifferent to the domestic roots of American foreign policy, especially cultural and economic forces, and to the role played by trade unions, multinational corporations, and other nonstate actors. But the realists did focus renewed attention on certain issues intrinsic in the field, such as national security, national interest, balances of power, and grand strategy; and they introduced a critical point of view that continues to characterize more recent studies. In addition, many historians who worked within the realist framework added significant new dimensions of their own. In a series of monographs, for example, Ernest R. May rivaled Bemis's research in foreign archives. Not only did May place American diplomacy in an international setting, he went beyond Bemis in using multiarchival research to write multinational history.⁵ Other historians delineated the influence of key individuals on American diplomacy or explored the intellectual and ideological assumptions that guided policymakers.⁶ These lines of

4 Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106 (Summer 1977): 47–48.

5 A sample of May's work would include *World War I and American Isolation, 1914–1917* (Cambridge, MA, 1959); *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power* (New York, 1961); and *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge, MA, 1975). May continues to be a master of this kind of research. See his impressive last book, *Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France* (New York, 2000).

6 See, for example, Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956); and Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1961).

analysis would broaden and deepen in the 1960s, producing such works as those by Arno J. Mayer and N. Gordon Levin on the ideological and social forces that shaped Wilsonian diplomacy.⁷

At the same time, however, the works by Mayer and Levin highlighted a renewed interest in the internal sources of American diplomacy. Emphasized by Beard and the progressive historians but slighted by the realists, these sources became the special concern of William Appleman Williams and other revisionists of the 1960s and 1970s.⁸ The revisionists placed primary emphasis on American ideas and on the American system of liberal capitalism. As they saw it, American leaders had embraced an ideology of expansionism founded on the principle of the Open Door. They had sought foreign markets to relieve domestic economic and political crises, and had forged in the process an overseas empire that violated the best principles of the nation. Although they surveyed the whole record of American diplomacy, the revisionists focused special attention on the Cold War. Finding that American policy in this era was more purposeful than the realists would admit, they also deviated from the realists in assigning the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, primary responsibility for the breakdown of the wartime coalition and for the years of unremitting tension that followed. Influenced by these events and by the wrenching experience of the Vietnam War, the revisionists were particularly critical of American policy toward developing countries. In the Third World, they argued, American officials had linked the United States to decaying colonial regimes, jeopardized their nation's best interests, and betrayed its basic commitment to the principle of self-determination.

The revisionists helped other historians shift their attention away from Europe and the great powers to the developing world. By shining a Bear-dian light on the economic forces that influenced decision making, they also brought more clearly into view the important role played by actors outside the state, especially organized business and financial interests. They reminded their readers of the significant linkages between state and society and of how social structure can shape foreign policy. In addition, the revisionists reemphasized the importance of ideas and ideology in the history of American foreign relations and lent new credence to the view of

7 See Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, 1959); idem, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919* (New York, 1967); and Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968).

8 Williams launched New Left revisionism with *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959). He explained the development of his thinking in "A Historian's Perspective," *Prologue* 6 (Fall 1974): 200–203. See also William Appleman Williams, "Open Door Interpretation," in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, ed. Alexander DeConde, 3 vols. (New York, 1978), 2:703–10.

American leaders as rational policymakers who sought to control events, calculate the national interest, and pursue a coherent, if misguided, vision.

At the same time, however, critics complained that revisionism was monocausal in its emphasis on economic motives, failed to differentiate between competing domestic interests, and ignored both the influence of legitimate national security concerns and the actions of other states on American diplomacy.⁹ Reacting to these criticisms in the 1970s and 1980s, some historians sought to replace revisionist assumptions with those more characteristic of realism. Typified by John Lewis Gaddis, these postrevisionist scholars refocused attention on the state as the principal actor, on decision-making elites, on the strategic and geopolitical determinants of policy, and on such traditional notions as national security, national interest, and the balance of power. Postrevisionists generally discovered success in America's diplomatic record, especially in the early Cold War. When critical of American policy, their criticism tended to echo the older realists' complaints about the deleterious effects on decision making of bureaucratic struggles, misplaced ideals, public opinion, and party politics. In addition, although postrevisionist historians accorded economic diplomacy some room in their studies, they treated it as an instrument of grand strategy driven by geopolitical concerns, not by domestic pressures. If American leaders were empire builders, as these scholars admitted in a nod to revisionism, the empire grew by invitation from abroad rather than from imperatives rooted in the American system. It was a defensive empire erected in the context of the Cold War, for which the Soviets were primarily responsible.¹⁰

Postrevisionism was neither a new method of analyzing American foreign relations nor a coherent synthesis of older approaches. In contrast to revisionism, in whose shadow it emerged, postrevisionism reasserted the primacy of geopolitical considerations over internal forces in American foreign policy. Taken together, the two schools recapitulated a division that has marked the study of American foreign relations from its inception, and that also runs through many of the essays in this volume. As these essays reveal, however, ongoing differences over the primacy of causal forces have not deterred the current generation of historians from exploring new avenues of research, reconceptualizing older approaches, and charting fresh directions. On the contrary, the historical study of

9 For one of the many critiques of revisionism see Bradford Perkins, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-five Years After," *Reviews in American History* 12 (March 1984): 1-18.

10 The case for postrevisionism is made in John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Postrevisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90. Postrevisionist work on the Cold War is still very much alive and kicking. See Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997).

American foreign relations has been undergoing a fertile transformation in the last two decades.

The recent ferment, like earlier transformations, reflects broader trends and changes in society, politics, and scholarship. While the end of the Cold War may have encouraged a spirit of triumphalism in some quarters, it also led many diplomatic historians to mine newly opened archives in the United States and abroad, to ask new questions, and to rethink old conclusions. The communications revolution and a growing awareness of interdependence have prompted a return to issues of globalization and internationalization, including issues having to do with the women's movement, human rights, and the environment. They have encouraged many historians to address transnational connections that had not been addressed before, to explore anew the role of nongovernmental groups, and to "problematize" the issue of U.S. relations with the so-called "Third World."¹¹

On one level, some of the newest scholarship tends to marry more traditional approaches with newer concerns and historiographical trends. The recent emphasis on international history builds on the scholarship of Bemis, May, and others. Works by Michael H. Hunt and Michael J. Hogan, to name two historians represented in this volume, fit into this category, as does the scholarship of Akira Iriye, who has done more than most to promote international history. At the same time, Melvyn P. Leffler's prize-winning scholarship blends a careful analysis of geopolitical and strategic issues – of the sort that preoccupied realist and postrevisionist historians – with a concern for the influence that "core values" have had on the way American leaders defined the national interest. What is more, if realism and postrevisionism continue to influence recent scholarship, the same is also true of revisionism, as is evident in work that explores the corporatist paradigm. While this work, too, is interested in the strategic and geopolitical forces that have influenced American foreign policy, not to mention the role of the state in policy formation, its most important contribution lies in connecting these influences to the process of statemaking at home and abroad, to the role of nonstate actors, and to the part played by domestic economic, political, and cultural forces.¹²

In addition, specialists in the history of American foreign relations have responded to criticism that portrays their field as parochial, ethnocentric, and hidebound.¹³ Besides exploring international history, they have borrowed insights from scholars in related disciplines. The cross-fertilization

11 See Nick Cullather's contribution to this volume, which builds on his essay, "Development? It's History," in *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 641–53.

12 For a discussion of these two approaches see the essays in this volume by Melvyn P. Leffler and Michael J. Hogan.

13 This criticism is discussed and assessed in some of the essays that follow.

with political science and other social sciences has led diplomatic historians to explore such new avenues of analysis as those offered by dependency theory, world-systems models, and cognitive psychology, not to mention the corporatist paradigm. At the same time, specialists in the history of American foreign relations have learned from scholars in other fields, including those who are exploring the subject of historical memory, writing comparative and world history, or dealing with the issues and methodologies associated with the new cultural history.

The turn toward cultural history is perhaps the most significant transformation in the field since the first edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. Although Michael Hunt and Akira Iriye did important early work on ideology and culture, historians in larger numbers are now taking the cultural turn. To be sure, "culture" is a slippery and complicated term to define. Iriye described it as the production and transmission of memory, ideology, lifestyle, and symbols, such as artwork, film, and books. Andrew Rotter prefers to think of culture as a collection of overlapping "webs of significance." Whatever the specific definition, it seems fair to include under the rubric of culture a system of symbols and meanings, including language, emotions, values, and myths, that are embedded in everyday life.

Influenced by cultural historians and by specialists in literary theory, postcolonial studies, and anthropology, the new work on culture and international relations explores the connection between domestic political culture and foreign relations, questions of national identity and representation, and the role of new actors, such as tourists and artists. The best of the new contributions engage, with varying degrees of success, issues of power, including economic power, strategy, and geopolitics. Many diplomatic historians have come to understand that culture and power are inextricably entwined, that power can reside outside the state, and that culture influences how power is organized, who holds it, and how it is perceived.¹⁴

These newer cultural works follow two main strands of analysis. The first includes bilateral studies that address cultural exchange or "cultural transfer" between the United States and other countries. These focus on the motivations that influence the American government, as well as corporations, interest groups, and nongovernmental organizations, and they often reach beyond U.S. borders to examine how those abroad reshape American culture to their own ends.¹⁵ The second strand of analysis

14 For a good recent overview of the literature on culture and foreign relations, see Robert Griffith, "The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies," *Reviews in American History* 29 (2001): 150–57.

15 See for example, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA,

focuses on how culture affects policymaking in the United States, specifically on how ideas about race, gender, sexuality, religion, and family relationships, not to mention democracy, shape the worldview of American policymakers and the decisions they make.¹⁶ Hopefully, scholars will continue these avenues of research in the next decade, find ways to synthesize both strands of analysis, and even extend their analysis to non-Western nations.¹⁷

The new directions in the field have begun to alter the way historians of American foreign relations use sources. Diplomatic historians have always valued a multiarchival, multilingual approach, and this trend continues.¹⁸ The progress of declassification and additions to the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* have also, to a certain extent, defined the boundaries of scholarship in the field. With the advent of the cultural turn, however, diplomatic historians are just as likely to use the archives of the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Labor Department as they are the records of the Departments of State and Defense. What is more, they are increasingly looking beyond government records to the records of nongovernmental organizations, corporations, interest groups, and international agencies. They are using newspapers and periodicals to gauge public opinion, and they are examining the intentions and impact of film, literature, music, and marketing campaigns.

Many of the essays that follow touch upon the variety of sources available to specialists in the field, as well as the different analytical approaches they deploy. Taken as a whole, they offer an overview of the current state of scholarship on the history of American foreign relations. They do not

1999); Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993); and Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997).

16 Representative works include Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1309–39; Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); and Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

17 Two recent standouts are Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000); and Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca and London, 2000).

18 Two recent examples are Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, 1999) and Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, 2002). See also Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York, 2002), which ably combines international history with a variety of new analytical approaches.

systematically review recent literature, detail all topics worthy of inquiry, or summarize all methods and interpretative frameworks, especially the seasoned schools of thought outlined in the early part of this introduction. They seek instead to define the state of the field, to outline new analytical models, to show how familiar topics and methods are being rethought, and to reveal the usefulness of questions raised by other disciplines and other fields of American history. These chapters illustrate many of the challenging ways of approaching the study of American foreign relations and highlight the healthy ferment and rich diversity that now mark the field.

Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign Relations: A Primer

FRANK COSTIGLIOLA* AND
THOMAS G. PATERSON

This “primer” seeks to define the field of the history of United States foreign relations (what are we trying to do?), identify some of the well-explored topics in the field (what are we doing successfully?), and suggest some fresh approaches. How have changes in technology and environmental problems shaped U.S. foreign policy? How have the transfer of culture and the cross-border activities of individuals, corporations, and other non-state organizations changed the concerns of governments and the meaning of *foreign relations*? How can methodologies adapted from literary criticism, anthropology, and other fields of history open possibilities for foreign relations history?¹

All foreign relations historians are engaged in explaining over time the interaction of states, peoples, and cultures in the international system.² We study U.S. expansion into Mexico in the nineteenth century; twentieth-century anticommunism; and economic influences, such as lending by the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and operations overseas by U.S.-based corporations. We analyze the intersection of cultural and economic forces, such as in Nike’s promotion of basketball star Michael Jordan as a symbol for high-fashion sneakers that are made in low-paid nations and consumed in the United States and in other rich nations.³

* Frank Costigliola wishes to thank Molly Hite, J. Garry Clifford, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas G. Paterson.

1 This chapter is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather suggestive in its citations to the vast literature in foreign relations history. We have emphasized recent representative studies.

2 “Foreign relations” has advantages over other definitions. “Foreign policy” focuses on the process in government of making a decision and on the policy decision itself, and “diplomacy” emphasizes negotiations between states (or statecraft). “International history” is so broad a term that it loses its usefulness. “Foreign relations” can be used to explain the totality of interactions – economic, cultural, political, and more – among peoples and states.

3 Walter LaFeber, *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism* (New York, 2002).

We also study U.S. individuals abroad, such as tourists and the wives of diplomats.⁴ “But are tourists or spouses of diplomats really involved in the making or executing of *foreign policy* or in the process of *diplomacy*?” critics might ask. Historians have answered that *foreign relations history* has been expanding its purview to include all aspects of foreign relations, not just diplomacy. A broader, more inclusive history of foreign relations, moreover, can often better explain the context of diplomacy.

To study U.S. foreign relations is not to assume that the United States has been responsible for every change or problem in the world, that U.S. power is unlimited, or that weaker nations do not possess countervailing power.⁵ We need to be aware of the reception issue – how influences from the United States have been received and often altered by recipient nations or groups. Foreign relations history has come a long way since the days of the “nationalist” school of Samuel Flagg Bemis, whose 1961 presidential address to the American Historical Association assumed that the United States was *exceptional*, for the growth of the American empire extended the “blessings of liberty.” According to Bemis, whites migrated through an “empty continent,” a metaphor that masked the harsh removal of American Indians and the expansion of African American slavery.⁶

Although written history has become more inclusive, the grand narrative of American exceptionalism still prevails in public discussions of the past and, more subtly, in some historical scholarship. A grand or master narrative is a foundational story, widely told and retold, that shapes the overall framework in which most history is written and remembered, and that makes *only some* evidence (in Bemis’s formulation, the liberty of white males) seem relevant.⁷ The grand narrative of American

4 Dennis Merrill, “Negotiating Cold War Paradise: U.S. Tourism, Economic Planning, and Cultural Modernity in Twentieth-Century Puerto Rico,” *Diplomatic History* 25 (Spring 2001): 179–214; Christopher Endy, “Travel and World Power: Americans in Europe, 1890–1917,” *Diplomatic History* 22 (Fall 1998): 565–94, and symposium *ibid.*, 533–615; Catherine Allgor, “Louisa Catherine Adams in Russia,” *Diplomatic History* 21 (Winter 1997): 15–43; Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations* (Berkeley, 1990); *ibid.*, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics and the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley, 1993); Jewell Fenzi, *Married to the Foreign Service: An Oral History of the American Diplomatic Spouse* (New York, 1994); Molly Wood, “‘I Consider I Had a Career in the Foreign Service’: American Foreign Service Wives, 1940–45,” unpublished manuscript.

5 See John Lewis Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” *Diplomatic History* 14 (Summer 1990): 403–25.

6 Samuel Flagg Bemis, “American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty,” *American Historical Review* 67 (January 1962): 291–305.

7 Like a paradigm, a grand narrative reflects, and helps shape, stories with varying truth values that we tell to make sense of history and our world. Thomas S. Kuhn described a *paradigm* as “some implicit body of intertwined and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism.” See Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1996), 16–17.

exceptionalism assumes, first, that the “rise” of the United States to global power resulted from preeminence descending upon “America,” a divinely favored nation with unique freedoms. Like a Horatio Alger tale, American exceptionalism is a rags-to-riches story that focuses on the luck and pluck and not on the stealing and killing entailed in becoming a continental and then a global empire. According to this compelling narrative, the United States, despite some mistakes, generally uses its power for benign purposes, a belief that has made it easier to cover up some foreign policy scandals. Another premise is that most people in the world appreciate, or should appreciate, U.S. beneficence. Related assumptions are that U.S.-style capitalism multiplies wealth and opportunity for nearly all; that human progress and happiness are best measured by such wealth and opportunity; that U.S.-style democracy enables the best “man” to be elected, as Woodrow Wilson put it; that U.S. influence is directed toward global peace, prosperity, and democracy; and finally, that the triumph over communism and ascendancy of global markets might mean the “end of history.”⁸

This grand narrative is told and retold in schools, in most of the media, in churches, and by public authorities. Like a myth, the story of American exceptionalism does have *partial validity*. The key point, however, is that because this narrative is so satisfying to many people, and because this narrative is retold by such powerful institutions, that partial validity often becomes accepted as the *whole story*. A master of persuasive narrative, the commentator and novelist Joan Didion acknowledges that constructing narratives requires many “tacit agreements, small and large, to overlook the observable in the interests of obtaining a dramatic story line.”⁹ U.S. grand narratives have relied on similar “tacit agreements” to secure dramatic, self-congratulatory story lines. The historian Michael Adas notes that American exceptionalism is not only “more comprehensive and extreme than its counterparts elsewhere,” but it “has also proven a good deal more impervious than most other national variants of divinely inspired mission to the unsettling excesses of human folly and cruelty that have abounded in the twentieth century.”¹⁰ Too few foreign policy

8 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992).

9 Joan Didion, *Political Fictions* (New York, 2001).

10 Michael Adas, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History,” *American Historical Review* 106 (December 2001): 1695. See also Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” *American Quarterly* 45 (September 1993): 1–43; Walter LaFeber, “The Bush Doctrine,” *Diplomatic History* 26 (Fall 2002): 551–53; Peter Bergmann, “American Exceptionalism and German *Sonderweg* in Tandem,” *International History Review* 23 (September 2001): 505–34; Daniel T. Rodgers, “Exceptionalism,” in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (ed.), *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton, 1998); 21–40; Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design American Exceptionalism and Empire* (Ithaca, NY, 2003).

makers have followed John Quincy Adams, who balanced his commitment to that “divinely inspired mission” with his understanding that going “abroad, in search of monsters to destroy” would endanger the nation’s freedoms.¹¹ Instead, many leaders have won at least initial domestic support by couching foreign intervention in terms of the grand narrative. Most foreign conflicts have largely been remembered and recorded in ways that embellish the story.¹² Although cynicism, dissent, criticism, and revisionism have persisted among the general public, counter narratives have generally remained as fragments or as conspiracy myths.

Inconsistencies in the story, such as the dictatorship and poverty in Guatemala following the U.S. intervention in 1954, or the economic breakdown in Russia following the “shock therapy” of U.S. private and governmental advisers after 1991, have largely been ignored, or explained as necessary or inevitable “transitions” by most U.S. observers.¹³ Although triumphalists have argued that the supposed U.S. “victory” in the Cold War affirmed the grand narrative, other scholars have countered that the Cold War ended because of largely autonomous changes in the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Historians who have analyzed specific aspects of U.S. relations with, say, Guatemala or Russia, have pointed to the holes in the master story.

Historians writing a broader narrative such as a textbook, however, have greater difficulty in avoiding the drama of American success, unless overt criticism becomes *the* focus of the story.¹⁵ A chapter on Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy, for instance, might easily dramatize Reagan’s triumphant, personal relations with Mikhail Gorbachev at the expense of detailing the story of Reagan’s incitement of wars in Central America. Even when writers try to present other viewpoints, some readers may still “read” according to the script they already know: The Rise of the United States to Number One. As the textbook writer C. Garry Clifford put it, when writing about U.S. leaders generally convinced of their own and of their nation’s rectitude, it can seem like “nipping at the heels of the

11 “Address of July 4, 1821,” in Walter LaFeber (ed.), *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire* (Chicago, 1965), 45.

12 For a discussion of how opposition to the war by Vietnam veterans slowly diminished after 1973, see Christian G. Appy, *Working Class War* (Chapel Hill, 1993); Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America* (Bloomington, IN, 1989).

13 Stephen M. Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–61* (Athens, OH, 2000); Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York, 1993); Stephen F. Cohen, *Failed Crusade: Americans and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York, 2000).

14 Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *The End of the Cold War* (New York, 1992). See also Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1999); and Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York, 2000).

15 Howard Zinn, *A Peoples History of the United States* (New York, 1999).

great ones” to criticize constantly the hollowness of their virtue and the costs of their expansion. Scholars such as William Appleman Williams, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter LaFeber have achieved some critical distance by writing history with tones of tragedy or irony. Yet the dominance of the grand story in public discourse has left little inclination or space for considering basic contradictions, such as the “Tocqueville problem,” which again became acute after September 11, 2001. Alexis de Tocqueville wondered whether it was possible for the United States – an entrepreneurial, pluralistic nation with a short attention span and a focus on individual gratification – to pursue a long-term foreign policy or war without undermining democracy and demonizing the enemy.¹⁶

However historians of U.S. foreign relations have considered the issue of American exceptionalism, they have situated their studies on one or more of four levels: the international, regional, national, and individual. One theme runs through all four levels and is thus central to the study of foreign relations history itself: the competition for power among individuals, interest groups, governments, economic systems, cultures, images, ideas, and more. Historians of foreign relations have traditionally studied material power, which is embodied in things we can touch, such as armies, tanks, and dollars. Many historians have also begun to study cultural power, which both reflects and produces meaning in grand narratives (the future according to communism), cultural beliefs (viewing, say, Koreans or Vietnamese as “gooks”), and cultural creations (film, television, and, in another aspect of cultural creation, the interpretive framework for viewing the world). These and other categories of power overlap. In the Shah’s Iran, for instance, images of American life in Hollywood films stimulated exports of U.S. consumer products even as they infuriated traditional Islamic clerics and their supporters, who found such influence corrupting and who overthrew the Shah in the 1979 anti-American revolution.

First, let us consider the *international* level of analysis. How is power in the world distributed – along multipolar, hegemonic, or bipolar lines? What are the major sources of conflict, which states are the key actors, and which instruments of power do they use? How prevalent and influential are alliances, cultural influences, economic arrangements, and shared or disputed environmental concerns? How much influence is exerted by international organizations or by nonstate groups and movements?¹⁷ How interdependent is the international system?¹⁸ What are the norms of

16 Eric Alterman, *Who Speaks for America?: Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY, 1998).

17 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997).

18 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, (New York, 2001).

international behavior and how have they changed?¹⁹ Other questions can guide analysis at the international level. Is the international system in a state of major transformation, as, for example, in the much swifter than anticipated end of the Cold War? How have epidemics, such as the AIDS crisis in Africa and elsewhere, and natural disasters, such as the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, altered international relations? How have shocks to the international system, such as the oil price crisis of the 1970s or the terrorist strikes of 2001, wrenched bilateral and multilateral relations among nations and created new lines of cooperation and enmity?²⁰

Second, historians of foreign relations can focus on the *regional* divisions of the world.²¹ The decentralization following Cold War bipolarity has increased the importance of regional blocs, such as the European Union, and temporary groupings, such as the 1990–91 Gulf War coalition. Geographical and other place names can reveal the name-makers' own perspectives about other parts of world. Some terms – such as “Atlantic Community,” “Free World,” “civilized world,” “Communist bloc,” “socialist world,” “underdeveloped nations,” and “European Community” – have obvious political and cultural implications. After the break up of the Soviet Union, some U.S. diplomats mocked the turbulent nations of central and southern Asia as “the Crazy 'Stans.” Geographical names, such as Far East, Middle East, East, and West, reflect a positioning of others by the people who originated the names and who had the cultural and political clout to make them stick. Saying or writing “America” when referring to the United States is so deeply imbedded in popular and scholarly discourses that it can be difficult to avoid even when one tries to do so. Consider also the Mercator projection, the most commonly used

19 Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, 1996).

20 Political scientists have devoted a good deal of attention to the international system. For a summary of their findings see Ole R. Holsti's contribution to this volume. For a historian's appraisal of the impact of terrorist attacks, see Walter LaFeber, “The Post-September 11 Debate over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation,” *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (Spring 2002): 1–17.

21 See, for example, James E. Lewis, Jr., *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783–1829* (Chapel Hill, 1998); Geir Lundestad, “*Empire*” by Integration (New York, 1998) (on the Western European and other U.S. allies); Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II* (New York, 1999); Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Place in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Berkeley, 1999) (on Western Europe and the war); Peter L. Hahn and Mary A. Heiss (ed.), *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945* (Columbus, OH, 2001); Matthew Connolly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” *The American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000): 739–69. For a world systems approach, see Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century* (Baltimore, 1995).

map of the world, which exaggerates the area of Europe and the rest of the northern hemisphere, while shrinking Africa and the southern half of the globe.²²

Third, at the *national* level of analysis, foreign relations historians primarily explore domestic characteristics. We ask who or what has power in the nation itself. Although external settings have conditioned U.S. foreign policy, they have not controlled it. For that control, we look inward at a number of factors: economic, strategic, political, ideological, cultural, and social. We ask questions about the nation's economic needs, or perceived needs, and study strategic raw-material imports, the export trade, tariffs, and overseas investments. We consider perceived security needs by examining calculations of threats, war planning, and budgets. As the historian Andrew J. Rotter has pointed out in his study of U.S.-Indian relations, we need to take into account nations' diverging (or merging) cultural assumptions, which, in this instance, concern such matters as gratitude, class, race, strategic space, and economic growth.²³ Finally, we can become more attuned to how culturally-conditioned feelings, such as injured pride, resentment, and a desire for respect or revenge, can influence supposedly rational perceptions and decisions about foreign relations.

We also delve into U.S. politics and government to determine how decisions are made and by whom – who has power?²⁴ We study public opinion (do leaders essentially hear what they have in fact already shaped?) and opinion elites (does a small group of educated, well-informed leaders dominate opinion?). The role of interest groups, such as the “China lobby” and the Committee on the Present Danger, and of political parties, command attention. Bureaucratic competition and imperatives, the national security state, and the imperial presidency are other topics in this category. We wonder why Congress has so often abdicated its foreign policy powers, and we look at the impact of foreign policy crises on domestic politics and vice versa, as in the Vietnam War. We investigate the decision-making process and ask whether it is a hapless series of uncoordinated, sometimes emotional responses or a rational, systematic identification of tasks and weighing of alternatives – or perhaps an untidy mix of the two. We study the power that has accrued to presidents from what the political historian Jeffrey K. Tulis has called “the routinization of crisis” and the “attempted repetitions of charisma.”²⁵ We ask about the quality and quantity of

22 See Alan K. Henrikson, “Mental Maps,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Explaining American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1991), 177–92.

23 Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000).

24 Garry R. Hess, *Presidential Decisionmaking for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore, 2001).

25 Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, 1987).

information available to leaders, and how their policy is carried out once it is decided. What instruments – foreign aid, covert agencies, military forces, foreign allies – are available to implement decisions? At the national level of analysis, we also probe social, ideological, and cultural categories. We explore the relationship between social and economic classes, political power, and decisions in the United States; the relationship between U.S. elites and elites of other countries who collaborate with them to dominate governments; lessons from the past such as the Munich and Vietnam syndromes; and tenacious ideological formulations, like manifest destiny, republicanism, and Western superiority.

At the national and at every other level of analysis, history and politics are unavoidably cultural. We can define *culture* as the shared meanings and values that are produced, exchanged, challenged, and altered by people operating within (and increasingly across) societies. Although cultural influences are often contradictory, even within a single person or government, they condition our perceptions and decisions. An ideology, such as Soviet communism or U.S. democratic-capitalism, condenses a complex, often contradictory culture to an easily understood formula.²⁶ The historian Seth Fein has pointed up the challenge of relating the “distinct international forces operating *between* nations to the transnational forces produced by the presence of one nation *within* another.” Borrowing from postcolonial studies, historians of foreign relations are increasingly focusing on the forces of cultural adaptation and appropriation operating across national borders.²⁷ Cultural exports – such as jazz, computer software, and fast food – have earned profits for U.S.-based corporations,

26 For a broader discussion, see Hunt's essay in this volume.

27 For Fein, see http://www.history-compass.com/Pilot/northam/NthAm_CulturesAbstract.htm. On post-colonial studies, see Ann Laura Stoler, “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies,” *The Journal of American History* 88 (December 2001): 829–65 and the commentaries that followed. See also forum in *Diplomatic History* 23 (Winter 1999): 21–7; Kristin Hoganson, “Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865–1920,” *The American Historical Review* 107 (February 2002): 55–83; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Dependence in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999); Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (ed.), *Culture and International Relations* (Providence, RI, 2003); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream* (New York, 1982); Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1924–1930* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); *ibid.*, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York, 1992); Richard Kuise, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mail: European and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, IL, 1996); Melanie McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000* (Berkeley, 2001); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997); Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997).

have extended U.S. influence abroad, and have antagonized opponents of that influence. Culturally resonant events have influenced diplomatic relations. For instance, when Charles Lindbergh met a fervent welcome upon landing in Paris in 1927, Washington officials tried to ease resentment of war debt payments by sending the “boy aviator” on a goodwill tour of Europe.²⁸ In 1953, however, the U.S. government could do little when the electrocutions of spy Julius Rosenberg and of his wife Ethel Rosenberg motivated worldwide protests and undermined popular French support of U.S.-led NATO.²⁹

Although the *individual* level of analysis has long been central to U.S. foreign relations history, the story of less powerful individual Americans living or visiting in foreign lands has only begun to be examined. Mary A. Renda has approached this topic by examining how U.S. Marines occupying Haiti in 1915–34 changed in the ways that they thought about their role, and the United States’ role, as occupiers.³⁰ (See also the discussion of microhistory, below). Other individuals have the power to decide whether or not to negotiate, and their styles of diplomacy help to shape results. To understand how foreign policy is carried out, we need to study the personality traits, knowledge, emotional “buttons,” ideology, political ties, ambitions, rivalries, prejudices, class, youth, and family background of U.S. leaders and others. We study not only the idiosyncratic but also the shared, which is to say that we explore the assumptions and environments that leaders have in common with their compatriots. What have been the impacts of illness and aging? Scholars have studied and debated the degree of intellectual impairment suffered by Woodrow Wilson during and after the Paris Peace Conference and by Franklin D. Roosevelt at and after the Yalta Conference, respectively.³¹ The topic of Ronald Reagan’s possible mental deterioration in his second term awaits declassification of records. Another crucial element is a diplomat’s style. In accounting for the origins of the Cold War, for example, how much of a difference did it make that

28 Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, 180–81.

29 *Ibid.*, *France and the United States*, 79–81.

30 Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, 2001).

31 Kenneth R. Crispell and Carlos F. Gomez, *Hidden Illness in the White House* (Durham, 1989); Bert Edward Park, *The Impact of Illness on World Leaders* (Philadelphia, 1986); *ibid.*, “The Impact of Wilson’s Neurologic Disease during the Paris Peace Conference,” in Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, 1988), 58: 611–30; Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography* (Princeton, 1981); Alexander L. George, “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decision Making,” in Frederic Solomon and Robert Q. Marston (ed.), *The Medical Implications of Nuclear War* (Washington, DC, 1986), 529–52; Robert H. Ferrell, *The Dying President: Franklin D. Roosevelt 1944–1945* (Columbia, MO, 1998); Robert E. Gilbert, *Managing Crisis: Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment* (New York, 2000).

a parochial, ill-informed, impatient man like Harry S Truman replaced a cosmopolitan, compromising, knowledgeable Roosevelt just when the international system was undergoing sudden change.³²

Regardless of which levels of analysis historians choose, doing research in foreign archives is often essential. Even research on domestic topics, such as decision-making in the Kennedy White House, can benefit from the reports of Washington-based foreign diplomats. Historians of foreign relations also rely upon specialists in a foreign country's history or on preeminent historians of the relationship – such as Louis A. Pérez, Jr. on Cuba, Jian Chen on China, John W. Dower on Japan, Robert K. Brigham and William Duiker on Vietnam, Andrew Rotter and Robert McMahon on South Asia, Irwin Wall and William Hitchcock on France, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov on the Soviet Union, Jussi Hanhimäki on Finland, Matthew J. Connelly on Algeria, and Douglas Little on the Middle East, to name but a few.³³ Fresh evidence on the Cuban missile crisis and on the Vietnam War has emerged from international meetings of scholars and former officials.³⁴ The 1998 CNN series on the history of the Cold War has yielded transcripts of interviews with former officials and analysts from both sides.³⁵ Transcripts of secretly recorded conversations

32 Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953* (Stanford, 2002).

33 Louis A. Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, 1998); *ibid.*, *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Jian Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999); Robert K. Brigham, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (Ithaca, 1998); William J. Duiker, *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam* (New York, 1995); Rotter, *Comrades at Odds*; Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York, 1994); Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Vietnam War* (Berkeley, 2001); William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–54* (Chapel Hill, 1998); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA, 1996); Thomas A. Schwartz, *Lyndon B. Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Jussi Hanhimäki, *Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the "Finnish Solution"* (Kent, OH, 1997); Matthew J. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York, 2002); Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Chapel Hill, 2002).

34 See, for example, Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (ed.), *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941* (New York, 1973); and Akira Iriye and Warren Cohen, eds., *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960* (New York, 1990); Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, Robert K. Brigham, et al., *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy* (New York, 1999); James G. Blight, et al., *On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York, 1993).

35 <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/about.series/interviews/>.

of Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon have provided fascinating insights, particularly into how the assumptions, styles, and emotions of these leaders affected their decisionmaking.³⁶

A diversity of topics and approaches keeps our field exciting. Studies have dealt with the impact of race, militarization, modernization, military influence, manifest destiny, colonial policy, nuclear issues, religion, missionaries, the Peace Corps, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, political movements, student protests, and drug trafficking.³⁷ Theories of

- 36 Michael R. Beschloss (ed.), *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964* (New York, 1997); *ibid.*, *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964–1965* (New York, 2001); <http://www.jfklibrary.org>; <http://www.nara.gov/nixon/tapes/index.html>.
- 37 Brenda Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Penny Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); *ibid.*, “Who’s the Real Ambassador? Exploding Cold War Racial Ideology,” in Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions* (Amherst, 2000), 110–31; Marc S. Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (New Haven, 1995); Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000); David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (ed.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, 2003); David C. Engerman, “Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development,” *The American Historical Review* 105 (April 2000): 383–416; Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era* (New York, 1996); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (ed.), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham, NC, 2003); Shane J. Maddock (ed.), *The Nuclear Age* (Boston, 2001); Seth Jacobs, “‘Our System Demands the Supreme Being’: The U.S. Religious Revival and the ‘Diem Experiment,’ 1954–55,” *Diplomatic History* 25 (Fall 2001): 589–624; Jane Hunter, *Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven, 1984); Carol C. Chin, “Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century,” *Diplomatic History* 27 (June 2003): 327–52; Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Deborah Kisatsky, *Containment, Co-optation, Cooperation: The United States and the European Right, 1945–55* (Athens, GA, 2004); Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* and the Iriye essay in this volume; Elizabeth McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924* (Ithaca, NY, 1995); Edmund F. Wehrle, “‘No More Pressing Task Than Organization in Southeast Asia’: The AFL-CIO Approaches the Vietnam War, 1947–1964,” *Labor History* 42 (August 2001): 277–95; Cecelia Lynch, *Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics* (Ithaca, NY, 1999); William O. Walker, III, “Drug Control and the Issue of Culture in American Foreign Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 12 (Fall 1988): 365–82, “Drug Control and National Security,” *ibid.* (Spring 1988): 187–99; “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: U.S. Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability, 1978–1997,” in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (ed.), *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (Lanham, 1999), 143–71; Anne L. Foster, “Prohibition as Superiority: Policing Opium in South-East Asia, 1898–1925,” *International History Review* 22 (June 2000): 253–73.

dependency and hegemony, constantly tested and revised by new empirical studies, continue to inform works on inter-American relations.³⁸ Historians have recognized that some international wars, such as those in Korea and Vietnam, are also civil wars.³⁹ The question of how U.S. foreign policy has responded to international law has taken a new turn with war crimes tribunals.⁴⁰ Scholarship on the Cold War has been revitalized with a rethinking of issues and with a partial opening of many archives.⁴¹ Although many top-level Soviet foreign policy files remain shut or have again been closed, important documents have nevertheless become available. The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) has translated and put online a treasure of foreign policy documents that are archived in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; in China; and in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and other former communist nations.⁴² Some topics in Soviet foreign policy that are nearly impossible to research in Moscow's archives can be pursued in the archives of these other nations.⁴³

Since the early 1990s, foreign relations history has been responding to fresh concepts about perception and reality in history. Although originating in older philosophical traditions, these concepts gained renewed impetus from the intellectual ferment in the structuralist and poststructuralist movements of the European continent in the 1960s and after. These ideas have also become influential among many literary critics, cultural critics, and other academics.⁴⁴ A principal argument here is that

38 See the essay on dependency in this volume.

39 Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton, 1981, 1990); Robert J. McMahon (ed.), *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War* (Lexington, MA, 1995).

40 John W. Coogan, *The End of Neutrality: The United State, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899–1915* (Ithaca, NY, 1981); Calvin D. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914* (Durham, NC, 1976); Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic, *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia* (New York, 1996); Leon Friedman and Susan W. Tiefenbrun, *War Crimes and War Tribunals: Past, Present, and Future* (Hempstead, NY, 1999).

41 The most influential synthesis to emerge in the early 1990s is Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power* (Stanford, 1992). Also influential, and with a different perspective, is John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997). See also Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence* (Chicago, 1993); Anders Stephanson, "Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War," in G. O' Tuathail and S. Dalby (ed.), *Rethinking Geopolitics* (New York, 1998); Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 551–91; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2002*, 9th ed. (New York, 2002).

42 <http://cwihip.si.edu/>.

43 Odd Arne Westad, "Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 259–71.

44 Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago, 1968); Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA, 1980); Frank Lentricchia, *After the New Criticism* (Chicago, 1980); Catherine Belsey, *Critical Practice* (New York, 1980); Dominick LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual*

although common-sense or philosophical positivism may be appealing, such thinking may often be simplistic in assuming that reality is concrete, reachable, and fundamentally unaffected by our perceptions. Historians such as Joan Scott, Robert F. Berkhofer, and Emily S. Rosenberg have agreed that our underlying cultural assumptions and categories about the world help shape what we see and what we conclude about reality, including our own experiences and the experiences of historical actors.⁴⁵ The same argument holds for former U.S. Presidents and for other historical actors: *Their* underlying cultural assumptions and interpretive categories helped shape what *they* saw, experienced, and what they concluded – say, about the necessity for U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia. Underlying assumptions, such as those concerning communism, race, and American exceptionalism, are most influential when they remain implicit and thus unexamined. One essential qualification to keep in mind is that categories and assumptions *influence* but do not *determine* interpretations of experience and our data. It is not relativism but rather clear-eyed investigation when historians draw attention to the interpretive categories that historical actors used – usually without being aware of the fact – in their own perceptions of reality. There can be many interpretations of reality. Historians construct and narrate *their* accounts of the past (and the present) with their own, often tacit, often unconscious assumptions and interpretive categories. As a practical matter, this “constructivist” approach has not resulted, and need not result, in drastic changes in writing history.

History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, 1983); *ibid.*, *History and Reading* (Toronto, 2002); John Toews, “Intellectual History After the Linguistic Turn,” *The American Historical Review* 92 (October 1987): 879–907; George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (Chicago, 1987); Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (New York, 1994); William F. Hanks, *Language and Communicative Practices* (New York, 1996).

- 45 Joan W. Scott, “Experience,” in Joan W. Scott and Judith Butler (ed.), *Feminists Theorize the Political* (New York, 1992), 22–40; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse* (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Emily S. Rosenberg, “Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness,” *Diplomatic History* 22 (Spring 1998): 155–76. See also Lynn Hunt (ed.), *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, 1989); Frank Ninkovich, “No Post-Mortems For Postmodernism, Please,” *Diplomatic History* 22 (Summer 1998): 451–66; Regina U. Gramer, “On Poststructuralisms, Revisionisms, and the Cold War,” *ibid.*, 19 (Summer 1995): 515–24; Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (ed.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993); Gilbert E. Joseph, et al. (ed.), *Close Encounters of Empire* (Durham, NC, 1998); Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, *Minding the Law* (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (ed.), *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, 1999). Historians of foreign relations might also profit from Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York, 1998); Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York, 1997); David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics, and Power* (New Haven, 1988). See also the essays in this volume by Hunt, Rosenberg, Hoganson, Gienow-Hecht, Iriye, and Costigliola.

Rather, like other scholars in the humanities, foreign relations historians need to do their work fully aware that there are many implicit assumptions shaping our thoughts, even as we try to be objective.

The ideas sketched above have been used by historians who examine how interpretive categories, such as gender, can legitimate or delegitimize foreign policy options. Kristin Hoganson, Emily Rosenberg, and Mary Renda have shown that at the turn of the twentieth century, leaders and opinion-makers implicitly believed that it was masculine, and hence necessary, to go to war against Spain in Cuba and to act in what they saw as paternal ways in supposedly helpless, feminized nations.⁴⁶ As another example, George F. Kennan in 1945 depicted an end to U.S. cooperation with the Soviets as “political manliness” while labeling continued cooperation as “collaboration,” language that suggested the debased “collaboration” that had just taken place in Nazi-occupied Europe.⁴⁷ In the postwar era, what Robert D. Dean calls “the politics of manhood” seemed to justify Joseph McCarthy in linking “commies and queers” in the State Department while silencing the doubts of Kennedy and Johnson administration officials about escalating the Vietnam War.⁴⁸

Aspects of “microhistory” can be adapted to foreign relations history. Microhistorians have likened their methods to criminal detection, in which careful observation of seemingly marginal details of obscure events and lives can result in evidence that is significant in terms of larger issues. As the European social and microhistorian Edward Muir has noted, the “guiding premise . . . has been that through the intense study of a few revealing documents,” one can “recapture” social or other interactions of the past.⁴⁹ Although microhistory generally assumes, as Muir puts it, that there is a historical “reality that can be known,” this sub-field also assumes that historical discoveries can be understood only in their original cultural contexts.⁵⁰ Microhistorians watch for “silences” and changes of

46 Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); Renda, *Taking Haiti*.

47 Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” *The Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1330.

48 Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, MA, 2002). See also Geoffrey Smith, “National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States,” *International History Review* 14 (May 1992): 221–37.

49 Edward Muir, “Introduction: Observing Trifles,” in Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero (ed.), *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe* (Baltimore, 1991), x; Richard D. Brown, “Microhistory and the Post-Modern Challenge,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 23 (Spring 2003): 1–20. We are indebted to Richard D. Brown for discussions on microhistory.

50 Muir, “Introduction,” xiv.

voice within a document, shifts that can suggest what was not recorded, gaps between what was said and recorded, or struggles, say between two arguing diplomats, to control the discourse of the spoken discussion and the written document.

Microhistorians pay special attention to unrepresentative documents and other texts that are exceptionally revealing because of their details or because they transgress their genre's customary form and content. For instance, analyzing the apparent trivia in the detailed diary of a diplomat at an international conference may enable historians to interpret the cultural and emotional contexts of the politics at that meeting. Thick description of a seemingly unimportant diplomatic exchange that has abundant documentation can yield understandings applicable to a more important event with less documentation. Close analysis of particular incidents at unusual events, such as Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 travel through the United States or Fidel Castro's 1959 visits to Harlem or Harvard, can reveal cultural and political fault lines. Foreign relations research often uncovers diplomatic documents that recount episodes of high emotion, or that indicate some diplomats' assumptions of cultural superiority or resentment, or that reveal a social/political dynamic that include some people and nations (say, sought-after allies) while excluding others.

Microhistory also addresses the issue of historical proof.⁵¹ Although foreign relations written history is often discussed in terms of "proof," much that is accepted as "proven" is arguably not so conclusive as is assumed. Probably all or almost all written history strives toward "suggesting," "showing," or "demonstrating" a thesis. Microhistory aims at written history that is both serious and creative in allowing that research need not, as Muir puts it, "prove anything." Historical research can "merely suggest that something *may* be."⁵² Historians of foreign relations can adapt aspects of microhistory to develop a relatively new area in foreign relations history – the study of the lives and stories of various marginal Americans overseas – deserters of all kinds, adventurers, expatriates, deportees, isolated consuls, bankrupt businessmen, not wealthy women, stranded sailors and whalers; prostitutes and madams; and fugitives from crime, slavery, and homophobia. Although the histories of people marginal to both their native and their adopted cultures lie outside grand narratives and are therefore usually deemed unimportant, such histories are worthwhile in themselves and they can provide cultural, racial, and economic contexts for more traditional diplomatic relations.⁵² There is evidence for such history in the rich anecdotes and fragmentary

51 See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the Historical Profession* (New York, 1988).

52 See, for example, Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942* (New York, 2001).

details buried in reports to Washington from diplomats, consuls, military attache's; records kept at legations and other foreign service posts; the records of missionary groups, businesses, and special institutions, such as the U.S. Court for China; and memoirs, letters, and novels.

Opening the history of foreign relations to microhistory does not mean neglecting macrohistory, particularly in three areas that merit more attention: technology, the environment, and communications. The historian Walter LaFeber has argued that technology "opens a way to understand" the political, economic, and social characteristics of a nation or era.⁵³ According to LaFeber, William Seward, Elihu Root, and George Shultz each applied the advanced technology of his time to developing the wealth, power, and influence of the United States at home and abroad. The unfortunate paradox was that technology – the skilled manipulation of resources, expertise, and labor – also led to the manipulation and reduction of democratic decision-making.⁵⁴ The historian has Robin Winks argued that technology shapes foreign relations because imperialism is "the impact of high technology cultures on lesser technologies."⁵⁵

If we consider how the advantages in technology of a nation or a corporation can facilitate influence over the resources and people of another nations, we can see some of the continuities between foreign relations history and environmental history. The historian Mark Lytle has explained that while a foreign relations historian might "define imperialism as the unjustified appropriation of wealth or resources of one people by another, the environmental historian might describe it as one culture re-ordering nature to serve its own narrowly defined economic interests without regard for the long-term consequences for the nonhuman elements or indigenous people."⁵⁶ Public and governmental interest in the environment mounted in the late twentieth century,⁵⁷ and in the 1990s

53 Walter LaFeber, "Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Winter 2000): 2; Roundtable: "Science and the Cold War," with Joseph Manzione, "Legacy of Scientific Internationalism"; Richard V. Dammis, "Eisenhower's 'Scientific-Technological Elite'"; Jefferson P. Marquis, "Social Science and Nation Building in Vietnam"; and commentaries by Gregg Herken and Walter McDougall. See also Ronald E. Doel and Allan A. Needell, "Science, Scientists, and the CIA," in Rhodri Jeffries-Jones and Christopher Andrew (ed.), *Eternal Vigilance: Fifty Years of the CIA* (London, 1997).

54 "Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations," 6, 11, 18–19.

55 *Ibid.*, 7.

56 Mark Lytle, "An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Spring 1996): 285.

57 "A Round Table: Environmental History," *Journal of American History* 76 (March 1990): 1087–1147; Donald Worster, *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas* (New York, 1994); Lawrence E. Susskind, *Environmental Diplomacy* (New York, 1994); Philip Shabecoff, *Earth Rising* (Washington, DC, 2000); J. R. McNeil, *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World* (New York, 2000).

historians such as Lytle, LaFeber, and Thomas G. Paterson called for more connections between the field of foreign relations history and environmental history.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, a survey of titles in *Diplomatic History* from 1991 to 2001 finds only two articles that directly address environmental issues: Lytle's introduction, discussed here, and an essay by Kurkpatrick Dorsey.⁵⁹ A difficulty may arise from the necessity of adjusting one's concepts when working with environmental issues. As Lytle put it, foreign relations history traditionally sees "the nation-state as the basic unit of study and the map of the world as defined by political boundaries. For the ecologist, such boundaries have little meaning for they seldom correspond to any reality of the natural world."⁶⁰ As ecological problems have become more and more global, however, the United States and other nations have met, negotiated, and sometimes agreed about how to respond to these challenges. Foreign relations historians have long studied the politics of treaties aimed at protecting endangered sea mammals and fisheries.⁶¹

Newer environmental topics – and environmental aspects of older issues – include: global warming and debate over how to reduce emissions; the safeguarding of coastal and island nations that are in danger of flooding with rising sea waters; oil spills and leaks and air pollution that foul other nations and the seas; nuclear wastes, unsecured bombs, and accidents such as Chernobyl; the dumping of toxic wastes from industrial nations into poorer nations; issues of biodiversity and the protection of endangered species and habitats, such as rain forests; issues of population growth, intensive agriculture, and water usage; erosion problems arising from intensive raising of crops or lumbering by transnational companies; the consequences of bio-warfare and bio-terrorism; and disputes over endangered fish, whales, and turtles.⁶² Consider, too, the implications for foreign relations and environmental history of the changes over time in the

58 Lytle, "Environmental Approach," 279–300; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992* (New York, 1992), 349–50; Thomas G. Paterson, "Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer," in Hogan and Paterson (ed.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 45–47; "Environmental History: Retrospect and Prospect" [forum], *Pacific Historical Review* 70 (February 2001): 55–111. For an earlier consideration of the connections among farmers, products of the land, and foreign policy, see William A. Williams, *The Roots of Modern American Empire* (New York, 1969).

59 Kurkpatrick Dorsey, "Scientists, Citizens, and Statesmen: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era," *Diplomatic History* 19 (Summer 1995): 407–29. See also Richard P. Tucker, *Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World* (Berkeley, 2000).

60 Lytle, "Environmental Approach," 283.

61 Alexander Sarbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery* (Waltham, MA, 1989); Kurkpatrick Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy* (Seattle, 1998).

62 Lytle, "Environmental Approach."

foods, beverages, and other products that Americans have consumed.⁶³ Wars usually devastate the environment. While savaging the landscape of Russia, the Second World War also stepped up industrial pollution in the “arsenal of democracy.” What historian Theodore A. Wilson has called the “fight to the finish” in 1945 led not only to starvation but also to the devastation of the environmental underpinnings of European and Asian economies.⁶⁴ In 1946–47, harsh weather retarded recovery in Europe, contributing to both communist strength in French and Italian elections and U.S. concerns that would lead to the Marshall Plan in 1948.⁶⁵ In the Vietnam War, the United States made war on the land by bombing and defoliating jungle that hid the enemy. Investigators are beginning to calculate the environmental costs of developing and producing nuclear weapons.⁶⁶

Published in 1999, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968: Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues* documents the concerns of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration that issues of the environment and of technology could exacerbate or ease long-standing foreign policy problems.⁶⁷ For instance, Western European allies complained to Washington that commercial spin-offs from U.S. space and weapons research were aiding U.S. corporations and draining European talent while widening the allies’ “technology gap.” Although Johnson’s advisers appreciated that high-technology exports helped stanch the U.S. payments deficit, they also worried that the technology gap might push the French further toward independence and drive the allies toward seeking technology from the Soviets. Trying to address the Europeans’ complaints while keeping the alliance central, the United States proposed a NATO Computer Center.⁶⁸ In another instance, Johnson’s science adviser suggested that the “scientific miracle” of desalination and abundant fresh water could help bring about the “political miracle” of peace between Israel and its neighbors.⁶⁹ Persuaded that “lesser developed countries” were growing too rapidly in population, the Johnson administration considered how to limit that growth without alienating the Catholic Church. Referring to Walt

63 The historian Penny Von Eschen expanded on this theme at the plenary session of the 2001 SHAFR convention.

64 This is a central theme in Theodore A. Wilson, “Endgames: V-E Day and War Termination,” in Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson (ed.), *Victory in Europe 1945* (Lawrence, KS, 2000), 11–45.

65 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*

66 Stephen I. Schwartz, Arjun Makhijani, and William J. Weida, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (Washington, DC, 1998).

67 Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968* (Washington, DC, 1999), 34. (Hereafter FRUS.)

68 *Ibid.*, 1–44.

69 *Ibid.*, 263–64. See also 235–314.

Rostow's stages-of-growth model, a White House official said that by promoting limits in population, the United States could shorten "the process of getting [poorer] nations to the states of self-sustaining growth, and thus *reduc[e] the longer term foreign aid burden on us.*"⁷⁰ Although President Johnson and his advisers at first spoke out for population control, they later retreated before the opposition of U.S. Catholic bishops.⁷¹

International communications have always had political, economic, and cultural consequences, even as the technology has changed from underwater cables and telegraph lines in the nineteenth century to films, radio, newspaper wire services, television, satellites, and the Internet in the twentieth century.⁷² U.S. diplomats have devoted considerable effort to communications issues. For instance, the United States has dominated the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), founded in 1964 to coordinate the use of satellites. Like other modes of communication, INTELSAT quickly became a football of international politics. The Johnson administration sought Soviet membership in INTELSAT as a step toward normalizing relations with Moscow. U.S. pre-eminence in INTELSAT, however, irritated West Germany and France, which saw still another example of their not being treated as "equal and respected partners."⁷³ Other nations complained that the United States and its European allies kept too much of the electromagnetic spectrum for themselves.⁷⁴

U.S. efforts to influence through internal communications have had mixed results. From the Voice of America (founded in 1942) to Radio Free Europe (established in 1950) to the United States Information Agency (founded in 1953), with its overseas libraries and its distribution of

70 *Ibid.*, 482 (emphasis in original).

71 *Ibid.*, 477–519.

72 For a more detailed discussion of communications and foreign policy, see the 1991 version of this essay in Hogan and Paterson, *Explaining American Foreign Relations*, 47–52. See also Michael J. Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928* (Columbia, MO, 1977); Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*; Joseph S. Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (New York, 1971), 32–52; Fred Fejes, *Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Shortwave Broadcasting to Latin America* (Norwood, NJ, 1986); James Schwoch, *The American Radio Industry and Its Latin-American Activities, 1900–1939* (Urbana, IL, 1990); James L. Baughman, *The Republic of Mass Culture* (Baltimore, 1997); Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics* (New York, 1991).

73 *FRUS*, 1964–1968, 34: 191–92; see also 120–205.

74 See G. Russell Pipe, "Transborder Data Flow: New Frontiers— or None? National Policies, International Debates," *Journal of Communication* 29 (Summer 1979): 114–24; Oswald H. Ganley and Gladys D. Ganley, *To Inform or to Control?: The New Communications Network* (New York, 1982); James G. Savage, *The Politics of Telecommunications Regulation* (Boulder, 1989); Philip M. Taylor, *Global Communications* (New York, 1997).

films abroad, the United States has used propaganda, in “the battle for world opinion” – especially in waging the Cold War through a “strategy of truth.”⁷⁵ In Egypt during the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser started, with help from the CIA, the broadcasting station Radio Cairo. In a classic example of “blowback,” the station soon beamed pan-Arabist, anti-American propaganda to the Middle East.⁷⁶ Decades later, the development of CNN television has reduced the ability of governments, including Washington, to control the flow of news. Yet this Atlanta-based station has also interpreted the news largely from a U.S. or Western perspective.

Mass media technology has also aided dissidents and terrorists. For instance, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in exile in Paris in the 1970s, kept anti-Shah revolutionary passions high in Iran by sending tape cassettes into the country. Terrorists, hijackers, and hostage takers in the Middle East and elsewhere have attempted to propagandize their causes by playing to television cameras, by preparing videocassettes of captives, and by sending out videos through the Internet. The Internet has also become a channel for freer thinking and for some dissent and organizing in China and elsewhere.⁷⁷ Although broadcast and digital technology can spread the messages of critics and rebels, much more sophisticated technology – and human intelligence – have facilitated surveillance by the spy agencies of the United States and of other nations.⁷⁸

75 Holly C. Shulman, *The Voice of America* (Madison, 1990); Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1994); Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, 1997); Susan A. Brewer, *To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II* (Ithaca, 1997); Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*; Laura Belmonte, *Selling America: Propaganda, National Identity, and the Cold War, 1945–1960* (Philadelphia, forthcoming).

76 Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback* (New York, 2000). See also Deborah Kisatsky, “The Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953: U.S. Liberal Developmentalism, Propaganda, and the Cold War,” *Intelligence and National Security* 14 (Autumn, 1999): 168–93; Bill Grantham, “Some Big Bourgeois Brothel”: *Contexts for France’s Culture War with Hollywood* (Luton, UK, 2000).

77 William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of International Affairs* (Norwood, NJ, 1982); James F. Larson, *Global Television and Foreign Policy* (New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 283, 1988); Warren P. Strobel, *Late-breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations* (Washington, DC, 1997); Wilson Dizard, Jr., *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age* (Westport, CT, 2001); Heidemarie Sherman, *The Impact of the Internet Revolution on International Economic Relations and Society* (Munich, 2001).

78 Philip Taubman, *Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage* (New York, 2003); Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York, 2002); Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt’s Secret War* (New York, 2001); David Alvarez, *Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy, 1930–1945* (Lawrence, KS, 2000); Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency From Washington to Bush* (New York, 1995). The 1995 release of the VENONA documents – the FBI’s decoded intercepts of 1940s Soviet cable traffic – sparked a number of

Since the early twentieth century, Hollywood films have been a global box office hit. The story of this popularity has often been told in terms of the grand narrative of model America: even dramatizations of the American way of life can raise-up foreign nations and sell U.S. products. *Collier's* noted in 1918 that the U.S. "moving picture" is "familiarizing South America and Africa, Asia and Europe with American habits and customs. It is educating them up to the American standard of living. It is showing them American clothes and furniture, automobiles and homes. And it is subtly but surely creating a desire for these American-made articles."⁷⁹ Such faith in Hollywood's images spurred the U.S. government to promote film exports in the 1920s, to send U.S. films to the Soviet Union during World War II, and to insist that if postwar France wanted a large loan, it had to allow imports of Hollywood films.⁸⁰ During the two world wars, government propaganda agencies turned to film makers to mobilize public opinion around simple views of the enemy.⁸¹

Historical analysis of such cultural influences has recently focused on reception – how films, music, television, and other cultural productions have been received or interpreted in foreign nations. How have various groups and nations altered U.S. cultural productions toward their own traditions and purposes? How have cultural influences morphed as they flow among nations? The literary and cultural critic Mary Louise Pratt has developed the useful concept of "'contact zones' – social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination."⁸² Seth Fein has described the contact zone created by the Mexican and U.S. governments working with Hollywood in the 1940s–50s to produce soft-core propaganda films. Fein shows that although trucks equipped with sound

sensational accounts, such as Allen Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America* (New York, 1999) and Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, *The Venona Secrets* (Washington, DC, 2000). For a reply, see Athan Theoharis, *Chasing Spies* (Chicago, 2002).

79 Kristin Thomson, *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–1934* (London, 1985); 121–22.

80 Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*; *ibid.*, *France and the United States*; Todd Bennett, "Culture, Power, and Mission to Moscow: Film and Soviet-American Relations during World War II," *The Journal of American History* 88 (September 2001): 489–518; Kuisel, *Seducing the French*.

81 Stephen L. Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill, 1979); Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945* (New Haven, 1978); Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (New York, 1987); Thomas Doherty, *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II* (New York, 1993).

82 Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York, 1992), 4.

and projectors carried into remote villages images – of U.S. and Mexican officials acting with respect toward each other, happy families developing their private homesteads, and cute Disney characters brushing their teeth – such “education” was often not received as officials had intended it.⁸³ As part of this trend, dissertations have appeared on the ambivalences in Japanese reception of Hollywood films in the 1920s and on the shifts in U.S. reception of images of post-World War II Germany from deadly enemy to frontline ally.⁸⁴ While adults in postwar Austria reacted coldly toward U.S. efforts to promote American high culture, Austrian youth warmly embraced rock ‘n’ roll music and Hollywood films – an example of what historian Reinhold Wagnleitner has termed the Marilyn Monroe Doctrine.⁸⁵

All historians of U.S. foreign relations working on post-1941 topics – regardless of whether their research is at the individual, regional, national, or international levels – must contend with obstacles put in their way by governmental declassification policies. Regardless of how historians deal with the power of grand narratives; how they approach issues of culture and of reality; what time period or nations have captured their interest; and whether they include issues of the environment, technology, communications, or reception – all can be stymied if needed documents remain classified. Established by law in 1991, the Historical Advisory Committee includes academic historians who advise the Department of State on the selection and declassification of documents for the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. In 1997, the historian and chair of Historical Advisory Committee Warren F. Kimball warned of a “fundamental lack of progress in getting certain portions of the historical (30-year old) record opened to the American public.” Kimball was referring mostly to records of the CIA and the Defense Department, which have resisted declassifying records under their control. Operating within a culture of secrecy, the CIA denied even possessing records of several of its major covert operations. Other intelligence operations such as the National Security Agency remained even more distrustful of openness and public accountability. With key portions of the foreign policy record withheld,

83 Seth Fein, “U.S. Film Propaganda in Cold War Mexico,” in *Close Encounters of Empire*, 400–450. See also *ibid.*, “Myths of Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism in Golden Age Mexican Cinema,” in Gilbert Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov (ed.), *Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico, 1940–2000* (Durham, NC, 2001), 159–98.

84 Yuji Tosaka, “Hollywood Goes to Japan: American Cultural Expansion and Imperial Japan, 1918–1941,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2002); Brian Etheridge, “Window and Wall: Berlin, the Third Reich, and the German Question in the United States, 1933–1999,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2002).

85 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, 1994).

a number of *FRUS* volumes under preparation remained “in never-never land,” Kimball warned in a published report.⁸⁶ The problems continue to this day.

Regulations governing newly created electronic documents also worked against openness, boosting “classification decisions” by 200% in 2000 as compared to the previous year, while reducing “declassification activity” by 42%.⁸⁷ The inauguration of George W. Bush’s administration and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 furthered these trends.⁸⁸ Secrecy entailed not just huge numbers of documents but also complex, inconsistent regulations across agencies with different norms about openness. J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office at the National Archives, observed that “confusion abounds” both inside and outside the government.⁸⁹

While this uncertainty made it difficult to predict or even always to discern the impact of directives from the top, the Bush administration pushed for greater secrecy. In October 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft reversed the presumption of openness embodied in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by issuing a directive assuring federal officials that the Justice Department would back them up in all appropriate efforts to resist FOIA requests.⁹⁰ A month later, President Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13233, which changed aspects of the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA) so as to give the President, members of his family (once he left office or died), or his predecessors the right to block the release of certain presidential documents, particularly “confidential communications” between the President and his key advisers or between those advisers.⁹¹ Critics recalled James Madison’s warning that “a popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.” The new order shifted the burden of proof. Under the PRA, the former President had to prove why a document should remain secret. Under EO 13233, the researcher

86 Kimball, “The Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation to the U.S. Department of State,” *Perspectives Online*, January 1998, <http://www.theaha.org/perspectives/issues/1998/9801/9801NOT.CFM>. For efforts by the State Department and the Historical Advisory Committee to moderate the CIA’s secrecy in 1998–2000, see Robert D. Schulzinger, “Transparency, Secrecy, and Citizenship,” *Diplomatic History* 25 (Spring 2001): 165–78. We are grateful to Bruce Craig of the National Coalition for History and to Warren Kimball for sharing with us their expertise on these issues.

87 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2000rpt.html>.

88 In 2002, federal classification decisions reached twenty-three million, a 14 percent rise from 2001, while declassification sank to a seven-year low. See <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2000rpt.html>; <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2002rpt.pdf>.

89 J. William Leonard, “Information Sharing and Protection: A Seamless Framework or Patchwork Quilt?” June 12, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/ncms061203.html>.

90 <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapist/2001foiapist19.html>.

91 For Executive Order 13233, see <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/11/eo-pra.html>.

now had to establish a “documented need” demonstrating why a specific document should be released. The incumbent President, rather than the Archivist of the United States (as provided in the PRA), is empowered to decide disputes and, in the case of lawsuits, the former President as well as the incumbent President would be defended by Justice Department lawyers. The order had similar provisions to keep secret important Vice-Presidential papers.⁹² Although EO 13233 has been challenged in court by the historical and archival communities, it remains a potential roadblock to the declassification process necessary to prepare new *FRUS* volumes.

In a similar tactic of staking out authority for greater secrecy that it initially utilized only in part, the Bush administration in March 2003 issued EO 13291, which replaced the expiring, Clinton-era EO 12598 that had mandated automatic declassification of most federal documents after twenty-five years. Even EO 12598, however, had more stringent regulations for opening most foreign policy documents. According to the Society of American Archivists, EO 13291 postponed automatic declassification for an additional three years while giving officials further broad authority to keep large bodies of foreign policy documents closed. The executive branch extended its reach to “keep information classified indefinitely” and to “reclassify documents that have already been declassified.” The order for the first time gave the vice-president authority to classify documents, while making it easier for the CIA to reject declassification decisions by an interagency panel. Perhaps the biggest danger to the future writing of foreign relations history was that EO 13291 exempted from automatic declassification materials that would “impair relations between the United States and a foreign government,” thereby creating a new “presumption of secrecy” category, not present in Clinton’s EO, for information provided by a foreign government.⁹³ From his government post, Leonard assured that EO 13291 “does not represent a substantial change to the declassification process.” Yet Tom Blanton of the National Security Archive, a private organization dedicated to getting documents declassified, warned that the Bush administration was “sending one more signal from on high to the bureaucracy to slow down, stall, withhold, stonewall Making foreign government information presumptively classified drops us down to Uzbekistan’s openness norms.”⁹⁴ Questions remained about how this and future administrations would enforce this regime of secrecy, and how the various agencies involved in declassification would interpret these signals.

92 John Dean, “Hiding Past and Present Presidencies: The Problems with Bush’s Executive Order Burying Presidential Records,” November 9, 2001, <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20011109/html>; for more, see <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html>.

93 <http://www.archivists.org/news/secrecyorder.asp>.

94 *Ibid.*

The Executive Orders and agency directives by Bush and Ashcroft were culturally attuned to the grand narrative of American exceptionalism. When the underside of America's triumphal rise to global power has come to light, the revelations have usually been sensationalized, and they have often been transmuted into a gendered, heroic narrative starring a few determined individuals. The wartime emotionalism following the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq muted public criticism that the deepening pattern of secrecy would shape common memory, shield the Executive against Congress, and cloak the actions of various officials in the current and in past administrations. Proud of their group loyalty and secret-keeping, Bush and his advisers forged what Robert Dean has called an "imperial brotherhood" of elites who assumed that they were destined to govern and were answerable only to (grand narrative) history.⁹⁵ Depending on how they are enforced, Executive Orders such as 13233 and 13291 will shape the writing of future foreign relations history. Executive orders do not burn books, another traditional method of control over information. But they can prevent books from being written. Historians of foreign relations must continue to work to gain the declassification of documents or governments will manage the questions we ask and set the terms for historical inquiry, ultimately controlling our writing of history itself.

95 See Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*. The inclusion of a few highly talented women and people of color only strengthens such predominantly white, male elites.

Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as International History and National History

ROBERT J. McMAHON

So many signs of robust health abound that one might speak without too much exaggeration of an emergent renaissance in the study of U.S. diplomatic history. For close to a decade now, annual meetings of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) have attracted between 300 and 400 participants, extraordinary figures for any subdiscipline. Those meetings, moreover, have included a growing contingent of scholars from outside the United States, offering unmistakable evidence of the burgeoning internationalization of the study of U.S. foreign relations. SHAFR now boasts close to 1,700 members, over 300 of whom are non-Americans. *Diplomatic History*, the society's flagship journal, remains not just vibrant in terms of the quality and diversity of its essays, reviews, forums, and think pieces, but highly innovative as well, regularly showcasing work that pushes the traditional boundaries of the field in challenging new directions. And *Diplomatic History* finds itself competing for article submissions with the growing number of rival journals also devoted principally to scholarship on the history of international relations: *International History Review* (established in 1978), the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* (1992), the *Journal of Cold War Studies* (1999), and *Cold War History* (2000) chief among them.

University and commercial publishers continue actively to solicit manuscripts on U.S. diplomatic history, some of which even manage to attract enthusiastic readerships outside academe. The popularity of documentaries on diplomatic and military history topics on television's History Channel and Public Broadcasting System, and the use of some prominent international historians as "talking heads" on such shows, testifies powerfully to the resonance of these subject areas with a wider public. The Turner Broadcasting System's recent, multipart documentary on the Cold War, for example, which was strongly influenced by several SHAFR

members who served as historical consultants, reached a huge audience in the United States and worldwide. Within the academy, new graduate students continue to flock to the field, while, at the undergraduate level, courses in the history of American foreign relations register impressive enrollments – and not just in the United States, but abroad as well. Many diplomatic historians, in addition, teach courses on the Vietnam War, some of which rank among the most popular offerings at their respective universities.

Yet lingering evidence of malaise, status anxiety, and self-doubt coexist in paradoxical tension with those signs of vitality – as they have for at least two decades now. Specialists in the history of U.S. foreign relations often portray themselves as a beleaguered and besieged minority, one long ago relegated to the margins by a profession dominated by the concerns and methods of social and cultural historians. The signature “I don’t get no respect” routine of legendary stand-up comic Rodney Dangerfield springs to mind when considering the litany of complaints that have become so common within the diplomatic history fraternity. The annual meetings of the American Historical Association (AHA) and the Organization of American Historians (OAH) feature few panels on foreign relations history; the *American Historical Review* and the *Journal of American History* rarely publish articles by U.S. foreign relations specialists, and when they do the essays tend to be decidedly nontraditionalist in subject matter and approach; several of the nation’s leading History Departments have chosen not to replace prominent U.S. diplomatic historians upon their retirements, or did so only after rumored departmental fights about the value of the field; the OAH’s much-touted “internationalization” of U.S. history initiative was launched with minimal participation by diplomatic historians, despite the indisputable fact that by training and focus they constitute the most internationalist-minded coterie among Americanists. There is substance as well as exaggeration in these oft-cited examples of slights, hostility, or, just as bad, indifference, reports of which regularly circulate at professional meetings and on H-DIPLO.¹

Just as seriously, it remains the case that in most history graduate programs in the United States one can receive a Ph.D. without ever taking a course – or even reading a book – on foreign relations. If personal observation and anecdotal evidence are useful guides, as I suspect they are, then there are thousands of recently and not-so-recently minted history Ph.D.s teaching U.S. survey courses who received little or no preparation during their graduate training for covering such essential topics as eighteenth and nineteenth century U.S. expansion, American imperialism, World Wars I

1 H-DIPLO is a moderated email discussion list available through H-NET, an online community for scholars in the humanities and social sciences. For more information see <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~diplo/about.htm>.

and II, and the Cold War. It is almost certainly the case that far more American historians today are more comfortable lecturing to undergraduates about the impact of World Wars I and II on women and African Americans than they are lecturing on why the United States entered those conflicts in the first place, or on what difference U.S. involvement had on America's power and influence within the wider world.

The paradox of vitality and renewal coexisting uneasily with self-doubt and status anxiety is perhaps best explained by the confluence of two intellectual-structural factors: first, the awkward relationship that has traditionally obtained between U.S. diplomatic history and the larger historical profession in the United States; and, second, the transformation of that profession since the 1960s, a transformation that has placed additional strains on the relationship. The history of American foreign relations is, by nature, a Janus-faced field: part national history, focused as such on the internal constellation of forces within the American state and within American society that shape U.S. foreign policy; and part international history, focused on the external forces that influence and constrain the U.S. encounter with the wider world. All students of foreign relations, whatever place or time their work concentrates on, need to choose between, or blend, internalist and externalist approaches. Although not mutually exclusive, to be sure, the first approach tends toward a national history framework, the second more toward an international history framework. The very nature of the subject matter of foreign relations history thus creates an ambiguous identity for U.S. diplomatic historians who for the most part find themselves housed in history departments demarcated along geographical lines. In academic universes made up of Americanists, Europeanists, Asianists, Africanists, and Latin Americanists, full-blown "internationalists" do not easily fit. Yet those who work primarily in an internalist mode can find acceptance by and common ground with fellow Americanists problematic as well.

The explosion, during the past generation, of "new" histories of the less powerful – histories exploring the lived experiences of blacks, native Americans, women, workers, immigrants, and other, formerly voiceless, nonelites – has revolutionized and invigorated the study of American history. But this galvanizing trend has also served to further distance U.S. diplomatic historians from the bulk of their professional colleagues. Foreign relations historians have traditionally emphasized state-to-state relations in their work; they have, accordingly, devoted the lion's share of their attention to those elites who have acted on behalf of the American state (the governmental policymakers so prominent in most diplomatic histories) or those who have sought to influence its decisions (businessmen, politicians, organized interests groups, and the like). Yet these overwhelmingly white, male elites, and the power they exercised, became suspect in

the eyes of many of the “new” historians who emerged with the intellectual ferment of the 1960s, determined as they were to write history from the bottom up. “History from the bottom up takes its toll in a field of human activity that is still largely executed, if not ultimately shaped, from the top down,” Charles S. Maier observed perceptively in a seminal 1980 essay. “Throughout the culture one might expose power or resist it, but hardly seek it, or even comfortably describe it without implicit condemnation.”²

The social scientific and postmodernist methodologies and theories most useful to the trend-setting social and cultural historians, further, seemed to afford considerably fewer insights to foreign relations scholars. The empiricism at the heart of traditional diplomatic history, moreover, appeared quaint, if not worse, in the eyes of those cultural historians sensitive to biases inherent in *all* written documents. To some, those trudging through countless archival repositories to recreate a foreign policy or diplomatic relationship “as it really was” seemed like so many naive positivists who had somehow missed, overlooked, or chosen to ignore the fundamental epistemological challenges of postmodernism.

Out of these conflicting cross-currents, a quiet renaissance has budded within U.S. diplomatic history. It has been characterized, as the pages that follow will briefly outline, by a striking revitalization within each of the field’s two distinct orientations: the international history realm and the domestic history realm. This renewal has also facilitated the construction of a set of new bridges to other fields in history, American and non-American alike, as well as to ancillary disciplines such as political science, international relations, cultural studies, and anthropology. As a result, U.S. foreign relations history stands at the opening of the new century as a more vigorous, diverse, open, and plural field, and one whose core questions and essential subject matter remain more indispensable than ever to any holistic understanding of both American and world history in the modern era.

The withering critiques of the field issued from without and within over the past quarter-century form the essential backdrop for any examination of the current renaissance of U.S. diplomatic history. Back in 1980, Charles S. Maier surveyed the historiography of foreign relations history in the United States and found it languishing. The distinguished Europeanist suggested that the field had become a “stepchild” at some remove from “the cutting edge of scholarship.” He identified the principal problems as a lack of theoretical rigor and an absence of methodological

2 Charles S. Maier, “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” in *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY, 1980), 356.

innovation. "Narrowly cast inquiries, parochial perspectives, and unfamiliarity with foreign languages and sources have limited not the best, but still too many works," Maier lamented.³

Two other prominent historians of European diplomacy leveled a series of equally stinging attacks on their Americanist counterparts toward the end of the 1980s. In order to judge the soundness and ultimate consequences of a policy, complained Sally Marks, it must be weighed against the real world, not just the world as perceived by policymakers in Washington. Yet the failure of most U.S. diplomatic historians to consult foreign archives or to master the necessary foreign languages perpetuated a one-sided perspective that tended to repeat, rather than critically examine, the assumptions of American officials. Accusing U.S. foreign relations scholars of typically "looking at only one side of a multifaceted problem," she implored them to "enlarge their horizons" by breaking out of "the less than splendid isolation in which the practice of twentieth-century American diplomatic history has incarcerated itself."⁴ Christopher Thorne similarly blasted the ethnocentric bias that he said plagued so much of the field, resulting in a "regrettable . . . national, cultural, and disciplinary parochialism." Is it not time, he asked, to consider a fundamental reconceptualization of the field?⁵

Many of those criticisms have since then been repeated, and broadened, by some of the most prominent scholars of U.S. foreign relations as well. At a 1988 session of the American Historical Association, Michael H. Hunt delivered a paper, subsequently published in *Diplomatic History*, which echoed the complaints of Maier, Marks, and Thorne. Graduate training for the next generation of diplomatic historians, he urged, should be broadened to emphasize the development of linguistic skills, frequent foreign travel, and immersion in non-American cultures. Sensitive to Thorne's lament that Americans rarely "enter into the texture of a foreign society," Hunt recommended that students of American foreign relations develop an expertise in at least one nation or region equal to their expertise in American history and culture. They should, in short, become not just historians of U.S. diplomacy but also area specialists.⁶

3 *Ibid.*, 355–56.

4 Sally Marks, "The World According to Washington," *Diplomatic History* 11 (Summer 1987): 265–67, 281–82.

5 Christopher Thorne, "After the Europeans: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast Asia," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Spring 1988): 206–08. More recently, Gerhard Weinberg, a distinguished German historian, observed acidly: "With few honorable exceptions, American diplomatic historians tend to be linguistic isolationists – if it is not in English it is not important." Weinberg, "World War II: Comments on the Roundtable," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Summer 2001): 491.

6 Michael H. Hunt, "Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Winter 1991): 1–11.

Certainly the value of the international history approach for the study of American foreign relations is undeniable. By relating U.S. policymaking “more rigorously and systematically to the international environment,” as Hunt rightly observes, historians can more effectively address two essential, and exceedingly complex, questions: “How have international developments influenced U.S. policy? And what consequences, unintended no less than intended, has that policy had for the broader world?”⁷ One simply cannot discuss with any degree of authority the *impact* of American policies on other nation-states and regions unless one possesses some degree of expertise in the histories and cultures of those areas. It would, as Marks correctly notes, severely limit the value of such a study if its author ignored primary or secondary sources highly pertinent to the subject at hand – from whatever locale and in whatever language. U.S. diplomatic historians have too often simply assumed influence without demonstrating it. If American actions and policies have truly made a difference on other nations and peoples, as so many specialists in the field assert, then diplomatic historians should devote at least some of the attention traditionally accorded to policy formulation to policy consequences, and they must utilize or develop methods appropriate to the task.

Likewise, area expertise coupled with binational or multinational research can contribute in a significant manner to policy evaluation, a subject invariably tackled in studies of U.S. diplomacy. A historian whose sources are exclusively American is at a great disadvantage on this score. Without alternative sources of information about the world as it really was, to use Marks’s terminology, the historian tends to recreate “the world according to Washington” and to judge policy against the standards, values, and assumptions of American decision makers. Even the most painstaking research in American documents about nation X will reveal little if erroneous preconceptions, ill-informed reporting, and cultural blinders prevented officials from comprehending what was actually occurring in that nation. Complete access to all of the documents produced by the American government with regard to Iran before the 1978–79 revolution, to illustrate the point more concretely, would probably tell the interested researcher an enormous amount about U.S. perceptions but remarkably little about the seething discontent that was transforming Iranian society – and that set the essential context for the development of U.S. policy and for the troubled diplomatic relationship between the United States and revolutionary Iran that followed.⁸ If we

7 Michael H. Hunt, “The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure” in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, 1995), 110.

8 For the inability of American officials to comprehend Iranian dynamics, see especially Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York, 1985).

consider an assessment of the efficacy of a particular policy and an analysis of its regional and international setting to be core aspects of diplomatic history, then a greater familiarity with foreign cultures and a more systematic examination of available foreign sources are indispensable tools.

The above critiques, although somewhat overstated, have had a salutary impact on the field. Partly in response to those criticisms and the prescriptive agendas behind them, a growing number of U.S. diplomatic historians have deepened the internationalist dimension of their work. Before turning to the burgeoning internationalist trend within the field, however, it bears note that the blanket indictment issued by Marks, Thorne, Maier, Hunt, and others is based on an overdrawn, caricatured portrait of American diplomatic history – even as practiced in the presumed dark ages. The nonspecialist might be surprised after reading such broadsides to learn that many scholars of American foreign relations have actually long possessed multilingual skills and have utilized non-English language sources in their work. Certainly the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic historians have always had more than a passing acquaintance with the histories and cultures of the lands encompassed by their research interests. Even in the benighted past, many managed to travel widely outside the United States, lecture or teach abroad, participate in international scholarly conferences, and cultivate professional friendships with scholars outside the United States and outside the English-speaking world. The cavalier charges of ethnocentrism and provincialism seem particularly misplaced; U.S. diplomatic historians arguably are now, as in the past, the *least* ethnocentric or provincial group of scholars within the larger field of U.S. history.⁹

To be sure, even the sternest critics acknowledge exceptions to their complaints, but they appear unwilling to accept the extent and significance of those exceptions. Yet Samuel Flagg Bemis, in many respects the founding father of modern American diplomatic history, was writing from a multiarchival, international perspective generations ago. His account of the diplomacy of the American Revolution, for all its nationalist bias, still stands as a model of the genre.¹⁰ Ernest R. May's magisterial account of U.S. entry into World War I, published over forty years ago, gained much of its power from the multinational perspective the author's exploitation of British and German sources shed on Woodrow Wilson's

9 For a recent variation on these complaints from a leading U.S. diplomatic historian, see Thomas Schoonover, "'It's Not What We Say, It's What We Do': The Study and Writing of U.S. Foreign Relations in the United States," *The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter* 31 (June 2000): 11–36.

10 Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (1935; reprint, Bloomington, IN, 1957).

decisionmaking. Akira Iriye's first book, *After Imperialism*, now over thirty-five years old, still impresses with its mastery of the archival sources and languages of half a dozen nations. David M. Pletcher's authoritative account of American expansion in the 1840s drew upon unpublished documents in Mexico, Spain, France, and Great Britain as well as those in the United States.¹¹ These examples could easily be multiplied.

Contrary to the critics' charges, furthermore, the study of American foreign relations has always attracted a significant number of genuine area specialists. Many historians of inter-American relations have long functioned precisely as the area experts that Hunt seeks to train. Most teach Latin American history as comfortably as the history of the United States, travel throughout the region as often as time and money permit, possess appropriate language skills, and utilize Latin American archival records wherever possible. Since at least the 1970s, the history of American-Asian relations has been energized by the growing number of scholars who, although trained primarily as U.S. diplomatic historians, function as regional specialists also. Michael Hunt himself serves as an excellent example of how one can successfully straddle two distinct fields. But he is hardly alone; Akira Iriye, Warren I. Cohen, Stephen E. Pelz, Roger Dingman, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Bruce Cumings, and Michael A. Barnhart, among others, also well fit that profile. They have been joined more recently by such outstanding younger scholars as Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Qiang Zhai, Shu Guang Zhang, Michael Sheng, Anne Foster, Mark Bradley, Robert Brigham, and Yukiko Koshiro, to mention just some of those in this impressive cohort.

This internationalist trend has clearly become more pronounced in recent years. The past decade, in particular, has witnessed a marked increase in broadly cast, internationalist-oriented work, work based on sufficient binational or multinational archival research to meet the most exacting standards of the international history school. Examples include, but are hardly limited to, the exemplary monographs written by Thomas D. Schoonover, Lester Langley, Norman E. Saul, David S. Foglesong, Nancy Mitchell, Thomas Schwartz, Marc Tractenberg, William Stueck, Chen Jian, Qiang Zhai, Fredrik Logevall, Daniel Fineman, Mark Bradley, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, Timothy Naftali and Alexandr Fursenko, and Eric Paul Roorda.¹² Concomitant with this development, the number of U.S.

11 Ernest R. May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917* (Cambridge, MA, 1959); Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Cambridge, MA, 1965); David Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia, MO, 1973).

12 Thomas D. Schoonover, *The United States in Central America, 1860–1911: Episodes of Social Imperialism and Imperial Rivalry in the World System* (Durham, NC, 1991); Lester D. Langley, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (Athens, GA,

diplomatic historians with a dual specialization in the history of another country or region has increased substantially as well. A glance at recent programs of the annual SHAFR meetings, which have regularly featured the work-in-progress of dozens of Ph.D. candidates, offers unmistakable evidence that much more work in this vein will soon be forthcoming, as do the ambitious research projects undertaken by recent recipients of the highly competitive SHAFR dissertation fellowships. Relatedly, the U.S. foreign relations field has shown itself quite open to those whose principal scholarly homes lie elsewhere, but whose work speaks directly to at least some of the issues and concerns of the diplomatic history community – whether they be Asian, European, or Middle Eastern historians, political scientists, or anthropologists. A growing number of European-, Asian-, or Latin American-born scholars now belong to the U.S. diplomatic history community, moreover, offering further testimony to the internationalization of the field. Taken together, these developments suggest a more open, fluid, and cosmopolitan field, a field marked by greater diversity, more scholarly collaboration, and abundant interdisciplinary cross-fertilization.

One especially important development which encapsulates many of the above trends is the flowering of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). Established in 1991 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, the project's central aim has been the dissemination of "new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War emerging from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' of the superpower rivalry that dominated international relations

1996); Norman E. Saul, *War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914–1921* (Lawrence, KS, 2001); idem, *Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867–1914* (Lawrence, KS, 1996); David S. Foglesong, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920* (Chapel Hill, 1995); Nancy Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1991); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, 1999); William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, 1995); Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994); idem, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2001); Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, 1999); Daniel Fineman, *A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958* (Honolulu, 1997); Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Timothy Naftali and Alexandr Furchenko, "One Hell of a Gamble": Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev, 1958–1964 (New York, 1997); Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Dominican Republic and the United States: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime, 1930–1945* (Durham, NC, 1998).

after World War II.”¹³ The CWHIP has labored assiduously, and with admirable success, to achieve that goal, publishing in its *Bulletin* English-language translations of key documents from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere, along with interpretive essays about those documents. It has also published a series of stimulating “Working Papers,” made additional documents available on its website, and organized a host of international conferences both to debate the significance of the new evidence for our understanding of the global dimensions of the Cold War and to showcase the work of historians immersed in the new sources. Since many of the scholars closely involved in these efforts – Hope Harrison, Mark Kramer, Vladislav Zubok, Vojtech Mastny, Leo Gluchowsky, Christian Ostermann, and Kathryn Weathersby among them – have been specialists in Russian, Eastern European, or Asian history, rather than U.S. diplomatic history, the CWHIP’s various initiatives have led to a fruitful blending of the different perspectives and scholarly preoccupations of area experts and foreign relations historians.

A burgeoning literature has also begun to appear on the impact of the United States on the wider world. Much of this work has focused on the cultural realm, including important, prize-winning books by Reinhold Wagnleitner and Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht on postwar Austria and Germany, respectively.¹⁴ The enormous influence of American popular culture, in its various guises, has featured prominently in much of this work, a focus doubtless spurred by the unmistakable significance of this force during our age of ubiquitous globalization/Americanization. *Diplomatic History* has run a number of forums specifically devoted to the subject of America’s impact on various corners of the planet and, taking off from the “American Century” theme, journal editor Michael J. Hogan devoted the bulk of two successive issues to essays exploring the global reach and influence of the United States throughout the twentieth century. Subsequently published in book form, those wide-ranging essays testify eloquently to the growing diversity and range within U.S. foreign relations historiography.¹⁵

13 Jim Hershberg letter, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Spring 1992): 1, 6.

14 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, transl. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, 1994); Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999).

15 “The American Occupation of Germany in Cultural Perspective: A Roundtable,” *Diplomatic History* 23 (Winter 1999): 1–77; “Roundtable: Cultural Transfer or Cultural Imperialism?” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 465–528; Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the ‘American Century’* (New York, 1999). See also Rob Kroes, R. W. Rydell, and D. F. J. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam,

For all the exciting, field-stretching contributions that the new internationalist orientation has made to U.S. diplomatic history, however, it cannot and should not be viewed as the One True Path that all must follow. Indeed, to the extent that some of the more overzealous adherents of internationalist approaches advocate a one-size-fits-all model, and tend to denigrate other modes of foreign relations scholarship, such evangelizing needs to be tempered by a broader vision of the field. U.S. diplomatic history has been, and should remain, a Janus-faced field, looking inward as well as outward. The benefits of its strengthened internationalist branch, as outlined above, are manifest. This trend deserves to be welcomed, applauded, and encouraged. At the same time, studies that seek to root the external behavior of the United States in the distinctive features of American society and the American state remain of at least equal importance. One of the most fundamental interpretive questions for students of foreign relations, it bears reemphasizing, concerns the extent to which any nation's interactions with foreign states, societies, and cultures are determined more by external or internal variables. Although the international and the domestic modes of analysis are not mutually exclusive, and in fact are frequently blended in individual studies, each of those realms exhibits particular *tendencies* – the former, toward external explanations of U.S. behavior; the latter, toward internal explanations.¹⁶ To suggest that one's choice of orientation, method, or appropriate archival sources might predetermine one's answers to essential interpretive questions would surely overstate the case. By the same token, such choices invariably color one's answers; issues of focus and method cannot so easily be separated from issues of interpretation.

For all of those reasons, it is especially fortunate and welcome that the internationalist renaissance within U.S. diplomatic history has been paralleled by a renaissance in the field's internalist branch as well. This dimension of U.S. diplomatic history, with its primary focus on state and society within the United States, has a rich tradition in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations. Charles Beard, one of the most influential American historians of the interwar period, helped establish in the 1930s a robust progressive critique of U.S. foreign policy as the product of governmental elites and their business allies who pursued a strategy of overseas economic expansion to meet what they identified as the nation's needs. Said needs, Beard insisted, were in all cases fully congruent with

1993); David W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam, 1994); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, IL, 1996).

16 For an analysis of similar internalist and externalist debates within political science, see Lynn Eden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History?" *International Security* 18 (Summer 1993): 174–207.

the particular class interests of America's ruling elites.¹⁷ That critique fell into disfavor during World War II and the early Cold War years only to reemerge with a vengeance during the 1960s and 1970s with the advent of a neo-Beardian revisionism, associated especially with the towering figure of William Appleman Williams. Some of the most vituperative interpretive debates within the diplomatic history field over the past several decades have continued to pit revisionists against their critics: the former emphasizing the material and ideological bases of American foreign policy, the latter typically insisting upon the importance of such noneconomic factors as public opinion, politics, national security concerns, or bureaucratic structures of decision making. These debates, it bears noting, have hinged especially on the relative weight scholars attach to different domestic variables and on the complex relationship between the state and the larger society it purports to represent. To realists, the state functions as a nearly autonomous entity, responding to the combination of dangers and opportunities apprehended in the external environment so as to advance the "national interests." To revisionist and corporatist historians, on the other hand, the state is hardly autonomous; rather, it acts as the handmaiden of the nation's most powerful and highly organized groups and thus invariably proves responsive to their particular agendas.

Over the past decade, there has been an outpouring of new scholarship that has extended the categories and scope of this longstanding debate, enriching, enlivening, and complicating it. The newer work, as many of the essays in the present volume detail, have explored such previously understudied matters as the role of culture, ideology, race, gender, language, and emotion. Much of this work has been influenced by the perspectives and insights of critical theory, cultural studies, and postmodernism – the same intellectual forces that have proven so galvanizing within the larger historical profession throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Brenda Gayle Plummer, Penny M. Von Eschen, Mary Dudziak, Thomas Borstelmann, Cary Fraser, Marc Gallichio, Michael Krenn, and Yukiko Koshiro have imaginatively inserted race into the diplomatic equation by examining the manifold ways in which American racial attitudes and prejudices have shaped encounters with nonwhite peoples while also capturing the active agency of those black Americans who sought to push the nation's foreign policy in a more progressive direction.¹⁸ Emily

17 Campbell Craig, "The Not-So-Strange Career of Charles Beard," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Spring 2001): 251–74.

18 Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: Race Relations and American Foreign*

Rosenberg, Andrew J. Rotter, Kristen L. Hoganson, Frank Costigliola, Robert Dean, and Michelle Mart have provocatively called attention to the pervasiveness of gendered language and categories of analysis in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking.¹⁹ Rosenberg, Rotter, Hunt, Anders Stephanson, William O. Walker, Frank Ninkovich, Michael E. Latham, and John Fousek, among others, have dissected some of the deeply rooted ideological presuppositions and cultural values and biases that have conditioned America's encounters with foreign states and societies, while Frank Costigliola has pioneered the study of emotion and foreign policy.²⁰ Taken together, this "culturalist" turn in diplomatic history has mounted a powerful challenge to some of the most basic epistemological assumptions of the field. To what extent, this work forces us to ask, are such widely used reference points as interests, security, and threats as much constructed concepts as terms that connote something fixed, tangible, and "real"? To what extent do diplomatic history's well-established empiricist and positivist inclinations need to be adjusted in light of poststructuralist challenges?

Policy since 1945 (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Cary Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Spring 2000): 233–64; Marc Gallichio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Michael L. Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969* (Armonk, NY, 1999); Yokiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999).

- 19 Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' After World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 59–70; Andrew J. Rotter, "Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947–1964," *Journal of American History* 81 (September 1994): 518–42; Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 163–83; Robert Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Winter 1998): 29–62; Michelle Mart, "Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948–1960," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Summer 1996): 357–80.
- 20 Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987); Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); idem, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); William O. Walker, III, "Drug Control and the Issue of Culture in American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Fall 1988): 365–82; idem, ed., *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict* (Wilmington, DE, 1996); Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994); Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Urge for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997), 1309–39; idem, "'I Had Come as a Friend': Emotion, Culture, and Ambiguity in the Formation of the Cold War, 1943–45," *Cold War History* 1 (August 2000): 103–28.

Even many traditional-minded scholars have begun to pay enhanced attention to the constellation of factors subsumed under the notions of culture and ideology – and particularly to the influence exerted by beliefs, ideas, values, and fears throughout the two-century history of American foreign relations. In his introduction to a recent collection of essays on the Cold War, Odd Arne Westad correctly identifies “the increasing willingness to take ideas and beliefs seriously as causal factors” as one of the hallmarks of recent Cold War scholarship.²¹ In the same collection, Melvyn P. Leffler, whose own impressive and influential work has emphasized the centrality of strategic variables in U.S. Cold War decision making, concedes that he previously “understated the role of ideology” by conceiving it “too narrowly.” Ideology, he now recognizes, “shaped perceptions of threat, the selection of friends, the assessment of opportunities, and the understanding of what was happening within the international system itself.”²² Anders Stephanson, in the same volume, goes so far as to label the Cold War an American ideological project. “Amidst the present triumphalism,” he boldly suggests “one might ask . . . what it was about the United States and its self-conception that made the Cold War a natural way of being toward the world, why indeed the Cold War turned out to be ‘the American way.’”²³

To note that some of the new culturalist approaches have stirred controversy within the field would be an understatement of epic proportions. Indeed, few subjects have in recent years simultaneously stirred more excitement and more angry resentment among diplomatic historians than the new “culturalism.” H-DIPLO has echoed for several years now with any number of sharply worded exchanges on this issue, and a recent recipient of SHAFR’s prestigious Bernath lecture prize, Robert Buzzanco, focused in that lecture and in a subsequent essay on the excessive claims of what he termed the “cultural left.”²⁴ One adherent of the new culturalism, in defense, complained about a movement among diplomatic historians “to police the boundaries of the discipline to exclude cultural history as an ideologically (that is, ‘PC’ driven) and epistemologically (insufficiently ‘objective’) dubious undertaking.”²⁵

21 Odd Arne Westad, “Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London, 2000), 18.

22 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole,” in *ibid.*, 45.

23 Anders Stephanson, “Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U.S. Ideology,” in *ibid.*, 95.

24 Robert Buzzanco, “What Happened to the New Left? Toward a Radical Reading of American Foreign Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 23 (Fall 1999): 575–607; idem, “Where’s the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 623–32.

25 Robert Dean, “Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the Cultural History of International Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 622.

These heated debates, as with those concerning the efficacy of the new internationalism, ironically serve as some of surest signs of diplomatic history's renewed vigor. The field is now as vigorous, lively, experimental, open to new approaches, and pluralist as it has ever been. The periodic bouts of self-criticism for which we have become notorious show no sign of abating, nor does it seem likely that proselytizing on behalf of one's preferred method, theory, interpretation, focus, or orientation will cease any time soon. Taken together, however, those symptoms suggest a robust, if raucously obstreperous, patient, rather than one in declining health. Diplomatic history today is many things, but it is not a field suffering from the terminal malaise and stagnation once identified by its leading critics.

There remain serious problems, to be sure, regarding diplomatic history's status and recognition within the larger historical profession. For many reasons, as noted above, foreign relations history, like political, military, legal and constitutional, and economic history, has been eclipsed in the American academy by social and cultural history. The sense of marginalization that many diplomatic historians feel vis-à-vis their professional colleagues, consequently, is not entirely a figment of their collective imaginations. The oversights, biases, blind spots, and political and intellectual agendas of other scholars have no doubt played an important role in this development, as so many frustrated diplomatic historians have charged over the years. Many of the remarkable accomplishments within the U.S. diplomatic history field, after all, are lost on those outside the field who devote little, if any, of their professional energies to keeping up with the voluminous literature produced by a field that seems irrelevant to their particularly scholarly gardens.

But diplomatic history's continuing outsider status cannot be attributed purely to the narrowness and prejudices of others. Foreign relations historians have often failed to make their findings as germane as they might to those nondiplomatic historians who are genuinely concerned with the broader contours of American, and world, history. They have not always presented their work in its widest context, thus neglecting opportunities to connect with the scholarship produced in related areas. Diplomatic historians have, in addition, participated willingly in the fragmentation and specialization that have permeated so much of academic discourse in the recent past. Indeed, the very success of SHAFR reflects this phenomenon. There are sufficient professional rewards and responsibilities attached to SHAFR now – ranging from offices to awards to committee assignments to the opportunity for presenting papers at its annual meeting and publishing articles and reviews in *Diplomatic History* – that it alone can provide ample professional sustenance for many a career. We simply

do not have to interact with the larger professional world of historical scholarship of which we are a part. But our colleagues suffer from our failure to engage them; we suffer, and American and world history as a whole each suffer as well.

If one of the chief challenges for historians with breadth of vision as we enter the new century is to provide fresh synthetic and holistic accounts not just of American but of global history, as many of the discipline's luminaries have advocated, then a major task for U.S. diplomatic historians must be to integrate our work and our perspectives into those larger stories. At its best, the work of diplomatic historians examines fundamental questions about the configuration of power in American society – and about the configuration of power within the global arena. How have elites attained, maintained, and exercised power? What have been the internal, or systemic, sources of the nation's external behavior? To what end have public and private elites interacted? What difference has the United States made in and to the wider global community? Certainly any effort to present a holistic view of the American national experience that ignores those cardinal questions would be fatally flawed. In view of the enormous influence that the United States has exerted, and continues to exert, on the contours of the modern world, any effort to present a holistic view of modern world history that ignored those questions would be equally flawed. By continuing to “walk the borders,” in Emily Rosenberg's apt phrase, between international history and national history, our increasingly vigorous, Janus-faced field should prove itself indispensable to some of modern history's most fundamental questions and concerns.

*Theories of International Relations**

OLE R. HOLSTI

Universities and professional associations usually are organized in ways that tend to separate scholars in adjoining disciplines and perhaps even to promote stereotypes of each other and their scholarly endeavors. The seemingly natural areas of scholarly convergence between diplomatic historians and political scientists who focus on international relations have been underexploited, but there are also some signs that this may be changing. These include recent essays suggesting ways in which the two disciplines can contribute to each other; a number of prizewinning dissertations, later turned into books, by political scientists that effectively combine political science theories and historical materials; collaborative efforts among scholars in the two disciplines; interdisciplinary journals such as *International Security* that provide an outlet for historians and political scientists with common interests; and creation of a new section, "International History and Politics," within the American Political Science Association.¹

* The author has greatly benefited from helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter by Peter Feaver, Alexander George, Joseph Grieco, Michael Hogan, Kal Holsti, Bob Keohane, Timothy Lomperis, Roy Melbourne, James Rosenau, and Andrew Scott, and also from reading K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London, 1985).

1 See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 3–21; John English, "The Second Time Around: Political Scientists Writing History," *Canadian Historical Review* 57 (March 1986): 1–16; Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 653–73; Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, 1985); Timothy Lomperis, *The War Everyone Lost – and Won: America's Intervention in Viet Nam's Twin Struggles* (Washington, DC, 1987); Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory, and Policy* (New York, 1979); Richard R. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision-Makers* (New York, 1986); Irving L. Janis, *Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management* (New York, 1989); K. J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge, 1996); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1999); Douglas C. Foyle, *Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1999); Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International*

This essay is an effort to contribute further to an exchange of ideas between the two disciplines by describing some of the theories, approaches, and "models" political scientists have used in their research on international relations during recent decades. A brief essay cannot do justice to the entire range of theoretical approaches that may be found in the current literature, but perhaps those described here, when combined with citations of some representative works, will provide diplomatic historians with a useful, if sketchy, map showing some of the more prominent landmarks in a neighboring discipline.

The most enduring "great debate" among students and practitioners of international relations has pitted realism against various challengers. Because "classical realism" is the most venerable and persisting theory of international relations, it provides a good starting point and baseline for comparison with competing models. Robert Gilpin may have been engaging in hyperbole when he questioned whether our understanding of international relations has advanced significantly since Thucydides, but one must acknowledge that the latter's analysis of the Peloponnesian War includes concepts that are not foreign to contemporary students of balance-of-power politics.²

Following a discussion of classical realism, an examination of "modern realism" or "neo-realism" will identify the continuities and differences between the two approaches. The essay then turns to several models that challenge one or more core premises of both classical and modern realism. The first three challengers focus on the system level: Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence/Liberal-Institutionalism, Marxist/World System/Dependency, and constructivism. Subsequent sections discuss several "decision-making" models, all of which share a skepticism about the adequacy of theories that focus on the structure of the international system while neglecting political processes within units that comprise the system.

Several limitations should be stated at the outset. Each of the systemic and decision-making approaches described below is a composite of several models; limitations of space have made it necessary to focus on the common denominators rather than on subtle differences among them. This discussion will pay little attention to the second "great debate," centering mostly on methodological issues; for example, what Stanley Hoffmann called "the battle of the literates versus the numerates."³ Efforts of some political scientists to develop "formal" or mathematical approaches to international relations are neglected here; such abstract models are likely

Relations (Cambridge, 2000); and G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, 2001).

2 Robert Gilpin, *Change and War in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK, 1981).

3 Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106 (Summer 1977): 54.

to be of limited interest to historians.⁴ The “post modern” challenge to all other theories and methodologies – the third “great debate” – will only briefly be described and evaluated. With these caveats, let me turn now to classical realism, the first of the systematic models to be discussed in this essay.

Realism

There have always been Americans, such as Alexander Hamilton, who viewed international relations from a realist perspective, but its contemporary intellectual roots are largely European. Three important figures of the interwar period probably had the greatest impact on American scholarship: diplomat-historian E. H. Carr, geographer Nicholas Spykman, and political theorist Hans Morgenthau. Other Europeans who have contributed significantly to realist thought include John Herz, Raymond Aron, Hedley Bull, and Martin Wight, while notable Americans of this school include scholars Arnold Wolfers and Norman Graebner, diplomat George Kennan, journalist Walter Lippmann, and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.⁵

Although realists do not constitute a homogeneous school – any more than do any of the others discussed in this essay – most of them share at least five core premises about international relations. To begin with, they view as central questions about the causes of war and the conditions

- 4 The British meteorologist Lewis Fry Richardson is generally regarded as the pioneer of mathematical approaches to international relations. See his *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh, 1960); and his *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago, 1960). These are summarized for nonmathematicians in Anatol Rapport, “L. F. Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1 (September 1957): 249–99. For more recent effort see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, 1981); idem, “The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model,” *American Political Science Review* 79 (March 1985): 156–77; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason* (New Haven, CT, 1992); a series of articles by Robert Powell in *American Political Science Review*; and Michael Brown, et al., eds., *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics* (Cambridge, MA, 2000).
- 5 Among the works that best represent their realist perspectives are E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis* (London, 1939); Nicholas Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York, 1942); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York, 1973); John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York, 1959); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London, 1977); Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (Garden City, NY, 1966); Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power and International Order,” in *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning*, ed. Alan James (London, 1973), 85–115; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, 1962); Norman A. Graebner, *America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan* (Wilmington, DE, 1984); George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951); Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, 1943); and Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, 1945).

of peace. They also regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations. According to classical realists, "structural anarchy," or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and it gives rise to the "security dilemma": in a self-help system one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question of *relative* capabilities is a crucial factor. Efforts to deal with this central element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive. Thus, unlike "idealists" and some "liberal internationalists," classical realists view conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than as a consequence that can be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or inadequate international understanding and education.

A third premise that unites classical realists is their focus on geographically-based groups as the central actors in the international system. During other periods the primary entities may have been city states or empires, but at least since the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), sovereign states have been the dominant units. Classical realists also agree that state behavior is rational. The assumption behind this fourth premise is that states are guided by the logic of the "national interest," usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities. Although the national interest may vary according to specific circumstances, the similarity of motives among nations permits the analyst to reconstruct the logic of policymakers in their pursuit of national interests – what Morgenthau called the "rational hypothesis" – and to avoid the fallacies of "concern with motives and concern with ideological preferences."⁶

Finally, the state can also be conceptualized as a *unitary* actor. Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the nature of the international system, their actions are primarily a response to external rather than domestic political forces. According to Stephen Krasner, for example, the state "can be treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interest of the society."⁷ Classical realists, however, sometimes use domestic politics, especially the alleged deficiencies of public opinion, as a residual category to explain deviations from "rational" policies.

6 Morgenthau, *Politics*, 5, 6.

7 Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1978), 33.

Realism has been the dominant model of international relations during at least the past six decades because it seemed to provide a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. Nevertheless, the classical versions articulated by Morgenthau and others have received a good deal of critical scrutiny. The critics have included scholars who accept the basic premises of realism but who found that in at least four important respects these theories lacked sufficient precision and rigor.

Classical realism has usually been grounded in a pessimistic theory of human nature, either a theological version (for example, Saint Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr) or a secular one (for example, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau). Egoism and self-interested behavior are not limited to a few evil or misguided leaders but are basic to *homo politicus* and thus are at the core of a realist theory. But because human nature, if it means anything, is a constant rather than a variable, it is an unsatisfactory explanation for the full range of international relations. If human nature explains war and conflict, what accounts for peace and cooperation? In order to avoid this problem, most modern realists have turned their attention from human nature to the structure of the international system to explain state behavior.⁸

In addition, critics have noted a lack of precision and even contradictions in the way classical realists use such core concepts as "power," "national interest," and "balance of power."⁹ They also see possible contradictions between the central descriptive and prescriptive elements of realism. On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate interests of other nations.¹⁰ Power plays a central role in classical realism, but the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables. Moreover, the distinction between "power as capabilities" and "usable options" is especially important in

8 For an excellent overview of the concept of system, see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, 1997).

9 Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York, 1962); James N. Rosenau, "National Interest," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), 11:34–40; Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in *Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, ed. Alexander George (Boulder, 1980), 217–37; Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," *World Politics* 5 (July 1953): 442–77; Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power," *Journal of Peace Research* 4:3 (1967): 270–88.

10 Morgenthau, *Politics*, 5.

the nuclear age, as the United States discovered in Vietnam and the Soviets learned in Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, even more dramatically illustrated the disjunction between material capabilities and political impact.

Although classical realists have typically looked to history and political science for insights and evidence, the search for greater precision has led many modern realists to look elsewhere for appropriate models, analogies, metaphors, and insights. The discipline of choice is often economics, from which modern realists have borrowed a number of tools and concepts, including rational choice, expected utility, theories of firms and markets, bargaining theory, and game theory.

The quest for precision has yielded a rich harvest of theories and models, and a somewhat less bountiful crop of supporting empirical applications. Drawing in part on game theory, Morton Kaplan described several types of international systems – for example, balance-of-power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, universal, hierarchical, and unit-veto. He then outlined the essential rules that constitute these systems. For example, the rules for a balance-of-power system are: “(1) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained essential actors to re-enter the system.”¹¹ Richard Rosecrance, David Singer, Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, and many others, although not necessarily realists, also have developed models that seek to understand international relations by virtue of system-level explanations.¹²

Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, the most prominent effort to develop a rigorous and parsimonious model of “modern” or “structural” realism, has tended to define the terms of a vigorous debate during the past two decades. It follows and builds upon another enormously influential book in which Waltz developed the Rousseauian position that a theory of war must include the system level (what he called the “third image”) and not just first (theories of human nature) or second

11 Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957).

12 Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in International Politics* (Boston, 1963); idem, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10 (September 1966): 314–27; Kenneth Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus* 93 (Summer 1964): 881–909; J. David Singer, “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” *American Political Science Review* 57 (June 1963): 420–30; Bruce M. Russett, “Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics,” *Journal of Politics* 25 (May 1963): 226–47; Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” *World Politics* 16 (April 1964): 390–406; Andrew Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York, 1967).

(state attributes) images. Why war? Because there is nothing in the system to prevent it.¹³

Theory of International Relations is grounded in analogies from microeconomics: International politics and foreign policy are analogous to markets and firms. Oligopoly theory is used to illuminate the dynamics of interdependent choice in a self-help anarchical system. Waltz explicitly limits his attention to a structural theory of international systems, eschewing the task of linking it to a theory of foreign policy.¹⁴ Indeed, he doubts that the two can be joined in a single theory and he is highly critical of many system-level analysts, including Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Rosecrance, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, and others, charging them with various errors, including "reductionism," that is, defining the system in terms of the attributes or interactions of the units.

In order to avoid reductionism and to gain parsimony, Waltz erects his theory on the foundations of three core propositions that define the structure of the international system. The first concentrates on the principles by which the system is ordered. The contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than hierarchical; although they differ in many respects, each unit (state) is formally equal. A second defining proposition is the character of the units. An anarchic system is composed of sovereign units and therefore the functions that they perform are also similar; for example, all have the task of providing for their own security. In contrast, a hierarchical system would be characterized by some type of division of labor. Finally, there is the distribution of capabilities among units in the system. Although capabilities are a unit-level attribute, the distribution of capabilities is a system-level concept.¹⁵ A change in any of these elements constitutes a change in system structure. The first element of structure as defined by Waltz is a quasi-constant because the ordering principle rarely changes, and the second element drops out of the analysis because the functions of units are similar as long as the system remains anarchic. Thus, the third attribute, the distribution of capabilities, plays the central role in Waltz's model.

Waltz uses his theory to deduce the central characteristics of international relations. These include some nonobvious propositions about the contemporary international system. For example, with respect to system

13 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA, 1979); idem, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959).

14 For a debate on whether neorealism may be extended to cover foreign policies as well as international politics, see Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 6 (Autumn 1996): 7–53; and a rejoinder by Waltz, "International Politics is Not Foreign Policy," in the same issue of *Security Studies*, 54–57.

15 Waltz, *Theory*, 82–101.

stability (defined as maintenance of its anarchic character and no consequential variation in the number of major actors) he concludes that, because a bipolar system reduces uncertainty, it is more stable than alternative structures. Furthermore, he contends that because interdependence has declined rather than increased during the twentieth century, this trend has actually contributed to stability, and he argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may contribute to rather than erode system stability.¹⁶

Waltz's effort to bring rigor and parsimony to realism has stimulated a good deal of further research, but it has not escaped controversy and criticism.¹⁷ Most of the vigorous debate has centered on four alleged deficiencies relating to interests and preferences, system change, misallocation of variables between the system and unit levels, and an inability to explain outcomes.

Specifically, a spare structural approach suffers from an inability to identify completely the nature and sources of interests and preferences because these are unlikely to derive solely from the structure of the system. Ideology or domestic politics may often be at least as important. Consequently, the model is also unable to specify adequately how interests and preferences may change. The three defining characteristics of system structure are not sufficiently sensitive to specify the sources and dynamics of system change. The critics buttress their claim that the model is too static by pointing to Waltz's assertion that there has only been a single structural change in the international system during the past three centuries.

Another drawback is the restrictive definition of system properties, which leads Waltz to misplace, and therefore neglect, elements of international relations that properly belong at the system level. Critics have focused on his treatment of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and interdependence. Waltz labels these as unit-level properties, whereas some of his critics assert that they are in fact attributes of the system.

Finally, the distribution of capabilities explains outcomes in international affairs only in the most general way, falling short of answering the questions that are of central interest to many analysts. For example, the distribution of power at the end of World War II would have enabled

16 Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in *The International Corporation: A Symposium*, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 205–23; idem, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (1981).

17 See especially Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York, 1986); David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York, 1993); Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York, 1995); John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics* (New Brunswick, 1988); and Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics* (Columbia, SC, 1988). A useful post-Cold War appraisal of realism may be found in "Realism: Restatements and Renewal," *Security Studies* 5 (Spring 1996): ix–xx, 3–423. The journal *International Security* is an indispensable source for the continuing debates on realism.

one to predict the rivalry that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union (as de Tocqueville did more than a century earlier) but it would have been inadequate for explaining the pattern of relations between these two nations – the Cold War rather than withdrawal into isolationism by either or both, a division of the world into spheres of influence, or World War III. In order to do so, it is necessary to explore political processes *within* states – at minimum within the United States and the Soviet Union – as well as *between them*.

Robert Gilpin shares the core assumptions of modern realism, but his study of *War and Change in World Politics* also attempts to cope with some of the criticism leveled at Waltz's theory by focusing on the dynamics of system change. In doing so, Gilpin also seeks to avoid the criticism that the Waltz theory is largely ahistorical. Drawing upon both economic and sociological theory, his model is based on five core propositions. The first is that the international system is in a state of equilibrium if no state believes that it is profitable to attempt to change it. Second, a state will attempt to change the status quo of the international system if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. Related to this is the proposition that a state will seek change through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the marginal benefits. Moreover, when an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the economic costs of maintaining the status quo (expenditures for military forces, support for allies, etc.) tend to rise faster than the resources needed to do so. An equilibrium exists when no powerful state believes that a change in the system would yield additional net benefits. Finally, if the resulting disequilibrium between the existing governance of the international system and the redistribution of power is not resolved, the system will be changed and a new equilibrium reflecting the distribution of relative capabilities will be established.¹⁸

Unlike Waltz, Gilpin includes state-level processes in order to explain change. Differential economic growth rates among nations – a structural-systemic level variable – play a vital role in his explanation for the rise and decline of great powers, but his model also includes propositions about the law of diminishing returns on investments, the impact of affluence on martial spirit and on the ratio of consumption to investment, and structural change in the economy.¹⁹ Table 4.1 summarizes some key elements of realism. It also contrasts them to other models of international relations – Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence, Marxist/World System/Dependency, and constructivism, to which we now turn.

18 Gilpin, *War and Change*, 10–11.

19 *Ibid.*, chap. 4. Gilpin's thesis appears similar in a number of respects to Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987).

Table 4.1. *Four models of the international system*

	Realism	Global Society	Marxism	Constructivism
<i>Type of model</i>	Classical: descriptive and normative Modern: deductive	Descriptive and normative	Descriptive and normative	Descriptive and normative
<i>Central problems</i>	Causes of war Conditions of peace	Broad agenda of social, economic, and environmental issues arising from gap between demands and resources	Inequality and exploitation Uneven development	Content, sources, and consequences of state identities and interests
<i>Conception of current international system</i>	Structural anarchy Structure conceived in terms of material capabilities	Global society Complex interdependence (structure varies by issue-area)	World capitalist system Structure conceived in terms of material capabilities	Environment in which states take action is social as well as material; the social gives meaning to the material world
<i>Key actors</i>	Geographically based units (tribes, city-states, sovereign states, etc.)	Highly permeable states <i>plus</i> a broad range of nonstate actors, including IOs, IGOs, NGOs, and individuals	Classes and their agents	States with socially constructed identities and interests
<i>Central motivations</i>	National interest Security Power	Security and a wider range of human needs and wants	Class interests	Different rather than uniform. Interests based on identities rather than fixed by structures

<i>Loyalties</i>	To geographically based groups (from tribes to sovereign states)	Loyalties to state may be declining To emerging global norms, values and institutions and/or to subnational groups Aggregate effects of decisions by national and nonnational actors How units (not limited to nation-states) cope with a growing agenda of threats and opportunities arising from human wants Moderate in the direction of the model (owing to the rapid pace of technological change, etc.) Broad range of social sciences Natural and technological sciences	To class values and interests that transcend those of the state	To states, at least for the intermediate future
<i>Central processes</i>	Search for security and survival		Modes of production and exchange International division of labor in a world capitalist system	Actors behave on the basis of socially constructed identities and interests
<i>Likelihood of system transformation</i>	Low (basic structural elements of system have revealed an ability to persist despite many other kinds of changes) Politics History Economics (especially modern realists)		High in the direction of the model (owing to inherent contradictions within the world capitalist system) Marxist–Leninist theory (several variants)	Indeterminate; change in social identities is both possible and difficult
<i>Sources of theory, insights, and evidence</i>			Sociology Social psychology Anthropology/cultural studies	

Global Society, Interdependence, Institutionalism

Just as there are variants of realism, there are several Global-Society/Complex-Independence/Liberal Institutionalism (GS/CI/LI) models, but this discussion focuses on two common denominators; they all challenge the first and third core propositions of realism identified earlier, asserting that inordinate attention to the war/peace issue and the nation-state renders it an increasingly anachronistic model of global relations.²⁰

The agenda of critical problems confronting states has been vastly expanded during the twentieth century. Attention to the issues of war and peace is by no means misdirected, according to proponents of a GS/CI/LI perspective, but concerns for welfare, modernization, the environment, and the like are today no less potent sources of motivation and action. It is important to stress that the potential for cooperative action arises from *self-interest*, not from some utopian attribution of altruism to state leaders. Institution building to reduce uncertainty, information costs, and fears of perfidy; improved international education and communication to ameliorate fears and antagonisms based on misinformation and misperceptions; and the positive-sum possibilities of such activities as trade are but a few of the ways, according to the GS/CI/LI perspective, by which states may jointly gain and thus mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshest features of a self-help international system. The diffusion of knowledge and technology, combined with the globalization of communications, has vastly increased popular expectations. The resulting demands have outstripped resources and the ability of sovereign states to cope effectively with them. Interdependence and institution building arise from an inability of even the most powerful states to cope, or to do so unilaterally or at acceptable levels of cost and risk, with issues ranging from terrorism to trade, from immigration to environmental threats, and from AIDS and SARS to new strains of tuberculosis.²¹

Paralleling the widening agenda of critical issues is the expansion of actors whose behavior can have a significant impact beyond national boundaries; indeed, the cumulative effects of their actions can have profound consequences for the international system. Thus, although states continue

20 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston, 1977); Edward Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York, 1976); James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence* (London, 1980); Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, 1984); Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York, 1981); James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton, 1990). The journal *International Organization* is an indispensable source. See especially the 50th anniversary issue edited by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner.

21 For an excellent overview of the challenges of creating effective yet nonoppressive institutions – the “Governance Dilemma” – to cope with such issues, see Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (March 2001): 1–13.

to be the most important international actors, they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies. The aggregate effect of actions by multitudes of nonstate actors can have potent effects that transcend political boundaries. These may include such powerful or highly visible nonstate organizations as Exxon, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, and even shadowy ones such as the al Qaeda group that claimed to have carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the cumulative effects of decisions by less powerful actors may also have profound international consequences. For example, decisions by thousands of individuals, mutual funds, banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions to sell securities on October 19, 1987, not only resulted in an unprecedented "crash" on Wall Street but also within hours its consequences were felt throughout the entire global financial system. The difficulties of containing economic problems within a single country were also illustrated by the international consequences of difficulties in Thailand, Mexico and Russia during the late 1990s.

The widening agenda of critical issues, most of which lack a purely national solution, has also led to creation of new actors that transcend political boundaries; for example, international organizations, transnational organizations, nongovernment organizations, multinational corporations, and the like. Thus, not only does an exclusive focus on the war/peace issue fail to capture the complexities of contemporary international life but it also blinds the analyst to the institutions, processes, and norms that self-interested states may use to mitigate some features of an anarchic system. In short, according to GS/CI/LI perspectives, analysts of a partially globalized world may incorporate elements of realism (anarchy, self-interest, rationality, etc.) as a necessary starting point, but these are not sufficient for an adequate understanding.

The GS/CI/LI models recognize that international behavior and outcomes arise from a multiplicity of motives, not merely the imperatives of systemic power balances. They also alert us to the fact that important international processes originate not only in the actions of states but also in the aggregated behavior of other actors. These models enable the analyst to deal with a broader agenda of critical issues; they also force one to contemplate a richer menu of demands, processes, and outcomes than would be derived from realist models, and thus, they are more sensitive to the possibility that politics of trade, currency, immigration, health, the environment, or energy may significantly and systematically differ from those typically associated with security issues.

A point of some disagreement among theorists lumped together here under the GS/CI/LI rubric centers on the importance and future prospects of the nation-state. The state serves as the starting point for analysts who focus on the ways in which these self-interested actors may pursue gains and reduce risks and uncertainties by various means, including creation

of institutions. They view the importance of the nation-state as a given for at least the foreseeable future.

Other theorists regard the sovereign territorial state as in a process of irreversible decline, partly because the revolution in communications is widening the horizons and thus providing competition for loyalties of its citizens, partly because states are increasingly incapable of meeting the expanding expectations of their subjects; the "revolution of rising expectations" is not limited to less developed countries. Theirs is a largely utilitarian view of the state in which national sentiments and loyalties depend importantly on continuing favorable answers to the question: "What have you done for me lately?" However, these analysts may be underestimating the potency of nationalism and the durability of the state. Several decades ago one of them wrote that "the nation is declining in its importance as a political unit to which allegiances are attached."²² Objectively, nationalism may be an anachronism but, for better or worse, powerful loyalties are still attached to states. The suggestion that, because even some well-established nations have experienced independence movements among ethnic, cultural, or religious minorities, the territorial state is in an irreversible decline is not wholly persuasive. In virtually every region of the world there are groups that seek to create or restore geographically-based entities in which its members may enjoy the status and privileges associated with sovereign territorial statehood. Events since 1989 in Eastern Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Quebec, Turkey, and elsewhere, seem to indicate that obituaries for nationalism may be somewhat premature.

The notion that such powerful nonnational actors as major multinational corporations (MNCs) will soon transcend the nation-state seems equally premature. International drug rings do appear capable of challenging and perhaps even dominating national authorities in Colombia, Panama, and some other states. But the pattern of outcomes in confrontations between MNCs and states, including cases involving major expropriations of corporate properties, indicate that even relatively weak nations are not always the hapless pawns of MNCs. The 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated once again that even the most powerful states that also enjoy a favorable geographical location cannot provide absolute safety for their populations. Perhaps paradoxically, these attacks and the resulting

22 Rosenau, "National Interest," 39. A more recent statement of this view may be found in Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York, 1986); Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *Politics: Authority, Identities, and Change* (Columbia, SC, 1996). See also John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics* 9 (July 1957): 473-93; and his reconsideration in "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," *Polity* 1 (Fall 1968): 12-34.

responses also reconfirmed the continuing importance of the state in world politics.

Underlying the GS/CI/LI critique of realist theories is the view that the latter are too wedded to the past and are thus incapable of dealing adequately with change. Even if global dynamics arise from multiple sources (including nonstate actors), however the actions of states and their agents would appear to remain the major sources of change in the international system. The third group of systemic theories to be considered, the Marxist/World System/Dependency (M/WS/D) models, even further downplays the role of the nation-state.

Marxism, World Systems, Dependency

Many of the distinctions among M/WS/D theories are lost by treating them together and by focusing on their common features, but in the brief description possible here only common denominators will be presented. These models challenge both the war/peace and state-centered features of realism, but they do so in ways that differ sharply from challenges of GS/CI/LI models.²³ Rather than focusing on war and peace, these theories direct attention to quite different issues, including uneven development, poverty, and exploitation within and between nations. These conditions arise from the dynamics of the modes of production and exchange, and they must be incorporated into any analysis of intra- and inter-nation conflict.

According to adherents of these models, the key groups within and between nations are classes and their agents: As Immanuel Wallerstein put it, "in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the world capitalist world-economy."²⁴ The "world capitalist system" is characterized by a highly unequal division of labor between the periphery and core. Those at the periphery are essentially the drawers of water and the hewers of wood whereas the latter appropriate the surplus of the entire world economy. This critical feature of the world system not only gives rise to and perpetuates a widening rather than narrowing gap between the wealthy core and poor periphery but also to a dependency relationship from which the latter are unable to

23 James Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (New York, 1972); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York, 1974); idem, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (September 1974): 387–415. Debates among advocates of these models are illustrated in Robert A. Denemark and Kenneth O. Thomas, "The Brenner–Wallerstein Debates," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March 1988): 47–66.

24 Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise," 390.

break loose. Moreover, the class structure within the core, characterized by a growing gap between capital and labor, is faithfully reproduced in the periphery so that elites there share with their counterparts in the core an interest in perpetuating the system. Thus, in contrast to many realist theories, M/WS/D models encompass and integrate theories of both the global and domestic arenas.

M/WS/D models have been subjected to trenchant critiques.²⁵ The state, nationalism, security dilemmas, and related concerns are at the theoretical periphery rather than at the core. "Capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world-economy," Wallerstein asserts, "not of nation-states."²⁶ A virtue of many M/WS/D theories is that they take a long historical perspective on world affairs rather than merely focusing on contemporary issues. Yet, by neglecting nation-states and the dynamics arising from their efforts to deal with security in an anarchical system – or at best relegating these actors and motivations to a minor role – M/WS/D models are open to question, much as would be analyses of *Hamlet* that neglect the central character and his motivations.

Finally, the earlier observations about the persistence of nationalism as an element of international relations seem equally appropriate here. Perhaps national loyalties can be dismissed as prime examples of "false consciousness," but even in areas that experienced two generations of one-party Communist rule, as in China, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Estonia, there was scant evidence that feelings of solidarity with workers in the Soviet Union or elsewhere replaced nationalist sentiments.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent events have rendered Marxist theories somewhat problematic, but the gap between rich and poor states has, if anything, become more acute during the past decade. Globalization has helped some Third World countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, but it has done little for most African countries. This condition has given rise to two somewhat related explanations for disparities, not only between the industrial west and the rest of the world, but also among countries that gained their independence since 1945.

The first focuses on *geography*. One analyst notes, for example, that landlocked countries in tropical zones have serious disadvantages in coping with such health problems as malaria and in overcoming the high costs of land transportation for exporting their goods.²⁷ The second cluster of theories purporting to explain uneven development point to *cultural*

25 Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 247–88; Aristide Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," *ibid.*, 33 (January 1981): 253–81.

26 Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise," 401.

27 Ricardo Hausmann, "Prisoners of Geography," *Foreign Policy* (January–February 2001): 44–53; and David Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York, 1999).

differences.²⁸ Neither of these theories is new; Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is a classic illustration of a cultural explanation for development.

While geographical and cultural theories have enjoyed some revival recently, they have also provoked spirited debates, in part because of highly dubious uses in the past.²⁹ Unlike Marxist theories, they also appear to place the primary responsibility for under-development on the poor countries themselves, and they seem to offer limited prospects for coping with the problem because neither geography nor culture can easily be changed. Proponents of these theories respond that a proper diagnosis of the roots of under-development is a necessary condition for its amelioration; for example, through aid programs that target public health and transportation infrastructure needs.

Constructivism

Although the theories described to this point tended to dominate debates during the past century, "constructivism" has recently emerged as a significant approach to world politics. Unlike many "post-modernists" (discussed in the next section), most constructivists work within the theoretical and epistemological premises of the social sciences, and they generally seek to expand rather than undermine the purview of other theoretical perspectives. As with other approaches summarized in this essay, constructivists do not constitute a monolithic perspective, but they do share some key ideas, the first of which is that the environment in which states act is social and ideational as well as material. Money provides a good example of the construction of social reality. If money is limited to metals such as gold and silver, then it has value because the metal itself is valuable, and its use constitutes a form of barter. For reasons of convenience and to expand the money supply, modern governments have also designated bits of colored paper and base metals to serve as money although they have little if any intrinsic value; that they are valuable and can be used as a medium of exchange is the result of a construction of economic reality.³⁰

28 Samuel Huntington has been a leading proponent of a cultural perspective on world affairs. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York, 1996); and Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York, 2000).

29 For example, the writings of Karl Haushofer were used (or misused) by the Nazis to justify German expansion into the "Eurasian Heartland"; and in *The Geography of Intellect*, Stefen Possony and Nathaniel Weyl propounded the racist thesis that intelligence is related to climate; the warmer the climate from which various racial groups originated, the lower their intellectual capacities.

30 This example is drawn from a study of the philosophical bases of constructivism, John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York, 1995), 37–43.

In their emphasis on the construction of social reality, its proponents challenge the materialist basis of the approaches discussed above. Because the social gives meaning to the material, many core concepts, including anarchy, power, national interest, security dilemma, and others, are seen as socially constructed rather than as the ineluctable consequences of system structures. Moreover, interests and identities – for example, those who are designated as “allies” or “enemies” – are also social constructs, the products of human agency, rather than structurally determined. The title of a widely-cited work by Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” provides something of the flavor of the constructionist perspective. Wendt shows that because anarchy can have multiple meanings for different actors, it may give rise to a wider range of behaviors than postulated by realism.³¹

Constructivists have also shown that ideas and norms sometimes compete with, shape, or even trump material interests. Although not labeled as a constructivist analysis, an early study of John Foster Dulles’ policies toward the USSR revealed that he constructed a model of the Soviet system, based largely on his lifelong study of Lenin’s writings. Brutal Soviet foreign policies during the Stalin era provided ample support for Dulles’ model, but the more variegated policies of those who came to power in the Kremlin after the Soviet dictator’s death in 1953 were also interpreted in ways suggesting that Dulles’ model was largely impervious to any evidence that might call it into question.³² The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union have triggered off a lively debate among proponents of ideational and material interpretations of the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of domestic reforms and collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.³³

At this point, constructivism is less a theory than an approach. It has been used to analyze the origins, development, and consequences of norms and cultures in a broad range of settings.³⁴ It might offer an especially

31 *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992): 391–425.

32 Ole R. Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia,” in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago, 1967).

33 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security* 25 (Winter 2000–01): 5–53; Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change* (New Haven, 1997); and Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York, 2000).

34 Some representative works include Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK, 1999); Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC, 1989); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY, 1996); Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York, 1996); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY, 1995); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochvil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, 1996). Thoughtful but

fruitful contribution to the persisting debates, described below, on the “democratic peace” thesis. The constructivist approach is of relatively recent vintage, but it bears considerable resemblance to the venerable social science dictum that we all perceive our environment through the lenses of belief systems, and thus that, “It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.”³⁵ This also illustrates the tendency for each generation of political scientists to reinvent, if not the whole wheel, at least some parts of it.

Decision Making

Many advocates of realism recognize that it cannot offer fine-grained analyses of foreign policy behavior and, as noted earlier, Waltz denies that it is desirable or even possible to combine theories of international relations and foreign policy. Decision-making models challenge the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize the nation as a unitary rational actor whose behavior can adequately be explained by reference to the system structure – the second, fourth, and fifth realist propositions identified earlier – because individuals, groups, and organizations acting in the name of the state are also sensitive to domestic pressures and constraints, including elite maintenance, electoral politics, public opinion, interests groups, ideological preferences, and bureaucratic politics. Such core concepts as “the national interest” are not defined solely by the international system, much less by its structure alone, but they are also likely to reflect elements within the domestic political arena. Thus, rather than assuming with the realists that the state can be conceptualized as a “black box” – that the domestic political processes are unnecessary for explaining the sources of its external behavior – decision-making analysts believe one must indeed take these internal processes into account, with special attention directed at policymakers.

At the broadest level of analyses within the “black box,” the past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning literature and heated controversies on the “democratic peace” arising from the finding that, while democracies are no less likely to engage in wars, they do not fight each other.³⁶ The

contrasting assessments may be found in adjoining articles in *International Security* 23 (Summer 1998): Michael Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” 141–70; and Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 171–200.

35 Kenneth Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3 (June 1959): 120. See also Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, 1970); and some of the decision-making approaches described in the next section.

36 The debate was triggered by Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–70. Some important

literature is far too vast to discuss in any detail in this brief essay. Some of the debate is about minutiae (does Britain's pro forma declaration of war on Finland during World War II constitute a crucial disconfirming case?), but parts of it engage such central issues as the role of institutions (transparent policymaking) in allaying fears of perfidy or of norms (the culture of compromise) in reducing or eliminating wars between democracies. Suffice it to say that proponents and critics of the democratic peace thesis line up mostly along realist-liberal lines. The democratic peace thesis is especially troubling to realists for at least three reasons. It runs counter to a long tradition, espoused by Alexis de Tocqueville, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Henry Kissinger, and other notable realists, that depicts democracies as seriously disadvantaged in conducting foreign affairs. Moreover, the thesis that democracies may behave differently directly challenges a core premise of structural realism. As Waltz notes, "If the democratic peace thesis is right, structural realist theory is wrong."³⁷ At the policy level, few realists are comfortable with espousal by the first Bush and Clinton administrations of "democracy promotion" abroad as a vital goal of American diplomacy, at least at the rhetorical level, usually denouncing it as an invitation to hopeless crusading, or as "international social work" worthy of Mother Theresa but not of the world's sole superpower.³⁸

To reconstruct how nations deal with each other, it is necessary to view the situation through the eyes of those who act in the name of the state: decision makers and the group and bureaucratic-organizational contexts within which they act. Table 4.2 provides an overview of three major types of decision-making models, beginning with the bureaucratic-organizational models.³⁹

contributions to the debate include: Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, 1993); John Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Spencer Weart, *Never at War* (New Haven, 1998); Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA, 1997); James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia, SC, 1995); Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 5–38.

37 Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 13.

38 Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (February 1996): 16–32.

39 There are also models that link types of politics with foreign policy. Two of the more prominent twentieth-century versions – the Leninist and Wilsonian – have been effectively criticized by Waltz in *Man, the State, and War*. Although space limitations preclude a discussion here, for some research along these lines see, among others, Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (March 1983): 27–71; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; idem, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Winter 1983): 205–35.

Table 4.2. *Three models of decision making*

	Bureaucratic politics	Group dynamics	Individual decision making
<i>Conceptualization of decision making</i>			
<i>Premises</i>	Decision making as the result of bargaining within bureaucratic organizations Central organizational values are imperfectly internalized Organizational behavior is political behavior Structure and SOPs affect substance and quality of decisions	Decision making as the product of group interaction Most decisions are made by small elite groups Group is different than the sum of its members Group dynamics affect substance and quality of decisions	Decision making as the result of individual choice Importance of subjective appraisal (definition of the situation) and cognitive processes (information processing, etc.)
<i>Constraints on rational decision making</i>	Imperfect information, resulting from: centralization, hierarchy, and specialization Organizational inertia Conflict between individual and organizational utilities Bureaucratic politics and bargaining dominate decision making and implementation of decisions	Groups may be more effective for some tasks, less for others Pressures for conformity Risk-taking propensity of groups (controversial) Quality of leadership “Groupthink”	Cognitive limits on rationality Information processing distorted by cognitive consistency dynamics (unmotivated biases) Systematic and motivated biases in causal analysis Individual differences in abilities related to decision making (e.g., problem-solving ability, tolerance of ambiguity, defensiveness and anxiety, information seeking, etc.)
<i>Sources of theory, insights, and evidence</i>	Organization theory Sociology of bureaucracies Bureaucratic politics	Social psychology Sociology of small groups	Cognitive dissonance Cognitive psychology Dynamic psychology

Bureaucratic and Organizational Politics

Traditional models of complex organizations and bureaucracy emphasized the benefits of a division of labor, hierarchy, and centralization, coupled with expertise, rationality, and obedience. They also assumed that clear boundaries should be maintained between politics and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and implementation on the other. Following pioneering works by Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James March, and others, more recent theories depict organizations quite differently.⁴⁰ The central premise is that decision making in bureaucratic organizations is not constrained only by the legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the rational and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behavior. There is an *emphasis* upon rather than a denial of the political character of bureaucracies, as well as on other “informal” aspects of organizational behavior. Complex organizations are composed of individuals and units with conflicting perceptions, values, and interests that may arise from parochial self-interest (“what is best for my bureau is also best for my career”), and also from different perceptions of issues arising ineluctably from a division of labor (“where you stand depends on where you sit”). Organizational norms and memories, prior policy commitments, inertia, and standard operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of problems, channeling of information, use of expertise, the range of options that may be considered, and implementation of executive decisions. Consequently, organizational decision making is essentially political in character, dominated by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.⁴¹

An ample literature of case studies on budgeting, weapons acquisitions, military doctrine, and similar situations confirms that foreign and defense policy bureaucracies rarely conform to the Weberian “ideal type” of rational organization.⁴² Some analysts assert that crises may provide the motivation and means for reducing some of the nonrational aspects of bureaucratic behavior: crises are likely to push decisions to the top of the organization where a higher quality of intelligence is available; information

40 Chester Barnard, *Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, MA, 1938); Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York, 1957); James G. March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958).

41 Henry A. Kissinger, “Conditions of World Order,” *Daedalus* 95 (Spring 1960): 503–29; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence*; Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, 1974).

42 The literature is huge. See, for example, Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1969); Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*.

is more likely to enter the top of the hierarchy directly, reducing the distorting effects of information processing through several levels of the organization; and broader, less parochial values may be invoked. Short decision time in crises reduces the opportunities for decision making by bargaining, log rolling, incrementalism, lowest-common-denominator values, "muddling through," and the like.⁴³

Even studies of international crises from a bureaucratic-organizational perspective, however, are not uniformly sanguine about decision making in such circumstances. Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis identified several critical bureaucratic malfunctions concerning dispersal of American aircraft in Florida, the location of the naval blockade, and grounding of weather-reconnaissance flights from Alaska that might stray over the USSR. Richard Neustadt's study of two crises involving the United States and Great Britain revealed significant misperceptions of each other's interests and policy processes. And an examination of three American nuclear alerts found substantial gaps in understanding and communication between policymakers and the military leaders who were responsible for implementing the alerts.⁴⁴

Critics of some organizational-bureaucratic models have directed their attention to several points.⁴⁵ They assert, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. In the American system, the president is not just another player in a complex bureaucratic game. Not only must he ultimately decide but he also selects who the other players will be, a process that may be crucial in shaping the ultimate decisions. If General Matthew Ridgway and Attorney General Robert Kennedy played key roles in the American decisions not to intervene in Indochina in 1954 and not to bomb or invade Cuba in 1962, it was because Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy chose to accept their advice rather than that of other officials. Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize its nonrational elements to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements on what

43 Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence* (New York, 1967); Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York, 1969).

44 Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crises Which Limit the Viability of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 8 (June 1963): 61-82; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence*; Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York, 1970); Scott Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 99-139.

45 Robert Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction, and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs: Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1972); Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)" *Foreign Policy* 7 (Summer 1972): 159-70; Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences* 4 (December 1973): 467-90; Desmond J. Ball, "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory," *Australian Outlook* 28 (April 1974).

national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation. Indeed, properly managed, decision processes that promote and legitimize "multiple advocacy" among officials may facilitate high-quality decisions.⁴⁶

These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions themselves. Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis does not indicate an especially strong correlation between bureaucratic roles and evaluations of the situation or policy recommendations, as predicted by his "Model III" (bureaucratic politics), and recently published transcripts of deliberations during the crisis do not offer more supporting evidence for that model.⁴⁷ Yet Allison does present some compelling evidence concerning policy implementation that casts considerable doubt on the adequacy of traditional realist conceptions of the unitary rational actor.

Small Group Politics

Another decision-making model used by some political scientists supplements bureaucratic-organizational models by narrowing the field of view to foreign policy decisions within small group contexts. Some analysts have drawn upon sociology and social psychology to assess the impact of various types of group dynamics on decision making.⁴⁸ Underlying these models are the premises that the group is not merely the sum of its members (thus decisions emerging from the group are likely to be different from what a simple aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might suggest), and that group dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.

Groups often perform better than individuals in coping with complex tasks owing to diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labor, and high-quality debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it. Groups may also provide decisionmakers with emotional and other types of support that may facilitate coping with

46 Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972): 751-85, 791-95.

47 David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 5-29; McGeorge Bundy and James G. Blight, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," *ibid.*, 30-92; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, 1989); Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes* (Cambridge, MA, 1997).

48 Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Boston, 1972); idem, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Boston, 1982); Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (December 1989): 361-88.

complex problems. Conversely, they may exert pressures for conformity to group norms, thereby inhibiting the search for information and policy options, ruling out the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent evaluation, and suppressing some forms of intragroup conflict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and options. Classic experiments have revealed the extent to which group members will suppress their beliefs and judgments when faced with a majority adhering to the contrary view, even a counterfactual one.⁴⁹

Drawing on historical case studies, social psychologist Irving Janis has identified a different variant of group dynamics, which he labels “groupthink” to distinguish it from the more familiar type of conformity pressure on “deviant” members of the group.⁵⁰ Janis challenges the conventional wisdom that strong cohesion among group members invariably enhances performance. Under certain conditions, strong cohesion can markedly degrade the group’s performance in decision making. Members of a cohesive group may, as a means of dealing with the stresses of having to cope with consequential problems and in order to bolster self-esteem, increase the frequency and intensity of face-to-face interaction, resulting in greater identification with the group and less competition within it; “concurrence seeking” may displace or erode reality-testing and sound information processing and judgment. As a consequence, groups may be afflicted by unwarranted feelings of optimism and invulnerability, stereotyped images of adversaries, and inattention to warnings. Janis’s analyses of both “successful” (the Marshall Plan, the Cuban missile crisis) and “unsuccessful” (Munich Conference of 1938, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion) cases indicate that “groupthink” or other decision-making pathologies are not inevitable, and he develops some guidelines for avoiding them.⁵¹

Individual Leaders

Still other decision-making analysts focus on the individual policymaker, emphasizing the gap between the demands of the classical model of rational decision making and the substantial body of theory and evidence about various constraints that come into play in even relatively simple

49 Solomon Asch, “Effects of Group Pressures upon Modification and Distortion of Judgement,” in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (Evanston, IL, 1953), 151–62.

50 Janis, *Victims*; idem, *Groupthink*. See also Philip Tetlock, “Identifying Victims of Groupthink from Public Statements of Decision Makers,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (August 1979): 1314–24; and Paul Hart, Eric Stern and B. Sundelius, *Beyond Groupthink* (Stockholm, 1995).

51 Janis, *Groupthink*, 260–76; idem, *Crucial Decisions*, 231–64.

choice situations.⁵² Drawing upon cognitive psychology, these models go well beyond some of the earlier formulations that drew upon psychodynamic theories to identify various types of psychopathologies among political leaders: paranoia, authoritarianism, the displacement of private motives on public objects, etc.⁵³ Efforts to include information-processing behavior of the individual decision maker have been directed at the cognitive and motivational constraints that, in varying degrees, affect the decision-making performance of "normal" rather than pathological subjects. Thus, attention is directed to all leaders, not merely those, such as Hitler or Stalin, who display symptoms of clinical abnormalities.

Many challenges to the classical model have focused on limited human capabilities for objectively rational decision making. The cognitive constraints on rationality include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information about the situation; an inability to identify the entire set of policy alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each option; and an inability to order preferences on a single utility scale.⁵⁴ These have given rise to several competing conceptions of the decision maker and his or her strategies for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, incomplete or contradictory information and, paradoxically, information overload. They variously characterize the decision maker as a problem solver, naive or intuitive scientist, cognitive balancer, dissonance avoider, information seeker, cybernetic information processor, and reluctant decision maker.

Three of these conceptions seem especially relevant for foreign policy analysis. The first views the decision maker as a "bounded rationalist" who seeks satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. As Herbert Simon has put it, "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world – or even a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality."⁵⁵ Moreover, it is not practical for the decision maker to seek optimal choices; for example, because of the costs of searching for information.

52 For a review of the vast literature see Robert Abelson and A. Levi, "Decision Making and Decision Theory," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, ed. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (New York, 1985). The relevance of psychological models and evidence for international relations are most fully discussed in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976); Robert Axelrod, *The Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, 1976); Philip Tetlock, "Social Psychology and World Politics," in Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th ed. (Boston, 1998); and Jerel Rosati, "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics," *International Studies Review* 2 (Fall 2000): 45–75.

53 See, for example, Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1931).

54 March and Simon, *Organizations*, 113.

55 Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 198.

Related to this is the concept of the individual as a “cognitive miser,” one who seeks to simplify complex problems and to find short cuts to problem solving.

Another approach is to look at the decisionmaker as an “error prone intuitive scientist” who is likely to commit a broad range of inferential mistakes. Thus, rather than emphasizing the limits on search, information processing, and the like, this conception views the decision maker as the victim of flawed decision rules who uses data poorly. There are tendencies to underuse rate data in making judgments, believe in the “law of small numbers,” underuse diagnostic information, overweight low probabilities and underweight high ones, and violate other requirements of consistency and coherence.⁵⁶

The final perspective emphasizes the forces that dominate the policy-maker, forces that will not or cannot be controlled.⁵⁷ Decisionmakers are not merely rational calculators; important decisions generate conflict, and a reluctance to make irrevocable choices often results in behavior that reduces the quality of decisions. These models direct the analyst’s attention to policymakers’ belief systems, images of relevant actors, perceptions, information-processing strategies, heuristics, certain personality traits (ability to tolerate ambiguity, cognitive complexity, etc.), and their impact on decision-making performance.

Despite this diversity of perspectives and the difficulty of choosing between cognitive and motivational models, there has been some convergence on several types of constraints that may affect decision processes.⁵⁸ One involves the consequences of efforts to achieve cognitive consistency on perceptions and information processing. Several kinds of systematic bias have been identified in both experimental and historical studies. Policymakers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenge existing beliefs, preferences, hopes, and expectations. They may deny the need to confront

56 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” *Science* 211 (January 30, 1981): 453–58; Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (Cambridge, UK, 1982). Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist, won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for demonstrating in the works cited above and many others that humans often violate the rules of rational decision making posited by standard economic theory. His frequent collaborator, Amos Tversky, died in 1996 and thus was ineligible for sharing the Nobel Prize. Kahneman and Tversky were jointly awarded the 2003 Grawemeyer Prize for their contributions to psychology.

57 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore, 1981); Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds* (Stanford, 1990).

58 Donald Kinder and J. R. Weiss, “In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (December 1978): 707–35.

tradeoffs between values by persuading themselves that an option will satisfy all of them, and indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating others.

A comparison of a pair of two-term conservative Republican presidents may be used to illustrate the point about coping with tradeoffs. Both came to office vowing to improve national security policy and to balance the federal budget. President Eisenhower, recognizing the tradeoff between these goals, pursued security policies that reduced defense expenditures – for example, the “New Look” policy that placed greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and alliance policies that permitted maintenance of global commitments at lower cost. Despite widespread demands for vastly increased defense spending after the Soviet satellite Sputnik was successfully placed in orbit around the earth, Eisenhower refused to give in; indeed, he left office famously warning of the dangers of the “military-industrial complex.” The result was a period of balanced budgets in which surpluses in some years offset deficits in others. In contrast, President Reagan denied any tradeoffs between defense expenditures and budget deficits by positing that major tax cuts would stimulate the economy to produce increases in government revenues. The results proved otherwise as the Reagan years were marked by annual deficits ranging between \$79 billion and \$221 billion.

An extensive literature on styles of attribution has revealed several types of systematic bias. Perhaps the most important for foreign policy is the basic attribution error – a tendency to explain the adversary’s behavior in terms of his characteristics (for example, inherent aggressiveness or hostility) rather than in terms of the context or situation, while attributing one’s own behavior to the latter (for example, legitimate security needs arising from a dangerous and uncertain environment) rather than to the former. A somewhat related type of double standard has been noted by George Kennan: “Now is it our view that we should take account only of their [Soviet] capabilities, disregarding their intentions, but we should expect them to take account only of our supposed intentions, disregarding our capabilities?”⁵⁹

Analysts also have illustrated the effect on decisions of policymakers’ assumptions about order and predictability in the environment. Whereas a policymaker may have an acute appreciation of the disorderly environment in which he or she operates (arising, for example, from domestic political processes), there is a tendency to assume that others, especially adversaries, are free of such constraints. Graham Allison, Robert Jervis, and others have demonstrated that decision makers tend to believe that the realist “unitary rational actor” is the appropriate representation of the

59 George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1978), 87–88.

opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever happens is the direct result of deliberate choices.⁶⁰

Several models linking crisis-induced stress to decision processes have been developed and used in foreign policy studies.⁶¹ Irving Janis and Leon Mann have developed a more general conflict-theory model that conceives of man as a "reluctant decisionmaker" and focuses upon "when, how and why psychological stress generated by decisional conflict imposes limitations on the rationality of a person's decisions."⁶² One may employ five strategies for coping with a situation requiring a decision: unconflicted adherence to existing policy, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, hypervigilance, and vigilant decision making. The first four strategies are likely to yield low-quality decisions owing to an incomplete search for information, appraisal of the situation and options, and contingency planning, whereas vigilant decision making, characterized by a more adequate performance of vital tasks, is more likely to result in a high-quality choice. The factors that will affect the employment of decision styles are information about risks, expectations of finding a better option, and time for adequate search and deliberation.

A final approach we should consider attempts to show the impact of personal traits on decision making. Typologies that are intended to link leadership traits to decision-making behavior abound, but systematic research demonstrating such links is in much shorter supply. Still, some efforts have borne fruit. Margaret Hermann has developed a scheme for analyzing leaders' public statements of unquestioned authorship for eight variables: nationalism, belief in one's ability to control the environment, need for power, need for affiliation, ability to differentiate environments, distrust of others, self-confidence, and task emphasis. The scheme has been tested with impressive results on a broad range of contemporary leaders.⁶³ Alexander George has reformulated Nathan Leites's concept of "operational code" into five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs that are intended to describe politically relevant core beliefs, stimulating a number of empirical studies and, more recently, further significant conceptual revisions.⁶⁴ Finally, several psychologists have developed and tested the

60 Allison, *Essence*; Jervis, *Perception*.

61 Charles F. Hermann, *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York, 1972); Margaret G. Hermann, "Indicators of Stress in Policy-Makers during Foreign Policy Crises," *Political Psychology I* (March 1979): 27-46; Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal, 1972); Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers," *Political Science Annual*, vol. 6 (Indianapolis, 1975).

62 Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 3.

63 Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (March 1980): 746.

64 Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York, 1951); Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political

concept of "integrative complexity," defined as the ability to make subtle distinction along multiple dimensions, flexibility, and the integration of large amounts of diverse information to make coherent judgments.⁶⁵ A standard content analysis technique has been used for research on documentary materials generated by top decision makers in a wide range of international crises.⁶⁶

Decision-making approaches permit the analyst to overcome many limitations of the systemic models described earlier, but they also impose increasingly heavy data burdens on the analyst. Moreover, there is a danger that adding levels of analysis may result in an undisciplined proliferation of categories and variables. It may then become increasingly difficult to determine which are more or less important, and ad hoc explanations for individual cases erode the possibilities for broader generalizations across cases. Several well-designed, multicase, decision-making studies, however, indicate that these and other traps are not unavoidable.⁶⁷

Post-Modern Challenges

The field of international relations has gone through three "great debates" during the past century. The first, pitting the venerable realist tradition against various challengers, was summarized above. The second, centered on disagreements about the virtues and limitations of quantification ("if

Leaders and Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (June 1969): 190–222; Stephen G. Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the Operational Code Construct," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (June 1983): 179–202; Stephen Walker, Mark Shafer, and Michael Young, "Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflict in the Post-Cold War World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (1999): 610–625.

65 Integrative simplicity, on the other hand, is characterized by simple responses, gross distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage.

66 Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (March 1977): 169–86; Philip Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Foreign Policy Rhetoric: A Time Series Analysis," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49 (December 1985): 1565–85; Karen Guttieri, Michael Wallace, and Peter Suedfeld, "The Integrative Complexity of American Decision Makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (December 1995): 595–621.

67 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1974); Richard Smoke, *Escalation* (Cambridge, MA, 1977); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, 1977). Useful discussions on conducting theoretically relevant case studies may be found in Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, 9 vols., ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA, 1975), 7:79–138; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy*, 43–68; Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, 1994).

you can't count it, it doesn't count" versus "if you can count it, that ain't it") and, more recently, on "formal modeling." Although those arguments persist in various guises, they have been bypassed in this essay.

The most recent debate, in many respects the most fundamental of the three, is the "post-modern" challenges to all of the theories and models described above.⁶⁸ The intellectual foundations of post-modernism are largely in the humanities, but the current debates extend well beyond issues of humanistic versus social science perspectives on world politics. They are rooted in epistemology: What can we know? Rather than addressing the validity of specific variables, levels of analysis, or methodologies, most post-modernists challenge the premise that the social world constitutes an objective, knowable reality that is amenable to systematic description and analysis.

Although realism has been a prime target, all existing theories and methodologies are in the cross-hairs of post-modern critics who, as Pauline Rosenau noted, "soundly and swiftly dismiss international political economy, realism (and neorealism), regime theory, game theory, rational actor models, integration theory, transnational approaches, world system analysis and the liberal tradition in general."⁶⁹ Nor are any of the conventional methodologies employed by political scientists or diplomatic historians spared.

Some versions of post-modernism label "evidence" and "truth" as meaningless concepts, and they are critical of categories, classification, generalization, and conclusions. Nor is there any objective language by which knowledge can be transmitted; the choice of language unjustifiably grants privileged positions to one perspective or another. Thus, the task of the observer is to deconstruct "texts" (everything is a "text"). Each one creates a unique "reading" of the matter under consideration, none can ultimately be deemed superior to any other, and there are no guidelines for choosing among them.

Taken at face value, the ability of these post-modernist perspectives to shed light on the central issues of world affairs seems problematic,

68 This perspective is sometimes called "post-positivism" or "post-structuralism." Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 235-54; Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory," *Millennium* 21, No. 1 (1992): 77-98; and Chris Brown, "'Turtles All the Way Down': Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations," *Millennium* 23, No. 2 (1994): 213-36. For overviews, see Pauline Rosenau, *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences* (Princeton, 1992); Rosenau, "Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," *Millennium* (1990): 83-110; and D. S. L. Jarvis, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism* (Columbia, SC, 2000).

69 Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neo-Realism," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984): 225-86. Rosenau, "Once Again," 84.

and thus their contributions to either political science or diplomatic history would appear to be quite modest. Indeed, they appear to undermine the foundations of both undertakings, eliminating conventional research methods and aspirations for the cumulation of knowledge. Moreover, if one rejects the feasibility of research standards because they necessarily “privilege” some theories or methodologies, does that not also rule out judgments of works by Holocaust deniers or of conspiracy buffs who write, for example, about the Kennedy assassination or the Pearl Harbor attack?

Even more moderate versions of post-modernism are skeptical of theories and methods based on reason and Western logic, but works of this genre have occasionally offered insightful critiques of conventional theories, methodologies and concepts.⁷⁰ The proclivity of more than a few political scientists for reifying a false image of the “scientific method” and for overlooking the pervasiveness of less elegant methodologies offers an inviting target. However, such thoughtful critical analyses are certainly not the unique province of post-modern authors; critiques of naive perspectives on scientific methods, for example, have abounded in political science and history journals for several decades.

Finally, most post-modernists are highly critical of other approaches because they have failed to come up with viable solutions for mankind’s most pressing problems, including war, poverty, and oppression. Though some progress has been made on all these fronts, not even a modern-day Pangloss would declare victory on any of them. But what does post-modernist nihilism offer along these lines? Jarvis makes the point nicely:

In what sense, however, can this approach [post-modernism] be at all adequate for the subject of International Relations? What, for example, do the literary devices of irony and textuality say to Somalian refugees who flee from famine and warlords or to Ethiopian rebels who fight in the desert plains against a government in Addis Ababa? How does the notion of textual deconstruction speak to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who fight one another among the ruins of the former Yugoslavia? How do totalitarian narratives or logocentric binary logic feature in the deliberation of policy bureaucrats or in negotiations over international trade or the formulation of international law? Should those concerned with human rights or those who take it upon themselves to study relationships between nation-states begin by contemplating epistemological fiats and ontological disputes?⁷¹

70 Prominent post-modern students of world affairs include Hayward Alker, Jim George, Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, James Der Derian, Christine Sylvester, and R. B. J. Walker.

71 D. S. L. Jarvis, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism* (Columbia, SC, 2000), 197–98. For both substance and clarity, reform-minded social scientists are urged to compare the writing of Ashley and his colleagues with Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (March 2001): 1–13.

Quite aside from the emptiness of its message for those with a concern to improving the human condition, the stylistic wretchedness of most post-modern prose ensures that it will have scant impact on the real world.

Conclusion

The study of international relations and foreign policy has always been an eclectic undertaking, with extensive borrowing from disciplines other than political science and history⁷² At the most general level, the primary differences today tend to be between two broad approaches. Analysts of the first school focus on the structure of the international system, often borrowing from economics for models, analogies, insights, and metaphors, with an emphasis on *rational preferences and strategy* and how these tend to be shaped and constrained by the structure of the international system. Decision-making analysts, meanwhile, display a concern for internal political processes and tend to borrow from psychology and social psychology in order to understand better the *limits and barriers* to information processing and rational choice. For many purposes both approaches are necessary and neither is sufficient. Neglect of the system structure and its constraints may result in analyses that depict policymakers as relatively free agents with an almost unrestricted menu of choices, limited only by the scope of their ambitions and the resources at their disposal. At worst, this type of analysis can degenerate into Manichean explanations that depict foreign policies of the “bad guys” as the external manifestation of inherently flawed leaders or domestic structures, whereas the “good guys” only react from necessity.

Conversely, neglect of foreign policy decision making not only leaves one unable to explain fully the dynamics of international relations, but many important aspects of a nation's external behavior will be inexplicable. Advocates of the realist model have often argued its superiority for understanding the “high” politics of deterrence, containment, alliances, crises, and wars, if not necessarily for “low” politics. But there are several rejoinders to this line of reasoning. First, the low politics of trade, currencies, and other issues that are usually sensitive to domestic pressures are becoming an increasingly important element of international relations. The George W. Bush administration came into office vowing to replace the “mushy” policies of its predecessor with “hard-headed realism” based on self-defined national interests. Yet its actions have shown a consistent willingness to subordinate those interests to those of such favored domestic

72 The classic overview of the field and the disciplines that have contributed to it is Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955).

constituencies as the energy, steel and soft lumber industries, and the National Rifle Association. Second, the growing literature on the putative domain par excellence of realism, including deterrence, crises, and wars, raises substantial doubts about the universal validity of the realist model even for these issues.⁷³ Finally, exclusive reliance on realist models and their assumptions of rationality may lead to unwarranted complacency about dangers in the international system. Nuclear weapons and other features of the system have no doubt contributed to the "long peace" between major powers.⁷⁴ At the same time, however, a narrow focus on power balances, "correlations of forces," and other features of the international system will result in neglect of dangers – for example, the command, communication, control, intelligence problem or inadequate information processing – that can only be identified and analyzed by a decision-making perspective.⁷⁵

At a very general level, this conclusion parallels that drawn three decades ago by the foremost contemporary proponent of modern realism: The third image (system structure) is necessary for understanding the context of international behavior, whereas the first and second images (decisionmakers and domestic political processes) are needed to understand dynamics within the system.⁷⁶ But to acknowledge the existence of various levels of analysis is not enough. *What* the investigator wants to explain and the *level of specificity and comprehensiveness* to be sought should determine which level(s) of analysis are relevant and necessary. In this connection, it is essential to distinguish between two different dependent variables: foreign policy decisions by states, on the one hand, and the outcomes of policy and interactions between two or more states, on the other. Political scientists studying international relations are increasingly disciplining their use of multiple levels of analysis in studying outcomes that cannot be adequately explained via only a single level of analysis.⁷⁷

73 In addition to the literature on war, crises, and deterrence already cited see Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC, 1987); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, 1985); Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis Decision Making"; and Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 1, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York, 1989), 8–84, 209–333.

74 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986): 99–142.

75 Paul Bracken, *Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven, 1983); Bruce Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* (Washington, DC, 1985); Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts"; Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, 1980).

76 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 238.

77 See, for example, David B. Yoffie, *Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries* (New York, 1983); John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton, 1982); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disaster of 1914*

A renowned diplomatic historian asserted that most theories of international relations flunked a critical test by failing to forecast the end of the Cold War.⁷⁸ The end of the Cold War has also led some theorists to look outside the social sciences and humanities for appropriate metaphors and models, but these are beyond the scope of the present essay.⁷⁹ This conclusion speculates on the related question of how well the theories discussed above might help political scientists and historians understand global relations in the post-Cold War world. Dramatic events since the late 1980s have posed serious challenges to several of the system level theories, but we should be wary of writing premature obituaries for any of them, or engaging in "naïve (single case) falsification." Further, in 2003, only a little more than a decade after disintegration of the Soviet Union and less than a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some caution about declaring that major events and trends are irreversible seems warranted.

The global society/complex interdependence/liberal institutionalism theories have fared relatively better than either structural realism or various Marxist theories. For example, creation of the World Trade Organization and progress toward economic unification of Europe, although not without detours and setbacks, would appear to provide significant support for the view that, even in an anarchic world, major powers may find that it is in their self-interest to establish and maintain institutions for cooperating and overcoming the constraints of the "relative gains" problem. Woodrow Wilson's thesis that a world of democratic nations will be more peaceful has also enjoyed some revival, at least among analysts who attach significance to the fact that democratic nations have been able to establish "zones of peace" among themselves. Wilson's diagnosis that self-determination also supports peace may be correct in the abstract, but universal application of that principle is neither feasible nor desirable, if only because it would result in immense bloodshed; the peaceful divorces of Norway and Sweden in 1905 and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 are unfortunately not the norm.⁸⁰ Although it appears that economic

(Ithaca, NY, 1984); Vinod K. Aggarwal, *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade* (Berkeley, 1985); Larson, *Origins of Containment*; Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*; and Stephen Walt, *Alliances*.

78 John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17 (Winter 1992-93): 5-58.

79 Rosenau's concept of "turbulence" is drawn from meteorology, and Gaddis finds some interesting parallels between the contemporary international system and "tectonics," a concept drawn from geology. Rosenau, *Turbulence*; and John Lewis Gaddis, "Living in Candlestick Park," *Atlantic Monthly* (April 1999): 65-74.

80 Although the concept of self-determination is generally associated with liberals, in the wake of civil wars within the former Yugoslavia, two prominent realists have suggested redrawing the map of the Balkans to reflect ethnic identities. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing," *New York Times* (April 19, 1999), p. A27.

interests have come to dominate nationalist, ethnic, or religious passions among most industrial democracies, the evidence is far less assuring in other areas, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Recent events appear to have created an especially difficult challenge for structural realism; although it provides a parsimonious and elegant theory, its deficiencies are likely to become more rather than less apparent in the post-Cold War world. Its weaknesses in dealing with questions of system change and in specifying policy preferences other than survival and security are likely to be magnified. Moreover, whereas classical realism includes some attractive prescriptive features (caution, humility, warnings against mistaking one's preferences for the moral laws of the universe), neorealism is an especially weak source of policy-relevant theory. Indeed, some of the prescriptions put forward by neo-realists, such as letting Germany join the nuclear club or urging Ukraine to keep its nuclear weapons, seem reckless.⁸¹ In addition to European economic cooperation, specific events that seem inexplicable by structural realism include Soviet acquiescence in the collapse of its empire and peaceful transformation of the system structure. The persistence of NATO, more than a decade after disappearance of the threat that gave rise to its creation, has also confounded realist predictions that it would not long survive the end of the Cold War; in 1993, Waltz asserted: "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are."⁸² The problem cannot be resolved by definition: asserting that NATO is no longer an alliance because its original adversary has collapsed. Nor can the theory be saved by a tautology: claiming that the Cold War ended, exactly as predicted by structural realism, "only when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared."⁸³ These developments are especially telling because structural realism is explicitly touted as a theory of major powers. Although proponents of realism are not ready to concede that events of the past decade have raised some serious questions about its validity, as distinguished a realist as Robert Tucker has characterized structural realism as "more questionable than ever."⁸⁴

81 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 5–56. Rejoinders by Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Bruce Russett, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, as well as responses by Mearsheimer, may be found in the same journal (Fall 1990): 191–99; and (Winter 1990/91): 216–22. Also, Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 50–66.

82 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 (Fall 1993): 76.

83 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 19, 39.

84 Robert W. Tucker, "Realism and the New Consensus," *National Interest* 30 (1992–93): 33–36. See also Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19 (1994): 108–48.

More importantly, even though the possibility of war among major powers cannot be dismissed and proliferation may place nuclear weapons into the hands of leaders with little stake in maintaining the status quo, national interests and even conceptions of national security have increasingly come to be defined in ways that transcend the power balances that lie at the core of structural realism. The expanded agenda of national interests, combined with the trend toward greater democracy in many parts of the world, suggests that we are entering an era in which the relative potency of systemic and domestic forces in shaping and constraining international affairs is moving toward the latter. The frequency of internal wars that have become international conflicts – the list includes but is not limited to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, and several parts of the former Yugoslavia – suggests that “failed states” may compete with international aggression as the major source of war.⁸⁵ Such issues as trade, immigration, the environment, and others can be expected to enhance the impact of domestic actors – including legislatures, public opinion, and ethnic, religious, economic, and perhaps even regional interest groups – while reducing the ability of executives to dominate the process on the grounds, so frequently invoked during times of war and crises, that the adept pursuit of national interests requires secrecy, flexibility, and the ability to act with speed on the basis of classified information.

If that prognosis is anywhere near the mark, it should enhance the value of decision-making models, some of which were discussed above, that encompass domestic political processes. Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, these models seem less vulnerable to such major events as the end of the Cold War. Most policymaking will continue to be made by leaders in small groups, with supports and constraints from bureaucracies. Moreover, even if nation-states are having to share the global center stage with a plethora of nonstate actors, decision-making concepts such as information processing, satisficing, bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and many of the others described above can be applied equally well to the World Trade Organization, NATO, OPEC, and the like.

Which of these models and approaches are likely to be of interest and utility to the diplomatic historian? Clearly there is no one answer: political scientists are unable to agree on a single multilevel approach to international relations and foreign policy; thus they are hardly in a position to offer a single recommendation to historians. In the absence of the often-sought but always-elusive unified theory of human behavior that could provide a model for all seasons and all reasons, one must ask at least

85 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994): 44–76; K. J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge, MA, 1996); and Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York, 1999).

one further question: a model for what purpose? For example, in some circumstances, such as research on major international crises, it may be important to obtain systematic evidence on the beliefs and other intellectual baggage that key policymakers bring to their deliberations. Some of the approaches described above should prove very helpful in this respect. Conversely, there are many other research problems for which the historian would quite properly decide that this type of analysis requires far more effort than could possibly be justified by the benefits to be gained.

Of the systemic approaches described here, little needs to be said about classical realism because its main features, as well as its strengths and weaknesses, are familiar to most diplomatic historians. Those who focus on security issues can hardly neglect its central premises and concepts. Waltz's version of structural realism is likely to have more limited appeal to historians, especially if they take seriously his doubts about being able to incorporate foreign policy into it. It may perhaps serve to raise consciousness about the importance of the systemic context within which international relations take place, but that may not be a major gain; after all, such concepts as "balance of power" have long been a standard part of the diplomatic historian's vocabulary.

The Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence/Liberal Institutionalism models will be helpful to historians with an interest in the evolution of the international system and with the growing disjuncture between demands on states and their ability to meet them, the "sovereignty gap." One need not be very venturesome to predict that this gap will grow rather than narrow. Historians of international and transnational organizations are also likely to find useful concepts and insights in these models.

It is much less clear that the Marxist/World System/Dependency theories will provide useful new insights to historians. If one has difficulty in accepting certain assumptions as *true by definition* – for example, that there has been and is today a single "world capitalist system" – then the kinds of analyses that follow are likely to seem flawed. Most diplomatic historians also would have difficulty in accepting models that relegate the state to a secondary role. Finally, whereas proponents of GS/CI/LI models can point with considerable justification to current events and trends that would appear to make them more rather than less relevant in the future, supporters of the M/WS/D models have a much more difficult task in this respect. The declining legitimacy of Marxism–Leninism as the basis for government does not, of course, necessarily invalidate social science theories that draw upon Marx, Lenin, and their intellectual heirs. It might, however, at least be the occasion for second thoughts, especially because Marx and his followers have always placed a heavy emphasis on an intimate connection between theory and practice.

Although the three decision-making models sometimes include jargon that may be jarring to the historian, many of the underlying concepts

are familiar. Much of diplomatic history has traditionally focused on the decisions, actions, and interactions of national leaders who operate in group contexts, such as cabinets or ad hoc advisory groups, and who draw upon the resources of such bureaucracies as foreign and defense ministries or the armed forces. The three types of models described above typically draw heavily upon psychology, social psychology, organizational theory, and other social sciences; thus for the historian they open some important windows to these fields. For example, theories and concepts of "information processing" by individuals, groups, and organizations should prove very useful.

Decision-making models may also appeal to diplomatic historians for another important reason. Political scientists who are accustomed to working with fairly accessible "hard" information such as figures on gross national products, defense budgets, battle casualties, alliance commitments, UN votes, trade, investments, and the like often feel that the data requirements of decision-making models are excessive. This is precisely the area in which the historian has a decided comparative advantage, for the relevant data are usually to be found in the paper or electronic trails left by policymakers, and they are most likely to be unearthed by archival research. For purposes of organization this essay has focused on some major distinctions between theoretical perspectives. This should not be read, however, as ruling out efforts to build bridges between them, as urged in several recent essays.⁸⁶

Perhaps the appropriate point on which to conclude this essay is to reverse the question posed earlier: Ask not only what can the political scientist contribute to the diplomatic historian but ask also what can the diplomatic historian contribute to the political scientist. At the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of their own models if historians would use them and offer critical assessments of their strengths and limitations.

A Note on Sources

Contributions to and debates about theories of international relations take place within both books and journals. While it is impossible to forecast the books that may, in the future, be useful in this respect, it may be helpful to identify some journals that are likely to be especially fruitful

86 Robert O. Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the 'Liberalism of Fear,'" *Dialog-IO* (Spring 2002): 29–43; Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," *International Studies Review* 4 (Spring 2002): 49–72; and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading," *International Studies Review* 4 (Spring 2002): 73–97.

sources of theoretical developments and controversies. This list is limited to U.S.-based journals. Many others published in Europe, Japan, Israel, South Korea and elsewhere may also include relevant articles.

The top mainline political science journals include *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, and *American Journal of Political Science*. *APSR* has published some major articles in international relations and foreign policy, especially in recent years, and each issue has a section devoted to book reviews. However, all three of these journals tend to place greater emphasis on American politics. That is especially true of *JP* and *AJPS*.

International Organization, *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Security Studies*, and *World Politics* are the most important sources of articles that bear on theoretical issues. Many of the authors are political scientists, but diplomatic historians, economists, sociologists and other social scientists are also frequently represented on their pages. These journals are indispensable for anyone interested in following theoretical developments and debates. Of the six, only *World Politics* regularly features extended book reviews.

Foreign Affairs and *Foreign Policy* are largely focused on current affairs, but on occasion essays in these journals have been authored by major contributors to current debates about theoretical issues. Both include book reviews, but they are often relatively brief.

The best source of book reviews is *International Studies Review*, which, along with *International Studies Quarterly*, is a publication of the International Studies Association. It features both extended review essays and shorter critical assessments of single books. *ISR* regularly includes reviews of books published in languages other than English.

Bureaucratic Politics

J. GARRY CLIFFORD

In the mid-1960s, when members of the Harvard Faculty Study Group on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy began to write their scholarly tomes, their sometime colleague in the mathematics department, the irreverent folk singer Tom Lehrer, inadvertently gave song to what came to be called the “bureaucratic politics” approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy. In his ballad about a certain German emigre rocket scientist, Lehrer wrote: “Once the rockets are up / Who cares where they come down? / That’s not my department! / Said Wernher von Braun.”¹ Lehrer’s ditty, by suggesting that government is a complex, compartmentalized machine and that those running the machine do not always intend what will result, anticipated the language of bureaucratic politics. The dark humor also hinted that the perspective might sometimes excuse as much as it explains about the foreign policy of the United States.

The formal academic version of bureaucratic politics came a few years later with the publication in 1971 of Graham T. Allison’s *Essence of Decision*. Building on works by Warner R. Schilling, Roger Hilsman, Richard E. Neustadt, and other political scientists who emphasized informal bargaining within the foreign policy process, and adding insights from organizational theorists such as James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Allison examined the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to counter the traditional assumption that foreign policy is produced by the purposeful acts of unified national governments. Allison argued that instead of behaving like a “rational actor,” the Kennedy administration’s actions during the crisis were best explained as “outcomes” of standard operating procedures followed by separate organizations (the Navy’s blockade, the Central Intelligence Agency’s U-2 overflights, and the air force’s scenarios for a surgical air strike) and as a result of compromise and competition among hawks and doves seeking to advance individual and organizational versions of the national interest. Allison soon collaborated with Morton

1 Tom Lehrer, *That Was the Year That Was* (Reprise Records RS 6179), recorded July 1965.

H. Halperin to formalize the bureaucratic politics paradigm.² Other scholars followed with bureaucratic analyses of topics including American decision making in the Vietnam War, the nonrecognition of China, the Marshall Plan, U.S.-Turkish relations, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) decision, nuclear weapons accidents, and U.S. international economic policy, as well as refinements and critiques of the Allison-Halperin model. The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard made bureaucratic politics the centerpiece of its new public policy program, and Allison became its dean. In 1999, his framework long since hailed as "one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social science," Allison and Philip Zelikow prepared an extensive, revised edition of *Essence of Decision* to refute political science theorists who "explain state behavior by system-level or external factors alone."³

The Allisonian message holds that U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly political and cumbersome with the growth of bureaucracy.

- 2 Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971). See also idem, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 689-718; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961); Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, NJ, 1967); Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly* 76 (March 1961): 24-46; James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958); and Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics* 24 (Spring 1972): 40-80. This last essay combines Allison's "organizational process" model and "governmental politics" model into one paradigm.
- 3 Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic Politics and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," *World Politics* 25 (October 1972): 62-96; idem, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, 1974); I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform* (Princeton, 1974); David J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946* (Thessaloniki, 1980); Stephen D. Cohen, *The Making of United States International Economic Policy* (New York, 1977); Hadley Arkes, *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest* (Princeton, 1973); Leslie Gelb, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC, 1979); James C. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," *The China Quarterly* 50 (April-June 1973): 220-43; Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, 1993); Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "Allison's Models," in *American Defense Policy*, eds. John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., 4th ed. (Baltimore, 1977), 22; David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security* 17 (Fall 1992): 112-46; Jonathan Bender and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review* 86 (June 1992): 301-22; Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Affairs* 70 (October 1994): 659-84; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision* (2nd ed., New York, 1999), 404. For recent debates among political scientists over state-level vs. systems-level theories, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 (October 1998): 144-72; and James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 289-313.

Diversity and conflict permeate the policy process. There is no single “maker” of foreign policy. Policy flows instead from an amalgam of organizations and political actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and organizational interests as they try to influence decisions. Even in the aftermath of such national disasters as Pearl Harbor or the terrorist attacks of September 2001, turf wars proliferate because agencies reflexively resist reorganization and scapegoat others to avoid blame. The president, while powerful, is not omnipotent; he is one chief among many. For example, President Ronald Reagan may have envisaged his Strategic Defense Initiative (or “Star Wars”) as a workable program to shield entire populations from the threat of nuclear war, but hardliners in the Pentagon saw it primarily as an antiballistic missile defense that would gain a technological advantage over the Soviet Union and stifle public agitation for more substantial arms control proposals.⁴

Even after a direct presidential decision the “game” does not end because decisions are often ignored or reversed. Just as Jimmy Carter thought he had killed the B-1 bomber, only to see it revived during the Reagan years, so too did Franklin D. Roosevelt veto a “Pacific First” strategy in 1942, whereupon the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in historian Mark Stoler’s words, “formally submitted to his/FDR’s/orders but did so in such a way as to enable them to pursue a modified version of their alternative strategy” for the rest of World War II.⁵ Because organizations rely on routines and plans derived from experience with familiar problems, those standard routines usually form the basis for options furnished the president. Ask an organization to do what it has not done previously, and it will usually do what the U.S. military did in Vietnam: It will follow existing doctrines and procedures, modifying them only slightly in deference to different conditions.

Final decisions are also “political resultants,” the product of compromise and bargaining among the various participants. As Allison puts it, policies are “resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen...but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense/of/... bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of government.” Similarly, once a decision is made, considerable slippage can occur in implementing it. What follows becomes hostage to standard operating procedures and the parochial interests of the actors and agencies doing the implementing. Even when a president personally

4 See Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York, 2000), chaps. 4–6.

5 Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 84.

monitors performance, as John F. Kennedy tried to do during the missile crisis, organizational routines and hierarchies are so rigid and complex that the president cannot micromanage all that happens. Not only did Kennedy not know that antisubmarine warfare units were routinely forcing Soviet submarines to the surface, thus precipitating the very confrontations he wanted to avoid, but the president was also unaware that NATO's nuclear-armed fighter-bombers had been put on a nuclear Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), thus escaping the tight personal controls he had placed on Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.⁶

The bureaucratic politics perspective also suggests that intramural struggles over policy can consume so much time and attention that dealing with external realities can become secondary. Virtually every study of nuclear arms negotiations from the Baruch Plan to START confirms the truism that arriving at a consensus among the various players and agencies within the U.S. government was more complicated, if not more difficult, than negotiating with the Soviets. Ironically, officials who are finely attuned to the conflict and compartmentalization within the American government often see unitary, purposeful behavior on the part of other governments. Recall the rush to judgment about the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner in autumn 1983 as compared to the embarrassed and defiant explanations emanating from Washington when a U.S. navy spy plane collided with a Chinese jet and crash-landed on Hainan Island in 2001. When NATO forces carried out long-planned war games (Operation Able Archer) in the aftermath of the KAL 007 shoot-down, Washington experts scoffed at intelligence reports that Soviet leaders genuinely feared a nuclear first strike, calling it a disinformation ploy. Only President Reagan, as one scholar has noted, worried that "[Andrei] Gromyko and [Yuri] Andropov are just two players sitting on top of a large military machine" and that panic and miscalculation might lead to Armageddon, so he told his startled senior advisers. Reagan's very next speech called for "nuclear weapons" to be "banished from the face of the earth."⁷

Several important criticisms have been leveled at the bureaucratic politics approach. Some critics contend that ideological core values shared by those whom Richard J. Barnett has called "national security managers" weigh more in determining policy than do any differences attributable to

6 Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 138, 162; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 198–201.

7 Larry G. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Winter 1982): 69–95; Michael Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate* (New York, 1984); John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn* (New York, 1973); Gerard C. Smith, *Doubletalk* (New York, 1980); Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York, 1979); idem, *Deadly Gambits* (New York, 1984). Quotation is from Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal* (Columbia, MO, 1997), 134–35.

bureaucratic position. The axiom "where you stand depends on where you sit" has had less influence, they argue, than the generational mindset of such individuals as McGeorge Bundy, Paul Nitze, John J. McCloy, and Clark Clifford, whose participation in the foreign policy establishment spanned decades and cut across bureaucratic and partisan boundaries.⁸ Because, as Robert S. McNamara later observed of the missile crisis, "you can't manage" crises amidst all the "misinformation, miscalculation, misjudgment, and human fallibility," other critics suggest that the framework lets decisionmakers off the hook by failing to pinpoint responsibility.⁹ Indeed, the president can dominate the bureaucracy by selecting key players and setting the rules of the game. Even though President Reagan once joked that "sometimes our right hand doesn't know what our far right-hand is doing," his defenders erred in absolving Reagan by blaming the Iran-contra affair on insiders "with their own agenda" who allegedly deceived the detached president by feeding him false information. Yet, as Theodore Draper has clearly demonstrated, at all top-level meetings on Iran-contra, President Reagan spoke more than any of his advisers, forcefully steered discussions, and made basic decisions, whether or not he subsequently approved every operational detail.¹⁰ The historian must be careful in each case to judge how much of the buck that stops with the president has already been spent by the bureaucracy.

Problems of evidence also arise. Given the pitfalls of getting access to recent government documents, analysts of bureaucratic politics have relied heavily on personal interviews. Indeed, one scholar has stated that if "forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents." In addition to using available documents, James G. Blight and David A. Welch have pioneered a "critical oral history" method whereby

8 In their second edition Allison and Zelikow reformulate the axiom as follows: "Where one stands is influenced, most often influenced strongly, by where one sits. Knowledge of the organizational seat at the table yield significant clues about a likely stand." Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 307.

9 Quoted in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink* (New York, 1989), 100.

10 See Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences* 4 (December 1973): 467-90; Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy* 7 (Summer 1972): 159-79; Desmond J. Ball, "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory," *Australian Outlook* 28 (April 1974): 71-92; James H. Nathan and James K. Oliver, "Bureaucratic Politics, Academic Windfalls, and Intellectual Pitfalls," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 6 (Spring 1978): 81-91; Dan Caldwell, "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making," *American Behavioral Scientist* 21 (September-October 1977): 87-110; Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (Baltimore, 1972), esp. 48-91; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men* (New York, 1986); Kai Bird, *The Chairman* (New York, 1992); idem, *The Color of Truth* (New York, 1998); Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line* (New York, 1991), 567.

participants and scholars meet to reexamine past event, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War.¹¹ Despite the value of having former policymakers review their roles and answer hard questions for the record, the Rosetta Stone for scholars of the missile crisis has been the declassification and publication of all White House tapes pertaining to the October 1962 confrontation.¹² In fact, Allison has relied on ExCom transcripts and other documents to correct historical inaccuracies from his first edition.¹³ As foreign relations historians await the release of further presidential tape recordings from the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years, Robert Schulzinger reminds us that the broader inter-agency documentation (as well as delays in publication schedules) in recent *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volumes has been the result of bureaucratic battles, in which the State Department Historical Office, abetted by its Historical Advisory Committee, has pressed the CIA and other agencies to disgorge and declassify records more than 25 years old.¹⁴

Yet such defects in the bureaucratic politics approach may not hamper historians, who do not need models that predict perfectly. Unlike political scientists, they do not seek to build better theories or to propose more effective management techniques. Because the bureaucratic politics approach emphasizes state-level analysis, it cannot answer such system-level questions as why the United States has opposed revolutions or why East-West issues have predominated over North-South issues.¹⁵ It is better at explaining the timing and mechanics of particular episodes, illuminating proximate as opposed to deeper causes, and showing why outcomes were not what was intended. The bureaucratic details of debacles such as Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs invasion are thus better understood than the long-term dynamics of war and peace. As such, to borrow Isaiah Berlin's anthropomorphic analogy, bureaucratic politics provides one of the many truths the fox must know as it competes with the single-minded

11 Neustadt, quoted in Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 181 and in Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 312–13; Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*; Blight, Welch, and Bruce J. Allyn, eds., *Castro on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York, 1993); idem, *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27–28, 1989* (Lanham, MD, 1992); Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Re-count the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago, 1994); Robert S. McNamara et al., *Argument Without End* (Washington, DC, 1999).

12 Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA, 1997).

13 See Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 134–64.

14 Robert D. Schulzinger, "Transparency, Secrecy, and Citizenship," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Spring 2001): 165–78.

15 See Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000): 739–69.

hedgehog.¹⁶ Whether one studies nuclear strategy, the rise of the military-industrial complex, or the U.S. alliance with Britain, bureaucratic history provides pertinent pieces to the jigsaw puzzle.¹⁷

Scholars have made excellent use of the perspective when it fits. In a recent study of Allied war crimes policies during World War II, Arie J. Kochavi has shown that, despite indifference and opposition from the State Department and Foreign Office (not to mention FDR's preference for summary executions), what eventually became the Nuremberg Charter resulted from Treasury and War Department compromises over Germany's postwar occupation, and from second-level officials such as Herbert Pell who insisted that the murder of German Jewish nationals be included as war crimes. One of the few efforts to test Allison's models systematically, Lucien S. Vandenbroucke's analysis of the Bay of Pigs affair places much of the blame on officials in the Central Intelligence Agency who sold the operation as a fail-safe version of the 1954 Guatemalan intervention and did not argue against White House restrictions because "we felt that when the chips were down," as CIA Director Allen Dulles later wrote, "any action required for success would have been authorized [by the president] rather than permit the enterprise to fail." In a careful study of V-E Day, 1945, Theodore Wilson has shown that bureaucratic mismanagement derailed any early end to World War II, as State, War, and Treasury officials fought among themselves and with Allied counterparts over "soft" and "hard" postwar plans for a still unconquered and unoccupied Germany, as a sprawling Anglo-American military bureaucracy made elaborate plans for disparate operations in global theaters, with planners focusing on their own military campaigns with little or no attention to the larger political aims – and without the knowledge of atomic weapons. The "unconditional surrender" formula, devised in 1943 as a propaganda ploy, took on a life of its own with the unintended consequence of strengthening Germany's resolve to fight to the bitter end. In short, Wilson concludes, the coordination necessary for a swift "endgame" was conspicuously absent.¹⁸

16 Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York, 1957).

17 David Alan Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983): 3–71; Andreas Wenger, *Living With Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons* (Lanham, MD, 1997); Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY, 1995); Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, NY, 1992); Paul A. C. Koistinen, *Planning War, Pursuing Peace* (Lawrence, KS, 1998); Brian Waddell, *War Against the New Deal* (Carbondale, 2000); Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York, 1970); idem, *Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis* (Ithaca, NY, 1999).

18 Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment* (Chapel Hill, 1998); Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Fall 1984): 471–89; Dulles

Ernest R. May, chair of the Harvard seminar that inaugurated the bureaucratic politics approach, has utilized it artfully and often. Because “one cannot run the facts of political history through a computer and test whether the outcome would have been different if one variable was changed and the others remained constant,” May has been suggestive rather than definitive in studying historical lessons used and misused by bureaucrats and presidents. He has compared Harry S. Truman’s decision not to intervene in China in 1945–1949 with that of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to do so in Vietnam; he has analyzed the disparate personal motives in the making of the Monroe Doctrine, studied intelligence assessments prior to the two world wars, and, most recently, carefully reconstructed the multiple reasons for France’s defeat in 1940 wherein “German processes of executive government – the ways in which the German government decided how to act – worked better than did those in the French and British governments.”¹⁹

Greater application of the bureaucratic politics framework presupposes solid monographs on the foreign affairs bureaucracies and good biographies of key players. Indeed, May has urged “quasi-anthropological research just to establish who ought to be in our narratives.”²⁰ Thus far the historical literature, as might be expected, is fullest on the period before 1945. Building on the organizational synthesis of Robert H. Wiebe and Louis Galambos, historians have done fine work in charting the growth of the State Department and U.S. Foreign Service, analyzing the collective worldview at the State Department, and studying its regional experts. Irwin Gellman is particularly effective in exposing the Byzantine secrets, animosities, and ambitions that dominated Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s twelve-year tenure, wherein Hull, William C. Bullitt, R. Walton Moore, and others plotted the ouster of Undersecretary Sumner Welles for his alleged homosexual behavior, thereby removing the one individual on whom FDR counted to coordinate policies and thus “guaranteeing governmental discontinuity after his death.”²¹

quoted in idem, “The ‘Confessions’ of Allen Dulles,” *Diplomatic History* 8 (Fall 1984): 369; idem, *Perilous Options* (New York, 1993); Wilson, “Endgame: V-E Day and War Termination,” in Theodore A. Wilson and Arnold A. Offner, eds., *Victory in Europe 1945: From World War to Cold War* (Lawrence, KS, 2000), 11–46.

- 19 Ernest R. May, *The Truman Administration and China, 1945–1949* (Philadelphia, 1975), 49, and May, *Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France* (New York, 2000), 458. See also idem, “Lessons” of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973); idem, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge, MA, 1973); and idem, *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before Two World Wars* (Princeton, 1984).

- 20 May, “Writing Contemporary International History,” *Diplomatic History* 8 (Spring 1984): 110.

- 21 Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967); Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” *Business History Review*

Even more conducive to bureaucratic analysis has been the release of millions of inter-agency documents from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, including Pentagon and intelligence records. Mark Stoler's analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Melvyn Leffler's massive study of national security policy during the Truman administration, and Robert Buzzanco on civil-military relations during the Vietnam War are models for integrating military developments (including organizational rivalries) into mainstream foreign relations history. Similarly, journals such as *Intelligence and National Security*, Gregory Mitrovich's study of covert operations for subverting the Soviet bloc, Richard Aldrich on Anglo-American intelligence competition in Asia, David Alvarez on code-breaking during World War II, David Rudgers on the origins of the CIA, among others, demonstrate that rigorous, nuanced interdepartmental analysis has rescued intelligence history from the espionage buffs.²²

When can the framework be most helpful? Because organizations function most predictably in a familiar environment, major transformations in the international system (wars and their aftermaths, economic crises, the Sino-Soviet split) require the analyst to study how these changes produce, however belatedly, institutional adjustments in U.S. policies. Equally propitious, even for the pre-Cold War era, are military occupations wherein the often clashing missions of diplomats and military proconsuls ("striped pants" versus "gold braid," in Eric Roorda's formulation) complicate the management of empire from Managua to Manila.²³ So too are political transitions that bring in new players pledged to reverse the priorities of their predecessors, and particularly those administrations in which the president, deliberately or not, encourages competition and initiative from strong-willed subordinates. Fiascos such as the U.S. failure to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Iran-contra affair not only force

44 (Autumn 1970): 279–90; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," in *Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy*, eds. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and David Brody (Columbus, OH, 1971); Richard Hume Werking, *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890–1913* (Lexington, KY, 1977); Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind* (Middletown, CT, 1975); Gellman, *Secret Affairs* (Baltimore, 1995), x.

22 Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power* (Stanford, 1992); Buzzanco, *Masters of War* (New York, 1996); Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin* (Ithaca, 2000); Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan* (Cambridge, UK, 2000); Alvarez, *Secret Messages* (Lawrence, 2000); Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State* (Lawrence, 2000).

23 For example, John Major, *Prized Possession* (New York, 1993); Bruce Calder, *The Impact of Intervention* (Austin, TX, 1984); Hans Schmidt, *The United States and the Occupation of Haiti, 1914–1934* (New Brunswick, 1971); Brian Linn, *Guardians of Empire* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty* (Maryknoll, NY, 1977); Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945* (Durham, NC, 1998).

agencies to reassess procedures and programs but, even better, often spawn official investigations that provide scholars with abundant evidence for bureaucratic analysis. Budget battles, weapons procurement, coordination of intelligence, war termination, alliance politics – in short, any foreign policy that engages the separate attentions of multiple agencies and agents – should alert the historian to the bureaucratic politics perspective.

Consider, for example, the complex dynamics of American entry into World War II. Looking at the period through the lens of bureaucratic politics reveals that FDR had more than Congress in mind when making his famous remark: “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead – and to find no one there.”²⁴ The institutional aversion to giving commissioned naval vessels to a foreign power delayed the destroyers-for-bases deal for several weeks in the summer of 1940, and only by getting eight British bases in direct exchange for the destroyers could Roosevelt persuade the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold Stark, to certify, as required by statute, that these destroyers were no longer essential to national defense. According to navy scuttlebutt, the president threatened to fire Stark if he did not support what virtually every naval officer opposed and the admiral agonized before acquiescing. The army’s initial opposition to peacetime conscription, FDR’s dramatic appointment of Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox to head the War and Navy departments in June 1940, his firing of Admiral James O. Richardson for his opposition to basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, the refusal of the army and navy to mount expeditions to the Azores and Dakar in the spring of 1941, the unvarying strategic advice not to risk war until the armed forces were better prepared – all suggest an environment in which the president had to push hard to get the bureaucracy to accept his policy of supporting the Allies by steps short of war.²⁵ Even the navy’s eagerness to begin Atlantic convoys in spring 1941 and the subsequent Army Air Corps strategy of reinforcing the Philippines with B-17s were aimed in part at deploying ships and planes that FDR might otherwise have given to the British and the Russians.²⁶

24 For FDR’s remark, see John F. Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1939–1941* (New York, 1968), 63; John C. O’Laughlin memo of telephone conversation with Herbert Hoover, 16 August 1940, O’Laughlin Papers, Box 45, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; and William R. Castle, Jr., diary, 20 September 1940, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

25 As to the important revelations from MAGIC code-breaking about Japanese intentions in 1941, FDR apparently paid little attention. “Roosevelt never seems to have grasped that SIGINT provided him with the best intelligence in the history of warfare.” Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only* (New York, 1995), 139.

26 J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence, KS, 1986); J. Garry Clifford, “A Connecticut Colonel’s Candid Conversation with

Bureaucratic opposition also revealed itself in leaks. Colonel Truman Smith, an intelligence officer on the General Staff with close ties to Charles A. Lindbergh, told former President Herbert Hoover in June 1941 that "no member of the General Staff wants to go to war . . . Out of fifteen members in his section of the General Staff . . . no one could see any point of our going to war." When the chairman of the America First Committee made a speech the following July predicting the occupation of Iceland while U.S. forces were still at sea, War Department lawyers considered the leak a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917 (even though the landing took place without incident). The more notorious leak of the Joint Army-Navy's RAINBOW-5 war plans to the *Chicago Tribune* just a few days before Pearl Harbor prompted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to trace the source to someone close to Army Air Corps chief General Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, perhaps Arnold himself.²⁷ This is not to argue that the German military attaché was correct in boasting to Berlin that pro-Nazi officers on the American General Staff would block U.S. intervention. It does affirm, however, that in steering the country toward war in 1940 and 1941, President Roosevelt could not move any faster than the armed forces were prepared to go. A zig-zag course became inevitable.

In sum, this essay should be read as a modest plea for greater attention to bureaucratic politics. The perspective can enrich and complement other approaches. By focusing on internal political processes we become aware of the tradeoffs within government that reflect the cooperative core values posited by the corporatists or neorealists. In its emphasis on individual values and tugging and hauling by key players, bureaucratic politics makes personality and cognitive processes crucial to understanding who wins and why. Bureaucratic hawks, as Frank Costigliola has noted, often use emotion-laden, gendered language to prevail over their dovish colleagues.²⁸ Although bureaucratic struggles may be over tactics more than strategy, over pace rather than direction, those distinctions

the Wrong Commander-in-Chief," *Connecticut History* 28 (November 1987): 25–38; Waldo H. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York, 1988), 42–44, 144; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, chaps. 2–3.

- 27 Herbert Hoover memo of conversation with Truman Smith, June 1, 1941, Post-presidential individual files, box 509A, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, IA Grenville Clark memorandum to Henry L. Stimson, July 18, 1941, Clark Papers, Baker Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, Thomas Fleming, "The Big Leak," *American Heritage* 38 (December 1987): 64–71; James V. Compton, *The Swastika and the Eagle* (Boston, 1967), 105–24. For analysis of leaks during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Thomas G. Paterson, "The Historian as Detective: Senator Kenneth Keating, the Missiles in Cuba, and His Mysterious Source," *Diplomatic History* 11 (Winter 1987): 67–70.

- 28 Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration": Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George F. Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 309–56.

may matter greatly when the outcome is a divided Berlin and Korea, a second atomic bomb, impromptu hostage rescue missions that fail, or a military “exit strategy” that precludes occupation of the enemy’s capital. Too easily dismissed as a primer for managing crisis that should be avoided, the bureaucratic politics perspective also warns that when “governments collide,” the machines cannot do what they are not programmed to do.²⁹ Rather than press “delete” and conceptualize policy only as rational action, it is incumbent on historians to know how the machines work, their repertoires, the institutional rules of the game, the rosters, and how the box score is kept. The peculiarities of the U.S. checks-and-balances system of governance make such analysis imperative. The British ambassador Edward Lord Halifax once likened the foreign policy processes in Washington to “a disorderly line of beaters out shooting; they do put the rabbits out of the bracken, but they don’t come out where you would expect.”³⁰ Historians of American foreign relations need to identify the beaters and follow them into the bureaucratic forest because the quarry is much bigger than rabbit.

29 Wallace Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968* (Berkeley, 1980).

30 Lord Halifax to Sir John Simon, March 21, 1941, Hickleton Papers, reel 2, Churchill College, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK.

Psychology

RICHARD IMMERMAN

Was Richard M. Nixon mad when he assumed responsibility for U.S. foreign policy? The attention paid to his personality, particularly after the Watergate break-in, suggests that many people believed him to be so, or close to it. In one context Nixon evidently preferred it that way: He intended to persuade Hanoi that it must either agree to a quick peace or, according to H. R. Haldeman, face the consequences of a madman cocking the trigger on the American nuclear shotgun. "They'll [the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam] believe any threat of force Nixon makes because it's Nixon," the president reportedly confided to his White House chief of staff. "I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do *anything* to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them [that we] can't restrain him when he's angry . . . and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."¹

Whether Nixon sincerely sought to portray himself as a madman, was mad to think he could, or was just plain mad cannot be determined conclusively from the available evidence, although many writers have tried.² Because Haldeman was reconstructing from memory a conversation that occurred some ten years earlier, moreover, he could have distorted the president's words or manufactured the incident to serve his own

1 Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House* (New York, 1983), 53.

2 The quality varies, but obvious examples of personality-oriented studies of Nixon are Bruce Mazlish, *In Search of Nixon. A Psychobiographical Inquiry* (New York, 1972); Arthur Woodstone, *Inside Nixon's Head* (New York, 1972); Fawn Brodie, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (New York, 1981); James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1992), esp. 123–68; Vamik D. Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, and Andrew E. Dod, *Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography* (New York, 1997); and most recently, Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York, 2000), esp. 91–110. In addition, "classics" such as Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York, 1975); Theodore H. White, *Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York, 1975); Stephen E. Ambrose's three-volume *Nixon: The Education of a Politician: 1913–1962; The Triumph of a Politician: 1962–1972; Ruin and Recovery: 1973–1990* (New York, 1987, 1989, 1991); and Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1995) remain valuable for providing insights on Nixon's personality.

purposes.³ Yet Haldeman alleges the conversation did take place, and it is plausible that it did and his recollection of it is accurate. What is more, the implications of the text are instructive.

Accounts such as Haldeman's invite us to consider and explore the relationship between psychology and the history of American foreign relations. On the one hand, the episode speaks directly to the influence of a policymaker's personality on his policies. Nixon need not have been mad for his predispositions, attributes, identifications, and emotions to have affected his strategies and tactics, and not only toward Vietnam. On the other hand, regardless of the condition of Nixon's mind, he stated that he wanted the North Vietnamese to *think* he was mad. This objective suggests another dimension of psychology that bears on foreign relations: cognitive psychology. Here we are concerned with perceptions, beliefs, the encoding and retrieval of information, memory, and other mental processes. Based on his assumptions about the North Vietnamese, Nixon wanted to send a particular signal that he expected to be interpreted in a particular way. Cognitive theories hold that this tactic was vulnerable to error.

Skeptics may judge Nixon and his alleged madman theory as too atypical to serve as normative illustrations. Granted that the incident was unusual, the characterization does not obviate the argument that psychology is integral to the study of diplomatic history in general. Indeed, quite the contrary is true. Because highly abnormal or unpredictable behavior such as that of Nixon or Woodrow Wilson, to cite another obvious example, is not easily explained by situational variables, it is the most accurate barometer of the salience of personality factors. In addition, personality disorders can most readily become consequential.

The suitability of a psychological approach, however, is not limited to circumstances or incidents when individuals appear to act irrationally or erratically. The history of American foreign relations is punctuated with fascinating and psychologically-complex individuals other than Nixon and Wilson: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John and John Quincy Adams, James K. Polk, William H. Seward, James G. Blaine, William Jennings Bryan, Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, James V. Forrestal, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Colin Powell – the list is endless. Their personalities and that of the many allies and adversaries who surrounded them alone did not determine policy – environmental and situational variables are always influential and frequently decisive. But predispositions,

3 Fred I. Greenstein raises a number of reasons for being skeptical in his review of Hersh's *The Price of Power*. See Fred I. Greenstein, "A Journalist's Vendetta," *The New Republic*, August 1, 1983, 30–31.

attributes, motives, affects, and other elements that constitute personality, and what one scholar has labeled “emotional intelligence” (the ability to “manage” emotions and “turn them to constructive purposes”), played a role.⁴

That role can only be inferred, but common sense requires such inferences. A few counterfactual excursions illustrate that examples abound. A secretary of state less self-confident, audacious, or stubborn than John Quincy Adams might have failed to orchestrate the transcontinental treaty of 1819 with Spain or might have settled for a joint Anglo-American declaration of policy toward the Western Hemisphere instead of for the Monroe Doctrine.⁵ Imagine the possible impact on history had the Japanese invasion of Manchuria occurred under the watch of a president with the “character” of Teddy Roosevelt in contrast to Herbert Hoover.⁶ Had a statesman less influenced by an Ulster ethnicity than Dean Acheson been secretary of state in 1949, the United States may well have challenged British objections and supported inviting Ireland to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁷ Negotiations to end America’s military engagement in Vietnam and pave the way for Nixon to visit the People’s Republic of China probably would have proceeded very differently if conducted by someone less secretive and devious than Henry Kissinger.⁸

In retrospect, the historian of the Cold War can provide robust evidence to support the argument that it was only a matter of time before the Cold War came to an end. Nevertheless, the impact of Ronald Reagan’s personality on his administration’s foreign relations and by extension international developments was palpable if ambiguous.⁹ One need not dismiss economic considerations, domestic unrest, or other impersonal forces to argue that the Cold War probably would not have ended when it did, and ended as it did (peacefully), were it not for the contributions not only of Reagan but also Mikhail Gorbachev. As Vladislav Zubok, a distinguished student of the Kremlin, recently wrote, “many of the most extraordinary aspects of this remarkable series of events [that produced the end of the Cold War] can *only* be understood by according primary importance to the Gorbachev *personality* factor.”¹⁰ One must not underestimate,

4 Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference*, 6.

5 Paul C. Nagel, *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, A Private Life* (New York, 1997).

6 H. R. Brands, T. R.: *The Last Romantic* (New York, 1998); Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (New York, 2001).

7 John T. McNay, *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia, MO, 2001).

8 Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York, 1992); *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow*, ed. William Burr (New York, 1998).

9 Lou Cannon, *Ronald Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York, 1991).

10 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality,” *Cold War History* 2 (January 2002): 62.

moreover, the role played by the personalities of Eduard Shevardnadze, George Schultz, and other "secondary" actors.¹¹

I will examine further the psychological dimensions of the end of the Cold War below. What must be stressed immediately is that the influence of a personality neither as complex nor "powerful" as that of Reagan can still substantially affect the course of international history. It is very possible, and perhaps probable, that a president less predisposed than George H. W. Bush to perceive the challenge posed by Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait as a "historic testing by fire" would have been inclined to go along with the attitude of "resignation to the invasion and even adaptation to a *fait accompli*" that initially appeared to pervade his administration.¹² Students of the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo will need to determine the relationship between the importance of Munich to Madeleine Albright's family history and her prescribing the use of force.¹³ Was George W. Bush so intent on ousting Saddam Hussein because his father had not? At a minimum, psychological variables serve as mediators between the environment and human activity. Behavior, therefore, is the product of the *interaction* between the individual and the situation in which he finds himself.¹⁴

An individual's cognitions, the processes by which one perceives and evaluates the physical and social environment, likewise contribute to one's conclusions and recommendations. How else, for example, does one interpret the data one collects on the threat posed by an adversary or assess the potential for a diplomatic initiative? What are the bases for inferences about the normally and oftentimes deliberately ambiguous behavior of others? It has become almost axiomatic that the assimilation and interpretation of information, the grist for the policy-making mill, does not occur in a contextual vacuum. Decision makers frequently rely on the "lessons of history," drawing analogies to define a situation or identify a phenomenon. Psychological theories can help to explain how and why decision makers act in this manner, and in the process they can provide clues for locating errors in judgment or perception. They can also alert us

11 Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis," *Political Psychology* 19 (March 1998): 1-16.

12 Robert H. Swansbrough, "A Kohutian Analysis of President Bush's Personality and Style in the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Political Psychology* 15 (June 1994): 227-76; Steven J. Wayne, "President Bush Goes to War: A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance," in *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War*, ed. Stanley A. Renshon (Pittsburgh, 1993), 29-48; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York, 1998), 314-18.

13 Thomas W. Lippman, *Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy* (Boulder, 2000).

14 Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Princeton, 1987), 7; Robert Jervis, "Political Decision Making: Recent Contributions," *Political Psychology* 1 (Summer 1980): 98; Alexander L. George and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York, 1964), xxii.

to conditions, such as stress and anxiety, which can affect the deliberations and their outcomes.¹⁵

The very nature of psychology leads us to associate it with abnormal behavior, distorted perceptions, compromised processes, and the like. For explanatory purposes, therefore, its value would seem to be limited to extraordinary situations, such as Wilson's monumental struggle for the League of Nations. Actually, psychology's relationship to foreign policy is so pervasive as to be unexceptional. Deterrence, brinkmanship, credibility, resolve, commitment, trust, risk, threat – these and countless other conventional entries in the historian's lexicon are psychological concepts. Central to each are perceptions, fears, wants, values, and parallel mental phenomena. The "psychology of foreign relations," while timeless, surely became even more pronounced in the nuclear age as the function, the primary *raison d'être*, of these devastating weapons was progressively divorced from the military sphere and associated with diplomatic gambits and political solutions.¹⁶ To illustrate, as defined by Richard Ned Lebow, deterrence "consists of manipulating another actor's assessments of his interests and seeks to prevent any specified behavior by convincing the actor who may contemplate it that its costs exceed any possible gain."¹⁷ The psychological implications are evident.

- 15 On the lessons of history see Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York, 1987). For the benefits of psychological insights compare these works with, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 217–87. See also John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton, 1974); and Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, 1992). On stress and anxiety see Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-makers," in *Political Science Annual*, vol. 6, 1975, ed. Cornelius P. Cotter (Indianapolis, 1975), 255–319; Alexander L. George, "The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decisionmaking," in *The Medical Implications of Nuclear War*, ed. Frederic Solomon and Robert Q. Marston (Washington, DC, 1986), 525–52. On the possible psychological implications of a medical condition, see "Special Symposium on Presidential Health," *Political Psychology* 16 (December 1995): 757–860. The potential impact of unusual conditions has long preoccupied students of decision making. See, for example, Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, 1980), 25–53; Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, rev. ed. (Boston, 1982); and Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York, 1977).
- 16 See especially Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); idem., *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY, 1989).
- 17 Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, 1981), 83. See also Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1974); and Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, 1985).

Lebow could have added that experimental evidence strongly suggests that a decision as to what policy best serves the national interest may depend on how decision makers frame their questions. Prospect theory holds that individuals are more likely to accept greater risks if they perceive the potential outcome as a loss than if they perceive it as a gain. Roosevelt's cost-benefit analyses of both the domestic and international environments after the Munich Conference, for example, appears to have influenced his decision to increase assistance to the British. Such psychological dynamics may have affected even more profoundly Jimmy Carter's approval of the mission to rescue the Iran hostages.¹⁸

Conclusions from experiments do not always generate universal certainties, nor do they generally take into account cultural or temporal differences. Still, when the historian looks at the failures of U.S. policy in Vietnam or the postures of both Washington and Moscow during the Cuban missile crisis, the psychological literature on risks and the framing of decisions can prove illuminating.¹⁹ So, too, can the concept of a security dilemma, which is likewise rooted in psychology. The foundation of the security dilemma is the generalization that efforts to increase the security of one nation frequently decrease – or are perceived to decrease – the security of another. Consider all the historical analyses that emphasize the failure of antagonists to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and force structures and that reveal how such spirals of misunderstanding and misperceptions fed tensions and conflict.²⁰ Much of the literature on the origins of the Cold War accents this phenomenon. To quote John Gaddis, "It seems likely that Washington policy-makers mistook Stalin's determination to ensure Russian security through spheres of influence for a renewed effort to spread communism outside the borders of the Soviet Union."²¹ It seems no less likely that the ominous inferences

18 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," *Journal of Business* 59 (October 1986): S251–S278; Barbara Rearden Farnham, *Avoiding Loss/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Relations* (Ann Arbor, 1995); idem., *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making* (Princeton, 1997); Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics* (Ann Arbor, 1998).

19 Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions* (Stanford, 1998).

20 Glenn H. Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 15 (March 1971): 66–103; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214. Jervis persuasively argues that the distinction between deterrence and the "spiral model" is a function of respective images of an enemy and perceptions of his intentions: *Perception and Misperception*, 58–113.

21 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972), 355. Gaddis revised his assessment of the influence of the security dilemma in *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997). But see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from*

Kennedy drew from Khrushchev's War of Liberation speech of January 1961, and the ominous inferences Khrushchev drew from Kennedy's inaugural and State of the Union addresses shortly thereafter, fueled a spiral of misperception that climaxed with the crises of the next year.²²

Scarcely an element of international relations is devoid of one, two, or several psychological components. What analysis of negotiations, for example, can overlook the psychology of the different actors? Success or failure at the bargaining table depends largely on the chips one holds usually on domestic factors as well. But outcomes can also turn on the ability of one participant to "read" or even mislead another, the flexibility of the respective personalities, comparative risk-taking tendencies, and parallel attributes and styles. Statespersons adopt negotiating strategies, as a rule, in light of the predicted response they will generate. Carrots and sticks, or sugar and vinegar, are psychological ploys.²³

What is more, with increasing frequency students of the history of U.S. foreign relations apply the descriptive term "personal diplomacy." No doubt the catalyst was Woodrow Wilson's decision to travel to Versailles and the much-debated consequences. But it was the dynamic that developed between the Grand Alliance's Big Three during the Second World War that confirmed for a broad audience the salience of personality to both the conduct and product of negotiations. At Teheran and Yalta especially, personal diplomacy involved more than "just" the interplay of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, three almost larger than life individuals and leaders. What proved most fascinating, and most instructive, was evidence that illuminated how each developed strategies to exploit the strengths and the weaknesses of the others, how they each sought to play one off against the other, how critical the notion of "trust" became, and other psychologically-driven dimensions. Indeed, assessments of which of the Big Three was most effective – or most culpable – often rested on personality-based criteria. Historians' evaluations of the negotiations among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin differ

Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC, 1985); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992); and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA, 1996).

- 22 Katherine Lavin, "Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Missile Crisis: The Politics of Cumulative Misperception," *The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics and Government* 1 (Fall 2001): 169–83.

- 23 For psychologically informed examinations of competing negotiation strategies see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, 1984); and Charles E. Osgood, *Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, IL, 1962). An example of a case study of negotiations that applies psychological theories is Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987): 27–60. Larson extends her argument by examining additional cases in *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1987).

dramatically, but virtually all agree that these meetings and their results, to a greater or lesser degree, would have been different were it not for Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.²⁴

This stress on the personal nature of diplomacy continued as the Cold War ebbed and flowed, reinforced by the very concept of "summitry." More than perhaps anything else, nevertheless, it was the already mentioned contributions to bringing about the end of the Cold War attributed to Reagan, Gorbachev, and their advisers that cemented the place of personal diplomacy in the hierarchy of interests among historians of U.S. foreign relations. Without the distinctive attributes that each brought to the summits in Geneva, then Reykjavik, then Washington, and then Moscow, and the synergy among their personalities that so manifestly developed, it seems inconceivable not only that the Cold War would have ended when it did, but also that it would have ended how it did.²⁵

What may prove to be even more striking for future scholars is the extent to which the Soviet-American relationship after the Cold War, and thus their bilateral negotiations, have become even more "personalized." Surely the next generation of scholars will need to seek out evidence about the importance and implications of Bill Clinton's defining U.S. interests in Russia as contingent on the viability, reliability, and thus sobriety of Boris Yeltsin. Central questions to explore must include the bases for Clinton's attachment to "Ol' Boris" (for example, did Clinton's experiences with his drunken stepfather matter?) and the extent to which this attachment affected the U.S. response to Russia's behavior in Chechnya or the epidemic of political corruption.²⁶ It appears that George W. Bush in fundamental respects personalizes his relations with Vladimir Putin as Clinton did with Yeltsin. The point is that historians cannot recognize "personal chemistry" as a variable in diplomacy without conceding an appreciable role for personality in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Intelligence, a fundamental aspect of American foreign policy since World War II, is another area that cannot be analyzed without taking psychology into account. The primary responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the collection and interpretation of information.

24 Representative literature includes Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957); Robin Edmonds, *The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in Peace and War* (New York, 1991); Warren Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War* (New York, 1997).

25 For fascinating insights, see the transcripts of a conference of former Soviet and U.S. decision makers on the end of the Cold War held at Princeton University, along with scholarly commentary, published in *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, ed. William C. Wohlforth (Baltimore, 1997).

26 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York, 2002).

No activity depends more on perceptions and inferences, the core concerns of cognitive theory.²⁷ The CIA does not confine itself to analyses and estimates; it also engages in such covert operations as propaganda campaigns, political actions, and paramilitary ventures. These activities invariably rely heavily on psychology. In the 1950s President Dwight D. Eisenhower went so far as to designate C. D. Jackson his special assistant for psychological warfare, and his administration's strategy for overthrowing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala, by the CIA's own admission, was "dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength." Successor administrations may not have believed so avidly in "psywar," but it has remained a staple instrument of American policy.²⁸ If policymakers recognize the seminal relationship between psychology and foreign affairs, so should scholars.

Nevertheless, until the last two decades historians were skeptical about the utility of applying psychology for the purpose of understanding foreign relations. In part this skepticism evolved from the level-of-analysis question: Are the sources of state conduct to be found at the level of the external environment, the domestic situation, or the individual policymaker?²⁹ Diplomatic history, reflecting realist roots that go back to Thucydides, traditionally favored the systemic (external environment) level. Policymakers, with a fixed human nature, are seen as rational actors who seek to advance the national interest through cost-benefit analysis. Because psychology introduces a concern about irrationality, it appeared inappropriate – and discomfiting.³⁰

Moreover, historians greeted those who waded into murky psychological waters with open hostility. This probably would have happened under any circumstances. Incompetent to evaluate the diagnoses, uneasy about the sources, and unsympathetic to the approach, historians in general were unwilling to lend much credence to "psychohistories." The

27 See Ernest R. May, *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, 1986); and John Ferris, "Coming in from the Cold War: The Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945–1990," *Diplomatic History* 19 (Winter 1995): 87–115.

28 Quoted in Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX, 1982), 161. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Spring 1989): 191–212; Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York, 1987); and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (2nd ed., New Haven, 1998).

29 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, ed. James N. Rosenau (rev. ed., New York, 1969), 20–29.

30 Kristen Renwich Monroe with the assistance of Kristen Hill Maher, "Psychology and Rational Actor Theory," in "Political Economy and Political Psychology," ed. Kristen Renwich Monroe, Special Issue of *Political Psychology* 16 (March 1995): 1–21.

publication of Alexander L. George and Juliette George's study of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel Edward House in 1964 exacerbated these doubts and enveloped the entire undertaking in controversy. Using psychoanalytic theory, George and George argued that Wilson's counterproductive behavior, especially his refusal to compromise over the League of Nations, was explicable primarily albeit not solely by his relationship with his father and his consequent compulsive personality. Although exemplary in its methodology, the George and George book elicited the criticism of Wilson's venerable biographer Arthur Link, who challenged the data as well as the conclusions. Subsequently, Link conceded a degree of irrationality to Wilson, but he rejected the Georges's psychoanalytical diagnosis. He joined forces with a physician, Edwin Weinstein, to promote a physiological and neurological explanation. A war of words ensued.³¹ To this day a consensus remains elusive.³² The controversy underscores the problem of collecting and assessing evidence of this kind. The footing appears surer if the historian concentrates on the impersonal influences on policy – the balance of power, economic stakes, domestic constraints, even culture and ideology – and avoids trying to penetrate the persons themselves.

Ironically, the charge that the field was "marking time" while other specialties (above all, social and cultural history) were marching forward may also have made historians of U.S. foreign policy gun-shy when it came to incorporating psychology.³³ As the effort to uncover the hidden histories of "ordinary people" grew in popularity and the writings of Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault became the rage, historians increasingly characterized political history, especially the Rankean tradition of international relations, as pedestrian and antiquated. To many, the history

31 For the exemplary nature of the Georges's methodology see Greenstein, *Personality and Politics*, 21, 61–96. See also the research note in George and George, *Wilson and House*, 317–22. The literature reflecting the polemical exchange is extensive. It includes George and George, *Wilson and House*; Edwin A. Weinstein, James W. Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson's Political Personality: A Reappraisal," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Winter 1978–79): 585–98; Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography* (Princeton, 1981); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, "Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Winter 1981–82): 641–65.

32 Jerald Post, "Woodrow Wilson Reexamined: The Mind-Body Controversy Redux and Other Dispositions," *Political Psychology* 4 (1983): 289–306; Stephen G. Walker, "Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects in Foreign Policy Decision-making: Woodrow Wilson's Operational Code," *Political Psychology* 16 (December 1995): 697–717.

33 The criticisms are legion. My reference is to the most notorious one, Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in *The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY, 1980), 355–87.

of U.S. foreign policy appeared to be top-down history of the worst sort. In another context the application of psychology might have been considered a welcome innovation, but in the post-Vietnam historiographic climate it was suggestive more of the problem than of the solution. We would be studying the personalities and cognitions of the elite: Leaders and decisionmakers who in the majority of instances were white and male. In fact, the emphasis on cultural anthropology and *mentalité* left little room for the individual. Unless historians were going to probe the psychology of groups instead of individuals, a problematic undertaking at best, prudence dictated that they borrow theories and perspectives and “cross-fertilize” from disciplines other than psychology.³⁴

Diplomatic historians have begun to overcome these impediments. No longer are presentations informed by psychological theory uncommon at meetings of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAHR), and experts in the psychology of international relations regularly contribute to SHAHR’s journal, *Diplomatic History*. As a matter of fact, the subtitle of one of the most enthusiastically received Stuart Bernath Lectures is “Exploring the Psychological Dimension of Postwar American Diplomacy.”³⁵ Further, in sharp contrast to the reception accorded *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* in 1964, historians have praised more recent studies of foreign relations that apply psychological theories, studies that combine impressive archival research with methodological sophistication and rigor.³⁶ This trend indicates that historians are recognizing that a psychologically-informed approach to international relations is a valuable complement to approaches that emphasize broader social developments and situational variables. After all, the history of U.S. foreign policy is the history of choices, and individuals make those choices. Psychology helps us to understand the particular choices that they made.

The field of psychology that historians are least likely to apply is the one that concerns what lies beneath the surface personality – psychoanalytic theory. The time needed to develop the necessary competence militates against venturing out onto a psychoanalytical limb. Without lengthy and intense training, Alexander and Juliette George could not have identified

34 Robert Dallek did just that when he attempted to explain much of America’s international behavior as the product of “displacement.” See Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1983).

35 Robert McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 15 (1991): 455–71.

36 A good example is Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, 1984). It is revealing that an earlier study, William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, *Untangling the Cold War: A Strategy for Testing Rival Theories* (Boston, 1971), was all but ignored. See also Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust*; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, 1993).

the symptoms of a compulsive personality, posited a hypothesis, and then modified and revised it to account for the dynamics of Wilson's development.³⁷ The adequacy of the evidence, moreover, will always be problematic. The Georges spent years immersed in the details of Wilson's life, but the subsequent publication of the more than sixty volumes of Wilson's papers and the revelations about his health indicate there was a lot more to be done. In addition, few policymakers leave the mountains of papers, especially intimate and introspective letters and diaries, required for this type of study.³⁸

Notwithstanding the obstacles to using a psychoanalytic approach, the influence of personality on policies must not and need not be overlooked. The literature on political psychology has indicated that there is a correlation between a policymaker's *observable* personality traits, including his communicative skill and rhetoric, and his behavior. Some analysts have gone so far as to postulate relationships among these traits to produce typologies that generate predictions about styles and policies.³⁹ This approach can be dangerously reductionist, yet certain finite relationships appear plausible.⁴⁰ Evidence suggests, for example, that individuals confident in their ability to control events tend toward more activism in foreign affairs, and that the norm for Western leaders during the Cold War was that extroverts advocated better relations with Communists than do introverts.⁴¹ Although the documentation remains inconclusive, an analysis of such contrasts between Johnson's and Kennedy's personalities as their

37 George and George, *Wilson and House*, 317–22.

38 Outstanding psychobiographies have been written. See, for example, Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography* (Chicago, 1984); Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, *The Young Richelieu: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Leadership* (Chicago, 1983); Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York, 1973); idem., *Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above* (New York, 1989). U.S. historians, however, unequivocally expect biographies of Americans to be archivally-based. It warrants mention, moreover, that the most persuasive biographies of American leaders that draw on psychological theory have not been written by historians. For example, see Brodie, *Richard Nixon*, and Betty Glad, *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House* (New York, 1980); and Volkan, Itzkowitz, and Dod, *Richard Nixon*.

39 The best-known case is Barber, *Presidential Character*.

40 Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality in Politics," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 2, *Micropolitical Theory*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 8 vols. (Reading, 1975), 2–3; Paul A. Kowert, "Where Does the Buck Stop?: Assessing the Impact of Presidential Personality," *Political Psychology* 17 (September 1996): 421–52.

41 Margaret Hermann, "Leadership Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior," in *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York, 1974), 201–34; idem., *Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders* (Columbus, 1983); Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1978). Ronald Reagan may be the exception or the rule depending on how one interprets his attitudes, and at what juncture of his presidency one seeks to interpret his attitude.

respective power needs and differing styles of dealing with subordinates raises the possibility, especially when juxtaposed with other variables, that had Kennedy lived the American experience in Vietnam would have been different.⁴² Even if such unprovable counterfactuals are dismissed as useless, the argument that one's character traits can affect one's decisions remains compelling. An archivally-based examination of Johnson's Vietnam policy presents credible evidence that his attributes, including his propensity for "we-they" thinking and his passionately personal identification with the cause of the United States, manifested themselves in a diminished capacity to assess information and advice.⁴³

Dogmatism, mental complexity or flexibility, and similar attributes likewise affect policymaking and state conduct. They are also elements of the individual's overall personality, but they lead us to focus on cognitive psychology. Because the objective of cognitive psychology is to explain how individuals perceive and interpret their environment, it is concerned as well with misunderstandings and miscommunications. Its utility for students of international relations is thus manifest. The two theories of cognitive psychology that are probably most valuable for historians of U.S. foreign relations are attribution and schema theory.⁴⁴ According to attribution theorists, individuals function like "naive scientists" or "constructive thinkers." We explain others' behavior by looking for and accumulating clues; this is a rational process (unless the perceiver's emotions interfere). Schema theorists contend that our ability to assimilate information is limited; as a consequence we are "cognitive misers." We categorize the knowledge we have into schemata, mental or cognitive structures that fit the knowledge into a pattern. In other words, drawn primarily from what we have learned from previous experiences, we develop and retain preconceived notions, beliefs about how social objects and phenomena relate to one another.

42 Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," *The Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992): 568-87.

43 Fred I. Greenstein and John P. Burke, in collaboration with Larry Berman and Richard H. Immerman, *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965* (New York, 1989); Frederik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, 1999). Less persuasive is the argument that Johnson's behavior in Vietnam, and for that matter Nixon's as well, was a function of an admixture of humiliation and narcissism that can be traced to early childhood. Blema Steinberg, *Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam* (Montreal, 1996).

44 Kenneth M. Goldstein and Sheldon Blackman, *Cognitive Style* (New York, 1978). For overviews of cognitive theory see Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980); Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition* (2nd ed., New York, 1991); and *Political Cognition*, ed. Richard R. Lau and David Sears (Hillsdale, NJ, 1986). Unless otherwise indicated, the following summary is drawn from these works.

Intricately tied to the concept of schemata is the theory of heuristics. These shortcuts to rationality allow individuals to reduce complicated problem-solving tasks to simple judgments; they are strategies for managing information overload. Typical is the *representative* heuristic, by which people evaluate the extent to which the characteristics of a person, country, or political system – any object – are representative of a category of that same object: Either Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser or Iraq's Saddam Hussein could have been Adolf Hitler's identical twin. Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz had to be a Communist according to 1950s thinking. If it looks like a duck and acts like a duck, it is a duck. Korea is another Manchuria; Khe Sanh, another Dienbienphu. In the *availability* heuristic, we draw inferences based on whatever pattern or frame of reference is most available and therefore most easily comes to mind. A military man such as General Lucius D. Clay is more likely to interpret the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia as evidence that the Soviets appeared poised to invade Europe with "dramatic suddenness" than is an official in the State Department.

These theories help to explain how individuals make sense out of the complex world in which they live. They also help to explain why individuals make frequent errors of judgment and inference. Attached to each theory, or explanation for how we perceive and diagnose, are a series of "biases" or common mistakes: We may tend, for example, to overestimate the influence of personal dispositions on behavior and to underestimate the influence of situational influences (commonly referred to as the Fundamental Attribution Error, FAE). Or we may be more influenced by vivid, concrete data than that which is pallid and abstract; a nonevent (the dog that did not bark in the dark; the Soviet intervention that did not occur) may be overlooked altogether. Or because we know our own motives and intentions, we may assume others know them as well. Or we do not always distinguish between the inferences we draw from the data we receive and the data itself. Or we overlook base rate statistics and overestimate the size of the sample we use to generate a heuristic category. Or . . . There are many other biases, but the point is clear.

Most fundamentally, cognitive psychologists uniformly agree that once we have formed a belief we are reluctant to discard or even qualify it. We will interpret new evidence to conform to our prior beliefs: If it is consistent with them, we will accept it; if inconsistent or ambiguous, we will discredit, distort, or ignore it. This tendency is most pronounced when the belief is deeply felt and deeply held. Our values are hierarchically ordered, and our beliefs are interconnected to form a system; when incoming information is so discordant that we cannot ignore it, we will revise our least fundamental notions before even questioning our core assumptions. Our most highly valued beliefs are thus minimally disconfirmed.

By establishing the parameters of an individual's "particular type of 'bounded rationality,'" belief systems serve as sets "of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received."⁴⁵ No matter how forcefully Mikhail Gorbachev pushed for arms control, he did not alter then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's estimation of the Soviet threat. Cheney could "explain away" Gorbachev's behavior by attributing it to the success of a "peace through strength" posture, by dismissing it as a tactic to lull the non-Communist world into complacency while the Kremlin regroupes and the economy revives, or by acknowledging that Gorbachev is different but would not last. Cheney trusted Boris Yeltsin no more than Gorbachev. He continued to counsel that the United States must keep a watchful eye on Russia and the Soviet Union's other successor states and take the utmost care before agreeing to any arms control or force reduction measures. Cheney's core beliefs and images remained frozen.⁴⁶

Indeed, because the issue of how U.S. leaders and policymakers perceived foreign leaders and policymakers has been a continuous concern of historians of U.S. foreign relations, most of us on many occasions have sought to identify the influences on those perception. And once we have judged a leader's perceptions to have been at all subjective, we have concluded that psychological factors warrant consideration. One need not classify Thomas Jefferson's relationship with France a "long affair" to assess his perceptions of the French as complicated by his emotions, beliefs, values, and/or motives.⁴⁷ In arguing that there was a very rational, pragmatic, and, yes, human side to Joseph Stalin, President Dwight D. Eisenhower repeatedly recalled a four-hour conversation that General Dwight D. Eisenhower had held with the Soviet leader. "[D]amn near all he talked about was all the things they needed, the homes, the food, the technical help. He talked to me about 7 people living in a single room in Moscow just as anxiously as you or I'd talk about an American slum

45 Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 103; Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Image: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (September 1962): 245; Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, "Bill Clinton's Operational Code: Assessing Source Material Bias," *Political Psychology* 21 (September 2000): 559-71. For the concept of "bounded rationality" see Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organization*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1957).

46 Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991* (Baltimore, 1998), 343; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC, 1994), 537. Cheney has provided insufficient evidence on how as vice president he perceives Russia and its leadership in today's dramatically different environment.

47 Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, 1785-1800* (Chicago, 1998).

problem.”⁴⁸ This quote provides robust evidence to support the psychological theory that first-hand experiences, particularly those that took place earlier in one’s career, can powerfully affect subsequent perceptions and images.⁴⁹

Oral testimony by participants to the Reagan–Gorbachev summit meetings provides evidence – though hardly robust – of related phenomena of perception with psychological overtones, phenomena intertwined with the dynamic of personal diplomacy discussed earlier. Almost all scholars of the Cold War accept the proposition that the Soviets and Americans, based on historical experience, ideology, geography, and other considerations, lived in different and frequently contrasting perceptual worlds. There is broad agreement that neither side fully understood the other, and each side’s leaders’ image of their counterparts (i.e., adversaries) and self-image contrasted with their counterparts’, and the reverse was equally true. One might infer from the oral testimony of the “witnesses” to the end of the Cold War, then, that sustained interactions among such specific personalities Gorbachev, Reagan, George Schultz, Eduard Shevardnadze, coupled with related influences on perception such as the Kremlin’s progressive ideological “revisionism,” allowed for enhanced empathy, and thus improved understanding and relations.⁵⁰

Those theories that pertain to our strategies for coping with complexity highlight the influence beliefs have on perceptions and behavior; a growing body of thought concentrates on our wants, needs, and fears. Psychologists who emphasize motivations argue that our judgments are largely a function of emotions as opposed to mental capacities. Perhaps the most prevalent motivation for human error is the need to reduce the anxiety an individual experiences when confronting a severe dilemma. This stress can lead to such tactics as bolstering, in which one chooses one option by extolling its virtues and denigrating all alternatives; defensive avoidance, in which people refuse to acknowledge a threat; or hypervigilance, in which one makes an impulsive commitment, stemming from panic, to the least objectionable alternative.⁵¹

Based on this conflict model of decision making, Irving Janis developed his well-known “groupthink” hypothesis to explain the Bay of Pigs fiasco. According to Janis, in stressful situations members of a decision-making group tend to seek consensus by failing to challenge overly optimistic predictions and by terminating deliberations prematurely. “The

48 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York, 1998), 46.

49 Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 239–62.

50 Robert Jervis, “Perception, Misperception, and the End of the Cold War,” in *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, ed. Wohlforth, 227–39.

51 Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 85–95, 199.

concurrence-seeking tendency," Janis writes of the decision to approve the Bay of Pigs invasion, "was manifested by shared illusions and other symptoms [of groupthink], which helped the members to maintain a sense of group solidarity. Most crucial were the symptoms that contributed to complacent over-confidence in the face of vague uncertainties and explicit warnings that should have alerted the members to the risks of the clandestine military operation."⁵² Historians certainly should question Janis's evidence, and his conclusions demand qualification. Still, "groupthink" must not be overlooked when investigating policy decisions.

Although cognitive and motivational explanations for behavior are often placed in opposition to one another, they are in fact interrelated. One's beliefs affect one's emotions and vice versa; unmotivated and motivated biases are frequently indistinguishable.⁵³ Insights drawn from these psychological theories – and my summary is far from exhaustive – can prove illuminating for historians of foreign relations. Anyone who has ever read a State Department situational report, an intelligence estimate, or a memorandum of a National Security Council meeting will profit from an understanding of the normative strategies by which we perceive the world and draw inferences, an awareness of our cognitive shortcomings, and a sensitivity to the possible influence of emotions.

My own work can serve as an example. In *The CIA in Guatemala* I argued that an exaggerated perception of the Communist threat resulted in Washington's decision to intervene in 1954. I arrived at this interpretation after analyzing what I described as a "Cold War ethos" which pervaded American society in the postwar period. I am convinced that a familiarity with the literature on cognitive psychology and belief systems would have strengthened my analysis. By clarifying the Cold War ethos, schema and attribution theories provide a perspective, a framework that contributes to our understanding of how Americans perceived and defined the threat and why they interpreted labor codes, agrarian reforms, and other liberal measures as evidence of Soviet influence. Indeed, my own evidence revealed the extent to which Washington policymakers drew parallels between developments in Guatemala and what had occurred in another agrarian nation – China – but I knew nothing about scripts or analogical reasoning.⁵⁴

52 Janis, *Groupthink*, 47.

53 Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," *Political Psychology* 9 (June 1988): 257; Robert Jervis, "Political Psychology: Some Challenges and Opportunities," *ibid.* 10 (September 1989): 487; Stephen G. Walker, "Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects in Foreign Policy Decision-making: Woodrow Wilson's Operational Code," *ibid.* 16 (December 1995): 697–717.

54 Although too mechanically in my opinion, in *How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Oxford, 1990), 49–69, Alex Roberto Hybel draws heavily on evidence I presented in *CIA in Guatemala* to develop an analogical

Psychological theory, therefore, helps to explain why nothing the Arbenz government could say or do could shake Washington's preexisting beliefs. When Arbenz purchased arms from Czechoslovakia in a last-minute attempt to defend the revolution, Eisenhower's officials jumped to the conclusion that Guatemala's neighbors were in peril. The CIA's later identification of Fidel Castro with Arbenz and its application to Cuba of the covert strategy developed for Guatemala appear illustrative of the potential pitfalls of both the representative and availability heuristic: Arbenz was representative of the Communist leadership of Latin America, despite his making up a set of one; and the CIA planners, many of whom had participated in PBSUCCESS, had the covert Guatemalan operation readily available when conceiving the Bay of Pigs intervention.⁵⁵

I am likewise persuaded that my examinations of Eisenhower's policy toward Indochina would have benefited from a psychologically informed perspective. Although the administration's deliberations during the Indochina crisis are better described as multiple advocacy – the vigorous, uninhibited exchange of viewpoints among advisers – more than groupthink, the dilemma posed by the French request for intervention precipitated the procrastination, wishful thinking, and retrospective rationalization that one might expect from the conflict model of decision making. Indeed, psychological theory suggests that John Foster Dulles's testimony on May 11, 1954, four days after the fall of the French fortress of Dienbienphu – “We do not want to operate on what has been referred as the domino theory” – was more for his benefit than for that of Congress or the public.⁵⁶ Similarly, in light of the evidence of a disunited Communist bloc and the ineffectiveness of Ngo Dinh Diem, the postures ultimately adopted by the administration at the 1954 Geneva Conference and during the 1955 sect crisis are suggestive of bolstering on the one hand and hypervigilance on the other. Desperate to find a solution when none appeared possible, the administration concluded that the Geneva settlement was the best that could be achieved and then threw its support behind Diem, despite its own recognition of his shortcomings.⁵⁷

theory of foreign policymaking which he applies for the purpose of explaining the Eisenhower administration's estimate of the Communist danger in Guatemala and its choice of a covert operation to eradicate it.

55 For evidence beyond that provided in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, see Nick Cul-lather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, 1999).

56 Quoted in Richard H. Immerman, “Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable,” in *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the Fifties*, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana, IL, 1987), 145.

57 Richard H. Immerman, “The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look,” *Diplomatic History* 14 (Winter 1990): 43–66; George C. Herring, Gary R. Hess, and Richard H. Immerman, “Passage of Empire: The U.S., France, and South Vietnam, 1954–55,” in *Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations*,

My work also shows that while psychological theories can assist in interpreting evidence, they cannot and must not be used to compensate for the lack of evidence. During the interregnum between Stalin's death and Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" address, the perceptions of the U.S. president and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conflicted starkly. Eisenhower was much more inclined to explore the possibility that Georgi Malenkov was not a clone of Stalin and that some kind of détente with the Soviets was possible. Yet by allowing Dulles publicly to denounce the new Kremlin leadership at the same time that he was seeking to extend something approximating an olive branch to that same leadership, Eisenhower all but assured that there would be no chance for peace. A number of psychological theories seem applicable to explain this apparent paradox, but without better data, I am hesitant to apply any of them. In another kind of example, I have found it extremely difficult to correlate let alone connect the well formed and articulated beliefs that Dulles formulated prior to his appointment as secretary of state – on the need to negotiate flexibly or demonstrate sensitivity to nationalism in the developing world, for example – and his behavior once he inhabited Foggy Bottom. My intuitive explanation is that prior to assuming office Dulles had more time to commit his thoughts to paper. As a historian, however, I need that paper to do my work.⁵⁸

Even when the evidence is available, for the historian to use psychology effectively, he or she must learn it, which means reading more than one or two textbooks. There are alternate theories to consider, and none should be employed mechanically.⁵⁹ Further, one must be careful not to get carried away with psychology's explanatory power. One must take care not to be seduced by the temptation to fit the evidence to the theory. Understanding the individual is necessary but not sufficient for understanding the policy. To assume that there is always a direct linkage between beliefs and behavior would be misguided. And even if the historian has developed adequate expertise in psychology, even if he or she is judicious in its application, and even if the documents are available, there remains the problem of practicality. Ideally we should examine the personalities of all those involved in the policy process (after we have identified who they are), determine which attributes appear related to what behavior, investigate their individual belief systems, and take into account the psychological

1954–55, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud, and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington, DE, 1990), 171–95.

58 Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 109–22; Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, DE, 1999).

59 For the distinction between rote "classification" and informed "diagnosis" see Alexander L. George, "Some Uses of Dynamic Psychology in Political Biography: Case Materials on Woodrow Wilson," in *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner (Chicago, 1971), 80.

influences on the process itself. This is an ambitious assignment; in addition to the research involved, it requires that one devise a method of weighing a variety of personalities and beliefs in proportion to their relative influence on the decision. Once that is accomplished, then one must factor in the other domestic and systemic variables that shape and constrain behavior in order to complete the analysis.

Psychological theories allow us to gain additional insights about the history of U.S. foreign relations. Applying them presents great opportunities as well as great challenges. We must remain mindful of both.

National Security

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

Since I wrote my initial essay on national security for this volume more than a decade ago, the concept's utility for studying American foreign policy has grown. Its attractiveness stems from its synthetic qualities; its synthetic qualities stem from the fact that it is not a specific interpretation that focuses on a particular variable as much as a comprehensive framework that relates variables to one another and allows for diverse interpretations in particular periods and contexts.

National security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats.¹ This definition is important because it underscores the relation of the international environment to the internal situation in the United States and accentuates the importance of people's ideas and perceptions in constructing the nature of external dangers as well as the meaning of national identity and vital interests.

By encouraging students of American foreign policy to examine both the foreign and the domestic factors shaping policy, by obligating them to look at the structure of the international system as well as the domestic ideas and interests shaping policy, the national security approach seeks to overcome some of the great divides in the study of American diplomatic history. Heretofore, the most influential studies of American diplomatic history have stressed the moralistic or legalistic or idealistic strains in American foreign policy, or, alternatively, the quest for territorial expansion and commercial empire and geopolitical influence.² More recently, two influential accounts of the origins of the Cold War place ideas and power in contradistinction to one another: John Lewis Gaddis tells us that ideas were critical; Marc Trachtenberg argues that power realities were decisive, especially the contest over the control of German

1 This definition emerges from the writings of P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz. See, for example, Bock and Berkowitz, "The Emerging Field of National Security," *World Politics* 19 (October 1966): 122–36.

2 George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959).

power.³ Generally, realist historians believe that diplomatic behavior responds (or should respond) to the distribution of power in the international system; most revisionist and corporatist scholars and most historians who dwell on ideas and ideology assume that domestic economic requirements, social and cultural forces, and political constituencies are of overwhelming importance. By relating foreign threats to internal core values, the national security model encourages efforts to bridge the gaps between these divergent interpretative approaches, or, more precisely, to see that these variables must be studied in relation to one another and nuanced judgments made about how they bear on one another.

Although the national security approach acknowledges that power plays a role in the functioning of the international system and that interests shape the behavior of nations, it does not reify the salience of power or the centrality of interest in the construction of foreign policy. Indeed, in one of the more sophisticated approaches to the study of national security, Barry Buzan points out that realists who dwell on power and idealists who focus on peace often have obscured the meaning of national security, defined as the protection of core values from external threats.⁴ More recently, the most sophisticated approach to national security reconceptualizes the concept and takes explicit cognizance of the impact of culture and identity. National interests, argues Peter Katzenstein, "are constructed through a process of social interaction"; "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors." States are social actors operating in social environments. National identity is constructed as a result of human agency, and external threats are measured in relation to their perceived impact on core values.⁵

National security, as Arnold Wolfers wrote many years ago, is an ambiguous symbol. Security is used to encompass so many goals that there is no uniform agreement on what it encompasses and hence no universal understanding of the concept. Certainly, it involves more than national survival. But just what is involved is often left vague and indeterminate.⁶ Although the ambiguity presents formidable problems to policymakers and contemporary analysts, it should not handicap the work of historians. Indeed, it should explicitly encourage historians to focus attention on matters of central importance: How have policymakers assessed

3 John Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, 1999).

4 Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton, UK, 1983), 4–9.

5 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, 1996), 1–32, and for the quotations, see p. 2.

6 Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (December 1952): 481–502.

dangerous threats? How have they defined national interests? What are the relationships between interests and core values? How are policies formulated to ensure that their costs do not undermine the core values they are designed to foster?

External dangers come in many varieties. The historian of U.S. foreign policy must appraise the intentions and capabilities of the nation's prospective foes. But that step is only the beginning. Views of a potential adversary, after all, are heavily influenced by perceptions of other variables such as the impact of technological change, the appeal of one's own organizing ideology, the lessons of the past, and the structural patterns of the international system itself.⁷ In defining the Soviet Union as an inveterate foe after World War II, U.S. officials, as John Gaddis argues, were influenced by their perception of Stalin as a ruthless, aggressive tyrant and by their inclination to associate Communist Russia with Nazi Germany, a point made long ago by Thomas Paterson and Les Adler.⁸ But assessments of the international system were also instrumental in shaping the threat perception of American policymakers. Officials imparted dangerous connotations to developments within the international system, like the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements and exchange controls, the political instability within European governments, the popularity of leftist and communist parties, and the rise of revolutionary nationalist movements, especially in Asia.⁹

In studying the systemic sources of foreign policy behavior, the national security approach demands that analysts distinguish between realities and perceptions. This task, as simple as it sounds, is fraught with difficulty because it is often harder for historians to agree on what constitutes an actual danger than on what is a perceived threat. Nancy Mitchell shows, for example, that German imperial actions in the early 1900s engendered enormous feelings of insecurity and hostility among Americans, but that, in fact, German actions and policies were far less threatening than widely perceived. She analyzes how rhetoric, military images, and trade competition conjured up fears and shaped perceptions that were inconsistent with the realities of German behavior.¹⁰ Likewise, the very different interpretations of American diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s between "realists"

7 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA, 1979), 79–101; Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973).

8 Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 24–25, 294–96; Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s," *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970): 1046–64.

9 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48," *American Historical Review* 89 (April 1984): 356–78.

10 Nancy Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1999).

on the one hand and “revisionists” or “corporatists” on the other hand rests in part on assessments of the degree of threat to vital U.S. security interests in the interwar years. If there were no real threats before the middle or late 1930s, then contemporary proponents of arms limitation treaties, arbitration agreements, and non-aggression pacts can be viewed as functional pragmatists seeking to create a viable liberal capitalist international order rather than as naïve idealists disregarding the realities of an inherently unstable and ominous balance of power.¹¹

Perceptions of events abroad, however, are themselves greatly influenced by the ideas, ideals, and core values of the perceiver. The national security approach demands that as much attention be focused on how the American government determines its core values as on how it perceives external dangers. The term *core values* is used here rather than *vital interests* because the latter implies something more material and tangible than is appropriate for a national security imperative. The United States has rarely defined its core values in narrowly economic or territorial terms. Core values usually *fuse* material self-interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state’s organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity. “The purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, homes, or lives,” said Dwight D. Eisenhower. In fact, much of the recent literature on the Eisenhower presidency stresses the president’s concerns with domestic core values as does my own work on Eisenhower’s predecessor, Harry S Truman.¹²

To determine core values, historians must identify key groups, agencies, and individuals, examine their goals and ideas, and analyze how trade-offs are made. Decision makers and interest groups will have different internal and sometimes conflicting internal and external objectives. Core values are the goals that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made; core values are the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials and the defense of territory; core values are the interests that are pursued

11 For a reevaluation of the relative strength and efficacy of American military capabilities in the 1920s and early 1930s see John Braeman, “Power and Diplomacy: The 1920s Reappraised,” *Review of Politics* 44 (July 1982): 342–69; also see Melvyn P. Leffler, “Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy Toward Western Europe, 1921–1933,” *Perspectives in American History* 8 (1974): 413–61.

12 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York, 1998); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992).

notwithstanding the costs incurred; core values are the goals worth fighting for. In his work on Woodrow Wilson, for example, N. Gordon Levin, Jr., beautifully describes how, when faced with unrestricted German submarine warfare, Woodrow Wilson fused ideological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Together these factors became core values and influenced his decisions for war, for intervention, and for the assumption of political obligations abroad.¹³

Different groups may have different core values or different strategies for pursuing the same core values. The struggle between interventionists and isolationists on the eve of World War II illuminates how groups sharing similar core values could disagree about strategies. Interventionists believed aid to the Allies was essential to protect American liberal capitalism and the territorial integrity of the United States; isolationists believed such aid would aggrandize the powers of the chief executive and the federal government, provoke the Axis powers, and thereby endanger not only the nation's physical safety but also its political institutions and ideology.¹⁴ Explaining how core values are translated into policy requires a careful investigation and a viable theory of the relationship of the state to society.¹⁵

The effort to show how core values emerge in the policymaking process forces the diplomatic historian to study the importance of foreign policy goals in relation to the officials' other objectives. As they seek to achieve diplomatic aims, officials (and leaders of private organizations) may encounter costs that exceed the value of the goals themselves.¹⁶ For example, much as Republican officials in the 1920s yearned for markets abroad, they were unwilling to forego the protection of the home market; much as they wanted international financial stability, they were reluctant to cancel the war debts or raise taxes; much as they sought good relations with the Japanese, they were unwilling to eliminate the discriminatory provisions in the immigration laws. In these cases the foreign policy benefits did not seem to outweigh the domestic costs. Hence the diplomatic objectives,

13 Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 36–72; Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968).

14 Justus D. Doenecke, *Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941* (New York, 2000); Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York, 1988).

15 One can choose from a variety of Marxist or pluralist approaches. One can see the state acting autonomously or as a captive of particular groups or classes. For some stimulating views and essays see Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power* (New York, 1969); Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems* (New York, 1977); and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison, 1978); and Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds., *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann Arbor, 1984).

16 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York, 1981), 50–105.

significant though they were, never became core values.¹⁷ American history is replete with examples demonstrating a quest for territory, markets, and influence and with examples demonstrating restraint. An interpretive framework for the study of American foreign relations must be able to explain why Theodore Roosevelt sent troops to the Caribbean and Central America and why Franklin Roosevelt did not; why Wilson hesitated to intervene in Europe in 1914–1916 but chose to do so in 1917; why the United States resisted the role of hegemon in the interwar years yet assumed it after World War II; why the United States eschewed political commitments and strategic obligations in one era while it welcomed them in another.

The protection and pursuit of core values requires the exercise of power. Power is the capacity to achieve intended results. Power may be an end in itself as well as a means toward an end. In the twentieth century, power (including military power) derives primarily from economic capabilities. Power stems from the scale, vigor, and productivity of one's internal economy and its access to or control over other countries' industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower, and raw materials. Power is relative.¹⁸

The chief characteristic of twentieth-century American foreign policy has been the willingness and capacity of the United States to develop and exert its power beyond its nineteenth-century range to influence the economic, political, and military affairs of Europe and Asia. This trend has manifested itself in the evolution of the Open Door policy, in the aid to the Allies in both world wars, in the wielding of American financial leverage, in the assumption of strategic obligations, in the deployment of troops overseas, in the provision of economic and military assistance, in the undertaking of covert operations, in the huge expenditures on armaments, in the growth of the American multinational corporation, and in the assumption of a hegemonic role over the world capitalist system. The national security approach helps to make sense out of these developments. Alterations in the distribution of power, changes in the international

17 Melvyn P. Leffler, "1921–1932: Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints," in *Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789*, ed. William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (New York, 1984), 225–75.

18 This definition of power comes from Bertrand Russell and was used by Paul Nitze's Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State in the early 1950s. See Paper Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, "Basic Issues Raised by Draft NSC 'Reappraisal of U.S. Objectives and Strategy for National Security,'" n.d. [July 1952], U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954* (Washington, DC, 1984), 2:61 (hereafter FRUS); Gilpin, *War and Change*, 67–68; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987); and Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York, 1973).

system, and developments in technology influence the perception of threat and the definition of core values and impel American officials to exercise power in varying ways.

Notwithstanding the desire of American officials in the 1920s and 1930s to expand markets, stabilize European affairs, pursue investment opportunities, and gain control over raw materials abroad, those goals did not become vital interests worth fighting for until changes in the international system impelled American officials to redefine them as core values. The Axis domination of much of Europe and Asia in 1940 and 1941, for example, endangered markets and investment opportunities.¹⁹ But far more important, Axis aggrandizement enabled prospective adversaries of the United States to mobilize additional resources, coopt other nations' industrial infrastructure, and secure forward bases. Nazi conquests, moreover, raised the possibility that Latin American countries, which had traditionally traded largely with the European continent, would be sucked into the Axis orbit. To deal with autarkic and regimented trade practices abroad and to protect the United States from the growing military capabilities of the adversary, American officials felt they had to mobilize, raise taxes, monitor potential subversives, and prepare to assist or perhaps even take over the export sector of the American economy. Even if the United States had not been attacked, core values were at stake, not because the Axis powers crushed the self-determination of other nations or jeopardized the world capitalist system, but because foreign threats of such magnitude required a reordering of the domestic political economy, portended additional restrictions on civil liberties and individual rights, and endangered the nation's physical integrity and organizing ideology. The purpose of Roosevelt's partial internationalism, writes John Harper, "was not universal salvation for its own sake but the safeguarding of democracy in the United States."²⁰

After World War II the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, the vacuums of power in Western Europe and northeast Asia, and the emergence of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World created a similar specter. American core values were perceived to be at risk. The Kremlin might have neither the intention nor the capability to wage war effectively against the United States, but prudence dictated that the United States organize and

19 For this view, see Patrick J. Hearden, *Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America's Entry into World War II* (DeKalb, IL, 1986); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, 1964).

20 Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994), 112–22; John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (New York, 1994), 64; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Was 1947 a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy?" in *Centerstage: American Diplomacy Since the Second World War*, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York, 1989), 19–42.

project its own power to protect its core values. If the country did not do so, if it withdrew to the Western Hemisphere, President Harry S. Truman warned that the American people would have to accept

a much higher level of mobilization than we have today. It would require a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known. In the end, . . . we would face the prospect of bloody battle – and on our own shores. The ultimate costs of such a policy would be incalculable. Its adoption would be a mandate for national suicide.²¹

During the Cold War years, the perception of an external threat to core values inspired U.S. officials to mobilize American power in unprecedented ways. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are two excellent examples. For the first time in American history the U.S. government appropriated billions of dollars for the rehabilitation of European economies and assumed strategic obligations to protect European countries. In the 1920s, Republican policymakers also had been cognizant of the interdependence of the economies of Europe and the United States.²² Nevertheless, they had eschewed long-term governmental aid and security commitments. How does one account for the willingness of American officials to incur such financial sacrifices and strategic commitments after World War II but not after World War I?

According to the national security approach, the answer rests primarily in the ways American officials perceived external threats to core values. In the mid-1940s, the political and economic vulnerability of Western European governments, the popularity of Communist parties in France, Italy, and Greece, and the economic and social problems beleaguering Germany adumbrated a significant strengthening of the Soviet Union. And if this happened, Truman and his advisers believed, there would be profound repercussions in the way the U.S. government would have to structure its domestic economy and conduct its internal affairs. Because the configuration of power in the international system was profoundly different in the mid-1920s, external developments did not pose as much danger and hence did not justify the allocation of government aid and the assumption of overseas strategic obligations.

21 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953* (Washington, DC, 1966), 189.

22 Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill, 1979); Michael J. Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Relations, 1918–1928* (Columbia, MO, 1977); Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984).

But even when the perception of threat is great, the existence of core values places constraints on the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Aaron Friedberg insightfully shows how “the basic structure of American government institutions, the interests and relative strength of various groups (both within the government itself and in society at large), and the content of prevailing ideas or ideology” circumscribed the growth of a garrison state even during the most scary years of the Cold War. And although these fundamental ideas and institutions limited government ownership, central planning, and military expenditures, they ultimately had a profound impact on the evolution of the Cold War. “By preventing some of the worst, most stifling excesses of statism, these countervailing tendencies made it easier for the United States to preserve its economic vitality and technological dynamism, to maintain domestic political support for a protracted strategic competition and to stay the course in that competition better than its supremely statist rival.”²³ The national security approach, by relating perceptions of threat to core values, helps explain why particular tactics are adopted as policies and why others are rejected.

Although occasionally criticized for its disregard of ideological and cultural concepts, the national security approach to the study of American foreign relations should be conceived as perfectly congruent with these new directions of scholarship.²⁴ Central to the national security approach is the concept of core values. National security is about the protection of core values, that is, the identification of threats and the adoption of policies to protect core values. The new studies on culture and ideology mesh seamlessly with the synthetic qualities of a national security paradigm because they help to illuminate the construction and meaning of core values. In his insightful book on social scientists and nation building in the Kennedy era, Michael Latham writes that “A larger, more deliberate analysis of ideology and identity... can open new areas of inquiry by introducing a less reductive analysis of the ‘interests’ that critics have typically discerned behind official discourse.” And he concludes that “in the midst of a collapsing European colonial order, social scientists and Kennedy administration policymakers conceived of [modernization] as a means to promote a liberal world in which the development of ‘emerging’ nations would protect the security of the United States.”²⁵

23 Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, 2000), especially pp. 4–5, 60–61.

24 William O. Walker, III, “Melvyn P. Leffler, Ideology, and American Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 663–73; Bruce Cumings, “Revising Postrevisionism: or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History,” *ibid.*, 17 (Fall 1993): 563–64ff.

25 Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000), quotations on pp. 8–9, 209.

The fervor with which the United States waged the Cold War can only be grasped by understanding the role of ideology in the construction of American national identity. In his succinct, valuable volume on Manifest Destiny in American history, Anders Stephanson reminds us of the puritannical, millennial, and religious impulses that infuse America's approach to the world. Other factors might have influenced the Cold War, he writes, "but the operative framework in which they all fit is the story of American exceptionalism, with its missionary implications."²⁶ And this emphasis on American nationalist ideology, sometimes conflated with notions of an American century or a Wilsonian century, pulsates through the new foreign policy literature. "American nationalist ideology," writes John Fousek, "provided the principal underpinning for the broad public consensus that supported Cold War foreign policy."²⁷

But when translated into policy, the ideological fervor was always calibrated. Nobody has shown the interplay of ideas and policies better than Michael Hogan in his recent book on the origins of the national security state. When all is said and done, he writes, "the most important constraints on the national security state were built into the country's democratic institutions and political culture." American institutions, ideas, and ideals, indeed American ideology, however constructed by personages as different as Robert Taft and Harry Truman, set the parameters for the conduct of foreign policy. "Traditional values and institutions channeled American policy and American state making in some directions while damning them up in others. The American people and their leaders, or at least the best of them, would go so far and no further, lest a reckless abandon destroy the very Republic they sought to protect."²⁸

By focusing on the relationship of threat perception to core values, the national security approach has the capacity to weave together ideology and policy in illuminating ways. Other approaches to American foreign policy, although sophisticated and incisive, do not offer the same synthetic capacity both to interpret change over time and to explain discrete decisions at given moments. Corporatist historians, for example, show how business corporations, private-public linkages, and supranational institutions served as policy instruments. Continuities between the

26 Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995), 124.

27 John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 2; Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago, 1999); Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994).

28 Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York, 1998), quotations on 474-75, 482.

two post-world war eras are emphasized; change minimized.²⁹ But many students of American history believe the Marshall Plan and NATO represented significant change and want to know how to account for it. As splendidly as the corporatist approach elucidates the tactical changes in policy, it is less successful in explaining motivations. It remains difficult, for example, to find the evidence to show that the New Deal coalition had a greater bearing on the formulation of the Marshall Plan than did the drastically altered configuration of power in post-World War Europe.

Corporatism has the capacity to illuminate *how* American officials hoped to cast a modern, integrated industrial economy. But to be persuasive as an overarching synthesis of American foreign policy, it must address matters of motivation as boldly and provocatively as did an earlier generation of revisionists, and it must cast its net just as widely. Either by self-definition or by practice, corporatist writers have rarely dealt with threat perception, arms expenditures, military assistance, force deployments, nuclear strategy, military alliances, political commitments, and client states in the Third World – matters central to the study of international diplomacy in the post-World War II era. Much to my own chagrin, because I did not see how the corporatist model could explain many of these developments, I relegated it to an instrumentalist, rather than interpretive, role in my writing on the Cold War, despite the great relevance that it had to my analysis of American diplomacy in the 1920s.

Because it calls for integrating core values, power, and foreign threats, the national security approach forces historians to study geopolitical and strategic issues in relation to political economy, ideology, and culture. Attention is focused on how policymakers linked means and ends and on how they sought to balance commitments and resources. In seeking to accomplish those tasks, scholars can and should use techniques from other interpretive approaches and from other disciplines. In discussing threat perception, psychological approaches will help; in discussing core values, theories of decision making and organizational behavior will be useful and an understanding of culture and ideology will be indispensable; in discussing the exercise of power, corporatist, realist, and world systems approaches will be applicable.

Heretofore the integrative potential of the national security approach has been obfuscated by the fact that it has become so closely linked to debates over the origins of the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, the founder of post-revisionism, initially sought to use a national security approach

29 See especially Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Modern Europe, 1947–1952* (New York, 1987).

to refute the revisionist interpretation of the Cold War. He disputed the centrality of economic factors and minimized American responsibility for the Cold War. More recently, he has looked at the new evidence emanating from communist archives and claimed that containment was a response to the perceived evils of communist totalitarianism and the threats posed by Stalinist rule. In response to the external menace, the United States utilized its power to create an empire of its own, but it was a defensive empire aimed at creating independent centers of democratic power and fashioning a world of diversity.³⁰

Gaddis's analysis of how democratic sensibilities shaped the U.S. approach to Western Europe, Germany, and Japan is insightful, but it is not the only one that can flow from an analysis of threats to core values. The American sense of threat, it can be argued, was not so much a function of Stalin's personality; it resulted from an acute understanding of the vulnerabilities of the international system and the perceived capacity of the Kremlin to take advantage of those vulnerabilities. And the configuration of power that the United States sought was not a balance of power, but a preponderance of power.³¹ When Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, Paul Nitze, and most other influential policymakers (except for George Kennan) talked about power, they meant "preponderant power." And preponderant power, in the words of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, was designed to achieve "a hierarchy of objectives, namely: a. strength at the center (Western Europe, West Germany, and Japan); b. strength at the periphery (Southeast Asia, Middle East, and North Africa); c. the retraction of Soviet power and a change in the Soviet system."³²

Policymakers' belief that it was a vital American interest to integrate core and periphery suggests that there should be a close convergence between the national security approach to understanding American diplomatic history and the world systems model outlined by Thomas J. McCormick in this volume. There are some important distinctions, however. The American economy always has functioned as part of the world capitalist system, but only occasionally has its participation in that system dictated critical foreign policy decisions. For example, American officials rejected a hegemonic role for the United States in 1919 and spurned responsibility for the effective functioning of the world capitalist system during the Great Depression. When the United States did assume the role

30 John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972); idem, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York, 1982); idem, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): 171–90; idem, *We Now Know*.

31 Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*.

32 Policy Planning Staff, "Basic Issues," n.d. /July 1952/, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 2:62–63.

of hegemon in the late 1940s, American policymakers were inspired as much by their concern for America's long-term physical security and for its domestic political freedoms and free enterprise economy as by solicitude for the world capitalist system itself. For although McCormick is right to say that the Truman administration faced a global, systemwide capitalist crisis in early 1950, policymakers nevertheless believed that the foundering of the system would redound to the benefit of the Kremlin. If the Soviet Union could attract part of the periphery or lure Germany or Japan into its orbit, Soviet strength would grow and the power of the Western alliance would erode. Eventually, the Kremlin might gather enough resources, industrial infrastructure, military capabilities, and self-confidence to challenge more vital American interests and to wage war effectively should it erupt through miscalculation or accident.

According to official Washington, prudence dictated that the United States intervene on the periphery, rearm Germany, and militarize its foreign policy. If the Truman administration did not do so, it might subsequently encounter even greater dangers. It might then have to multiply its defense expenditures, raise taxes, interfere in the operation of the marketplace economy, and infringe on individual rights in ways that far exceeded the possibilities contemplated in NSC 68 and the worst excesses of the McCarthy era. The real threat therefore emanated not from the malfunctioning of the capitalist system, but from the Kremlin's ability to capitalize upon it; the core values that were endangered were not markets, raw materials, and overseas investment opportunities, but political liberty and free enterprise at home. Truman, Acheson, and Nitze wanted to integrate core and periphery, as McCormick incisively argues, but for more complex reasons (related to strategy, geopolitics, and ideology) than the world systems approach allows for.

Preponderance and hegemony, as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have written, confer advantages and impose costs. If threats are exaggerated and commitments overextended, if one's credibility is vested in the achievement of too many goals, one's relative power will erode and one's core values may become imperiled. There is an ominous dynamic influencing the behavioral patterns of great powers.³³ Whether or not the United States will succumb to it will depend on whether groups, bureaucracies, and individual policymakers can find a means of restoring a viable equilibrium among threats, core values, and the exercise of power.

The national security model can and should serve as a framework for studying the history of American foreign policy in the eighteenth and

33 Gilpin, *War and Change*; Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 36–37.

nineteenth centuries as well as in the twentieth. For although changing perceptions of space and time caused by technological change made it imperative to integrate policy in a more timely manner after World War II, the use of power to overcome threats and defend core values has been an enduring element of the American diplomatic experience. Jefferson and Madison, after all, sought to use economic leverage and then went to war to protect neutral rights, to foster trade, and to demonstrate the viability of the republican form of government. Only a few historians, however, have begun to apply the national security model to the pre-atomic era.³⁴ Although that model is not well designed to evaluate and measure the *impact* of American policies on foreign countries, it is eminently well designed to study policy formulation at any given period of time. And it can be used in a comparative framework to study the behavior of foreign governments as well as that of the United States.³⁵ Not the least of the advantages of the national security model is that it encompasses diverse variables, allows for different weights to be assigned to them, and constitutes the basis for synthesis without imposing rigidity and uniformity.

34 Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, Jr., *American Foreign Policy and National Security Policies, 1914–1945* (Knoxville, 1987); James Chace and Caleb Carr, *America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Insecurity from 1812 to Star Wars* (New York, 1988); James E. Lewis, Jr., *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783–1829* (Chapel Hill, 1998); Mitchell, *Danger of Dreams*.

35 Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*.

Corporatism

MICHAEL J. HOGAN

One of the challenges facing diplomatic historians is to construct an analytical framework that illuminates both the internal and external sources of foreign policy. Historians may disagree over which of these sources is more important or begin at different ends of the chain of causation. They may see American leaders as responding to the demands of a domestic system that opens outward to the world, thereby shaping the basic thrust and particular goals of diplomacy, or as reacting to imperatives embedded in the global balance of power. But wherever they start, the explanatory power of their work will be diminished if one set of sources is ignored or treated as clearly peripheral to the long-term pattern of American diplomacy. Revisionist historians, for example, have generally highlighted the domestic economic and ideological influences on policy without elaborating the geopolitical considerations that also figured in the thinking of American leaders. Postrevisionists, on the other hand, have concentrated on policymaking elites in the government and on issues of national security, including shifts in the balance of power and various strategies to contain aggressors and promote the national interest. While their approach bridges the gap between diplomatic history and political science, it fails to explore the nature of the American system or its influence on diplomacy, and thus falls short of a coherent synthesis.

Still needed is a framework that can accommodate both internal and external imperatives, whatever the point of departure, and that borrows as much from the literature on domestic processes as from the perspectives of political science. Nor is this the only challenge facing diplomatic historians. Because foreign relations cannot be contained within the state, or even the nation, any such framework has to account for the important role played by nonstate actors, as well as government officials, and not only their role in shaping government policy but also the part they played in creating the international environment in which policy operated. At the same time, such a framework has to connect national policy to a process that extends beyond the nation, as well as the state. It has to situate American policy internationally by noting the role of other states and by linking

national policies to political, economic, social, and cultural developments on a global scale.

One effort to meet these needs has come from a group of diplomatic historians whose work deals with the interaction of national systems in the world arena. Tracing this interaction dictates a concern with many of the international factors at the center of postrevisionism, with the policies and objectives of other states, for example, and with global balances, threat perception, deterrence strategy, and alliance politics. At the same time, however, these factors become part of an interpretative approach that begins with the nature of the domestic system, both the American system and its counterparts in other countries. Like the revisionism of an earlier day, this approach analyzes the economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences at work on diplomacy. But it also describes the organizational dimension of decision making, focuses on the role of functional elites rather than governing classes, and traces the connection between foreign policy and ongoing changes in the industrial and political structure. Although adaptable to the interpretative slant that marked revisionism, it draws its inspiration from the corporatist model employed by scholars of modern capitalism in the United States and elsewhere.¹

These scholars have used the terms *corporatism* or *associationalism* to describe a system that is characterized by certain organizational forms, by a certain ideology, and by a certain trend in the development of public policy. Organizationally, corporatism refers to a system that is founded on officially recognized functional groups, such as organized labor, business, and agriculture. In such a system, institutional regulating and coordinating mechanisms seek to integrate the groups into an organic whole; elites in the private and public sectors collaborate to guarantee stability and harmony; and this collaboration creates a pattern of interpenetration and power sharing that makes it difficult to determine where one sector leaves off and the other begins. Ellis W. Hawley defined corporatism in these

1 This chapter draws on my earlier work, especially Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Fall 1986): 363–72. For another discussion of the corporatist synthesis as applied to diplomatic history, see Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery?: A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History," *Reviews in American History* 10 (December 1982): 318–30. See also Ellis W. Hawley, "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism,'" *Business History Review* 52 (Autumn 1978): 309–20. McCormick's essay shows how revisionist scholars might adapt corporatism to their own needs and purposes, pointing out that adaptability is one of the concept's virtues. Hawley's essay enumerates some of the differences, other than those noted in the text, in the way revisionists and nonrevisionists use the concept. For some theoretical background since this essay was first published, see Larry G. Gerber, "Corporatism and State Theory: A Review Essay for Historians," *Social Science History* 19 (Fall 1995): 313–32; Oscar Molina and Martin Rhodes, "Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept," *Annual Reviews in Political Science* 5 (2002): 305–31; and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism!" *Government and Opposition* 24 (1989): 54–73.

terms, his work building on the insights of historians, such as Alfred D. Chandler and Robert H. Wiebe, who identified the organizational revolution and the search for order as major themes in the history of modern industrial society.²

Still other scholars delineated the ideology and political culture of the associative state and its champions among progressive political leaders and their counterparts in labor, industry, agriculture, and the professions. They uncovered a body of liberal thought that celebrated such virtues as voluntarism, enlightened cooperation, efficient administration, and managerial expertise. They explored the many programs to promote social welfare, tame the business cycle, and nurture growth. And they demonstrated how these programs often sought to contain the state by entrusting much of the responsibility for public policy to semiautonomous agencies, to supposedly nonpartisan experts, and to collaborative systems of economic planning and voluntary regulation. According to most of these studies, those who championed the associative system saw it as a "middle way" between the laissez faire capitalism of a bygone day and the paternalistic statism of an Orwellian nightmare. In this system, partisan politics would supposedly give way to managerial expertise, public legislatures would yield some of their functions to private forums, and redistributive battles would dissolve in a material abundance in which all could share.³

The portrait drawn in this scholarship is fluid rather than static; the relative weight assigned to various components of the corporative system, particularly to public versus private power, varies according to historical circumstances, the political power of the groups involved, and the national system under discussion. While corporatism is therefore a useful model for describing modern society at any particular moment, it is best perceived and most fruitfully employed as an analytical device for explaining important, long-term trends in politics, the economy, and public policy. By using it this way, historians have discovered hitherto obscure lines of continuity running throughout the twentieth century. And they

2 Hawley, "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism'"; Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York, 1968); Chandler, *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge MA, 1962); idem, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA, 1977).

3 For a sample of Hawley's work see "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," *Journal of American History* 61 (June 1974): 116-40. See also Joan Hoff-Wilson, *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* (Boston, 1975); Robert M. Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964* (New York, 1981); Kim McQuaid, *Big Business and Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan* (New York, 1982); and Robert Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," *American Historical Review* 87 (February 1982): 87-122. For a discussion of corporatism, its connections to organizational history, and the relevant literature see Hawley, "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism.'"

have done so without slighting the significance of new ideas and scientific adaptations and without substituting consensus theory for one that takes account of political struggles. On the contrary, they have focused on efforts to contain group conflict through strategies of growth and through organizational structures that could harmonize differences. They have also talked of competing political coalitions and have sought to integrate important economic and political transformations into the unfolding history of modern corporatism. My own work, for example, describes how the Great Depression of the 1930s combined with changes in the industrial structure to produce the New Deal coalition, an alliance of interests that defeated conservative opponents and elaborated the corporative design envisioned by Republican leaders a decade earlier.⁴

If corporatism has illuminated important trends in domestic history, it has been no less helpful to a substantial group of diplomatic historians. As these historians realize, political leaders seldom compartmentalize their vision, thinking one way about the domestic system, another about the international system. On the contrary, American leaders, to give one example, tried to build a world order along lines comparable to the corporatist order that was taking shape at home. Their global design became more elaborate as time passed and circumstances changed, and much of what we know of that design first emerged from scholarship on American foreign policy in the 1920s.

Although rejecting the League of Nations and other collective security arrangements, Republican policymakers were heirs to a long tradition of expansionism and dollar diplomacy. They built on this tradition, on the internationalism of the war period, and on such venerable shibboleths as the Open Door, joining forces in many cases with private industrial and financial institutions that had a growing stake in the global economy. My early work focused on their efforts to reconstruct the international system in the wake of World War I, and similar contributions came from Carl P. Parrini, Joan Hoff-Wilson, Burton I. Kaufman, Melvyn P. Leffler, Emily S. Rosenberg, and Frank Costigliola.⁵

4 Michael J. Hogan, "Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad," *Diplomatic History* 8 (Fall 1984): 287-310; idem, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (New York, 1987), 1-25. My argument about the formation of the New Deal coalition borrows from Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984): 41-94.

5 Parrini, *Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923* (Pittsburgh, 1969); Hoff-Wilson, *Herbert Hoover*; idem, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1922* (Lexington, KY, 1971); Kaufman, *Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization in the Wilson Administration, 1913-1921* (Westport, CT, 1974); Michael J. Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928* (Columbia, MO, 1977); Leffler, *The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933* (Chapel Hill,

These studies differed in chronological coverage, topical focus, and point of view, but all shared elements of the corporatist synthesis. The ideology of American diplomats, as they elaborated it, echoed the ideology of the associational movement in the United States. For Republican policymakers, in other words, state trading, national autarky, and unregulated international rivalries posed a threat to global peace and stability comparable to the threat that paternalistic government, class conflict, and the unbridled pursuit of self-interest posed to liberal capitalism and democracy at home. And if the dangers were similar, so were the safeguards. According to these historians, the Republicans saw economic growth as a way to eliminate autarky and integrate national economies into a world capitalist order. Growth could be achieved by unleashing private initiative and normal market forces, steps best arranged through most-favored-nation treaties, convertible currencies, the reduction of international indebtedness, and the export of private capital and technical know-how. Government could play a positive role in promoting these initiatives and in organizing the private sector for overseas expansion. But in the international arena, as on the home front, the major emphasis was on scientific administration, not political management, and on voluntary self-regulation by cooperating private elites.

Guided by their associational vision, Republican leaders touted a "scientific" settlement of war debts and tariff rates by nonpartisan "experts" and semiautonomous commissions. They joined forces with the financial community to regulate foreign loans, tried to reconcile the differences between private groups with a stake in foreign trade, and sought to bring bankers and manufacturers together in collective programs to expand the world economy. In an era dominated by economic problems, Republican policymakers also fostered an international network of cooperating central banks. They relied on private commissions to modify the reparations settlement imposed on the defeated Germans, and they sanctioned the organization of multinational groups to underwrite development, manage resources, and expand communications. Their goals were peaceful growth and integration without destabilizing competition or excessive intervention by the state. And to achieve these goals, the Republicans tried to forge a new order in which market forces and cooperating private groups worked in tandem to regulate the global economy.

1979); Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982); Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984). See also Ellis W. Hawley, *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917–1933* (New York, 1979). This list does not include the contributions by specialists in European diplomatic history, especially Charles S. Maier, some of whose articles are cited in subsequent notes.

While analyzing the New Era vision and the programs that resulted, the historians of interwar corporatism also described the imperfect internationalism that contributed to the collapse of world peace and prosperity after 1929. They noted the failure of Republican leaders to control public opinion, ameliorate group differences, and overcome bureaucratic obstacles. In surveying the complicated negotiations between the United States and other governments, they pointed out the limits inherent in the Republican design as applied to trade and tariff disputes, debt-funding agreements, loan policies, and collective security arrangements. In addition, Leffler combined his discussion of economic diplomacy with a careful scrutiny of such issues as strategic commitments, neutrality rights, and naval limitations. Costigliola focused attention on the expansion of American technology and mass culture, as well as American business, and Rosenberg did much the same in a volume that traced the evolution of American diplomacy from the late nineteenth century through World War II.⁶

These works put to rest forever what William Appleman Williams called the legend of isolationism in the 1920s.⁷ They revised substantially the older textbook interpretation of the New Era as a decade of unmitigated reaction, marked by a rigid and ethnocentric diplomacy, and they made it possible to see important connections between the search for order at home and abroad. The best of these works managed to integrate the economic influences identified by revisionist historians into a multidimensional analysis that also took account of geopolitical considerations, not to mention organizational arrangements and bureaucratic determinants. They demonstrated convincingly that a corporatist analysis could be combined with a searching examination of state-to-state relations and the influence exerted by party politics, congressional pressures, and public opinion. Like postrevisionist scholarship, they noted the important role of government elites in shaping foreign policy, but they did not ignore the equally important part played by private experts and nongovernmental groups. Indeed, more recent work by Paul W. Drake, Thomas F. O'Brien, and Emily S. Rosenberg has focused particular attention on the influence of multinational corporations and financial missionaries such as Edwin Kemmerer, especially on their efforts to export American corporate culture and economic values to developing countries.⁸

6 See the citations to Leffler, Costigliola, and Rosenberg in footnote 5.

7 Williams, "The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s," *Science and Society* 18 (Winter 1954): 1–20.

8 Paul W. Drake, *Money Doctor in the Andes: The Kemmerer Missions, 1923–1933* (Durham, NC, 1989); Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900–1945* (New York, 1996); and Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

As evident in this body of scholarship, corporatism also has advantages for those historians who want to move beyond the state in their study of foreign relations or who want to locate American diplomacy in a larger international, comparative, or cultural framework. To be sure, most of works in this category do not ignore the state altogether or abandon the nation as a subject of analysis. Nevertheless, they supplement an investigation of government policy with a discussion of private groups and informal diplomacy, just as they explore the connection, noted by Akira Iriye and others, between power and culture in international relations.⁹ Indeed, most of the scholars in this group root government policy in American political culture, and some of them, especially Costigliola and Rosenberg, link the pursuit of corporatist policies abroad with the process of cultural expansion and Americanization. Like others in the group, most recently Paul Drake and Thomas O'Brien, Costigliola and Rosenberg elaborate the role that nonstate actors played in the history of American foreign relations, but add social workers, missionaries, filmmakers, and similar carriers of culture to the well-established list of industrialists, bankers, and trade unionists. In addition, Rosenberg's most recent work on financial missionaries combines a traditional account of dollar diplomacy with an analysis that follows the cultural turn of recent scholarship by situating American policy in a context that includes notions of racial superiority, manliness, modernization, and professionalism.

What is more, even though the scholars in this group do not forsake the nation in their analysis, most explore the connection between national policy and various forces, particularly economic forces, at work in the international system. Several also utilize bi-archival or multi-archival research to place national policy in a larger regional or global context, with the most notable example being Charles S. Maier, who used corporatism to compare and describe the political arrangements that took shape between governments, industrialists, trade unionists, landowners, peasants, and other private groups in much of Europe after the First World War.¹⁰

Although corporatist historians first concentrated on the 1920s, virtually all of the works noted above discerned patterns that linked Republican diplomacy to the foreign policy of the Progressive Era and earlier periods in American history. This pattern became even clearer in Gregg Andrews's impressive study of the collaboration between the American government

9 Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Cambridge, MA, 1981); idem, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," *Diplomatic History* 3 (Spring 1979): 115-28; idem, "War as Peace, Peace as War," in *Experiencing the Twentieth Century*, ed. Nobutoshi Hagihara, Akira Iriye, Georges Nivat, and Philip Windsor (Tokyo, 1985), 31-54.

10 Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, 1975).

and the American Federation of Labor in shaping U.S. policy toward the Mexican revolution between 1910 and 1924. While Andrews, along with Elizabeth McKillen and others, explored labor's role in foreign policy, including its cooperation with government officials, others remained fascinated by the relationship between government elites and their counterparts in business and banking. This was the case with Linda B. Hall's work on the intertwining of petroleum, banking, and politics in U.S. policy toward Mexico after 1917, and it was also the case with the earlier work of Richard Hume Werking and William H. Becker. These historians described the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts of American business leaders to establish essentially "quasi-corporative" organizations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that could protect their interests at home and abroad. They uncovered the linkages that business groups tried to forge with public policymakers, particularly in the State and Commerce departments, who were devising their own plans to make government more efficient and improve their connections with the private sector. In addition, they described how the search for private gain, including career goals and bureaucratic advantage, often coincided with the promotion of national interests and with the larger themes of professionalism, scientific management, and national efficiency that characterized the progressive period as well as the 1920s.¹¹

Other works extended the corporatist analysis from the 1920s to the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Andrew P. N. Erdmann did so for international monetary policy in an article that highlighted a shift in the corporatist balance of power between the private and public sectors from the New Era to the New Deal. David S. Painter did the same for oil diplomacy in a monograph that devoted particular attention to the close collaboration between public policymakers and company officials.¹² Burton Kaufman's study of economic diplomacy in the 1950s added weight to Robert Griffith's important article on the domestic and diplomatic aspects of Eisenhower's

11 Andrews, *Shoulder to Shoulder? The American Federation of Labor, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1924* (Berkeley, 1991); McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924* (Ithaca, NY, 1995); Hall, *Oil, Banks, and Politics: The United States and Postrevolutionary Mexico* (Austin, 1995); Werking, *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890–1913* (Lexington, KY, 1977); idem, "Bureaucrats, Businessmen, and Foreign Trade: The Origins of the United States Chamber of Commerce," *Business History Review* 52 (Autumn 1978): 321–41; Becker, *The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893–1921* (Chicago, 1982). The phrase "quasi-corporative" is taken from Hawley, "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism.'"

12 Erdmann, "Mining for the Corporatist Synthesis: Gold in American Foreign Economic Policy, 1931–1936," *Diplomatic History* 17 (Spring 1993): 171–200; Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, 1986). Painter's is the last of several books on oil diplomacy, all of which provide support to those looking for a corporatist synthesis of American foreign policy.

"Corporate Commonwealth."¹³ In her prize-winning book *The Rich Neighbor Policy*, Elizabeth Cobbs painted a detailed, if benign, picture of American corporate capitalism at work in Brazil under the leadership of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller and Henry J. Kaiser. A far more malignant picture emerged in Bruce Cumings's brilliant analysis of the Korean War, which stressed in part the connection between U.S. policy, the structure of the American political economy, and the struggle for power between different groups in the United States. Somewhat similar themes emerged in my own recent work, which analyzed the link between statemaking and foreign policy in the first decade of the Cold War and integrated that analysis into a broader study of partisan politics, bureaucratic rivalries, and issues of political culture and national identity. Focusing also on the 1950s, Paul G. Pierpaoli used the corporatist synthesis to present the first systematic history of U.S. economic mobilization during the Korean War, while Federico Romero relied on the corporatist paradigm to examine the collaborative efforts of American government and labor leaders in promoting stability and containing communism in Europe.¹⁴

In addition to these works, Charles S. Maier and I have used corporatism to analyze the evolution of European and American diplomacy from the end of World War I through the early Cold War. My contribution revised conventional interpretations that relied on external factors alone, particularly on the Soviet menace of the early Cold War, to explain the triumph of internationalism in American diplomacy. It saw this triumph stemming as well from the rise of the New Deal coalition in the United States, a coalition that prevailed against Robert Taft and other conservatives whose anti-Communist strategy ruled out many of the economic and military innovations of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.¹⁵

As the preceding discussion points out, the work of corporatist historians describes how internal and external developments (domestic politics and Soviet expansion) led Cold War policymakers to elaborate the associational formulations of the New Era. Through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as the reciprocal trade agreements,

13 Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961* (Baltimore, 1982); Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth."

14 Cobbs, *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil* (New Haven, 1992); Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War. Vol. 2 The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, 1990); Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia, MO, 1999); Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-1951* (Chapel Hill, 1992).

15 Hogan, "Revival and Reform"; idem, *The Marshall Plan*; Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," *International Organization* 31 (Autumn 1977): 607-33; idem, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," *American Historical Review* 86 (April 1981): 327-52.

they added multilateral ingredients to the Open Door prescriptions of the first postwar period. Through technical assistance schemes they extended Hoover's earlier efforts to export the American way. Through government aid programs, including the Marshall Plan, they enlarged the design for a corporative world order envisioned by their predecessors. And through new alliances and military assistance programs they committed the United States to collective security arrangements that would safeguard their design against potential aggressors. There were organizational innovations too, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which tended to formalize the mechanisms of economic coordination that had taken shape during the Republican ascendancy. As in the 1920s, moreover, Cold War diplomacy was often a by-product of close collaboration between public policymakers and private elites. At times this collaboration took the form of frequent consultation or the appointment of private leaders to public positions, phenomena described by Painter in his study of oil diplomacy. At times, as my book on the Marshall Plan points out, cooperation was institutionalized in agencies that operated as a bridge between the public and private sectors.¹⁶ Whatever the method, Cold War and corporatism, as I have argued more recently, combined to transform American political culture, the American state, and the way Americans defined themselves.¹⁷

These works illustrate again how a corporatist analysis can take account of political pressures, bureaucratic rivalries, and geopolitical strategy. Painter integrates these factors into his investigation of oil diplomacy, as does Griffith in his overview of the Eisenhower administration. My book on the Marshall Plan details the bureaucratic wrangling between the administrative agencies involved and outlines the critique of the plan mounted by conservatives in Congress. It also argues that economic aid became a vehicle for reconstructing the elements of a viable balance of power on the Continent, first by reconciling Franco-German differences in the West, then by bringing the participating countries into a unit of sufficient strength and coherence to contain the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. Economic policy reinforced geopolitical goals, just as military policy, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program, sought to reinforce the corporative design for a new European order that inhered in the Marshall Plan.¹⁸

From works on the late nineteenth century, the Progressive Era, and the interwar period, and from those on the 1940s and 1950s, we now

16 Painter, *Oil and the American Century*; and Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*.

17 Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, UK and New York, 1998).

18 Painter, *Oil and the American Century*; Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth"; Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*.

have the rudiments of a corporatist view covering a substantial portion of modern American history. This interpretation places key events within a framework that emphasizes ongoing transformations and that connects the national and international sources of American diplomacy. Critics have charged that corporatism is marked by conceptual fuzziness, that it ignores important discontinuities, and that historians have applied the model only to those topics, areas of the world, and periods suited to their purpose.¹⁹ To be sure, the past is prologue in a corporatist analysis, which stresses how historical forces limit the choices available to decision makers and how change usually comes in evolutionary increments, not in dramatic watersheds. But if used properly, as the discussion of post-World War II diplomacy suggests, corporatism can highlight long-term patterns of policy without ignoring important innovations. Even critics admit that it has proven to be a remarkably fruitful mode of analysis as applied thus far. Further research should enlarge the subjects at its command and expand its chronological horizon.

There are different varieties of corporatism, as Philippe C. Schmitter noted several years ago; their central components may remain the same but the relationship between them and their relative weight vary according to national circumstances and the historical period involved.²⁰ This variety helps to illustrate that what critics see as corporatism's fuzziness others see as its strong suit, namely, its flexibility as an analytical device and its emphasis on historical *process*. These attributes make corporatism particularly useful for explaining change over time and for comparing national systems in an age when different brands of corporatism characterize much of the world. Indeed, one of the most exciting aspects of this concept is the hope it holds for writing what is often termed international history, what might better be called transnational or comparative national history. As Charles Maier was the first to show in his impressive study of the 1920s, corporatism provides a framework for analyzing how different national systems respond to similar forces, both internal and external, and thus for comparing societies that are usually treated separately.²¹ In addition, corporatism may enable us to see the international system as not simply a conglomerate of autonomous institutions, competing states, and rival alliances but as a complex defined by imperatives

19 For the most thoughtful critiques see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Fall 1986): 357–62; idem, "New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Summer 1990): 405–23; and Leo Panitch, "Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry," *British Journal of Sociology* 31 (June 1980): 159–87.

20 Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics* 36 (January 1974): 85–131.

21 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.

arising from within the complex itself or projected globally by national corporatism.

If it is useful to resort to such concepts as postrevisionism, then a corporatist approach, as Maier once suggested, "might be described as transrevisionist," in that it "has crossed to new concerns."²² Corporatism is not for those historians who are content to work with conventional categories of analysis, such as the national interest and the balance of power, or within older interpretative frameworks, such as the realist critique and its subsequent resurgence among postrevisionist scholars. Nor is corporatism for those who want to concentrate primarily on such familiar topics as military strategy or on such well-worn issues as the question of who started the Cold War. To be sure, a corporatist analysis can take account of the strategic and geopolitical notions that typify traditional diplomatic history. But it is far more concerned with the globalization of economic, political, and social forces; with the connections between state and society and between national systems and foreign policy; and with the interaction of these systems internationally.

As such, corporatism can provide an analytical link between scholars with different interests and points of view. As noted earlier, it is compatible with the approach of international historians who tell their story from the point of view of at least two countries, who use research drawn from both countries, and who are thus less impressed with American perceptions of the world beyond Washington than with the reality of that world. At the same time, corporatism is also adaptable to the analytical needs of scholars who are interested in world systems and dependency theories. And as my recent work on the origins of the national security state suggests, it can be used as well by scholars who deploy state-centered paradigms, who are concerned with the role of non-state actors, or who are interested in discourse analysis and in issues of ideology, political culture, and national identity.²³ Although each of these approaches can explain aspects of policy or policymaking, none can absorb the others in a coherent synthesis. Corporatism, at least, can bring them together in an integrated framework and, in the process, restore the connection between more traditional diplomatic historians and their colleagues in other fields. It can help to overcome what many see as the isolation of diplomatic history and enable its practitioners to rejoin the larger community of scholars who are unraveling the history of modern America.

22 Maier, "American Visions and British Interests: Hogan's Marshall Plan," *Reviews in American History* 18 (March 1990): 102.

23 Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*.

World Systems

THOMAS J. McCORMICK

*[Every] capitalist development . . . seems, by reaching the stage of financial expansion, to have in some sense announced its maturity: it [is] a sign of autumn.*¹

– Fernand Braudel

*When Mr. [Henry] Kissinger asked whether economic factors have ever controlled political, Mr. [George] Ball said . . . Economics will influence the political shape of the world since politics can only go so far in interrupting profit before strong pressure develops for a more suitable set of political rules.*²

– Council on Foreign Relations meeting, 1968

The brilliant Adolf Berle once wrote in his diary: “There is order in the cosmos and if you can not apprehend it, then you make one up inside your head.”³ World systems theory (WST) is such an invention. And while it has both limits and flaws, as we shall see, it is a theory that transcends those deficits and offers historians a tool that is not only useful, but arguably essential in generating innovative categories, vocabulary, questions, paradigms, and insights. At its most general, its crucial advantage is its absolute insistence on locating any study within the *temporal* frame of long-term time and within the *spatial* context of a global unit of analysis. To do otherwise runs the risk of reinventing the wheel, of misinterpreting short-term trends as self-contained or unique when they are often merely segments of medium-term cycles or long-term secular tendencies. Similarly, to do otherwise runs the risks of failing to see the forest for the trees, of misinterpreting local/national developments as exceptional and discrete when they are often connected to and shaped by comparative, on-going developments both regionally and globally. In sum, world systems theory assumes that all time frames and all spatial units of analysis,

1 Quoted in Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (New York, 1994), 6.

2 Council on Foreign Relations meeting, New York, January 17, 1968.

3 Quoted in Thomas J. McCormick and Walter LaFeber, eds., *Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898–1968* (Madison, WI, 1993), 126.

whatever their size, are important; but it argues that it is always best to begin with (or at least be consciously and systematically aware of) the longest and largest – and then to devolve through the intermediate to the short-term and the particular.⁴

The father of world systems theory was the great European historian Fernand Braudel, but its popularizer was the historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, along with his many disciples. They define the world-system as a dynamic one composed of two, interacting subsystems: the world-economy and the interstate system of nations. The world-economy, in its modern sense since 1500, is synonymous with global capitalism – that is, that part of the planet earth that, at any given moment in time, is largely governed by market forces, by capitalist relations of production and exchange. For its part, the modern interstate system since 1500 is quite different from ancient empires like Rome where “there is a single political system over most of the area, however attenuated the degree of effective control.”⁵ Instead, it encompasses a multiplicity of nations, whose interstate relations tend to shift between periods of “decentering” and “recentering” – between balance of power eras and epochs of single-power hegemony, sometimes bridged by collective concerts of power as intermediate transitions.⁶ The relationship between the two subsystems of global capitalism and the political order of nation-states is a complex and volatile one. The former, inherently *internationalist* in nature, seeks maximum fluidity and mobility of goods and capital, even in distant and foreign places, in order to secure greater profits. The political interstate system, however, has an inherent *nationalist* bias as individual nations seek to maximize their power, status, territory, and security, if need be at the expense of others. The eternal problem of the world-system then is to square the circle, to reconcile the contrary tendencies of its two subsystems – that is, to ensure that the political-military power of the interstate system is used to provide the world-economy with the peace, security, incentives, and proper rules of the game necessary to its predictable and profitable operation; and to avoid the war, insecurity, unpredictability, and economic restrictions that undermine its course of action.

A number of general attributes define this world-system. **First**, it possesses spatial limits that exclude from its boundaries *minisystems* of subsistence economies (now almost gone from the earth) and *external empires* like Russia and China that were contained outside the system in the

4 See Preface to Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1995), xvi.

5 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1976), 230.

6 Fernand Braudel, *Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism* (Baltimore, 1977), 86.

Cold War and only partly reintegrated into the epoch that has followed. **Second**, it posits a complex, symbiotic division of labor between *core* (developed) countries, who dominate high-tech manufacturing, finance, and insurance; *peripheral* (less developed) areas, specializing in plantation economies, raw material extraction, and low-tech, sweatshop manufacturing; and, in between, *semiperipheral* countries (emerging markets, newly-industrializing-countries), who engage in medium-tech manufacturing, mobilize local capital, share in global transport, and act as export platforms for multinational corporations. **Third**, that division of labor is hierarchical in nature, "a chain of subordinations, each conditioning the other."⁷ Disputing globalization's view (i.e., modernization theory) that a rising tide lifts all ships, WST accepts the dependency perspective that the gap between core and periphery, between rich and poor, remains essentially unchanged. Even emerging market countries, those sometime showcases of capitalist success, enjoy only *dependent* development, limited by volatile capital flows, debt traps, currency speculation, intrusive demands of Washington and the International Monetary Fund, and a perpetual technology lag behind the G-7 nations. **Fourth**, and notwithstanding those unequal relationships, individual countries still can experience mobility between zones – downward mobility, as in Spain and Portugal's fall from core to semiperiphery; or upward mobility, as in America and Japan's reverse course (a feat not replicated since).

As we shall see, WST's vocabulary, categories, and insights, coupled with its focus on long-term time and a global unit of analysis, can be a wonderful tool of study in the hands of historians of U.S. foreign relations. Nonetheless, it is a tool to be used with some care, as its critics have pointed out. The theory has its pitfalls, though many of them are less the fault of the theory than the excesses to which it is put, especially by sociologists and political scientists. **First**, WST's users sometimes neglect Wallerstein's essential insight that "exploitation" on one hand and "the refusal to accept exploitation as either inevitable or just" on the other are "joined together in a dialectic." Instead, there is a tendency to focus on the might and momentum of the system ("the imagination of its profiteers") and to neglect the will and capacity of others, especially in the Third World, to resist it ("the counter-assertiveness of the oppressed.")⁸ In the view of some Third World advocates, world systems theory stymies political resistance by implicitly judging socialism to be impossible and revolution to be futile – at least until some distant utopian day when the whole system implodes.⁹

7 Braudel, *The Perspective of the World* (Berkeley, 1992), 48.

8 Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*, 239.

9 See Steve Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," *American Historical Review* 93 (October 1988): 829–872.

Second, there is a similar tendency by systemic theorists to forget that the world-system really has two halves to it – the world-economy and the interstate system of nations. Instead, they give far greater priority to the former and sometimes neglect the latter. (Realists often reverse the error, privileging political-military power over market forces.) The error is ironic because one of the essential contributions of WST is its analysis that State mercantilism, as well as world wars, from the Napoleonic to World War II, have been crucial in redistributing wealth and economic primacy among nations.

Third, WST practitioners have not always resolved their ambivalence about how to locate Russia and China in their system. Do they stand outside the system as *external empires* or, if they are in the system, in what zone does one locate them? The former USSR, for example, was militarily a nuclear superpower, but its economic attributes were less those of a core country than a semiperiphery one. Is it possible, moreover, that both were true at different times – that the USSR was an external empire before 1970 and then began its partial reintegration in the global economy when it gave up the notion of an autonomous socialist world-economy and saw itself as part of a single world market, while still practicing command economics at home?

Fourth, WST scholars sometimes seem fixated on only one version of long-term time – the so-called Kondratieff waves that supposedly last fifty years or more and caused major depressions in 1815, 1870, 1929, and 1970. But K-cycle “long waves” are controversial contrivances, even in Europe where they are better known; their empirical evidence is thin; and some American historians, like David Hackett Fischer in his book *The Great Wave*, take sharp issue with the construct.¹⁰ As Fischer demonstrates, there are alternative and plausible ways to analyze and periodize the long-term – Braudel’s *la longue duree*.

Despite those deficits, born more of bad practice than bad theory, WST can wonderfully illuminate both our analysis and our periodization of U.S. Foreign Relations history. Moreover, as we shall see, it offers us the option of doing so in a comparative, systematic way. Of central importance is systemic theory’s understanding of the dynamic oscillation between very different types of world orders, between hegemony and balance of power, between the cycles of “concentration” and “diffusion” that Brooks Adams described a century ago. “Each time decentering occurs,” said Braudel, “a recentering begins.”¹¹ That continuous, complex process provided the

10 Nikolai Kondratieff was a Soviet economist who conceived of his long waves cycles in a 1925 publication. Much criticized, even by other Marxists, he was later exiled to Siberia. David Hackett Fischer, *The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History* (New York, 1996), 415–418.

11 Braudel, *Afterthoughts* . . . , 86.

external forces that helped to shape American foreign policy, even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Republic itself was born in an unstable interstate system, poised on the brink of global war and of Britain's ascent to global hegemon. It was also born into a stagnating Atlantic World economy, perched on the threshold of the industrial revolution and capitalism's first historic round of globalization. From that moment to this, the transformation of America from colony to colossus was not simply the linear product of domestic dynamics, but the dialectical consequence of external constraints and demands from changes in the world-economy and the interstate system.

It is, however, WST's analysis of American twentieth-century hegemony that provides the greatest boon to historians, by offering a more sophisticated definition of hegemony than that provided by realist theories. The latter tend toward a rather simple, mechanic definition – hegemony is the possession of overwhelming military and economic might (preponderance of power) that continually expands its sway until the hegemon's commitments exceed its resources (Paul Kennedy's *imperial overstretch*). World systems theory shares but transcends that definition by positing that true hegemony only exists if three interrelated facts obtain. **First**, a single country must possess such broad economic supremacy in finance and trade, especially in leading-edge technologies, that it stands to gain the most from a globalized economy organized according to the rules of free trade and free enterprise. **Second**, in addition to its economic might, it must possess such preponderant military power and “intellectual and moral leadership” that it is able (and *willing*) to set and enforce the rules of such a “free world” – either through coercion as global policeman or through a kind of social contract in which other nations deferentially give up part of their autonomy in return for promises of greater prosperity and peace under the hegemon's aegis. **Third**, a hegemon also has to act as manager of the global economy; and, in the process, be willing to “take on an undue share of the burdens of the system.” It has “to provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and...liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” – what some scholars call “*public goods*.” As Charles Kindleberger put it, “For the world to be stable, it needs a stabilizer.”¹²

By this tripartite definition, full hegemony may not have existed before the industrial revolution; and Great Britain and the United States may be the only true exemplars of it. While Wallerstein attempts to make a case for Dutch hegemony in the mid-seventeenth century, it seems more

12 Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley, 1986), 11; quoted in Andrew Walter, *World Money and World Power: The Role of Hegemony and International Monetary Order* (New York, 1991), 3.

plausible to see modern hegemony as the product of structural imperatives associated with *The Great Transformation*, as Karl Polanyi termed the first great wave of globalization. Outgrowth of the industrial revolution and the triumph of free market ideology, that transformation produced by the end of the nineteenth century an expansion of trade and finance so great that the consequent economic interdependence matched or even surpassed the extent and intensity of our own contemporary wave. As Polanyi put it, in words that still resonate today, "A new way of life spread over the planet with a claim to universality unparalleled since the age when Christianity started out its career, only this time the movement was on a purely material level."¹³ The new way of life, however, could only be sustained if the economic and military conflicts of mercantilism were rendered a thing of the past. Some center of power had to ensure that the great trading nations of the world were at peace and that all abided by the ground rules of open doors and free trade. *Pax Britannica* attempted to do so in much of the nineteenth century; the United States would do the same in the next century. Both did so out of their own national self-interests, for they stood to gain the most, but they also did so in ways that consciously met the systemic needs created by "the great transformation."

WST's approach to hegemonic cycles invites historians to do two things. *First*, its emphasis on long-term time encourages a systematic comparative history of Britain and America in their respective eras of primacy. Both nations performed similar hegemonic tasks for the world system, but seemed to do so in very different ways – exemplified by America's far greater military spending percentages; Britain's unilateral embrace of free trade and America's halting, incremental path toward it; Britain's (allegedly) more unconscious approach to its systemic responsibilities and America's conscious embrace of its hegemonic project; Britain's greater reliance on private bankers for global economic management and America's larger use of State power and its global Keynesianism (e.g., the Marshall Plan and Offshore Procurement programs). Do such comparisons give us ways to sophisticate the theory to account for those differences? Do they defy theoretical generalizations about hegemony? Do they even suggest, as they did to one prominent European historian, that the British were never hegemonic at all; that only America, exceptional as always, merits the designation?¹⁴

Second, WST's more sophisticated notion of hegemony enables historians to undertake a fresh look at the periodization and meaning of the

13 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, 1957), 67–68.

14 See Patrick O'Brien's essay in Shigeru Akita and Takeshi Matsuda, eds., *Looking Back at the 20th Century: The Role of Hegemonic State and the Transformation of the Modern World System* (Osaka, 2000), 44–71.

hegemonic cycle embedded in the American Century. Using WST's three-pronged criteria for hegemony, let us broadly suggest *in the rest of this essay* some ways that might be done, dividing America's hegemonic cycle into four periods – nascent hegemony, 1919–1945; hegemony at its zenith, 1945–1973; a relative decline, 1973–1989; and an apparent revival of hegemony since 1989 that may not be all that it seems.

First, the era of nascent hegemony, the interwar period, was reminiscent of the British ascent toward hegemony in 1815–1840, prior to its embrace of free trade. The United States possessed the necessary but not yet sufficient conditions for global primacy – an industrial supremacy that produced almost half the world's goods, more than twice its present-day share; financial parity with London; technological and managerial dominance; a global navy and a demonstrated capacity to mobilize large armies for distant lands; and, in echoes of earlier British liberalism, a dominant ideology of free trade, open doors, democracy, and decolonization. Moreover, it possessed a new and talented foreign policy elite, committed to a vision, as Charles Evans Hughes put it, of a *Pax Americana*, maintained not by military might, but by moral suasion and dollar diplomacy. Moreover, many of their goals were largely realized, sometime alone and sometimes in a kind of Anglo-American cohegemony – in Asia, the Washington Treaty System; in Europe, public-private ventures to stabilize currencies, lighten German reparations, and coordinate American and British interest rates; and in the world at large, progress on the thorny issues of communications, banking, and raw material access.

On balance, however, the American performance was disappointing for it failed to provide to the world the necessary *public goods* required of a true hegemon. Not only did America fail to join its own League of Nations, it also “played its international economic role haltingly and irresponsibly.”¹⁵ In particular, its protectionism, climaxing in Smoot–Hawley, prevented it from providing a market for the distress goods; and its failure to provide stable lending abroad distorted the global economy through high-volume speculation in the mid-1920s and then sharp contraction after 1927, two years before the Great Crash.¹⁶ Those failures lay not with “unwillingness to assume responsibilities,” but with inexperience, bureaucratic struggles between State and Treasury, a *laissez faire* ideology that hampered public control over private actors, and the constraints of a Congress responsive to businesses oriented to home market protection rather than foreign market expansion.¹⁷

15 Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley, 1977), 18.

16 Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, 271–274.

17 Block, *Origins of International Economic Disorder*, 4–10.

Second, the epoch of 1945–1973 paralleled the British period of 1840–1870 of full-blown hegemony. No accident, that primacy was the product of a conscious hegemonic project conceptualized and set in motion even before formal U.S. entry into World War II and well before the Cold War began. In a view widely shared by his State Department colleagues, Adolf Berle wrote in October 1940 “that the only possible effect of this war would be that United States would emerge with an imperial power greater than the world had ever seen.”¹⁸ In the half-decade of intense postwar planning that followed, the resulting global enterprise sought to manage and overcome obstacles to its envisioned world order of globalized market forces and liberalism. The Soviet Union was one such obstacle and the inability to overcome it produced the Cold War. But other American targets had impeded a free world order in the past – Japan’s Co-Prosperity sphere, Germany’s New Order, Britain’s imperial preference system, Western European empires, and Third World political-economic nationalism. So too had domestic, isolationist sentiment for a Fortress America. All had to be managed.

Ironically, it was the Cold War with the *external world* of communism that made American success possible within the capitalist world; indeed, American success might have been highly problematic without an external enemy. Using the real but often exaggerated threat of international communism, U.S. monopolization of the protection business (that is, its nuclear umbrella and alliance systems) was potent leverage in overcoming European and Asian resistance to American rules of the game. Cold War containment also facilitated three related management functions. **First**, it provided a Cold War rationale for essentially “resource wars” like Vietnam, whose primary purpose was to ensure Japanese access to rice, raw materials, and markets in Southeast Asia once China and Korea were closed to it, ensuring Japan’s continued integration into America’s free world economy. **Second**, America’s system of regional alliances like NATO and SEATO offered its members not only protection from the USSR and the PRC, but tacitly against any revived German and Japanese ambitions as well. **Third**, it helped to abort any postwar revival of American isolationism and to create a domestic consensus in support of collective security and economic internationalism.

Fourth, the period of 1973–1989, like Britain after 1870, seemed to witness a relative decline of American hegemony, marked by a similar loss of domestic consensus and economic dominance; by an overextension of commitments (e.g., the Vietnam War); and by a deterioration in the provision of ‘public goods’ in the world economy. WST scholars noted

18 Quoted in Patrick Hearden, *Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II* (DeKalb, IL, 1987), 244.

the development first, but realist academics took up the refrain in the 1980s, dramatized especially by Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*.¹⁹ The latter's emphasis on State actors and military power was a useful corrective to WST's tendency to focus on market forces. On the other hand, realists' own accounts of American decline, as suggested earlier, were badly distorted by their tendency to define hegemony simply as a preponderance of power, not by its functional definition as provider of public goods; to focus on individual nations rather than a global system of interlocking zones; and to treat economics as only a factor, but never a system. Capitalism, for example, is a nonword and a nonconcept in Kennedy's book.²⁰

This relative decline of American hegemony coincided with a global crisis of the world-system. Its interstate sub-system vacillated wildly and often between confrontations and *détentes* with the Soviet bloc, until it ended with Cold War's demise. Its economic sub-system suffered repeated and serious recessions in 1974, 1979 and 1981, a collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, unstable lending patterns, two devastating 'oil shocks,' and a debt trap for emerging markets like Latin America, that stunted their growth for a decade.

While the causes of this global crisis were complex, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the relative decline of American hegemony lay at its core. *Politically*, the debacle of the Vietnam War had polarized American domestic opinion over that war and spawned a volatile debate over America's global role in general – thus ending two decades of popular consensus. It had also raised doubts among European and Asian allies about the rationality of U.S. global priorities, denting American credibility in the process. *Economically*, a sharp decline in productivity, disinvestment in the industrial sector, stagflation in the 1970s and 'paper' growth in the 1980s, a vulnerable currency, and a serious balance of payments crisis – all stood in unsightly contrast to a steady German economy in the 1970s and a spectacular Japanese economy in the 1980s. Systemic and realist scholars alike blamed the plight on excessive military commitments and over-investment abroad at the expense of domestic stimulation – a difficulty that had also plagued Britain in its decline.

19 For some early WST examples, see James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York, 1973); Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder*, 1977; Giovanni Arrighi, "A Crisis of Hegemony," in Wallerstein, et al., *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York, 1983); and McCormick, "Every System Needs a Center Sometime," in Lloyd Gardner, ed., *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams* (Corvallis, OR, 1986). For realists, see especially Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York, 1987) and Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, 1987).

20 I use the term "realist" in a very broad sense, aware that there are some distinctions that could be made between realists and neorealists.

The American response in the political interstate sub-system was a continuous reassessment of whether Cold War or détente better served its hegemonic project of managing allies as well as enemies. While many of the preconditions for the Cold War vanished after 1962, an “imaginary war” (as Mary Kaldor called it) still permitted American and Soviet leaders to manage both domestic public opinion and their NATO and Warsaw Pact protectorates. Burgeoning dissident movements at home and abroad, however, undercut that symbiotic enterprise, prompting each side to shift toward détente in the 1970s – a choice reinforced by material advantages each hoped to gain. And when, instead, détente failed to produce economic advantage and also undercut the management of dissident movements (e.g., a Euro-communism hated equally by America and the Soviet Union), each side shifted once more to a short, aberrant Cold War in the early 1980s, only to see the pendulum shift back again in the late 1980s.

In the world-economy subsystem, a faltering America proved reluctant to provide the ‘public goods’ expected of a true hegemon; indeed it tried to force its allies to pay the costs of adjusting to U.S. economic weaknesses. For example, it muscled Germany and Japan to revalue their currencies upward; and after failing to do so, it halted dollar-gold convertibility and imposed a 10 percent surcharge – one to be lifted only if countries accepted U.S.-dictated exchange rates. But even that stop-gap measure could not prevent the Bretton Woods disintegration. Similarly, the United States retrenched on its hegemonic obligation to provide stable and steady lending and investing abroad, even experimenting with the heresy of capital controls in the late 1960s and early 1970s in an attempt to preserve the dollar’s key role in global trade and finance. And in the 1980s, America used high interest rates and tight money supplies to attract foreign capital to finance its budget and trade deficits. In effect, American dominance depended less on its steady provision of funds abroad than on its reverse ability to attract funds itself.

Fifth, the post-1989 era, unlike any experienced by the British, *seemed* to witness a revival of the hegemon. In the *interstate* subsystem, American supremacy in high-tech warfare – dramatically demonstrated in Iraq and Yugoslavia – still commanded respect from its core allies. Similarly, the expansion of NATO’s functions and its geographic reach sustained the alliance’s status as an American protectorate; likewise, Japan remained a U.S. client-state, despite some revisions in the Japanese-American security arrangement. In the *world-economy* subsystem, which now encompassed the whole planet, America’s booming consumer demand provided a market of last resort to absorb global over-capacity, as it did for Asia late in the 1990s. Its economic rules of the game – sound budgets, low inflation, deregulated markets, and free trade – were internalized in every zone of

the world-economy.²¹ The 'soft power' of its consumer lifestyle and popular culture had an almost missionary impact, albeit secular, on the peoples of the world. And it possessed a commanding technological lead in an allegedly New Economy, a new paradigm that had repealed the laws of the Old Economy. Given such realities, the 'declensionist' views of the 1980s gave way to a triumphalism that dismissed the idea that America had ever lost its hegemonic suzerainty; or in a curious twist, even seemed to suggest that only in the 1990s did American hegemony come to pass with the fall of the Soviet Union and America's new status as sole superpower.²²

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. While American primacy seems assured for an indefinite future, there is a growing resistance in the political interstate system against American 'unilateralism' and 'hyperpower.' Continental Europe, in particular, has little enthusiasm for NATO expansion eastward and already floats the idea of inviting Russia itself into the alliance. Humiliated by its dependence on American technology and transport in Yugoslavia, it has begun the slow process of creating a European Union rapid defense force – hopefully equipped in the future with weapons and transport produced by the European Aeronautic, Defense, and Space company (EADS), the third largest "defense giant" in the world.²³ Angered by American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on the environment and not persuaded by American plans for a National Missile Defense, it has openly castigated the United States for both. And economically, the European Union still hopes by the year 2010 to rival the American economy everywhere in the world.

Likewise, there are several reasons to question the capacity of the American State to manage the global economy in proper hegemonic fashion. **First**, it is not a given that the New Economy of high technology, low inflation, and soaring productivity is real or here to stay. Even Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan – a New Economy booster himself – acknowledged that it would be another decade before it was clear if "the American economy was experiencing once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation" or merely "one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history."²⁴

Second, it seems increasingly possible that the American State does not command the public consensus necessary to sustain a hegemonic role over

21 See Paul Krugman, *The Return of Depression Economics* (New York, 1999), 38–60, for an interesting discussion of American rules of the game, referred to often as the "Washington consensus."

22 See, for example, Joseph Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York, 1990).

23 "Europe Gets a Defense Giant," *The Economist*, October 14, 1999.

24 *New York Times*, January 14, 2000, C2.

the long term. Politically, there exists pervasive opposition to any military actions that put American soldiers at risk. Economically, a loose coalition of unions, environmentalists, human rights advocates, and home-market businessmen frontally challenge the tenets of globalization – blocking expansion of the North American Free Trade Association to South America, denying the President fast-track negotiating power in trade talks, questioning the efficacy of the International Monetary Fund, and attacking the World Trade Organization, vehemently and violently.

Finally, the American government may lack the *relative autonomy* to fulfill the traditional hegemonic role of global economic management. Functions that were once the responsibility of a proactive State have now devolved to a private domain of financiers, autonomous central banks, and the IMF – akin to what Keynes once called “a parliament of banks.”²⁵ *Rather than* “police a relatively stable system of exchange rates,” the United States has presided over a system of “adjustable peg” that “invited attacks by currency speculators when economic difficulties raised the prospect of devaluation” (e.g., the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998).²⁶ *Rather than* ensure “countercyclical, or at least stable, long-term lending,” it has insisted, in its call for so-called structural reforms, on a regime of *free capital flows*; and the result of that investor freedom has been a lending/investing pattern far from stable and long term.²⁷ It has expanded and retreated from one area of the world after another, and often done so in lock-step with the cycle rather than counter to it. Like Latin America in the 1980s, Asia had its turn at this financial game of musical chairs in the 1990s.

There was a moment, to be sure, in 1998 when the American government looked willing to use the power of the State to create a ‘new financial architecture.’ Frightened by the persistent Asian crisis, Russia’s currency collapse, Brazil’s vulnerability, and the American hedge fund fiasco, there was a movement to regulate against short-term capital flights in tough times. But the financial community strongly objected and the crises receded in 1999, along with talk of architectural reform. Arguably, the American government had not only relinquished autonomy and responsibility, it had committed “moral hazard.” It had allowed private American capital to take the risks – be it in Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, or Argentina – “while somebody else” – including the American taxpayer – “bears the costs when things go badly.”²⁸ All this suggests a world characterized less by American hegemony than “a world of weak governments

25 William Tabb, “Labor and the Imperialism of Finance,” *Monthly Review* (October 1999), 3.

26 Krugman, *Return of Depression Economics*, 105.

27 Kindleberger quote in Walter, *World Power and World Money*, 3.

28 Krugman, *Return of Depression Economics*, 66–68.

and strong central banks.”²⁹ A “stage of financial expansion” that might, as Braudel put it, mark America’s “maturity” – its “autumn.”³⁰

As the twenty-first century commences, U.S. economic, military, and ideological power still holds the commanding height and will perhaps do so for the foreseeable future. Only the European Union seems likely to act as significant counter-weight in the scales of power. It remains to be seen, however, whether this preponderance constitutes genuine hegemony in all senses of the word. There are simply too many imponderables to render a confident judgment. Can Europe transform itself into a true United States of Europe? Is the New Economy real and here to stay? Is resistance to globalization a passing nuisance or a major, limiting factor? Can high-technology create ways to police the world without placing American military in harm’s way? Will the American State remain wedded to global deregulation or rediscover some new financial architecture to manage the market when the market cannot manage itself?

Those are uncertainties that systemic theory, like any extant theory, can only look at through a glass darkly. It can identify certain tendencies and postulate alternative possibilities, but cannot credibly forecast the outcome. Systemic theory, however, can help us look backward in more illuminating ways, armed with vocabulary, categories, paradigms, and insights that light the way. And even if it cannot predict the future, it can help us to ask the hard questions about that future – an intellectual assistance far superior to the ahistorical conceit of prophecy.

29 William Wolman and Anne Colamosca, *The Judas Economy: The Triumph of Capital and the Betrayal of Labor* (Reading, MA, 1997), 142–143.

30 Quoted in Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, 6.

Dependency

LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR.

Systems of domination are often transmitted and replicated in the most innocent forms: through mass media, for example, by way of film and television, sometimes through musical idioms, occasionally by way of fashion and style, through consumption habits and the iconography of popular culture – in sum, within normative systems embedded in notions of progress and modernity and subsequently insinuate themselves in the vernacular forms by which people transact daily life. More than twenty-five years ago, Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelhart chronicled the presence of Donald Duck in Latin America. Donald Duck was identified speaking Spanish and Portuguese, and appeared serialized in the comic strips of scores of newspapers and magazines. The Disney comic book appeared in at least four different Spanish-language editions. In thousands of movie houses and on hundreds of thousands of television screens across the Hemisphere, the accumulated inventory of decades of Disney animated films has played and replayed to the squealing delight of successive generations of unsuspecting Latin American children.¹

Who was this Latin American incarnation of Donald Duck (“*el Pato Donald*”)? He was North American, and he embodied North American cultural norms and articulated North American ideological imperatives. In dialogue with his nephews, he talked politics; in conversation with his uncle, he discussed economics. The moral was not obvious, but it was never disguised: the virtues of capitalism, the vices of communism. Donald Duck was an agent of imperialism.

Donald Duck has not typically passed under the scrutiny of historians of the foreign relations of United States. In fact, North American historians of United States-Latin American relations have often experienced discomfort with the very proposition of “empire” and “imperialism” as a function of the U.S. purpose in Latin America. This uneasiness is due in part to assumptions that have long driven much of the historiography of United States-Latin American relations, derived principally from an over-reliance

1 See Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelhart, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, trans. David Kunzle (New York, 1975).

on U.S. sources as the point of view with which to fashion the narratives of United States relations with Latin America. North American historians whose livelihood has been the study of U.S. foreign relations have not typically been drawn to foreign archives. Nor do those who write about U.S. history ordinarily consult the historiography of other nations as a way to inform their own perspectives. This reflects a failure to take into account the presence and participation of others as having a part in outcomes of vital importance in U.S. history. The result has been a self-possessed – to say nothing of self-contained – historiography, given to the conviction that it alone has raised all the relevant questions and, of course, provided all the appropriate answers, and that the rest of the world has little useful to add. This tendency, moreover – and the tendency has been particularly pronounced in the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations – has often been accompanied by explicit ideological dispositions, including a belief that the means and ends of United States policy are proper and righteous and that, in any case, whatever happens in the Western Hemisphere is entirely a matter between the United States government and its electorate.

The proposition of “empire” and “imperialism” has not been eschewed by all, of course. Periodically it has entered mainstream historiography, at irregular intervals and with salutary effect. For many historians there can be no denying the signs. The dismemberment of Mexico, the seizure of Puerto Rico, mischief in Panama, the acquisition of the Virgin Islands, and the seemingly endless succession of armed interventions, military occupations, seized customhouses, and covert operations make for a powerful *prima facie* case for something akin to “empire” and “imperialism.” It is also true that some of the most engaging as well as original scholarship of relations between the United States and countries of Latin America has been produced not by scholars trained in U.S. history but rather by scholars of Latin America who feel perfectly comfortable in archives and libraries at home and abroad.²

For the most part, however, scholars of United States-Latin American relations traditionally have deemed the proposition of “empire” and “imperialism” to be of limited analytical value and of even less methodological

2 See, for example, Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine Le Grande, and Ricardo D. Savatore, eds., *Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998). Some of the recent scholarship derived from use of U.S. and foreign archival materials include Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflictual Relationship* (Boston, 1990); Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969* (Kent, OH, 1990); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1956* (Princeton, 1991); Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945* (Durham, NC, 1998).

utility. Not a few have assumed that the “misdeeds” of the United States have been confined to the Caribbean region. As a result, relations with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are often treated differently from those with South America. If the notion of empire has any value at all, it has been typically applied to the circum-Caribbean region.

Reservations about the utility of theories of imperialism are not entirely unfounded. Mainstream theoretical approaches have long tended to identify imperialism with territorial expansion, with an attending emphasis on the political and military and less attention to the economic, social, and cultural. From this perspective, United States imperialism has been understood as a series of isolated “events,” acts attributed to the idiosyncratic behavior of well-intended if often misguided presidential administrations but neither inherent in nor intrinsic to the character of United States relations with Latin America. Imperialism was the exception, not the rule, rendered as a deed or two that could somehow be “undone” by a more enlightened government in Washington: Woodrow Wilson’s new diplomacy was an antidote to Theodore Roosevelt’s gunboat diplomacy; the Good Neighbor Policy made amends for previous decades of armed interventions; the Alliance for Progress repudiated earlier support of Latin American dictatorships.

Concern with these issues has also preoccupied Latin Americanists, scholars who have sought to understand the internal mechanisms of global systems of domination as a way to examine the parameters in which national systems function. The formulation of dependency theory emerged from Latin America during the 1960s, a time of deepening political crisis, social unrest, and economic uncertainty. The Cuban revolution in 1959 signaled a momentous break with the hegemonic consensus with which the United States had previously presided over the region, and offered Latin America new and alternative strategies for change. At the same time, existing developmental theories had fallen into disfavor and dispute. The notion that national development was attainable through import-substitution strategies and industrialization initiatives had proven false and had failed to fulfill the promise of autonomous and balanced economic growth. On the contrary, underdevelopment persisted and dependence increased; disparities of income distribution widened, and vast sectors of the population remained in a state of marginal subsistence – and all signs pointed to more of the same, only worse. Ill-conceived industrialization strategies, moreover, had served further to open Latin American economies to multinational corporations, and the industrialization that had occurred was driven principally by foreign capital for the benefit of foreign capital. Modernization schemes and reform projects had failed, and the much-heralded Alliance for Progress had expired,

ingloriously and unmourned. By the end of the decade, military regimes were in power throughout much of the region and repression was on the rise.

New questions about old and persisting problems absorbed Latin American attention. Not perhaps since the Great Depression had a sense of crisis cast a shadow so dark or so long over the region. The inquiry into the sources of inequality, both within national systems and among nations, assumed a deepening urgency as revolutionary movements sought to develop both new explanations for conditions past and present and fashion new strategies for changing conditions in the future. Dependency developed early into an important theoretical concern within the larger context of expanding revolutionary movements across Latin America, a way to understand class conflict and to aid in the formulation of strategies to restructure Latin American societies. Implicit in most – but not all – *dependentista* formulations was the need to replace capitalism with socialism, peacefully if possible but by arms if necessary.

Dependency theory also served to place imperialism in a different and broader context: within the social reality of the underdeveloped nation. Its arguments were derived from a number of central assumptions, approximately the same but not always weighed equally, all of which shared with Marxism the central proposition that economic relationships were the principal determinants of political, social, and cultural forms.³

The dependency paradigm emerged as an explanation of development and underdevelopment, expressed in a number of interlocking formulations. Underdevelopment was seen as a function of the expansion of capitalism, not as a natural state through which all economic systems evolve. The circumstances of underdevelopment, hence, could not be examined solely in a national context, for development and underdevelopment represented two aspects of a single and simultaneous international process that were linked together structurally and organically.⁴ “By dependence,” posited Theotonio dos Santos in 1970, “we mean a situation [in] which

3 A somewhat dated but still useful bibliographical guide to the dependency literature is found in Roberto Jiménez, *América Latina y el mundo desarrollado: Bibliografía comentada sobre relaciones de dependencia* (Bogotá, 1977).

4 These themes are most clearly developed in André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York, 1967); Theotonio dos Santos, *El nuevo carácter de la dependencia* (Santiago, 1986); Susanne Bodenheirner Jonas, “Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment,” *NACLA [North American Congress on Latin America] Newsletter*, 4 (May–June 1979), 18–27; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjorie Mettingly Urquidí (Berkeley, 1979); Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, *Latin American: Capitalist and Socialist Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment* (Boulder, 1986).

the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.”⁵

Not all subsets of dependency theory are directly relevant or equally usable for historians of United States-Latin American relations. Dependency propositions on imperialism, however, and specifically those formulations that address the internal workings of domination, provide a generally coherent conceptual framework within which to examine the dynamics of inter-American relations. Insofar as the discursive emphasis of dependency pointed the internal mechanisms of North American hegemony, elements derived from these formulations continue to offer fruitful research possibilities.

In its most usable form, dependency theory established the relationship between development and underdevelopment as the context in which to examine relations between the United States and Latin America. The United States (the center or metropolis) flourished at the expense of Latin America (the periphery), and the impoverishment of the latter was a function of the prosperity of the former. Imperialism as the expansion of monopoly capital abhorred competition and sought to create structures that guaranteed that whatever development did occur in Latin America was dependent upon and complementary to North American needs. That is, the United States structurally influenced economic growth in Latin America as a function of its own national economic interests, and toward this end appropriated the service of a broad range of internal institutions to assure the primacy of its own needs over Latin American ones.

The subordination of Latin America was possible as a result of internal structures that operated in behalf of United States interests. Imperialism functioned as domination institutionalized from within, and in the process shaped the internal dynamics of Latin American societies through structures whose intrinsic properties in a national setting were defined by their roles in the international system. That the system “worked” was due less to external constraints than internal ones, related less to political and military relationships than to economic, social, and cultural ones. An inexorable reciprocity linked the internal structures in Latin America to the development needs of the United States and resulted in the emergence in Latin America of an institutional order that to a greater or lesser extent functioned to underwrite the primacy and propriety of North American hegemony. The U.S. presence has assumed many forms and the character of that presence has changed over time, according to circumstances. It has been most obviously economic and political, but it has been most decisively cultural, whereby the influence of North American institutions,

5 Theotonio dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” *American Economic Review*, 60 (May 1970), 231.

ideas, values, and norms take hold not through compulsion or coercion but by way of assent and acquiescence. At any given time during the last one hundred years, vast numbers of Latin American men and women have participated willingly in the very structures by which North American hegemony was exercised and experienced. Indeed, this participation has been indispensable for the success of U.S. hegemony and it is certainly an arguable proposition that Latin Americans bear some complicity in their own domination, although it must be emphasized too that few would remotely construe their condition as one of "subjugation."

The literature is rich with explanations of the means and mechanisms by which dependent relationships were established and subsequently maintained. Dependency was seen to penetrate all levels of national institutions and assume a variety of forms. The structure of foreign trade – historically, exports of raw materials and imports of manufactured products – arrested economic growth, skewed income distribution, and fostered stagnation. These conditions in turn were maintained through foreign aid, private investments, trade negotiations, and credit transactions – instruments of U.S. policy designed to preserve the internal balance of social forces that favored United States interests. To these issues have been added in recent years environmental concerns, that is, how the operation of multinational interests that routinely over-rely on capital-, energy-, and chemical-intensive technologies contribute to the depletion of the natural resources of Latin America by way of deforestation, soil erosion, and air pollution.⁶

The dependency paradigm also implies dependent social classes and dependent military organizations. Latin American elites enjoy privileged status and obtain political ascendancy as a function of their role in the defense of the interests of the United States. Shared ideological assumptions and similar political interests serve to link together the dominant classes of the center and the periphery and to create in the process a common stake in containing the forces of nationalism and popular mobilization.⁷

The expanding presence of the United States in world markets, and especially the degree to which the English language has emerged in the final decades of the twentieth century as the lingua franca of the global economy, have served to secure a place of privilege for those in Latin America who master things and ways North American. Vast numbers of young men and women from Latin America enroll annually in U.S. educational institutions, ranging from elementary schools to graduate and

6 See John Ward, *Latin America: Development and Conflict Since 1945* (London, 1997), 90–100.

7 Discussion of dependent classes is most clearly developed in André Gunder Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpen Development: Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin America*, trans. Marion David Berdecio (New York, 1972).

professional programs. Study in the United States is filled with promise and expectation, the occasion to learn English and become conversant with the methods and skills necessary to succeed in an economic environment increasingly dominated by North American conventions. Small indeed are the number of governments in Latin America in which important members of the administration, including the president and ranking cabinet and subcabinet officers, have not had an educational experience in the United States. In similar fashion, Latin American army officers educated in the United States, trained by United States military personnel, and equipped by – and dependent on – United States arms suppliers were unlikely to interpret reality in ways too dissimilar from their benefactors.

Dependency acts to limit the options available for political change and the means available for change. Supporting ideological formulations and cultural forms have provided the normative bases to validate dependent relationships, and they also summoned a moral vision that invoked values as a way to define and defend the place of various groups within a social hierarchy. It was thus possible to isolate and identify specific elements, within this institutional order: technological dependency, cultural dependency, capital dependency, ideological dependency, and industrial dependency.⁸ Directly or indirectly, dependency arguments suggest that elements that obstruct or otherwise limit the possibility for change and autonomous development in the periphery are in some way associated with the center.

Not all who subscribe to dependency theory shared similar concerns or assigned similar weight to the concerns they did share. Dependency theory examined the internal dynamics of Latin American society as a function of conditions of underdevelopment, which are in turn shaped by the region's place in the international system. It provided a framework

8 See, for example, Robert Girling, "Mechanisms of Imperialism: Technology and the Dependent State Reflections on the Jamaican Case," *Latin American Perspectives*, 3 (Fall 1976), 54–64; Armand Mattelart, Carmen Castillo, and Leonardo Castillo, *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente: La respuesta ideológica de la clase dominante chilena al reformismo* (Santiago, 1970); Pedro F. Paz, "Dependencia financiera y desnacionalización de la industria interna," *Trimestre Económico*, 37 (April–June 1970); Martin Carnol, "Financial Institutions and Dependency," in *Structures of Dependency*, ed. Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling (Stanford, 1973), 34–45; Juan Eugenio Corradi, "Cultural Dependence and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Latin American Case," *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology*, 8 (January 1971), 35–55; Evelina Dagnino, "Cultural and Ideological Dependence: Building a Theoretical Framework," in *Structures of Dependency*, ed. Bonilla and Girling, pp. 129–48; Fernando Carmona, "Profundización de la dependencia tecnológica," *Problemas del Desarrollo*, 3 (August–October 1972), 19–22; Dario Abad Arango, "Tecnológica y dependencia," *Trimestre Económico*, 40 (April–June 1973), 371–92; Simn Teitel, "Tecnología, industrialización y dependencia," *Trimestre Económico*, 38 (January–March 1973), 601–25.

for examining a broad range of social forces to understand how they interacted and formed part of a total system. The importance ascribed to these variables or combinations of variables was the subject of debate and dispute. Indeed, *dependentistas* showed themselves to be a mixed lot, and over time dependency theory evolved in sufficiently different directions to create distinctions not dissimilar to schools of thought.

Dependency theory appeared in three principal formulations. The first formulation assigned more or less equal emphasis to internal (national) and external (international) factors as sources of dependency. Attention was given more to such formal and institutional relationships as foreign aid, foreign investment, and trade relations than to class relations and class conflict, which received consideration but not prominence.⁹

The second current treated dependency theory as a subfield of the Marxist analysis of capitalism and a refinement of the Leninist theory of imperialism. The center and the periphery stood in antagonistic relationship to one another, and the influence of the former on the latter was all-encompassing and at all times pernicious and exploitative. Emphasis fell on the formation of classes and class conflict and on the interplay between classes and economic change.¹⁰

The third formulation represented variations of the first two schools and a mixture of both. Underdevelopment as an externally induced condition was not the only consideration; its effects on relations among different social classes operating within the same dependent structures were accorded greater prominence. The possibility was acknowledged that capitalism, including foreign capital, could play an economically useful role in development; its considerable social and economic costs, however, brought it within the realm of discussion and debate in political arenas.¹¹

Critics of dependency theory challenged *dependentistas* at a variety of points and on a number of issues. They ranged across the full ideological

9 Representative works include Celso Furtado, "Development and Stagnation in Latin America: A Structural Approach," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 1 (1965), 159–75; Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, *El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoría del desarrollo* (México, 1970); dos Santos, "Structure of Dependence," pp. 231–36; Joseph Kahl, *Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency in Latin America* (New Brunswick, 1976).

10 See Joel Edelstein, "Dependency: A Special Theory within Marxist Analysis," *Latin American Perspectives*, 8 (Summer–Fall 1981), 103–107; André Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York, 1969); Timothy F. Harding, "Dependency, Nationalism, and the State in Latin America," *Latin American Perspectives*, 3 (Fall 1976), 3–11; James Petras, *Politics and Social Structure in Latin America* (New York, 1970).

11 These writers include Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo in América Latina* (México, 1969); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Imperialism and Dependency in Latin America," in *Structures of Dependency*, ed. Bonilla and Girling, 7–16; and Anibal Quijano, *Redefinición de la dependencia y marginalización en América Latina* (Santiago, 1970).

spectrum, and they included *dependentistas* themselves who had quarrels with specific formulations of one school or another.

Some of the harshest criticism emerged from those who defended North American interests in the region as both beneficent and beneficial. "Dependency theory erodes Latin Americans' belief in themselves and in their society," Lawrence Harrison argued. "But it may have even more pernicious consequences for Latin America. . . . Dependency theory implies that Latin America is impotent, the course of its history determined by outside forces. Dependency theory both patronizes and paralyzes Latin America."¹²

The debate among *dependentistas* turned principally on theoretical issues and originated from a radical perspective; the challenge from the critics of dependency centered on methodological concerns and emanated largely from liberal traditions. Dependency theorists clashed at any number of points. Some bemoaned too much theory; others decried the ambiguity of theory. Some warned against the perils of emphasizing the dominance of the political over the economic; others insisted upon it. Some *dependentistas* emphasized market and trade relations; others examined relations of production. Some were critical of paradigms that stress competition and conflict among nations rather than of classes. Some rejected the emphasis on distribution over production.

These differences in emphasis led to differences of other kinds. Some suggested that capitalism retained the potential to contribute to development and assigned a leadership role to the national bourgeoisie; others saw no alternative to socialism and no place for the national bourgeoisie. Some writers contended that the emphasis on imperialism as the principal source of dependency overlooked the importance of internal social and cultural factors as sources of underdevelopment, specifically, that dependency formulations tended to ignore questions of culture, race, gender, and ethnicity and therefore risked neglecting noneconomic dimensions of dependency and underdevelopment.¹³

The liberal critique of dependency theory turned on a number of inter-related methodological issues. Not that theoretical concerns were unimportant issues. On the contrary, in a larger sense, theory was indeed the

12 Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case Updated Edition* (Lanham, MD, 2000), 162.

13 The debate among *dependentistas* has produced a vast literature. A summary of the *dependentista* critiques of dependency theory is found in Ronald H. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature," *Latin American Perspectives*, 1 (Spring 1974), 4–29; Ronald H. Chilcote, "Issues of Theory in Dependency and Marxism," *ibid.*, 8 (Summer–Fall 1981), 3–16; Ronaldo Munck, "Imperialism and Dependency: Recent Debates and Old Dead-Ends," *ibid.*, 162–79; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," *Latin American Research Review*, 12 (1977), 7–24.

central issue. Most liberal critics were essentially attacking Marxist analysis and charging that dependency theory was more ideological than empirical. They argued that *dependentistas* were long on theory and short on data, that dependency formulations had not been subject to sufficiently rigorous examination. The lack of empirical data and the absence of concrete case studies, critics charge, meant further that the central premises of dependency remained speculative and untested. The absence of empirical data appeared to reduce the dependency paradigm to a circular argument: dependent countries were those without the capacity to sustain independent development, and they lacked this capacity because their economic structures were dependent ones.¹⁴

The critiques of dependency theory both from within its ranks and from without had generally a salutary effect. The reworking of theoretical formulations was accompanied by a narrowing of research focus. Greater attention was been given to methodological rigor and to working with empirical data. This in turn encouraged *dependentistas* to respond to critics precisely where dependency had been most vulnerable: case studies.

The early research was directed to the obvious concerns of *dependentistas*. The links between dependent industrialization in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, for example, and U.S. penetration were examined in detail. The capacity of multinational corporations to raise capital from local sources served to facilitate the integration of local capitalists into the dominant economies. By this means, multinational corporations acted to repatriate capital in the form of profits, royalties, licensing charges, franchise fees, interest payments, and commissions. This outflow of capital, in conjunction with other forms through which Latin Americans sent capital abroad, contributed to a chronic balance-of-payments crisis in Latin America, which was then offset by foreign loans.

The implications of these developments in the context of globalization are far-reaching. Dependency on foreign loans resulted in still greater diminution of national decision-making autonomy, for borrowers were obliged to concede to lenders, as a condition of loans, greater participation its national policy formulation. The capacity of international lending agencies, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank, among others, to exact austerity measures as condition of loans often leads to calamitous internal consequences. The adoption of austerity measures as a means to combat inflationary spirals affects most directly the lower middle and working

14 See C. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James, "Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions"; *Latin American Research Review*, 11 (1976), 3–54; David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 15 (February 1973), 4–20.

classes and inevitably acts to deepen social tensions and exacerbate political conflict. Policies must be explained to and approved by lenders, and invariably these circumstances further opened the local economy to foreign capital. Loans, of course, must be repaid with interest and the inability to meet these requirements often necessitate new loans to finance the interest on old loans. This serves further to facilitate economic penetration, expand foreign political control, and sustain subservient relationships.¹⁵

Prerevolutionary Cuba served as a suggestive case study, albeit in somewhat exaggerated form. But precisely because the Cuban case stands in such sharp relief, it offers insight into the sources and consequences of dependent relationships and the means by which internal structures served United States interests. Through the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. capital all but overwhelmed the Cuban economy. Successively, sugar, tobacco, banking, transportation, mining, utilities, ranching, and commerce passed under North American control. The Cuban economy was dominated by U.S. capital, operated by U.S. technicians and managers, and organized around U.S. needs. Almost all elements of public life, including public administration, the armed forces, and mass media, were in varying degrees shaped by U.S. influences. The line that properly divided Cuban interests from U.S. needs grew ever so blurred, and the blurring favored the latter. Cuba also offers insight into the operation of normative systems often transmitted with penetration of North American material culture. A vast middle class came into existence all through the early decades of the republic, dependent upon and identified with United States

- 15 See Henry Veltmeyer, James Petras, and Steve Vieux, *Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin America* (New York, 1997). Some representative case studies include Theotonio dos Santos, "Foreign Investment and Large Enterprise in Latin America: The Brazilian Case," in *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, NY, 1968), 431–453; James Petras, *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution* (New York, 1973); Dale L. Johnson, "The National and Progressive Bourgeoisie in Chile," in *Dependence and Underdevelopment*, ed. James D. Crockcroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale I. Johnson (New York, 1972), 165–217; William G. Tyler and J. Peter Wogart, "Economic Dependence and Marginalization: Some Empirical Evidence," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 15 (February, 1973), 36–45; Frederick Stilton Weaver, *Class, State, and Industrial Structures: The Historical Process of South American Growth* (Westport, CT, 1980); George I. Beckford, *Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness* (Mona, Jamaica, 1975); George I. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (New York, 1972); Clive Y. Thomas, *Monetary and Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy: A Study of British Guiana, 1945–1962* (Mona, Jamaica, 1965); Clive Y. Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism* (New York, 1974); Paul Drake, "The Money Doctors: Foreign Advisors and Foreign Debts in Latin America," *NACLA: Report on the Americas*, 31 (November–December 1997), 32–36; Oscar Ugarteche, "The Structural Adjustment Stranglehold: Debt and Underdevelopment in the Americas," *NACLA: Report on the Americas*, 33 (July–August 1999), 21–23.

interests. Cubans were integrated directly into U.S. consumption patterns, and in the process they developed familiarity with and fondness for things North American, not only consumer goods but also normative structures, which influenced vast areas of the public and private lives of middle-class Cubans. In almost everything but name, Cuba had become a part of the United States.¹⁶

The Cuban revolution exposed the nature of dependency and the limits of dependent capitalist development with the structures of an export economy. The pursuit of independent development provoked the wrath of the United States. To overcome conditions of dependency, Cubans found it necessary to transform existing internal structures. That is, it became necessary to control natural, industrial, and technical resources and, most important, to redefine the terms of Cuba's relations with the United States, the single most salient facet of the island economy. The historic integration of Cuba's economy into the North American system had advanced to the point where the changing of internal structures in Cuba all but guaranteed confrontation with international structures, over which the United States had enjoyed virtually unchallenged control. Collision was inevitable. More than forty years after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, the United States continues steadfastly to pursue the destruction of the Cuban government. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced Cuba to adopt development strategies previously unthinkable. Much of the Cuban response to the post-Cold War environment has been driven by a tenacious defense of national sovereignty and advocacy of Cuban interests, objectives to which the United States remains adamantly opposed.

In the years since its initial formulation, the dependency paradigm has been reworked, revised, and refined. It has evolved in different directions, and in the process dependency arguments have found wider application, most notably in relation to underdevelopment in Africa.¹⁷

16 See Donald W. Bray and Timothy F. Hardin, "Cuba," in *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, ed. Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (New York, 1974), 583–739; Francisco Lopez Segrera, *Cuba: capitalismo dependiente y subdesarrollo (1510–1959)* (Havana, 1981); Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill, 1999).

17 See Juan Corradi, "Dependency and Foreign Domination in the Third World," *Review of Radical Economics*, 4 (Spring 1972), 1–125; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London, 1972); Samir Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (New York, 1973); Tony Barnett, "The Gezira Scheme: Production of Cotton and the Reproduction of Underdevelopment," in *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa*, ed. Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth (London, 1975), pp. 183–207; J. Esseks, "Economic Dependency and Political Development in New States of Africa," *Journal of Politics*, 33 (November 1971), 1052–1075; Barbara Stallings, "Economic Dependence in Africa and Latin America," *Comparative Political Series*, 3 (1972), 5–60.

Dependency propositions also raise important historiographical issues, including the continued efficacy of the very craft of “diplomatic history.” Alternative models of United States-Latin American relations serve to underscore the need for alternative methodological and theoretical frameworks. Nowhere perhaps is this more apparent than in the need to redress the normative imbalance so long a dominant feature of the historiography of United States-Latin American relations. An understanding of inter-American relations cannot be derived from research conducted principally in Washington and based largely on the use of presidential papers and a reading of the State Department cable traffic. The research scope must expand to include the use of Latin American archival sources and public records as well as Latin American newspapers, periodicals, and other published and unpublished materials – all as a way of obtaining some understanding of the meaning of “relations” within the Latin American context. That is, an understanding of the socio-cultural context in which Latin American leaders are intellectually and ideologically formed will serve to place relations with the United States in a more useful context.

Nor can relations with Latin America be subsumed into or replaced by the study of policy formulation or the conduct of political relations between governments. United States-Latin American relations suggest a reality of another kind, one that requires an alternative conceptual framework within which to analyze the points of contact and the consequences of those contacts. The logic of the dependency paradigm serves to frame the structural relationships of imperialist domination within which all other inter-American contacts must be located and understood. To state this in slightly different terms: the central issue is that the inter-American interaction, at almost all levels and all the time, is conducted between states vastly unequal in power and resources, and perhaps nowhere with greater consequences and longer lasting effects than in the realms of popular culture. The degree to which the region “consumes” North American culture and is thereby shaped or otherwise influenced by the normative system therein contained contribute powerfully to the salience of systems of domination.

The focus thus shifts to the context and contingencies of this inequality, specifically to the means and consequences of domination by the United States. It has not been the same everywhere in Latin America, of course; nor has it been the same in any one place over time. Certainly the Cuban revolution set this phenomenon in bold relief. Imperialism itself is often required to confront the contradictions generated by domination. Imperialism creates over time, and often at one and the same time, conditions that subvert as well as sustain continued domination. The system is not perfect and breaks down often. But as dependency theorists have argued forcefully, a system there is, and by focusing on the power of the United

States, in its multiple forms as well as in its maintenance and extension, the meaning of "relations" changes significantly.

Acknowledgment must be made, moreover, of the means by which people in Latin America succeed in creating space – and thus autonomy – within the interstices of these contradictions. Through wile and cunning, with resourcefulness and ingenuity, dependent societies learn to exploit vulnerabilities of the metropolis wherever and whenever exposed, and up to a point can limit the reach and effect of imperial systems.

Multiple formulations of domination offer historians of United States-Latin American relations alternative conceptual perspectives from which to examine the workings of the inter-American system, specifically the form and function of the presence of the United States in Latin America and the manner in which it contributes internally to shaping economic growth, delineating political options, defining ideological meaning, influencing cultural patterns, and finally how the sum of all the foregoing serves to give context and content to inter-American relations.¹⁸ A fuller understanding of these elements must necessarily seek to expand its temporal reach and enlarge its spatial range. Advances must be sought in the reconfiguration of historiographical contours around categories shaped more by methodological considerations than national boundaries. These perspectives expand the notion of "relations" between the United States and Latin America into a totality of things political, social, economic, military, cultural, and ideological, and in the process promise a fuller understanding of the reciprocities by which relations are shaped.

18 See Jorge Larraín, *Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence* (Cambridge, MA, 1994).

Considering Borders

EMILY S. ROSENBERG

This essay beckons historians of U.S. international relations to borders – those spaces at which different systems of meaning and organization intersect.

Borders – both geographic and figurative – can be messy places. They may produce conflict, demoralization, fear, and oppression. They may generate hybridization, creativity, and liberation. Borders are no one way or they would not be borders. The Berlin Wall marked a border. The metropolitan area of San Diego and Tijuana straddles a border. The journal in our field, *Diplomatic History*, has been most controversial, and I think most successful, when it has pushed the borders of the field. All of these provide apt, but different, metaphors of the dangers and opportunities represented at borders. Conflicted zones, borders may be unsettled and postmodern in their juxtapositions, and – for that very reason – they often raise concerns over control and become sites for oppression and policing.

Writing histories of American foreign relations is involved with – and complicated by – borders. The traditional scholarship of diplomatic history dealt largely with bounded states in an international system; more recently, economic and cultural interactions among nonstate actors have attracted considerable attention. In addition, historians of foreign relations now work within a larger universe of scholarly discourse that blurs disciplinary borders and debates the saliency of modernist categories and assumptions about the writing of history. Interrogating the borders of politics and power, of culture and knowledge, is what this field – perhaps more than any other – should strive to do best. This essay, in encouraging readers to think about borders of all kinds, will consider some issues and recent scholarship related to *geographic*, *disciplinary*, and *temporal* borders.

Borders of Empire

The border between “West” and “East,” “Occident” and “Orient,” is surely one of the most structuring, and also contentious, frameworks in global politics. Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, a seminal work that has framed academic conversations for over two decades, is an appropriate

place to begin a discussion of border-creation.¹ Although *Orientalism* deals with European and recent American representations of the Middle East, the implications of Said's work – and the debates generated by its many critics – extend far more broadly. Said draws together a wide-ranging body of Western material – from policy statements to travel accounts, to literature – and links this “orientalist” knowledge to imperial power. Arguing that “political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions,” he highlights ways in which cultural differences between East and West became represented as opposing, essentialized descriptions of self and other. By encountering and defining “others,” the West shaped its own image: As representations of the Orient stressed irrationality, backwardness, and timelessness, the West was implicitly and explicitly drawn as rational, progressive, and historical. Such “knowledge” about the Other sought to contain, discipline, and rule.

Numerous criticisms have been leveled at Said's work. Many critics have charged that Said compressed together too many kinds of writing about too many diverse places over too long a time. Western discourses on the Orient contain greater multiplicity than Said's work suggested. Moreover, the hegemonic discourse Said described seemed to replicate itself over time without much modification. By stressing this changeless, binary character, critics asked, did Said contribute to Orientalism in reverse? In addition, did Said's work, by focusing on Europe, effectively reproduce European hegemonic thought even while critiquing it?² Said's subsequent book, *Culture and Imperialism*, addresses his critics by adopting a more dynamic and less western centered approach.³

Despite the critics, Said's framework for dealing with the creation of “otherness” has become widely used in examining the representations of cultural borders in many different geographies and relationships. “Othering” is now a common shorthand for describing any process that constructs subordinate groups as being essentially different from one's own group. By showing how knowledge of the Other accompanied and helped construct control, Said raised epistemological questions about Western social science as well as literature. James Clifford, reflecting the questioning going on in his own discipline of anthropology, wrote that “the key theoretical issue raised by *Orientalism* concerns the status of all forms

1 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London, 1979). The most influential, and justifiably controversial, restatement of an East/West divide is Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996).

2 Two summaries of the major literature of critique may be found in Ulrike Freitag, “The Critique of Orientalism,” in Michael Bentley, ed., *Companion to Historiography* (London, 1997), 620–38, and Andrew J. Rotter, “Saidism without Said: *Orientalism* in U.S. Diplomatic History,” *American Historical Review* 105 (October 2000): 1205–217.

3 Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993).

of thought and representation for dealing with the alien. Can one ultimately escape procedures of dichotomizing, restructuring and textualizing in the making of interpretative statements about foreign cultures and traditions?"⁴

Orientalism's legacy has transcended issues relating to the constructed boundaries between East and West and ranks as a seminal work on the epistemology of any interaction marked by cultural difference. Said's approach – especially its emphasis on discourse (connecting power and knowledge together in a Foucaultian manner) – has been reshaping U.S. imperial scholarship, both directly and also indirectly through the many writers associated with "postcolonial studies."

A huge and diverse scholarship, postcolonial studies is too vast to be adequately summarized here. It emerged from Said's insights about the construction of the Other; from Indian scholars associated with Subaltern Studies, which was then adapted to different parts of the globe; and from other theorists who dissected the interconnecting discourses of nation, race and gender in an imperial context. Initially associated with literary theory and cultural studies, postcolonial theorists have sought to explore the cultural borders that empire-building both induced and undermined.⁵ Emphasizing issues of representation, postcolonial scholarship concerns itself with the transformations of relational identities – among states, groups, and individuals – in imperialism's diverse interplay of discipline, resistance, and syncretism. The term *postcolonial* may often designate the

4 James Clifford, "Orientalism," *History and Theory* 19 (February 1980): 204–23.

5 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton, 2000), pp. 11–16 provides some introduction to the multiauthored and multiedited ten-volume project called *Subaltern Studies: Studies in Indian Society and History* (Delhi, 1983–1993); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has been one the most influential theorists of subaltern studies in the United States See, especially, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA, 1999). On subaltern studies in Latin American history, see especially Florencia Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *American Historical Review* 99 (December 1994): 1491–1515. On discourses of nation, see Homi Bhabha's *The Location of Culture* (London, 1994); on discourses of race and gender, see especially Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC, 1995) and Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest* (New York, 1995). McClintock, while writing within the tradition of postcolonial studies, nevertheless also provides a trenchant critique of the term (pp. 9–17). As her critique suggests, even most scholars who continue to use the term postcolonialism acknowledge the limitations and contradictions that it, like any category, exhibits. The many theoretical works introducing postcolonial studies include Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *American Historical Review*, 99 (December 1994): 1477–83; Leela Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory: An Introduction* (Sydney, 1998). There are many edited collections of essays that introduce issues in postcolonial studies, including Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York, 1994), and Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997).

kinds of economic and cultural networks that the word *neocolonialism* describes, but as I have written elsewhere, “the theoretical discourses and genealogies of the two terms are quite different: neocolonialism is generally associated with a Marxist, materialist, modernist, positivist orientation; postcolonialism is more often associated with postmodern theory” and discourse analysis.⁶

Among the most influential works dealing with European colonization in the Americas has been Mary Louise Pratt’s *Imperial Eyes*, which sees borders as “contact zones.” To Pratt, “contact zones” are “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination.” In contact zones, power gets deployed but also negotiated, changing all parties to the interaction. Pratt’s analysis certainly does not erase inequality in power relationships; she invokes the term “imperial” even in her title. But she cautions that power never flows only one way and that agency is not one-sided. She is attentive to discrete localized interactions – the confusions and singular mutations that mark “contact zones.” Her book echoes Said in asking how travel writing “produced ‘the rest of the world’” for European readers and, in so doing, also produced Europe’s own conceptions of itself; that is, “how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other.” She also examines travel writing for its “enactment of race and gender relations.” *Imperial Eyes* centers on the processes of European colonialism in the Americas, but its concept of “contact zones” breaks with older ideas of “imperialist” implantations, as she insists upon “interrupting the totalizing momentum” implied by older critiques of imperialist ideology, critiques that she stresses were often as anchored in the metropolis as was imperialism itself.⁷

The insights of postcolonial theory, with its focus on constructions of nation and of difference in localized interactions, have been somewhat slow coming into histories of U.S. foreign relations. The United States, of course, has been both colony and imperial power, so the possibilities of theoretically informed research about empire in North America are rich indeed.⁸

6 Emily S. Rosenberg, “Turning to Culture,” in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998), p. 497.

7 Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York, 1992), quotes from pages 4, 7, 5, respectively. Stephen Greenblatt’s work has been similarly influential, especially *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago, 1991), and Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher, *Practicing New Historicism* (Chicago, 2000).

8 A highly suggestive essay is Ann Laura Stoler, “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies,” *The Journal of American History* 88 (December 2001): 829–65.

It seems odd, then, that historians specializing in foreign relations have largely abandoned issues related to seventeenth through mid-nineteenth-century empire, leaving the field to colonial historians or historians of the American West. Much of the recent dynamism in what is increasingly called "borderlands" history, which often draws on the kinds of theoretical perspectives sketched above, has largely bypassed foreign policy scholars and journals.

Borderlands history emphasizes "the accommodations between invaders and indigenes and the hybrid residuals of these encounters."⁹ A symposium in the *American Historical Review* on borders, led off by Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, endorses this culturalist turn but suggests that the international context of imperial rivalry is nonetheless essential. Lest the American West be imagined as having some timeless characteristic, Adelman and Aron insist that dynastic transitions in Europe marked "discreet turning points" without which the cultural interactions within borderlands cannot be understood. They chart the outlines of a broad process by which the seventeenth and eighteenth century's borderlands became, by the nineteenth century, more culturally exclusive and more strictly bounded into state territories. This argument – to join localized histories of the dynamic characteristics of American borderlands to changing international and imperial relationships – sounds like a clarion call for involvement by diplomatic historians. But only one person who might identify as a historian of U.S. foreign relations was even cited in this entire symposium!¹⁰

Scholars such as Peter Onuf and David Hendrickson make a different argument on behalf of interconnections between revolutionary-era imperial politics and American foreign relations. Onuf argues that American revolutionaries viewed the federal system "as a kind of embryonic world order."¹¹ Federalism potentially offered a world system, not just a domestic one; the truly revolutionary nature of the Revolution was that it provided the visionary foundations for future collective international

9 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104 (June 1999): 815, and see their citations for specific examples. Michael Adas, "From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History," *American Historical Review* 106 (December 2001): 1692–1720 places American borderlands in a global, comparative context.

10 Louis Pérez was cited in one footnote of one response.

11 Peter S. Onuf, "Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Winter 1998): 76. For elaboration, see Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, *Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776–1814* (Madison, 1993) and, for a different cast, see David C. Hendrickson, "In Our Own Image: The Sources of American Conduct in World Affairs," *The National Interest*, 50 (Winter 1997/98): 9–21. Jack P. Greene, *The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800* (Chapel Hill, 1993) is also relevant.

bodies. Federalism, as other works have elaborated, also provided a seemingly benevolent justification for an expanding "empire of liberty," an ideology which – by emphasizing the spread of "law" through treaties, territorial organization, and ultimately federal statehood – accompanied westward territorial acquisition.¹² In short, both the U.S. constitution and the more than 200 treaties with Indian nations that followed in its wake were *diplomatic* events within the purview of international history.

How is it that scholars of American foreign relations have defined the boundaries of their field so narrowly as to have largely abandoned studying the localized and imperial interactions that formed the shifting borders of America's federal system before the Civil War? The field of foreign relations has claimed many of the great historians of continental expansion and imperial rivalry – scholars such as Frederick Merck and Bradford Perkins – and continues to offer solid, innovative works such as Anders Stephanson's *Manifest Destiny*. Yet in the recent past, few articles in *Diplomatic History* pertained to pre-1850 interactions across U.S. borders.¹³ And colonial or border historians have assumed ownership of this growing field as people in foreign relations have abandoned it. "We" have apparently relinquished the territory to "others" who are more willing to work with theoretical perspectives about borders and the cultural creation of national identities. By implicitly refusing to see pre-1850 landed borders as international ones and by neglecting issues of nation-formation in liminal spaces, students of foreign relations have effectively helped inscribe the doctrine of Manifest Destiny into the field.¹⁴ Theorizing empire and its representations in North America before 1850, then, is producing a vibrant scholarship, but it is being described as "early national" or "borderlands" or "new Western history" rather than as "foreign or international relations."

The case is much different in scholarship dealing with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the United States began to accumulate an *overseas* empire. A generation ago, "new left" scholars reshaped the study of U.S. empire by examining its economic roots. Today, scholars are

12 See, especially, Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, 1935); William Earl Weeks, *Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Chicago, 1996); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); and various essays in Robert W. Johannsen, et al., *Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism*, Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, eds. (College Station, TX, 1997).

13 A notable exception is Nathan J. Citino, "The Global Frontier: Comparative History and the Frontier-Borderlands Approach in American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Fall 2001): 677–94.

14 For elaboration and citations on this point, see Emily S. Rosenberg, "Introduction to Symposium: Early U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* (Winter 1998): 63–70.

emphasizing the representations and knowledge that encoded the political economy of empire.

In a symposium for the *American Historical Review*, Andrew Rotter noted that Edward Said is rarely cited in foreign-relations literature, but this claim is slightly off the mark. Rotter based his claim largely on a narrow sample of studies focusing on America's policies toward the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and some parts of Asia. Because Said is a theorist of imperialism, however, one would expect his greatest impact to come in scholarship related to U.S. empire. Indeed, new studies of America's formalized empire in Latin America and the Pacific, some only in-the-works when Rotter wrote, confirm the growing impact of Said and other postcolonial theorists.¹⁵

Two seminal anthologies on American empire draw upon postcolonial theorists, such as Said, those in the Subaltern Studies group, Pratt, and others to form the basis for new histories of American empire. Essays in *Cultures of American Imperialism*, edited by Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, examine the relationships between U.S. expansion and the cultural consolidation of national identities at "home." Most of the contributors, like the editors, use backgrounds in literary theory to analyze the often-overlapping discourses of nation, race, and gender that delineate "foreign" groups (whether they reside inside or outside of U.S. borders) and to address practices of resistance and the construction of "transcultural" identities.¹⁶ In *Close Encounters of Empire*, edited by Gilbert Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo Salvatore, historians of U.S.-Latin American relations closely scrutinize the "contact zones" of United States formal and informal empire. The essays in this book bring the traditions of international, multiarchival historical research to their analyses of the diverse representational processes of encounter.¹⁷ Similarly, the concern with constructions of self and Other, and with the way that "knowledge" about others structures politics and economics, is developed in a number of recent monographs on U.S. empire. Louis Pérez, in both *The War of 1898* and *On Becoming Cuban* explores the constructions of Cuban history, identity, nationality, and culture, showing that many Cubans embraced ties with the United States as a sign of modernity only to be alarmed when they were "cast in the role of the North American

15 Rotter, "Saidism without Said."

16 Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., *Cultures of American Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993). Other examinations of American empire from perspectives in literary theory are John Carlos Rowe, *Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism: From the Revolution to World War II* (New York, 2000); John Carlos Rowe, eds., *Post-Nationalist American Studies* (Berkeley, 2000); and Amerjit Singh and Peter Schmidt, eds., *Postcolonial Theory and the United States: Race, Ethnicity, and Literature* (Jackson, MS, 2000).

17 Gilbert M. Joseph, et al., eds., *Close Encounters of Empire*.

Other, as exotic and primitive.” My own *Financial Missionaries*, investigates how the political economy of dollar diplomacy was shaped within varied discourses of money and gender. Eileen J. Suárez Findlay’s *Imposing Decency* examines the politics of gender and race in the context of the U.S. colonization of Puerto Rico. Vicente Rafael’s *White Love* considers contradictions in the production of the concept of the nation in the Philippines. Mary Renda’s *Taking Haiti* analyzes the diverse cultural meanings of the U.S. occupation for both the United States and Haiti.¹⁸ Such approaches have entered foreign-relations scholarship dealing with areas outside of the U.S. formal empire as well. Matthew Connelly’s work on Algeria “takes off the cold war lens” of U.S. policy toward post World War II decolonization to make visible the employment of “us-them categories – long a concern of postcolonial theorists” – that structured U.S. relations with emergent nations. Mark Bradley’s *Encountering Vietnam* makes a similar argument about how orientalism framed American attitudes and policies. Works by John Dower, Yukiko Koshiro, and Joseph Henning (on Japan), David Engerman (Russia), Andrew Rotter (India), Mark T. Berger (Latin America), Matthew Frye Jacobson, and various contributors to Christian Appy’s *Cold War Constructions*, among others, similarly analyze the discursive constructions of Others in foreign policy.¹⁹ What connects these studies is not necessarily a similarity in conclusion.

18 Louis A. Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, 1998) and *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); Eileen J. Suárez Findlay, *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870–1920* (Durham, NC, 1999); Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham, NC, 2000); Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, 2001); Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, eds., *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham, NC, 2003); Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley, 2001).

19 Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” *American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000), 739–69; Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000); John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986); Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999); Joseph Henning, *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations* (New York, 2000); David C. Engerman, “Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development,” *American Historical Review* 105 (April 2000): 383–416; Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, 2000); Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990* (Bloomington, 1995); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York, 2000), and contributors to Christian G. Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, 2000).

They do not structure a new master narrative about foreign relations in the way that the “new left’s” economic interpretation did. Rather, they ask complementary and comparative questions about disparate, localized foreign-policy interactions.

Disciplinary Borders and the Cultural Turn

The growing attention to borders and contact zones of all kinds relates to a larger intellectual shift often called the “cultural turn.” In confronting this turn, the challenge for historians of American foreign relations is not so much to “add” cultural factors to an instrumentalist list of causes (economics, strategy, psychological influences, and so on). Most historians, after all, have long included cultural attitudes and ideology within their broader analyses. George Kennan’s *American Diplomacy*, a classic of “realist” literature, is primarily a critique of the culture of legalism-moralism that allegedly suffused American policy. William A. Williams’s classic *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, long associated with economic interpretation, involves an exploration of America’s culture of the “open door,” as does my *Spreading the American Dream*. Melvyn Leffler’s *Preponderance of Power* and his essay in this book show how economic and geopolitical visions emerged as part of an assertion of what he calls “core values.” Michael Hogan’s work presents corporatist forms as a habit of mind that intertwines with changing structures of political economy.²⁰ Much other innovative recent work has called attention to cultural influences that more traditional scholars sometimes overlooked, especially ideologies of modernization, science, gender, and race.²¹ Indeed, one can

20 George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago, 1951); William A. Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire* (Ithaca, NY, 1963); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992); Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the National Security State* (New York, 1998).

21 Some examples (hardly exhaustive of the possibilities) include (on ideologies of modernization) Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Malden, MA, 2001); Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making of the Third World* (Princeton, 1995); Jon Thares Davidann, *A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890–1930* (Bethlehem, PA, 1998); David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, 2003); and Nick Cullather, “Development? It’s History,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 641–54; (on social science, science, and technology) Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (Yale, 1995); Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, 2001); Jessica Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War* (1999); and the contributors to “Science and the Cold War: A Roundtable,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Winter 2000):

scarcely find a work on American foreign relations, present or past, that does not, at some level, advance a cultural interpretation. And for good reason. It is absurd to imagine that the domain of foreign relations might exist outside of the domain of culture.

If historians of American foreign relations have long “done culture,” then what is new about the cultural turn? That turn connotes something different than some vague invocation of culture as a “cause” of policy. It challenges historians to grapple with the epistemological problems presented by cultural theory and the debates prevalent in the disciplines that study culture most intensely: anthropology, literary criticism, and cultural studies.

Anthropologists have, for well over a decade, challenged ideas of cultural authenticity and of the coherence of particular cultures, let alone their knowability in any nonmediated way. Rather than reifying the idea of culture, James Clifford and others stressed the “predicament” of culture and its contested, unsettled characteristics. Culture, for anthropologists, is not a single explanatory thing but a site of contestation over meaning and knowledge – and ultimately over the power to label and designate

21–128; (on gender) Ian R. Tyrrell, *Women's Work/Woman's Empire: The Women's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1800–1930* (Chapel Hill, 1991); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Changing Differences: Women in the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick, 1995); Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1998); Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Woman's Issue* (Syracuse, NY, 1998); Linda Schott, *Reconstructing Women's Thoughts: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom before World War II* (Stanford, 1997); Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, 2001); Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War,” *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1309–39; (on race, in addition to works listed in previous notes) Elliot P. Skinner, *African-Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850–1924* (Washington, DC, 1992); Hazel M. McFerson, *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy* (Westport, 1997); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–60* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill, 2003); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Mary Duziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2001); Michael Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969* (Armonk, NY, 1999); Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Cary Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Spring 2000): 233–64; Lawrence S. Little, *Disciples of Liberty: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the Age of Imperialism, 1884–1916* (Knoxville, TN, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York, 1993) and *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980* (Chapel Hill, 2001).

truth. Culture encompasses an on-going *process* by which meanings are negotiated and embedded and renegotiated. Gilbert Joseph, taking these insights directly into the realm of U.S. foreign relations, has written that “local and foreign cultures are produced in relation to each other through a dialectic of engagement that takes place in contexts of unequal power and entails reciprocal borrowings, expropriations, and transformations.”²² Clearly, this view of the cultural turn owes much to the post-colonial literary scholars discussed in the previous section. The creation and re-creation of identities and meanings, processes that fall into sharpest relief along borders marking difference, is one part of the cultural turn.

Seeing culture as a “dialectic of engagement” has significant implications for histories of international (or transnational) cultural relationships. As “response theory” in media and cultural studies has insisted, for example, the meanings of cultural products lie less in the *intent* of producers and the structures of production than in *negotiations* and *mediations* with diverse consumers. Stanley Fish became notorious for (among other provocative statements) telling students that there was no text in his class. He did not mean, of course, that he had assigned no books but that textual meanings arose from the reading, not simply from the writing, and thus could be neither stable nor singular.²³

An older tradition of scholarship often assumed that the expansion of American cultural products acted as a kind of magic bullet to produce predictable Americanizing effects. The classic of this genre from the Marxist left was Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart’s *How to Read Donald Duck*, a book that moved assumptions about economic imperialism into the cultural realm and helped spread the term “cultural imperialism,” which became prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s.²⁴ The U.S.’s cold-war informational offensives that Dorfman and Mattelart opposed were also based on magic bullet assumptions. Cost-conscious presidents and congresses, after all, would hardly have funded such offensives without believing that they would be directly effective in spreading the American Way.²⁵ Indeed, most twentieth century governments, particularly in the name of national security, have often operated on the premise that

22 Gilbert M. Joseph, “Close Encounters,” in Gilbert M. Joseph et al., eds., *Close Encounters of Empire*, 8.

23 Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA, 1980).

24 Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialism Ideology in the Disney Comic*, David Kunzle, trans. (New York, 1975), and Dorfman, *The Empire’s Old Clothes: What the Lone Ranger, Babar, and Other Innocent Heroes Do to Our Minds* (New York, 1983). For a thorough critique of the discourse of cultural imperialism, see John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (Baltimore, 1991).

25 Walter Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–61* (New York, 1997) examines the assumptions of Eisenhower-era informational programs.

informational and entertainment media could be enlisted to promote specific goals of social and ideological change.

A new generation of scholars, however, has asked deeper questions about cultural contact and its meanings. Contributors to a symposium in *Diplomatic History* on this topic in 2000 were unanimous in endorsing the greater complexity and multivocality of cultural exchange.²⁶ Several excellent studies assessing the impact of specific U.S. cold-war informational programs have all confirmed that the established goals of such programs often had little relationship to their cultural effects.²⁷

A few mass media scholars have produced especially illuminating studies of the reception of films. They tend to fault traditional film analysis, which has often "read" films as literary narratives, examining their structures and messages, rather than paying close attention to how audiences responded to the *images* – the very thing that makes movies so popular. Charles Ambler's study of bioscopes in Rhodesia in the 1940s and 1950s, for example, draws methodologically from theories of spectatorship to examine how "African audiences seem to have appropriated elements of westerns and other action movies in ways that subverted the narrative and racially defined principles of censorship."²⁸ Nicholas Reeves's study of the impact of European propaganda films in their own countries during World War II concludes that they failed to attract viewers when they pursued programs of cultural transformation. The films "that were positively received were almost always films that confirmed and reinforced existing ideas and attitudes. . . . Cinema audiences exercised considerable discrimination, both in films that they chose to see and in the meanings that they constructed in the films."²⁹ Films, like other cultural products, must be

26 "Roundtable: Cultural Transfer or Cultural Imperialism," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 465–528. An opening essay by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht was followed by comments by Richard Pells, Bruce Kuklick, Richard Kuise, and John Dower. See also Jessica C. E. Gienow Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International Relations* (New York, 2003).

27 Among these are Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, 1994); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, 1999) and Symposium on "The American Occupation of Germany in Cultural Perspective," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Winter, 1999): 1–78; Ron Robin, *The Barbed-Wire College: Reededucating German POWs in the United States during World War II* (Princeton, 1995); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999).

28 Charles Ambler, "Popular Films and Colonial Audiences: The Movies in Northern Rhodesia," *American Historical Review* 106 (February 2001): 86. Other studies of reception of American films with similar conclusions include the classic by Ien Ang, *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination* (London, 1985); Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, *Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of 'Dallas'* (New York, 1990); and Jackie Stacey, *Star Gazing: Hollywood Cinema and Female Spectatorship* (New York, 1994) on Britain in the 1940s.

29 Nicholas Reeves, *The Power of Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality* (London: Cassell, 1999), 239–40.

viewed as having potential power, but they must also be approached as somewhat open and flexible texts whose meanings must be researched in specific contexts, rather than being assumed from an analysis of intent.³⁰

Often reception interplays with preexisting political/cultural allegiances. While some youthful Germans in the 1930s flocked to swing clubs featuring American jazz, for example, others joined the Nazi party, which ultimately cracked down on this “mongrel” music. There were cultural divides over response to American jazz in other countries as well.³¹ Similarly, cultural products that highlighted images of America’s “new woman” held attractions for some international audiences who saw this woman as a progressive symbol of abundance, modernity, and even freedom. Yet cultural conservatives on the right, often joined by anticapitalist critics on the left, assailed the Americanized “new woman” as an emblem of cultural shallowness, materialism, and social disorder.³² “Americanization” – symbolized variously as jazz, “new women,” gangster movies, Fordist production practices, or any one of an avalanche of consumer products (Coke, McDonalds) – could become the touchstone in localized debates and culture wars that raged over how to envision and build the future. Richard Kuisel’s illuminating case study of the French wars over Coke, in which he examines the larger domestic debate that this issue came to symbolize, cautions against simplistic theoretical frameworks about culture in an international setting.³³

30 For an excellent summary of theoretical literature on response theory, which also mounts a critique of its assumptions, see Alan Durant, “What Future for Interpretive Work in Film and Media Studies?” *Screen* 41 (Spring 2000): 6–17.

31 Some relevant studies include Michael Kater, “Forbidden Fruit? Jazz in the Third Reich,” *American Historical Review* 94 (February 1989): 11–43; Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, 2000); S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1980* (1983); E. Taylor Atkins, *Blue Nippon: Authenticating Jazz in Japan* (Durham, NC, 2001); Christopher Ballantine, *Marabi Nights: Early South African Jazz and Vaudeville* (Johannesburg, 1993).

32 Emily S. Rosenberg, “Consuming Women: Images of Americanization in the ‘American Century,’” *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999), 479–98.

33 Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993). Other major works not mentioned in notes above include Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., *Here, There, and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture* (Hanover, NH, 2000); David W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam, 1994); David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (New York, 1995); Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds., *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital* (Durham, NC, 1997); Stephen Gundle, *Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943–1991* (Durham, NC, 2000); and Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. Poiger, eds., *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York, 2000).

Even these examples may suggest too much coherence in the dense symbolic networks that comprise cultural exchange. Two historians of Mexican mass culture, for example, question the usefulness of theorizing a production/reception divide. A distinction between production and reception breaks down, they note, when U.S. cultural influences (film fashions or Elvis Presley, for example) are adapted and then reproduced to express a local or national tradition.³⁴ In such cases, Rob Kroes' Lego metaphor for American culture (even though Legos themselves are not an American product) seems appropriate. Kroes thinks of cultural exports as little Legos that can be continually shaped and reshaped in new forms. America sends forth lots of figurative Legos, but what diverse international receivers make with them can be quite varied and totally unpredictable.³⁵ Cultural adaptability and redeployment, of course, should not hide discussions of power imbalances; "floating signifiers" do not simply just "float" any more than flows of capital and commodities simply "flow." But the challenge here is to think of culture as complex, interactive, and locally diverse, rather than as single, one-way, and headed toward homogeneity.

The many historians of U.S. foreign relations who have worked across disciplinary (as well as national) borders, borrowing especially from literary theory, anthropology, and cultural studies, are bringing the insights (as well as the controversies) of the "cultural turn" into American foreign relations. Academic border-crossing and hybridity enlarges possibilities and complicates frameworks.³⁶

Temporal Borders and Postmodernity

Charles Maier's provocative essay "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era" provides a way to think about other borders – those of time and periodization. Maier urges readers to think simultaneously about how to view both the temporal borders that help frame an understanding of world history and the territorial borders that marked the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries' system of nations.

34 Eric Zolov, *Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture* (Berkeley, 1999); Seth Fein, "Myths of Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism in the Golden Age of Mexican Cinema," in Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, eds., *Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico since 1940* (Durham, NC, 2001), 159–98.

35 Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, IL, 1996). See also his *Them and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalizing World* (Urbana, IL, 2000).

36 See also Robert Dean, "Tradition, Cause and Effect, and Cultural History," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 615–22.

He suggests seeing the period from, roughly, the 1860s to the 1970s as characterized by “territoriality.” Territoriality means “the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity.”³⁷ In this view, the era was preoccupied with border-drawing – the enclosure of states, together with administrative efforts to create “energized space” within those bordered areas. Moreover, “international competition compelled an obsession with social enclosures of all sorts: the boundaries that separated nation from nation, urban from rural, and the zones within cities, the conceptual frontiers that divided church from state, public from private, household from work, alleged male from reputed female roles – social and political order was conceivable only through spatial partition.”³⁸ The consolidation of nation-states and its social and cultural manifestations did not proceed in a consistent manner everywhere, but such attempts represented a global phenomenon in which the geopolitics of territoriality was taken as the foundation for survival and prosperity.

Since the 1970s, in Maier’s analysis, this old geopolitical thinking has made less and less sense, as “territory itself fades in importance as a political or economic resource.” Noting that the information-based economy has made physical space “less relevant,” he predicts that “decisive resources will not be those of space but of networks and interaction.” In this process of the decline of territoriality, he sees a weakening link between “identity space” (where ordinary people ascribe their primary public loyalties) and “decision space” (the locus of authority for ensuring people’s security).³⁹ The globalization of this new century may make some people wish to retreat back into the certainties of older, overarching schemas – strongly delineated states, clear lines of culture, ethnicity, and gender. The world may become swamped by cultures of nostalgia, including nativism. But the decline of territoriality – brought by mobile populations, flexible and sometimes even disorganized capital, global networks of electronic communications, a more image-based (rather than text-based) culture, and transnational activists of all kinds (from human rights officials to drug syndicates to environmental groups to terrorist networks) – will hardly go away.⁴⁰

Although critiques may be leveled at any view as sweeping as Maier’s, I would here emphasize the importance of Maier’s framework of weakening

37 Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review*, 105 (June 2000): 808.

38 *Ibid.*, 817.

39 *Ibid.*, 824, 825, 815.

40 There is an enormous literature on globalization; Maier’s article (note 37) contains many relevant citations, and consult, especially, Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large* (Minneapolis, 1996) and Appadurai, ed., *Globalization* (Durham, NC, 2001).

territoriality, call attention to its compatibility with other analyses of the onset of postmodernity, and inquire into ways in which these broad transformations might affect how foreign-relations scholars write history. How are the accelerating forces of deterritorialization, which some call globalization and some call postmodernism (each term has its advantages and hazards), changing ideas about history-writing?

First, the *topics* that focus foreign-relations histories are rapidly changing as the centrality of the nation-state lessens. As the nation becomes perceived as only one form of allegiance among competing identifications, historians become more and more conscious of nonstate forces in the past as well. As Maier himself points out, once any schema of periodization is established, historians then find one age's roots in the age that preceded it, and the boundary begins to recede, looking less distinct than it once did. Akira Iriye's work, for example, has called attention to the forces of globalization even before the 1970s. He looks specifically at NGOs and other transnational actors who provided a contrapuntal force, however weak, during Maier's age of territoriality.⁴¹ Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic* (among other works) anchors a burgeoning field of diasporic studies that brings visibility to the mobile populations that also fit uneasily into the age of territoriality.⁴² As scholars see transnational networks, diasporas, and nonterritoriality in our own time, the roots of these phenomena become more visible in the past as well, and the nation-state fades as the necessary organizing principle of all global relationships and their histories.

Second, the challenges to high-modernism, which characterized the age of territoriality, affect the *forms* of history-writing. The ideal of the "objective" narrative, which is central to the canons of professional, modernist history, is suffering the same fate as other modernist assumptions and institutions. Peter Novick and Robert Berkhofer have both, though in different ways, challenged not only the possibility but even the desirability of the pursuit of "objectivity." Advocating greater self-reflexivity about the inescapable roles of positionality, perspective, and mediation in history-writing, their works suggest trying to devise more multivalent modes both of reading "sources" (which are also already textualized representations) and of presenting history.⁴³

Foreign relations remains a fairly modernist field, employing a style that is the history-writing equivalent of what James Scott has called "imperial

41 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997), and his "A Century of NGOs," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999): 421–36.

42 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA, 1993).

43 See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), and Robert F. Berkhofer, *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

knowledge” or “seeing like a state” – that is, the habit of mind that seeks to impose an overarching, centralized, view-from-above upon the object of study.⁴⁴ “Synthesis” and “comprehensive views” are often still terms of aspiration and approbation, rather than triggers for critique. Yet some scholars are finding ways to inscribe into their work the concepts of reflexivity and multiple frames. Robert Rosenstone’s *Mirror in the Shrine*, for example, makes his own positionality an integral part of his historical narrative. Odd Arne Westad’s Bernath lecture on the Cold War in 2000 does not invoke postmodern narrative theory and epistemology, but its assumptions about doing history rest on the idea that multiplicity and partiality, rather than single stories and comprehensive synthesis, provide the basis for solid historical work. Westad doubts the utility of “comprehensive” examinations and, instead, modestly organizes his history around a few (among many possible) “patterns of interpretation which may possibly exist side by side.”⁴⁵ New forms of history-writing are breaking from the omniscient, single-narrative that served and was served by the age of territoriality.

In this age when weakening territoriality works to erase borders of all kinds, the act of history-writing raises unavoidable questions. Who gets to tell the story of the past? What are the implications of where the story starts and stops; which characters and topics are included and excluded; what “voice” is adopted; what metaphors provide structure? And, to consider one of the ultimate postmodern questions, what is an “author” anyway? Do we create something called history or does history create someone with our name? What dynamic relationship does each of us bring to the process of meaning and representation? Conscious or unconscious decisions about form, voice, and metaphor shape the content of historical stories, and many interpretive differences in historiography (especially in the international field) arise from this “content of the form” and from inescapable issues of subjectivity and partiality.⁴⁶

44 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998). But see Fernando Coronil’s comment that Scott has mounted a “high-modernist” critique of “high modernism,” in “Smelling Like a Market,” *American Historical Review* 106 (February 2001): 119–29.

45 Robert A. Rosenstone, *Mirror in the Shrine: American Encounters with Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 551–65 (552 quote).

46 See, especially, Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, 1987) and *Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect* (Baltimore, 1999); and F. R. Ankersmit, *History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor* (Berkeley, 1994). My own effort to examine the multivocality and metaphorical forms of historical memory appears in Emily S. Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (Durham, NC, 2003).

Such issues about multiple frameworks and the content of the form are not simply esoteric theoretical debates but can constitute central issues in global politics, as they become critical to battles – legal and moral – over blame, victim-status, restitution, and apology. As Elazar Barkin and others have suggested, the consequences of different versions of history (particularly related to World War II) are among some of the most visible irritants in current international affairs.⁴⁷ Might history-writing contribute to current contentious issues involving diverse perspectives less by seeking to stabilize a version of the past than by inquiring into its lack of stability; less by proposing some version of history that supposedly exists “objectively” outside of culture than by reflexively seeking a better understanding of why differences in narratives and meanings arise even in the work of those who adhere to professional standards of evidence?

Writing histories in this era of declining territoriality – of blurred borders of all kinds – may shift the form and voice, as well as content, of history. Reconsidering geographic, disciplinary, and temporal borders, in this age when related scholarship in the social sciences and humanities is doing the same, will suggest fresh questions about the past and new ways to approach drawing its representations.

47 Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York, 2000) provides some introduction to the many controversies over historical claims and demands for restitution. The classic examination of the importance of “recognition” in such processes is Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).

The Global Frontier: Comparative History and the Frontier-Borderlands Approach

NATHAN J. CITINO

“This trip into the Amazon would help to understand the real potential of Fordlandia: if it were all just an enormous glass container, a cavity made of precious crystal, into which an eccentric millionaire had poured his eccentric dreams; or if, in fact, it really was a pioneering adventure whose goal was to raise the flag of progress in an unknown territory, as unknown as it was beautiful, never to leave.”

“So, don’t you think, then, that to tamper with Eden is to destroy it?”

Eduardo Sguiglia’s novel *Fordlandia*, the source of these two quotations, is a fictionalized account of the real-life rubber plantation established by Henry Ford in the Brazilian jungle during the 1920s.¹ Ford’s errand into the Amazon wilderness served a dual purpose. He sought to establish a source of raw rubber for automobile tires other than British-dominated Malaya, while inculcating “backward” peoples with the work ethic and the faith in material progress that characterized Fordism. Ford regulated life in his self-named company town with a giant clock, whose piercing whistle imposed time discipline over the indigenous workforce, just as he hoped social dancing and proper hygiene would civilize the natives’ manners. But Fordlandia was not the success its sponsor envisioned. A cultural clash occasioned by the volatile mix of Anglo managers overseeing Indian workers and Afro-Caribbean migrants, as well as a rubber-tree blight, doomed Ford’s adventure into the twentieth-century global frontier.

Historians of American foreign relations would seemingly be well-positioned to offer a cutting-edge historical interpretation of Fordlandia

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1 Eduardo Sguiglia, *Fordlandia*, trans. Patricia J. Duncan (New York, 2000), 46–47, 91.

to match the brilliance of Sguiglia's literary treatment. Persistent calls for methodological innovation, ranging in tone from philippic to jeremiad, have prompted scholars to introduce race, culture, ideology, postmodernism, literary criticism, and gender into their analyses. They have studied nonstate actors and marginalized groups and borrowed from political science, cultural studies, and other disciplines.² But in general, these new approaches to U.S. foreign relations neither challenge the exceptionalist assumptions that have for so long been associated with the field, nor do they provide comparative perspective on the American experience in the world.³ Recent scholarship on borderlands and frontiers, however, offers historians valuable insight into the nature of cultural encounters and shifting cultural identities, the fringes of states' political authority, and the integration of the human and natural resources of peripheral areas into larger systems of economic exchange. Fordlandia serves as a case-study of these phenomena, one in which distinctly American notions of Manifest Destiny played an important role, as well as of larger patterns in global history that shaped the continental development and overseas expansion of the United States. The diverse group of historians, anthropologists, and area specialists who study borderlands and frontiers do not simply offer scholars of U.S. foreign relations another category of analysis to add to their *repertoire*. As some historians have already discovered, their approaches point the way toward a transnational history of the United States encompassing both the unique aspects of the American experience and a global, comparative context that enriches our understanding of U.S. history.

Defining "frontier" and "borderland" is a daunting challenge to say the least, given the myriad cases to which scholars have applied these two terms. Frederick Jackson Turner, whose well-known thesis is a fixture of diplomatic historians' lectures, replaced the European concept of frontier as national boundary with his account of the North American frontier as "the meeting point between savagery and civilization." Though criticism of Turner's ethnocentrism has been nearly universal, and some scholars have questioned his portrayal of the frontier as a process that came to

2 See Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in *The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY, 1980), 355–87; John Lewis Gaddis, "New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Summer 1990): 405–23; and Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis in Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," *Diplomatic History* 16 (Winter 1992): 115–40. For an overview and examples of new approaches in the field, see *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1991); and *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century"*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, 1999).

3 See Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *American Historical Review* 96 (October 1991): 1031–1055.

a close by the 1890s, others have retained his emphasis on cultural encounter within a shifting political geography. In their comparison of the U.S. and South Africa, for example, Leonard Thompson and Howard Lamar define a frontier "not as a boundary or line, but as a territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies." Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron have conceived the North American frontier as "a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined." Such a definition therefore minimizes the importance of the state, whose "sharp edge of sovereignty" had been synonymous with the earlier meaning of "frontier." Adelman and Aron distinguish the frontier from "borderlands," which they regard as "contested boundaries between colonial domains" in North America. Indeed, the term "borderland" can implicitly reinforce the primacy of the state, either by designating the geographic arena for political rivalry among states, or by referring to land both claimed by a state and adjacent to an acknowledged boundary.⁴

But it is not so easy to label a region by reference to state authority or lack of it. Anthropologists Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan define frontiers as "territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and meanings associated with their membership in nations and states."⁵ In their view, frontiers are features of states' borders. Historians of Spain's North American empire have been known to use "borderlands" and "frontier" interchangeably or in conjunction with one another, and, indeed, "borderland" is typically rendered "*la frontera*" in Spanish.⁶ One geographer even makes the ahistorical claim that frontiers were "common features of the political landscape centuries ago," but by "the 20th century most remaining frontiers had disappeared" with the establishment of recognized state borders. As Lamar and Thompson have observed, scholars with varied training in different fields do not naturally speak the common language needed for writing comparative studies.⁷

4 Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920), 3; *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*, ed. Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson (New Haven, 1981), 7; Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104 (June 1999): 815, 816; Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Frontier* (Boston, 1952), 2.

5 *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 9. See also *Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers*, ed. Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson (Lanham, MD, 1994).

6 See, for example, John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821* (Albuquerque, 1963).

7 J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (Boston, 1987), 1; Lamar and Thompson, *Frontier in History*, 6.

Any attempt to hash out an elusive distinction between “frontiers” and “borderlands” based upon North American history alone starts from an exceptionalist premise. Such an exercise will either perpetuate the idea that the national development of the U.S. was unique, or it will assume that the American experience with frontiers and borderlands is somehow definitive. In this essay, these two concepts are deliberately conflated to describe a general approach to studying relations between different peoples that regards official diplomacy among sovereign states as only one element in a range of contacts encompassing cultural interaction, economic exchange, human migrations, and environmental transformation. Far from suggesting the irrelevance of the state, the frontier-borderlands approach strives for a sophisticated understanding of state power, by investigating the degree to which states are successful in expanding their boundaries, imposing their political control over outlying territories, and even defining the identities of those over whom governments claim authority. Such themes, though central to the story of American continental and overseas expansion, were hardly unique to it. In fact, their prevalence across a variety of historical contexts invites comparison and offers a powerful challenge to American exceptionalism.

For those in American foreign relations, it is most profitable to consider the comparative possibilities of the frontier-borderlands approach by examining how scholars working in other fields have used it. For U.S. historians, “frontier” and “borderlands” denote particular research specialties. Turner has remained the touchstone for the study of the American frontier West, even as his thesis has sustained successive waves of revision, most recently in the form of a New Western History that has challenged his celebratory account of Anglo-American settlement and greatly expanded the types of actors and subjects considered part of western history.⁸ Herbert E. Bolton, Turner’s student, applied his mentor’s thesis to the parts of northern New Spain incorporated into the territory of the United States, and, in the words of one scholar, “virtually created the Spanish borderlands as a field of professional history.”⁹ Historians of U.S. foreign relations would do well to build on comparative themes developed by colleagues working in these two fields – to begin exploring the global frontier, as it were, in their own backyard.

Even the most cursory glance reveals striking similarities between American foreign relations history and U.S. Western history. Each discipline, after languishing as something of an historiographical backwater, has recently undergone a renaissance characterized by bold attempts to

8 On the centennial of Turner’s thesis, see *A New Significance: Re-Envisioning the History of the American West*, ed. Clyde A. Milner, II (New York, 1996).

9 Kerwin Lee Klein, *Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Narrating the European Conquest of Native America, 1890–1990* (Berkeley, 1997), 262.

reconceptualize the field and to expand its scope, as well as by much soul-searching and methodological experimentation. Some of this innovation has sought to transcend perennial, dichotomous debates in both literatures: realism vs. idealism, isolationism vs. internationalism; frontier history vs. Western history, closed frontier vs. unbroken past. This parallel trajectory is not surprising, given that both fields have been repositories for myths of national greatness first articulated by their respective founders, Samuel Flagg Bemis and Turner himself. By celebrating national development and expansion, both diplomatic and Western historians were vulnerable to criticism from colleagues in social history who exposed the human costs of that expansion and focused attention on groups such as African Americans, Hispanics, women, and Native Americans, whose experiences lay beyond the pale of the nationalist historiographies established by Bemis and Turner.

But the line between diplomatic and Western history has never been distinct, and scholars' recent experimentation in both fields has only increased the zone of disciplinary common ground. Since Bemis penned "The Anglo-American Frontier" as the first chapter of *Jay's Treaty*, diplomatic historians have regarded continental expansion as part of their scholarly turf. William Appleman Williams identified Turner's frontier thesis with Open Door expansion overseas and traced the origins of America's free-trading imperialism to nineteenth-century frontier farmers concerned about the agricultural surplus.¹⁰ More recent works by Thomas Hietala on Manifest Destiny, Michael Hunt on ideology, Reginald Horsman on race, and Brian McAllister Linn on the Philippine War have in different ways portrayed western expansion as a dress-rehearsal for the acquisition of overseas empire.¹¹ Some historians have noted that the

10 Samuel Flagg Bemis, *Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (New Haven, CT, 1962), 1–27; William Appleman Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," in *A William Appleman Williams Reader: Selections from his Major Historical Writings*, ed. Henry W. Berger (Chicago, 1992), 89–104, and *The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society* (New York, 1969). See also Patricia Nelson Limerick, "Dilemmas in Forgiveness: William Appleman Williams and Western American History," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Spring 2001): 293–300. On the diplomacy of continental expansion, see Robert D. Schulzinger, "Foreign Affairs and Expansion," in *American Frontier and Western Issues: A Historiographical Review*, ed. Roger L. Nichols (Westport, CT, 1986), 217–34; and Kinley Brauer, "The Great American Desert Revisited: Recent Literature and Prospects for the Study of American Foreign Relations, 1815–1861," in *Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, 2000), 44–78.

11 Thomas Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, 1985); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA, 1981); and Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence, KS, 2000). See also Anders Stephanson, *Manifest*

careers of such figures as Teddy Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover combined the conquest of the continental frontier with expansion abroad, while others have examined how America's emergence as a great power shaped the development of the West.¹² For their part, Western historians, most notably Walter Prescott Webb, have long placed the story of continental expansion against a global backdrop, a trend that in recent scholarship has highlighted comparisons between the U.S. and other "frontier" societies. Significantly, through their use of comparative history, scholars of America's western frontier have been more successful in overcoming the exceptionalist inheritance of Turnerian history than their counterparts in U.S. foreign relations have been in addressing the similar legacy bequeathed to them by Bemis.

Webb's seminal work *The Great Frontier* applied the Turner thesis to world history since 1500 and claimed that European expansion into Africa, Asia, and the western hemisphere represented a four-hundred-year boom for the European "metropolis." As they helped themselves to the "*vast body of wealth without proprietors*" found in these regions, Europeans used the spoils of empire to build the social and political institutions of western civilization, whose continued existence was placed in doubt, according to Webb, by the closing of the Great Frontier around 1900.¹³ For him, the story of European settlement of North America, American independence and expansion, and the extraction of the material wealth of the continent was only one episode in a much larger global saga. Viewed from this perspective, the frontier was not the unique wellspring of

Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New York, 1995); Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Minneapolis, 1980); and Michael Krenn, ed., *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy from Colonial Times Through the Age of Jackson* (New York, 1998) and *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Ages of Territorial and Market Expansion, 1840 to 1900* (New York, 1998). See also John Whitehead, "Hawai'i: The First and Last Far West?" *Western Historical Quarterly* 23 (May 1992): 153-77.

- 12 See William G. Robbins, "Laying Siege to Western History: The Emergence of New Paradigms," in *Trails: Toward a New Western History*, ed. Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner, II, and Charles E. Rankin (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 182-214; Paul Sabin, "Home and Abroad: The Two 'Wests' of Twentieth-Century United States History," *Pacific Historical Review* 66 (August 1997): 305-35; Thomas Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1980); and H. W. Brands, T. R.: *The Last Romantic* (New York, 1997).

On the West, war, and the defense industry, see Roger W. Lotchin, *Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare* (New York, 1992); *The Atomic West*, ed. Bruce Hevly and John M. Findlay (Seattle, 1998); Gerald D. Nash, *World War II and the West: Reshaping the Economy* (Lincoln, NE, 1990) and *The West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War* (Bloomington, 1985); Spencer C. Olin, "Globalization and the Politics of Locality: Orange County, California in the Cold War Era," *Western Historical Quarterly* 22 (May 1991): 143-61; and "California at War," Special Issue, *Pacific Historical Review* 63 (August 1994).

- 13 Webb, *Great Frontier*, 13.

American democracy that Turner claims, and North America was only one of many areas around the globe connected to the metropolis during the centuries-long period of European conquest.

The ways in which Webb's successors have reinterpreted his global perspective have been closely connected to the debate about whether the American West should be studied as a distinct region (the trans-Mississippi West, for instance, or the region of aridity west of 100 degrees longitude), or as part of an ongoing frontier process that recurred in different settings as white settlement spread over North America and other continents.¹⁴ In *The Legacy of Conquest*, Patricia Nelson Limerick advocated study of the West as region, though she has more recently sought "to place Western American history back into global history," by comparing the conquest of the region she studies to "other parts of the planet" transformed by European expansion, and even argued for the usefulness of comparative frontier studies.¹⁵ An emphasis on place, however, while acknowledging the larger global story, tends to stress discrete instances of conquest whose special histories are shaped by local factors. Lamar and Thompson point out how different geographies, cultures, and climates helped to mold the histories of white settlement in North America and Southern Africa. Whereas inhospitable South African soils and aridity limited the numbers of white agricultural settlers in the Cape, more favorable conditions in much of North America supported a larger farming population. Southern Africa was therefore home to only about twenty thousand Europeans in 1800, when the European population of North America exceeded 4 million. Different immigration patterns also made these two frontier societies distinct in terms of their ethnic and racial politics.¹⁶

For historians interested in the frontier as process, Turner's sequential, regional histories, each of them variations on a theme, offer a theoretical basis for comparison. In the introduction to *Under an Open Sky*, William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin identify several stages to the recurring frontier process: species shifting, market making, land taking,

14 On the place-process debate, see Stephen Aron, "Lessons in Conquest: Towards a Greater Western History," *Pacific Historical Review* 63 (May 1994): 125-47; Michael Steiner, "From Frontier to Region: Frederick Jackson Turner and the New Western History," *Pacific Historical Review* 64 (November 1995): 479-501; and David M. Wrobel, "Beyond the Frontier-Region Dichotomy," *Pacific Historical Review* 65 (August 1996): 401-29.

15 Patricia Nelson Limerick, *Something in the Soil: Legacies and Reckonings in the New West* (New York, 2000), 20. See also *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York, 1987) and "Going West and Ending Up Global," *Western Historical Quarterly* 32 (Spring 2001): 5-23. See also Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West* (New York, 1985); and Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West* (Norman, OK, 1991), 3-4.

16 Lamar and Thompson, *Frontier in History*, 16-17.

boundary setting, state forming, and self shaping.¹⁷ Statebuilding and identity formation are therefore integral to the frontier experience. While Western historians pioneered comparative frontier studies by analyzing how different locales experienced this process as the line of settlement moved east-to-west, Walter Nugent has broadened the comparative frame of reference to encompass European expansion beyond North America. Using this "wide-angle lens," Nugent argues that European settlers had similar, though far from identical, experiences based on the geographies, climates, and indigenous peoples they encountered. In fact, Nugent offers a basic taxonomy that classifies frontiers according to their economic bases and demographic characteristics. Type I frontiers were based upon farming and settled by the "colorless many" families drawn west by the promise of free land. Type I frontiers were more densely populated than Type II frontiers, which were based on natural-resource extraction, mining, and ranching. Evoking images more in tune with popular imagination, the Type II frontier was home to the "colorful few," including cowboys, gold prospectors, prostitutes, and gun-slingers. Nugent draws careful comparisons between North American frontiers and those in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. To cite one example, he trains his lens on California and the Australian province of Victoria, both sites of mid-nineteenth-century gold rushes and ensuing Type II frontiers. Such comparisons, he argues, reveal "that American history is not incomparable or unique" and offer a corrective to "moral superiority and self-righteous missionizing."¹⁸

Other historians have invoked the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein to locate North America within the development of the capitalist world economy. Richard White has shown how incorporation into the world system and European trading networks sapped the economic self-sufficiency of Choctaw, Pawnee, and Navajo peoples. William G. Robbins associates the West's transformation with "the ever-expanding boundaries and the constantly changing parameters of capitalism, especially in its national and international contexts." In a fascinating contribution to the place-process debate, Michael P. Malone argues for a "stereopticon" view that seeks to understand how

17 William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin, "Becoming West: Toward a New Meaning for Western History," in *Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past*, ed. William Cronon et al. (New York, 1992), 3–27.

18 Walter Nugent, "Frontiers and Empires in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Trails*, 161–81; and "Comparing Wests and Frontiers," in *The Oxford History of the American West*, ed. Clyde A. Milner, II et al. (New York, 1994), 831. For an environmental history of post-gold-rush California and Australia that is comparative and transnational, see Ian Tyrrell, *True Gardens of the Gods: Californian-Australian Environmental Reform, 1860–1930* (Berkeley, 1999). See also "Frontiers-A Global View," Special Issue, *Journal of the West* 34 (October 1995).

the long-term process of global economic integration transformed the American West. A resource-producing region on the economic periphery, the West "has been defined by the dialectical tension of those historical factors that defined it as place with those that dictated its changing role in the world order." Malone even suggests replacing the term "frontier" with "globalization," implicitly raising the possibility of comparing the West to other regions similarly affected by the world economy.¹⁹

While Turner set regional history in a national context and moved the frontier to the center of American life, these historians connect the West to changes in the capitalist world system and highlight the historical passage of the United States from the economic periphery to the core. These perspectives bring frontier history to the doorstep of the American foreign relations field, which has associated the periphery-to-core evolution with expanding foreign interests and with a paradigm shift to a "new" diplomacy, one in which the federal government helped to facilitate overseas economic expansion just as it had shaped the economic and political development of the western frontier.²⁰ Although diplomatic historians have made productive use of Turner's thesis and subsequent literature on continental expansion to understand American foreign relations, they have yet to employ a comparative approach to escape Bemis's exceptionalism in the way that Western historians have to challenge Turner's.

Frontier and diplomatic history are converging not only at a common global level of analysis, but also in their re-examination of relations between Europeans and Native Americans at local points of contact. White's *The Middle Ground*, the most important such study, re-creates the "village world" of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century *pays d'en haut*, where the Algonquin and French societies "melted at the edges and merged." White argues that the Middle Ground faded with U.S. independence, because Americans neither understood the cultural conventions that had governed Euro-Indian relations under the French and British, nor, given the weak position of Native Americans after the American Revolution, had any need of them. The Middle Ground, which had been characterized by intermarriage and cultural hybridization, therefore "yielded to stark choices between assimilation and otherness." Francis Paul Prucha reaches

19 Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln, NE, 1983); William G. Robbins, *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence, KS, 1994), xi; and Michael P. Malone, "Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward a New Approach to Western American History," in *Trails*, 156. See also Klein, *Frontiers of Historical Imagination*, 193–94.

20 See Robert Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865–1900* (New York, 1986); and Walter LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 2, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* (New York, 1993), 54–55, 107–113.

a similar conclusion in his major study of American Indian treaties, by noting that the centralization of treaty-making authority under the Constitution replaced the "treaty councils" borrowed from the French and British with formal, written agreements. Prucha also examines the roles of commissioners, Indian negotiators, traders, and even interpreters in the making of treaties. In contrast, Jay Gitlin contends in his recent *Diplomatic History* essay that "the Middle Ground did not in all places wither and die." Rather, U.S. officials relied on the "legacy of the French" in converting Indian land into private property, a process from which individual Native Americans, such as the Miami leaders he describes, derived considerable benefit. As Bradford Perkins has observed, diplomatic historians have only recently acknowledged Indian relations as part of early U.S. diplomacy. By building on recent trends toward local analysis to enrich a comparative understanding of American, French, and British frontiers with Native Americans, historians have the opportunity to reinvigorate a neglected topic in the diplomacy of the early republic.²¹

The study of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands – like the history of the frontier West, a meeting ground for scholars of imperialism, cultural relations, and international affairs – has also addressed a number of comparative themes ranging from colonization to the postmodern metamorphosis of the nation-state. Though drawn to the borderlands by a desire to compare them with Turner's Great Western frontier, Bolton was "far more interested in the impact of Spaniards on the frontier than in the influence of the frontier on the Spaniards." Bolton devoted his career to studying the institutional outposts of the Spanish Empire in North America, the presidio and the mission, and the cultural influence of Spain on lands that became part of the United States. He also called for a comparative colonial history of the western hemisphere, an approach he hoped would overcome the Hispanophobic "Black Legend" and provide a clear-eyed understanding of the differences between the British and Spanish colonial legacies. David J. Weber explains Bolton's focus by observing that, unlike the boundless opportunity represented by the frontier in Turner's thesis, the borderlands have more often been the site of racial discrimination

21 Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991), 50, 518; Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly* (Berkeley, 1994), 67; Jay Gitlin, "Private Diplomacy to Private Property: States, Tribes, and Nations in the Early National Period," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Winter 1998): 89, 99; and Bradford Perkins, "Early American Foreign Relations: Opportunities and Challenges," *ibid.*, 115–20. On Euro-Indian relations, see also James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (New York, 1985), *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York, 1988), and *Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America* (New York, 1992); and Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore, 1992).

and economic marginalization for Hispanics whose lives were tied to the American economy, whether they lived north or south of the border. A disparity in power characterized relations between the two revolutionary states that won their independence from Britain and Spain, just as racial and economic inequality continues to define personal relationships along the U.S.-Mexican border.²²

Recent scholarship has looked beyond Bolton's work to the postcolonial United States and Mexico, whose intertwined histories challenge assumptions of sovereignty and independence so central to each country's national mythology. Andrés Reséndez has reinterpreted the history of the borderlands during the Mexican-American War by "paying attention to how the Mexican and the American national projects collided there and how conflicts played out at the local level." Reséndez examines the use of rituals and political symbolism in American and Mexican claims to borderlands territory, and he explains how local groups responded to such appeals on the basis of self-interest. Reséndez uses New Mexico as a case study for his approach and shows that while local Spanish-speaking officers and merchants acquiesced in annexation to protect their economic interests, Pueblo Indians resisted out of opposition to further land expropriation by Anglos. Colonel Stephen W. Kearny therefore marched into Santa Fe unopposed in 1846, but soon faced rebellion from Taos Pueblos. Lisabeth Haas's study of California examines the persistence of Native American identities despite conquest by the Spanish in the eighteenth century, the ascendancy of local *Californios* who defied Mexico City and obstructed Indian emancipation during the period of Mexican independence, and conquest again by the Americans in the mid-nineteenth century. Rival statebuilding enterprises have therefore shaped the history of the borderlands since the retreat of European empires, and scholars are increasingly focusing on how these enterprises appeared to different local populations.²³

22 David J. Weber, "Turner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands," *American Historical Review* 91 (February 1986): 68. See also *Spanish Borderlands Sourcebooks*, Vol. 1, *The Idea of Spanish Borderlands*, ed. David J. Weber (New York, 1991); David J. Weber, "John Francis Bannon and the Historiography of the Spanish Borderlands: Retrospect and Prospect," in *Myth and the History of the Hispanic Southwest* (Albuquerque, 1988), 55–88; and Russell M. Magnaghi, *Herbert E. Bolton and the Historiography of the Americas* (Westport, CT, 1998).

23 Andrés Reséndez, "National Identity on a Shifting Border: Texas and New Mexico in the Age of Transition, 1821–1848," *Journal of American History* 86 [Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States as a Case Study: Special Issue] (September 1999): 670; Lisabeth Haas, *Conquests and Historical Identities in California* (Berkeley, 1995). See also James F. Brooks, "Violence, Justice, and State Power in the New Mexican Borderlands, 1780–1880," in *Power and Place in the North American West*, ed. Richard White and John M. Findlay (Seattle, 1999), 23–60.

For those studying the twentieth-century borderlands, cross-border migration, the establishment of *maquiladoras* by American companies, and the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in some ways suggest the disintegration of American and Mexican "national projects." The state's importance has diminished in terms of an undocumented, "stateless" Mexican immigrant population north of the border that, while censured by official U.S. policy, plays an indispensable role in both the American and Mexican economies. In other ways, however, recent developments point to the persistent, if changing, significance of the U.S.-Mexican border. More than ever, the border represents economic inequality and marks the frontier between two societies whose disparities in living standards and environmental regulation make Mexico so attractive to American corporations, while Mexicans documented and undocumented pursue opportunities in a U.S. economy hungry for low-wage labor. In another sense, the border has assumed symbolic importance, used as a metaphor by individuals and communities seeking to define their identities throughout what Américo Paredes has called "Greater Mexico." Indeed, such recent films as *Lone Star* (1996) and *Traffic* (2000) depict the borderlands as a place where personal identities are ambiguous and shifting, and scholars have described the borderlands as a site of cultural conflict and syncretism. Paredes showed how the lyrics of Mexican *corridos*, or border songs, challenged Anglo hegemony. According to José E. Limón, though Anglo-Americans have defined themselves culturally by reference to a Hispanic Other, Anglos have also been subject to countervailing impulses, such as sexual desire and affinity for Hispanic culture, which foster "self-doubt within those who dominate." Gloria Anzaldúa's postmodern work *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* uses both gender and race to describe the place of borderlands *Mestiza* women who define their identities through resistance to Anglo hegemony, Spanish cultural assimilation, and Hispanic males' machismo. Such work refocuses borderlands studies on the evolution of separate personal and group identities, a process that paradoxically requires intimate cross-cultural contact. The comparative history of the American and Mexican "national projects," linked by the common experiences of anticolonial revolution and the building of multiethnic national states, has therefore given way to a new conception of the borderlands appropriate to a post-modern age.²⁴

24 José David Saldívar, "Américo Paredes and Decolonization," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham, NC, 1993), 292–311; José E. Limón, *American Encounters: Greater Mexico, the United States, and the Erotics of Culture* (Boston, 1998), 103; and Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco, 1987). See also Michael Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 4

The comparative themes prominent in scholarship on the U.S. West and U.S.-Mexican borderlands, while useful as correctives to American exceptionalism, only hint at the potential of the frontier-borderlands approach for changing the way scholars conceive of relations between different societies. As David Thelen has observed, the U.S.-Mexican border offers a "paradigmatic perspective of borderland studies" that encompasses not only "the division of people into separate spheres and opposing identities," but also, as with White's Middle Ground, "interaction between individuals from many backgrounds, hybridization, creolization, and negotiation."²⁵ By focusing on official diplomacy, historians of American foreign relations tend to neglect behaviors on the ground and the complexity of intergroup relations carried on beneath the radar of state policy. In addition, despite growing calls for internationalizing U.S. diplomatic history, scholars' unfamiliarity with languages and historiographies from parts of the globe other than the U.S. and Europe constrains their comparative frame of reference. Only those historians who leave the familiar landscapes of American historiography and venture into the *terra incognita* of other literatures can fully realize the potential of the frontier-borderlands approach and recognize how unexceptional the American experience truly is.

Themes similar to those developed by scholars of the U.S. West and U.S.-Mexican borderlands reappear in very different historical contexts. Middle Eastern history, for instance, offers examples of how frontiers helped to shape the institutions and characters of burgeoning states, as well as of the ways in which state boundaries affect the identities of particular groups. More than a century before European contact with North America, the North African writer Ibn Khaldûn identified a dialectical process across the frontier between settled and nomadic peoples as the basis for the rise and decline of bureaucratic states. According to his *Muqaddimah*, religious revival movements united nomadic groups and enabled them to conquer settled populations and establish royal dynasties. After assimilating urban culture over generations, the dynasty lost the very military prowess and fervor that was the basis of its success. It fell into a spiral of decline that made it vulnerable to attack by frontier bedouin, who kept the cycle going. Some modern scholars have used

(March 1991): 52–74; Jorge A. Bustamante, "Demystifying the United States–Mexico Border," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992): 485–90; David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity* (Berkeley, 1995); and Klein, *Frontiers of Historical Imagination*, 266–73. See also Carlos Fuentes, *The Crystal Frontier: A Novel in Nine Stories*, trans. Alfred MacAdam (New York, 1997).

25 David Thelen, "Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States," *Journal of American History* 86 (September 1999): 441.

the *Muqaddimah* as a comparative tool for understanding tribalism and statebuilding in the Middle East and Central Asia.²⁶ Cemal Kafadar has shown how the Ottoman empire originated in western Anatolia along the Muslim-Byzantine frontier, where, despite cultural syncretism between Muslims and Christians whose fluid identities sometimes overlapped, a powerful *gazi*, or Islamic holy warrior, ethos emerged that became the ideology of the Ottoman state.²⁷ Examples abound in the era of the nation-state as well. According to Christine Moss Helms, Saudi Arabia, established in Ibn Khaldūnian fashion when the Saudis rallied nomadic groups on the basis of Wahhabi Islamic revival, made the transition to a modern state after the drawing of international boundaries cut across seasonal migration routes and created reluctant Saudi "citizens" out of tribal nomads. Rashid Khalidi explains that for stateless Palestinians, identity verification at border checkpoints and airports, an indignity, which almost invariably excludes them or singles them out, "brings home to them how much they share in common as a people."²⁸ Such examples illustrate the significance of the frontier in Middle Eastern history, just as Middle Eastern borderlands have also been sites of identity formation.

In fact, the American experience with frontier-borderlands replicates major patterns in world history, recurring themes studied by both specialists investigating particular cases and world historians engaged in comparative studies. Scholars working in widely differing fields have seen the dialectic between the political center and the frontier as a fundamental factor in state formation. As Mark Bassin notes in his work on Russia, "there is nothing exclusively American about the 'frontier.'"²⁹ Jane M. Rausch has examined the role of a century of frontier wars on the

26 Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J. Dawood (Princeton, 1981). See also *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley, 1990).

27 Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, 1995). See similarly-titled works on the U.S.-Mexican borderlands, *Between Two Worlds: Mexican Immigrants in the United States*, ed. David G. Gutiérrez (Wilmington, DE, 1996); and Américo Paredes, *Between Two Worlds* (Houston, 1991).

On the Andalusian frontier, see Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 1978); and Olivia Remie Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900–1500* (New York, 1994).

28 Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity* (London, 1981); and Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York, 1997), 1.

29 Mark Bassin, "Turner, Solov'ev, and the 'Frontier Hypothesis': The Nationalist Signification of Open Spaces," *Journal of Modern History* 65 (September 1993): 473, and *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge, MA, 1999). See also Kate Brown, "Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same Place," *American Historical Review* 106 (February 2001): 17–48. On Russia's Arctic frontier, see Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North* (Ithaca, NY, 1994).

evolution of state and nationalism in Colombia.³⁰ For these scholars, and those working in other areas, the struggle to subdue a landed frontier is a basic part of statebuilding.³¹ While central governments might seek to control peripheral territory and bestow political identities on frontier peoples through inclusion or exclusion, ethnic and national identities are just as likely to be formed at the periphery as they are to be imposed from the center outward. Peter Sahlins, for example, argues that French and Spanish national identities had coalesced along the Catalan border by the 1820s, long before the infrastructures of the national states were in place. Indeed, behaviors and identities in border regions coincide with policies imposed by the political center only when they accord with the needs of local populations. "No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps, how many customs officials are appointed, or how many watchtowers are built," write Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "people will ignore borders whenever it suits them."³²

Though cross-border migrations occur despite state policy, as in the case of "stateless" Mexican immigrants in the U.S., exchanges along cultural frontiers might actually create powerful, if socially constructed, ethnic identities. Frederik Barth first noted the persistence of constructed ethnic identities despite intimate contact and cultural exchange between groups, and David A. Chappell contends that ethnogenesis often occurs in frontier areas where reference to an 'Other' provides the basis for identity formation.³³ Igor Kopytoff has reconfigured Turner's perspective on North American history into an "African frontier thesis" that regards the construction of group identities at the periphery of existing polities as the basis of African ethnogenesis. Kopytoff, like Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin, describes a historical frontier process that involves self shaping and the building of institutions.³⁴

30 Jane M. Rausch, *Colombia: Territorial Rule and the Llanos Frontier* (Gainesville, FL, 1999), and *The Llanos Frontier in Colombian History, 1830–1930* (Albuquerque, 1993). See also *Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History*, ed. David J. Weber and Jane M. Rausch (Wilmington, DE, 1994); and Catherine LeGrand, *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Columbia, 1830–1936* (Albuquerque, 1986).

31 See Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (London, 1940); and *Shifting Frontiers in Late Antiquity*, ed. Ralph W. Mathisen and Hagith S. Sivan (Brookfield, VT, 1996).

32 Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989) and "The Nation in the Village: State-Building and Communal Struggles in the Catalan Borderland during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of Modern History* 60 (June 1988): 234–63; Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands," *Journal of World History* 8 (Fall 1997): 211.

33 See *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, ed. Frederik Barth (Boston, 1969); and David A. Chappell, "Ethnogenesis and Frontiers," *Journal of World History* 4 (Fall 1993): 267–75.

34 Igor Kopytoff, "The Internal African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture," in *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, ed.

This handful of examples suggests the ubiquity of historical themes considered special to the American case and refutes Turner's claim that the "peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people."³⁵ This comparative discussion even makes the argument for an *anti*-Turner thesis: the hypothesis that territorial consolidation and cultural encounter have been the typical bases for statebuilding and identity formation in modern history. Turner's contribution in revising the European definition of "frontier" to fit a supposedly distinctive North American context simply reflects the conceptual power of the unitary nation-state when he was writing.³⁶ But as historians have developed alternatives to a state-centered approach, certain scholars have begun to rethink U.S. history itself, de-emphasizing the state without removing it from the story altogether, in a way that folds continental conquest and global economic expansion into a transnational history of the frontier.

Certain scholars have combined expertise on the American West and non-U.S. areas into a transnational perspective that situates the U.S. within patterns of global economic integration. While comparing the American West to other frontiers, these historians regard the North American conquest and the extension of U.S. economic hegemony over peripheral regions of the globe as elements of a single historical process. William H. McNeill places the frontier at the center of world history by rehabilitating Webb's Great Frontier concept, though, unlike Webb, McNeill addresses the experiences of Native Americans by portraying U.S. history as an "extreme case of contact and collision between societies at different levels of skill." McNeill regards technological disparities between cultures as the "principal drive wheel of historical change," a factor that helps to explain why frontiers are not always the egalitarian settings of Turner's thesis. When cash-cropping or extractive industries are involved, frontiers are more likely to yield a "social hierarchy steeper than anything familiar in Europe."³⁷ Robert Vitalis notes that exceptionalist ideologies justified exploitation of both the North American mineral frontier of the nineteenth century and the eastern Arabian oil frontier of the twentieth, succeeding instances in which U.S. corporations managed extractive enterprises and presided over racial hierarchies. Whereas Manifest Destiny sanctified American expansion into the trans-Mississippi West,

Igor Kopytoff (Bloomington, IN, 1987), 3–84 [esp. pp. 16–17]. On climatic change and ethnogenesis in West Africa, see James L. A. Webb, Jr., *Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change Along the Western Sahel, 1600–1850* (Madison, WI, 1995).

35 Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, 2.

36 For a discussion of how state-centeredness overtook alternative themes in American historiography, see Ian Tyrrell, "Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of Empire," *Journal of American History* 86 (December 1999): 1015–44.

37 William H. McNeill, *The Great Frontier: Freedom and Hierarchy in Modern Times* (Princeton, 1983), 9–10, 20. See also Malone, "Beyond the Last Frontier," 151–52.

Wahhabi Islam stamped God's imprimatur on Saudi custodianship of Arabia's petroleum, a claim the Saudis advanced with the help of the Arabian American Oil Company and the western novelist Wallace Stegner.³⁸ Paul Sabin has identified similarities among oil frontiers in Alaska, Ecuador, and elsewhere not as parallel case-studies, but as sharing a "direct *lineage* between earlier American Wests and later developments" linked by common patterns of corporate expansion, missionary activity, and environmental transformation. For Sabin, the story of the West is a transnational epic that cannot be contained within political boundaries, just as frontier history cannot properly be the exclusive domain of either Western or diplomatic historians.³⁹

Though the New Left's influence on Sabin is apparent, he argues that the Wisconsin School overemphasized the search for markets and neglected the increasing mobility of raw materials and capital across the twentieth-century global frontier. He might have added that it was American consumers, as much as the U.S. government and corporations, who shaped the unfolding of the frontier process in North America and beyond. Just as consumer demand drove the development of ranching and other industries that commodified nature across the frontier West, Americans' habits of consumption have created extractive frontiers in parts of the globe that produce bananas, coffee, rubber, and especially oil.⁴⁰ Even now, the frontier process continues in Central Asia and the Caspian, where multinational corporations prospect in the midst of the Afghanistan crisis for oil to fuel the SUVs and heat the "McMansions" so popular in today's Rocky Mountain West.⁴¹

Turner and Bemis helped to perpetuate the exceptionalist tradition that places the United States outside of global history as both a unique nation

38 Robert Vitalis, "Crossing Exceptionalism's Frontiers to Discover America's Kingdom," *Arab Studies Journal* 6 (Spring 1998): 10–31, and "The Closing of the Arabian Oil Frontier and the Future of Saudi-American Relations," *Middle East Report* 27 (July–September 1997): 15–25.

39 Sabin, "Home and Abroad," 308.

40 See William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York, 1991); Richard P. Tucker, *Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World* (Berkeley, 2000); Paul J. Dosal, *Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899–1944* (Wilmington, DE, 1993); Douglas Yarrington, *A Coffee Frontier: Land, Society, and Politics in Duaca, Venezuela, 1830–1936* (Pittsburgh, 1997), 196–212; Michael F. Jiménez, "'From Plantation to Cup': Coffee and Capitalism in the United States, 1830–1930," in *Coffee, Society, and Power in Latin America*, ed. William Roseberry et al. (Baltimore, 1995), 38–64; Mark Pendergrast, *Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Transformed our World* (New York, 1999); Steven C. Topik, "Coffee Anyone? Recent Research on Latin American Coffee Societies," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 80 (Spring 2000): 225–66; and Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (New York, 1991).

41 See Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, 2000), 143–82; and Robert D. Kaplan, *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus* (New York, 2000), 237–38, 265–85.

and a model society. They also left their mark on American historiography by conceiving continental and overseas expansion as distinct episodes of national development. But when this fracture is repaired and replaced by a continuous narrative, it becomes possible to appreciate U.S. history for what it contributes to world history, while the global context sheds new light on the American past.⁴² If the U.S. is exceptional, it may be because the dawn of American power coincided with a historic shift from an era of landed and colonial empires to one dominated by a transnational frontier of consumer capitalism. Put another way, American history fits into a larger story about the rise of globalization.

Fortunately, the innovations in American foreign relations over the last twenty years have outfitted scholars with what they need to pioneer exploration of the global frontier and to blaze interpretive trails for their colleagues in other fields. Walter LaFeber's *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism*, to cite one example, describes transnational corporations' search for new frontiers of cheap labor, the intersection of race and commerce, and the "soft power" of American mass media and consumer culture in the age of globalization. LaFeber's chapter "New Frontiers – and Inner Cities" contains no references to Frederick Jackson Turner, but several to media mogul Ted Turner.⁴³ Future work may analyze the transnational frontier process itself or use comparative history to illustrate distinctions between specific locales and societies affected by it. Historical comparisons between the U.S. and Russia, both of which developed from continental frontier empires into global superpowers, hold particular promise as a way of transcending well-worn debates about the Cold War. Frontier-borderlands therefore offers an approach to American foreign relations that includes official diplomacy but is not state-centered; that concerns itself with power but measures it by disparities in technology and capital, as well as by sheer military strength; and that acknowledges U.S. hegemony but regards American expansion in North America and beyond as part of broader historical trends in global economic integration and cultural exchange. Further creative study of globalization even has the potential to restore the field to the sort of prominence in American historiography it enjoyed during the heyday of New Left scholarship. For the next generation of historians, the global frontier beckons.

42 For diverse perspectives on writing the U.S. into world history, see Michael Adas, "From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History," *American Historical Review* 106 (December 2001): 1692–1720; and *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 2002).

43 Walter LaFeber, *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism* (New York, 1999), 90–112. See also Thomas W. Zeiler's Bernath Lecture, "Just Do It! Globalization for Diplomatic Historians," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Fall 2001): 529–51.

Modernization Theory

NICK CULLATHER

The Bush administration's support for trade, in spite of tensions, with the People's Republic of China, a policy known as "engagement," is based on an expectation that economic growth leads to democracy. In the president's view, commercial links will "help an entrepreneurial class and a freedom-loving class grow and burgeon and become viable." House Majority Whip Tom Delay predicts that "this middle class will eventually demand broad acceptance of democratic values."¹ President Clinton also asserted a natural progression linking growth, class formation, and democracy, or at least "civil society." U.S. policy toward the largest Asian power thus relies upon a theory of futurity, an anticipation that large social forces unfold in time in predictable, perhaps even controllable ways and that China will follow pattern. President Bush does not present his view as a theory, and he may not realize it is one. Without elaboration or evidence, its familiar reasoning is accepted as valid in the United States and much of the world.

The historical record, however, offers only tenuous support for the trade-equals-middle class-equals-democracy formula. The twentieth century is rife with examples of industrial dictatorships, strongmen appealing to middle-class anxieties, and democracy arising amid poverty. China already has a larger middle class than India in 1947 or Virginia in 1776. The recent history of the surrounding Asian states – Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan – suggests that one-party rule thrives on rapid growth while decline brings democracy. The exception has been the Southeast Asian states with the largest middle classes, Malaysia and Singapore, which remain unbudgingly authoritarian.

Nor is Bush echoing ancestral wisdom. The founding fathers saw a reverse relationship between prosperity and democracy, fearing "luxury" would destroy their fragile experiment.² Throughout the nineteenth century American thinkers fretted that industrial society was incompatible

1 Bush and Delay quoted in Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Trade Barrier," *The New Republic* (July 9 and 16, 2001): 24.

2 Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, 1980), 13–47.

with the ideals of the Constitution. Bush's rhetoric more nearly resembles European theorists, Karl Marx and Max Weber, a lineage he would be reluctant to acknowledge, but its specific roots go through Milton Friedman to Seymour Martin Lipset, whose seminal study "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," published in 1959, was a work of modernization theory.³ Thus, the conventional wisdom that guides China policy and has guided policy toward newly-independent states for much of the postwar period is scarcely forty years old. To the historian, the sudden, generalized acceptance of a new policy idiom – e.g., containment, credibility, national security – signals an important ideological turn, perhaps even a redirection in the meaning and purposes of foreign policy. In the United States and around the world, modernization put forward a whole new vocabulary of international relations.

Modernization theory, sometimes called development doctrine, supplied the working concepts through which the United States understood its obligations to unindustrialized, newly-independent nations in the last half of the twentieth century. Described as both an ideology and a discourse, modernization comprised a changeable set of ideas and strategies that guided policies toward foreign aid, trade, nationalism, and counterinsurgency. Among its core precepts was the idea that the state of economic and political advancement enjoyed by the United States and the industrialized West was normative, and that the progress of the other two thirds of humanity toward convergence at a comparable level could be accelerated. This process, called development, was the responsibility of ministries, banks, international agencies, G-7 summits, dictatorships, and insurgent groups. Development was, according to Gilbert Rist, a kind of "collective certainty," like human rights or world opinion, mobilizing people and nations to act as if it were true.⁴

While other essays in this volume explain the utility of an analytical model, historians study modernization to learn how to escape from one. Academic inquiry joined in the collective certainty in the formative decades after World War II, and modernization is the legacy code of the social sciences. Government turned to social and behavioral scientists to create reliable, quantitative, universally applicable techniques for managing the breakup of empires and their integration into the world economy.

3 Marx, of course, saw bourgeois democracy as an intermediate stage. Weber linked both capitalism and democracy through other factors such as Protestantism and a reformist monarchy. Lipset's theory matches the Bush/Delay/Clinton sequence, with capitalism and development raising the "wealth level" and inducing a conversion to government based on "universalistic norms." Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959) 1: 69–105.

4 Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London, 1997), 22.

Many social sciences – including history – placed explaining development at the heart of their disciplinary mission.⁵ Comparative history, world history, and international history all apply modernization's modeling, quantifying, and universalizing template, and a number of approaches to foreign relations, such as world systems and dependency theories, are explicitly developmentalist. Histories in which nations measure themselves against one another and vie for advantage fall easily into narrative patterns that imply linearity and convergence. Prasenjit Duara suggests that a "preoccupation with the utopia of modernity" is inseparable from narratives of the nation, since modernity is the nation's final goal and justification.⁶ It is the ubiquity of this discourse that students of international relations must contend with.

Recently, scholars in a variety of fields have joined a new critique of the development idea, attacking core assumptions shared by modernization theorists and their critics but also explaining the doctrine's enduring power and appeal. Their solution puts the framework inside the frame. It treats development *as* history, as an artifact of the political and intellectual context of the Cold War, and makes history the methodology for studying modernization, instead of the other way around. This historicist approach offers a way to write about development without accepting its clichés, and to see the record of Americans' cynical, heroic, disastrous, and occasionally inspired attempts at global humanitarianism in all of their moral and political complexity.

Foreign aid and development programs are this literature's primary subject, but its theme is broader: how U.S. policymakers understood the process of historical change. The perception that "massive forces" impelled two thirds of the world in simultaneous and irreversible social movement overshadowed policymaking in the cold war era.⁷ Rapid urbanization, population growth, and the energies released by the destruction of traditional and colonial authority could prove catastrophic for U.S. interests unless properly channeled. This realization touched off in the 1950s a "knowledge panic" among political leaders desperate for expert advice on how to steer the hidden processes of development.⁸ What resulted was a new area of inquiry and action, as well as the set of prescriptions familiar today in connection with economic and humanitarian

5 On modernization's centrality to historiography, see Jouyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York, 1994), 77.

6 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 27, 49.

7 Rusk to Johnson, January 31, 1966, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1997), 9: 134.

8 The term is from C. A. Bayly, "Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India," *Modern Asian Studies* 27 (1993): 38.

interventions – stimulus packages, technology transfer, austerity measures, nation building, etc. Historians have examined three broad subjects in connection with modernization: How developmentalist thought originated, how it gained a wide acceptance within the United States and around the world, and how it reconfigured power relations and the norms of international conduct.

Historians seek the origins of modernization where the scientific sensibility of the Enlightenment intersected with the exercise of power. The idea that the course of human progress could be understood and controlled dates to the early nineteenth century, when France and Britain were struggling to reestablish their mercantile empires on a secular, commercial basis, and just before technology and scientific racism ushered in an era of guiltless imperialism. Since then, it has tended to recur at times and places where systems of dominance required justification or explanation. European liberals reconciled universalism with imperialism by arguing that while all men were *not yet* equal, they were ruled by universal economic laws and followed a common historical path. Jean-Baptiste Say, John Stuart Mill, and Auguste Comte each contended that societies passed through successive stages, from savagery through barbarism, finally reaching a developed state that resembled industrial Europe. “Whoever knows the political economy of England, or even of Yorkshire,” Mill claimed, “knows that of all nations, actual or possible.”⁹ Comte called the science of human evolution Sociology and proposed that the highest stage would be a “positive” society governed by science.¹⁰

A growing literature reveals how applied science, harnessed to an idea of social evolutionism, augmented the powers of government as it defined hierarchies of dominance. James C. Scott has observed that techniques of measurement and mapping allowed opaque pre-modern nations to renovate themselves as legible inventories of natural wealth at the disposal of the monarch.¹¹ Reimagining empire as a “useful garden” tended by a sovereign master gardener, according to Richard Drayton, made development “a sacred responsibility imposed on those to whom the sciences had revealed the fabric of the universe.”¹² This distinguishing obligation separated the civilized from the savage and justified the taking of ‘unimproved’ lands in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Machinery’s ability to multiply

9 John Stuart Mill, *On the Logic of the Moral Sciences* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 90.

10 On the earliest origins of developmental thinking, see Michael P. Cowen and Robert Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London, 1996); Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York, 1969).

11 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, 1998).

12 Richard Drayton, *Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World* (New Haven, 2000), 77.

natural energies confirmed the virtue of industrial societies, and by the end of the nineteenth century, according to Michael Adas, technology had emerged as the definitive index of human progress.¹³

American scientists likewise measured their own society's advancement relative to the surrounding peoples, who might with help "catch up." Lewis H. Morgan, a founder of American anthropology, speculated in 1877 that since the career of human societies ran in "uniform channels upon all continents... American Indian tribes represent, more or less nearly, the history and experience of our own remote ancestors."¹⁴ The liberal developmentalism practiced by colonizers and missionaries in the early twentieth century aimed to transplant institutions and knowledge for the advancement of commerce as well as social welfare.¹⁵ By the 1930s, according to David Engerman, many of the themes that would be elaborated by modernization's supporters and critics in the 1950s were discernible in American press coverage of the Soviet famine.¹⁶ Social scientists refined their techniques, devising quantitative indicators of modernization. Census takers speculated in the 1940s that the "demographic transition," a sudden downturn in rates of human reproduction, marked the onset of modernity.¹⁷ Talcott Parsons's innovations in the use of social statistics and national-income accounting, developed during World War II, provided new means of tracking the progress of states on a linear scale.¹⁸ The terms "modernization" and "development," describing a process of social and economic advancement across a broad front were in general use by mid-century, but President Harry Truman's description of poor, post-colonial nations as "underdeveloped" in his inaugural address of 1949 raised the semantic stakes, making development a condition toward which all nations aspired.¹⁹

13 Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men* (Ithaca, 1989).

14 Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (Chicago, 1877), NY, vii. Morgan estimated that the Iroquois had achieved the level of the Greeks at the time of the first Olympiad in 776 B.C., 222–228.

15 On liberal developmentalism, see Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream* (New York, 1982); on missionaries and modernization, see Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change," *Journal of American History* 70 (March 1984), 4: 799–820.

16 David C. Engerman, "Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development," *American Historical Review* 105 (April 2000), 2: 383–416.

17 Simon Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History," *Population and Development Review* 19 (1993), 4: 659–701.

18 Dudley Seers, "The Birth, Life, and Death of Development Economics," *Development and Change* 10 (1979): 709.

19 H. W. Arndt, *Economic Development: The History of an Idea* (Chicago, 1987); H. W. Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29 (1981) 3: 457–66.

Historians have identified the 1950s as a culminating moment when social scientists formulated the most powerful articulation of the developmentalist vision and the United States began systematically to apply modernization as an instrument of influence. Interdisciplinary teams sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies (CENIS) and the Social Science Research Council worked out the inventory of interlocking concepts – social overhead capital, transitional personality, crisis of rising expectations, takeoff – that defined a new orthodoxy. Unlike improvers in the age of imperialism, the social scientists were optimistic that the backward countries could close the distance between themselves and the advanced societies, and that they could do it quickly, perhaps in a single generation. Designed for policymakers, their theories made the jump from university think tanks to the National Security Council by virtue of their uniquely useful combination of conceptual tools. They provided quantifiable measures of progress and principles for the use of aid. CENIS's leading light, Walt W. Rostow, devised indicators to determine the optimal amounts and timing that would allow U.S. assistance to decisively boost a country into self-sustaining growth.²⁰ Rostovian theory (as the CENIS/SSRC paradigm came to be called) made economic aid a surgical instrument that could “create an environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve.”²¹ Specialists believed the science of development rendered traditional diplomacy – “pacts, treaties, negotiation and international diplomacy” – obsolete.²² Governments could be stabilized, revolutions averted, and states realigned through precise interventions in the modernization process.

Modernization, in Rostovian theory, was partly economic, partly institutional, but largely mental. A behavioral approach emphasized the creation of new motivations and personalities and warned of the vulnerability of immature national psyches to the delusions of communism.²³ Development, in this view, was a kind of conversion experience, an acceptance of the imaginary of the developer. Much like the theories of Sigmund Freud

20 On Rostow's contribution, see Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 'Nation Building' in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 44–58; John Lodewijks, “Rostow, Developing Economies, and National Security Policy,” *History of Political Economy* 23 (1991): 285–310; Nils Gilman, *Paving the World With Good Intentions, The Genesis of Modernization Theory*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2000.

21 Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, “Notes on Foreign Economic Policy,” May 21, 1954, in *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, ed. Christopher Simpson (New York, 1998), 41.

22 Quoted in David C. Engerman, “West Meets East: The Center for International Studies and Indian Economic Development,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, ed. David Engerman (Amherst, 2003), 199–224.

23 Ellen Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Berkeley, 1995), 136–42.

or of Karl Marx (whom Rostow was explicitly responding to), Rostovian theory achieved its plausibility and explanatory power from the tight fit between its conceptual parts, rather than from the correspondence between any of the parts and the conditions they were meant to describe. It was thus both universally applicable and immune to empirical challenge (Rostow regarded South Vietnam as a developmental success twenty years after its demise). No single case could discredit the Rostovian model of developmental success, which was the United States itself, or an idealized version of it.

Since modernization theory was, in Michael Latham's words, "a sustained projection of American identity," its authority and acceptance derived from its correspondence to "truths" embedded in Americans' cultural self-awareness.²⁴ Richard Slotkin has observed how closely images of the modernizing encounter match mythic representations of the frontier in nineteenth century novels or twentieth century films. In *The Ugly American*, the 1958 bestseller that popularized the Rostovian worldview, characters familiar from movie Westerns enact the drama of development. So powerful were these stereotypes that nation builders working in Southeast Asia – such as covert operator Edward G. Lansdale or jungle doctor Thomas Dooley – created public personas to match.²⁵ Broadway and Hollywood productions such as *The King and I* schooled national and international publics in the fundamentals of development doctrine. In representation and reality, modernization was politics disguised as common sense.²⁶ "What's wrong with the kind of an urge that gives people libraries, hospitals, baseball diamonds, and movies on a Saturday night?" Humphrey Bogart insists in *Sabrina*.²⁷ Such expressions did more perhaps than policy statements to build the collective certainty, making culture both a conduit and an instrument of power.

This intellectual and cultural context illuminates the motives and methods of the U.S. foreign aid effort in richer detail than dependency or world systems theory can. If national security was the sum of our fears, a nightmare vision of an American garrison state cowering before a hostile Eurasia, development spoke our dreams: a transparent, modernizing world mastering man and the environment with American technology. "These things can be done, and don't let anybody tell you different,"

24 Latham, "Introduction," in Engerman, ed. *Staging Growth*, 1–24.

25 James T. Fisher, *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927–1961* (Amherst, 1997); Jonathan Nashel, "The Road to Vietnam: Modernization Theory in Fact and Fiction," in *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966*, ed. Christian Appy (Amherst, 2000), 132–54.

26 Christina Klein, "Musicals and Modernization: Rodgers and Hammerstein's *The King and I*," in Engerman, ed. *Staging Growth*, 129–64.

27 *Sabrina*, Billy Wilder, dir., Paramount, 1954.

Truman explained to David Lilienthal. "When they happen, when millions of people are no longer hungry and pushed and harassed, then the causes of war will be less by that much."²⁸ The stakes of the Cold War must be measured against the grandeur of that vision, not simply against George Kennan's criteria for minimal victory.

Unlike the structures of meaning that go by the names ideology or culture, development had universal influence, accepted as an article of faith by Rwandan schoolchildren and European central bankers. Americans tried to lay claim to the development idea, but it was never an exclusive property. Historicists have shown that the discourse had plural origins and responded to transnational influences. Chinese intellectuals used the language of modernity in the 1920s, and Indian nationalists articulated rival visions of national development decades before CENIS held its first seminar.²⁹ Korean intellectuals bent Rostovian concepts to fashion a uniquely Korean path to the future. Latin American economists reversed development logic and constructed a critique of dependency. Matthew Connelly has described the moment of crisis when French policymakers and intellectuals recognized that forces of modernization – population growth, rising expectations, education – undermined rather than reinforced colonial rule in Algeria, a realization that cast doubts on the legitimacy of empire.³⁰ Historicizing modernization allows us to notice the expanding divergence of social, political, and economic arrangements within market economies over the past fifty years, and to explore ways to understand and reconcile competing modernities.

Despite its paternalism, the development discourse mobilized humanitarianism on a global scale and established an entitlement to a better future. It provided a flexible set of common assumptions for negotiating issues of political and economic inequity, and its utility has allowed it to survive repeated debunkings. The riots in Watts, Detroit, and Newark in the 1960s discredited the notion that a stable, ordered modernity had been achieved. By the 1970s, the Rostovian canon came under attack from all sides, but development proved surprisingly resilient. The World

28 Quoted in Alonzo Hanby, *Liberalism and its Challengers: FDR to Reagan* (New York, 1985), 72–73.

29 Sun Yat-sen, *The International Development of China* (New York: 1922); Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton, 1999); Sugata Bose, "Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development: India's Historical Experience in Comparative Perspective," in *International Development and the Social Sciences*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley, 1997), 45–63; Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, "Koreanizing Modernization: Modernization Theory and South Korean Intellectuals," in Engerman, ed. *Staging Growth*, 251–74.

30 Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York, 2002), 17–38.

Bank, AID, Oxfam, and the vast institutional structure of international relief, as well as long-range planners in the State Department and CIA, continue to require a theory of history to guide understandings of the future. Modernization is still humanity's mission statement, and its solutions are offered as answers to the problems of rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, calming Arab militancy, and transforming China's authoritarianism. The study of modernization theory can help us to recognize the presuppositions on which policy rests and the power latent in the terminology of international discourse. It can also suggest what parts of the developmental creed can be preserved or reformed as we construct a new explanation of the duty we owe to strangers.

Ideology

MICHAEL H. HUNT

Ideology is the proper concern of all diplomatic historians. Its relevance rests on a simple proposition of fundamental importance: To move in a world of infinite complexity, individuals and societies need to reduce that world to finite terms. Only then can they pretend an understanding of their environment and have the confidence to talk about it and the courage to act on it. Policymaking, like any other individual or collective activity, requires that simplifying clarity. Policymakers get their keys to “reality” in the same ways that others in their culture do. Policymakers are formed by a socialization that begins in childhood and continues even as they try to retain those keys or to discard them as a result of experience in making decisions.

Thus, every diplomatic historian, like it or not, constantly comes in contact with the problem of ideology. Those intent on a better understanding of its importance and complexity may turn to a rich, suggestive body of literature. Part of that literature comes from political scientists preoccupied with the problem of definition. Their work catalogs the senses in which *ideology* is used (some twenty-seven according to one count) and sorts through the variations in meaning. Historians will find these writings particularly helpful in formulating a working definition with the greatest utility and applicability to their concerns.¹ Those who think of the concept of ideology as unproblematic will see the importance of being explicit

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1 For helpful articles in definition see Willard A. Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science,” *American Political Science Review* 66 (June 1972): 498–510; and Malcolm B. Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology,” *Political Studies* 35 (March 1987): 18–38. For a succinct, critical, clear-headed introduction see David S. McLellan, *Ideology* (Minneapolis, 1986).

about what it is and what it does, while anyone inclined to downplay the role of ideas or to regard them as freestanding may well reconsider after encountering definitions with clear interpretative promise.

Of the many possible definitions, I favor one that identifies ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.” Foreign policy ideologies are thus sets of beliefs and values, sometimes only poorly and partially articulated, that make international relations intelligible and decision making possible. This broad notion launches diplomatic historians on a quest for ideas that give structure and meaning to the way policy-makers see the world and their country’s place in it. That this definition corresponds closely to that reached independently by two other recent examinations does not make it correct, but it at least suggests that the understanding is plausible and worth testing against other definitions.²

Arriving at a definition is an important step, which immediately alters the frame of reference for studying policymakers. The question becomes “not whether they have an ideology but to what ideology they subscribe; not whether ideology makes a difference but what kind of difference it makes for the shaping of their intentions, policies, and behavior.”³ The basic premise that ideology matters and that it is neither simple nor rigid leaves us with a question of overriding importance. What fundamental notions (for example, about human nature, the constituents of power, and national mission) do policymakers carry in their heads? The search for an answer can go in a variety of directions. It can lead us to look at the mindsets of individuals or collectives. Biographical studies dealing with formative, early years are invaluable for the former, while prosopographical techniques are indispensable for the latter, especially as we attempt to identify commonalities or divergences within or between groups, even generations.⁴ It can alert us to the need for greater sensitivity to language and especially to the meaning embedded in key words such as “progressive change,” “terrorism,” or “free world” in our reading of conventional diplomatic documentation and personal correspondence. It asks us to

2 Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), xi. For similar definitions see Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science,” 510; and Hamilton, “Elements of the Concept of Ideology,” 38.

3 Seweryn Bialer, “Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy,” in *Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective*, ed. George Schwab (New York, 1978), 86.

4 As examples of biographies see Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1979); and John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation* (Princeton, 1978). Anyone who doubts the relevance of personality to an understanding of ideology in foreign policy should read M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York, 1956); and Robert Jervis, “Political Psychology – Some Challenges and Opportunities,” *Political Psychology* 10 (September 1989): esp. 487–92. See also Lawrence Stone, “Prosopography,” in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard (New York, 1972), 107–40.

examine rhetoric in a more sophisticated way, and to extend our scrutiny to symbols and ceremonies that can reveal much about the form and content of ideology that conventional sources usually leave implicit.⁵

Writings about cultural systems further broaden our understanding. They tell us (in the words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz) that ideology springs from those "socially established structures of meaning" associated with culture.⁶ As long as cultures create meaning, there will be ideologies that can be understood only by entering into those cultures and decoding their meanings. But a system of culture can seem sprawling and amorphous and far too static to suit the needs of historians.

Neo-Marxist writings can help overcome such limitations, providing insights into causation and process. Their clear focus on class and the hegemonic ideology associated with the dominant class has provided an attractive way of making culture more comprehensible and analytically manageable. Their attention to conflict between different social groups injects a dynamic element missing in the concerns of anthropologists and warns against treating ideology as a unitary or finished product. Neo-Marxist studies also show that ideology is closely tied to patterns of privilege and the exercise of power. Finally, they offer a conception of the relationship between the system of production and consciousness that is complex and indirect, not simple and straightforward. The consciousness of elites may have but a tenuous relationship with the economic system on which their power ultimately rests.⁷

What has been called the new cultural history can also contribute to our enlightenment and help us guard against an overly superficial and schematic notion of ideology. It offers not a model or paradigm, but an argument that alerts students of ideology to linguistic and philosophical

5 On decoding see Daniel T. Rodgers, *Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence* (New York, 1987). On rhetoric see Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 15–16. On symbols and ceremonies see Wilbur Zelinsky, *Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1988).

6 Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), 12. Most pertinent here is his classic, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (London, 1964), 47–76. The deep impact of cultural anthropology on intellectual history can be gauged in the instructive essays in John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, eds., *New Directions in American Intellectual History* (Baltimore, 1979). For the broader impact see Ronald G. Walters, "Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and the Historians," *Social Research* 47 (Autumn 1980): 537–56. For a reassessment see Aletta Biersack, "Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 1989), 72–96.

7 See Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Williams, *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London, 1980), 31–49; Jorge Larraín, *Marxism and Ideology* (London, 1983); and T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *American Historical Review* 90 (June 1985): 567–93. Antonio Gramsci has won a following on the basis of fragmentary observations, available in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, 1971).

complexities. The proponents and practitioners of this approach urge scholars to look beneath the explicit meanings texts convey to the deeper structures of language and rhetoric that both impart and circumscribe meaning. Those structures will help us understand what policymakers can and cannot say about the world. No diplomatic historian will be able to regard evidence in quite the same way after reading the new cultural historians on the relations of language to knowledge and power, the complexity of reading a text and relating it to context, and the creation of meaning through discourse. Although the new cultural history is sometimes couched in convoluted and obscure language, the approach remains an important source for a sophisticated conception of ideology.⁸

Ideology cannot be understood apart from cultural context, relationships of power, and the creation, transmission, and interpretation of meaning. Once this becomes clear, it is no longer possible to treat, however tacitly, policy as autonomous. What goes on in the heads of policymakers is inseparable from the social setting broadly understood. This perspective on the state's policymaking function prompts a series of questions about ideology. How do policymakers' systems of belief relate to those of the broad public or the small portion of it keenly interested in foreign affairs? How do ideologies held by policymakers and the public relate to the patterns of privilege and structures of power in the society? How do fundamental policy assumptions and core ideas assume their meaning, and how does that meaning shift depending on time and context? How does change, even crisis, within society alter ideological formulations?

Those questions, whether applied to a particular policymaker or a particular decision, should induce diplomatic historians to step more often out of the archives and to explore the broader literature of American history dealing with the cultural values and concerns that sustain ideas and give them meaning. Interpretative guidance and inspiration can be found in topics and themes in American history as diverse as the influence of economic systems and economic interests, the role of social class and ethnicity, the impact of regional identity and national political culture, the process of nation and state building, and even the constraints of gender.⁹

8 See Lynn Hunt, "Introduction: History, Culture, and Text," Patricia O'Brien, "Michael Foucault's History of Culture," and Lloyd S. Kramer, "Literature, Criticism, and Historical Imagination: The Literary Challenge of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra," all in Hunt, ed., *New Cultural History*, 1–22, 25–46, 97–128; and John E. Toews, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and Irreducibility of Experience," *American Historical Review* 92 (October 1987): 879–907. For an account that offers a helpful introduction to the "linguistic turn" but does not demonstrate precisely how it might contribute to historiographical or historical understanding see Frank Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Spring 1989): 135–61.

9 See, for example, Robert Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," *American Historical Review* 82 (June 1977): 531–62; Tennant S. McWilliams,

To establish the intellectual context of policymaking, our research must become more wide-ranging, imaginative, and ingenious.

The notion of ideology as a complex structure with potentially far-reaching influence and with intimate links to social and economic conditions builds on and offers advantages over older approaches dominant in the field. Diplomatic historians have been slow in coming to terms with ideology, preferring to consider ideas in a somewhat disembodied form. On the one hand, the impact of ideas on policy was often only implied or impressionistically developed. On the other hand, ideas were frequently left free floating, divorced from economic or social processes or need. "Realists" during the early Cold War tried to clear room for ideology. But their conception of it as an intellectual deformity characteristic of totalitarian states converted the United States into a special case, thus nullifying the value of the breakthrough. According to the realists, U.S. policymakers, as the leaders of the "free world," had shown a lamentable tendency to fall under the sway of such pernicious influences as moralism and idealism, but they were not ideological.¹⁰

Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s, an explicitly ideological treatment of U.S. policy came into its own thanks to William Appleman Williams and like-minded historians associated with the New Left.¹¹ Their critics' passionately held Cold War convictions, however, trivialized the discussion of ideology and overshadowed abstract considerations of method and theory. Those critics, most of them open or closet realists, summarily dismissed as absurd the suggestion that Open Door ideology or any other ideology had fundamentally influenced U.S. policy.¹²

The New South Faces the World: Foreign Affairs and the Southern Sense of Self, 1877–1950 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1988); and Geoff Eley, "Nationalism and Social History," *Social History* 6 (January 1981): 83–107.

- 10 For a stark example of the neglect of the function and origin of ideas characteristic of much of the early diplomatic history literature see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, 1935). For a classic exposition, itself strikingly ideological, see George F. Keenan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951). This denigrative notion of ideology informs the entry by Edward Shils in *International Encyclopedia of Social Science*, ed. David L. Sills, 18 vols. (New York, 1968), 7:66–76; it lingers in Paul Seabury, "Ideology and Foreign Policy," in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, ed. Alexander DeConde, 3 vols. (New York, 1978), 2:398–408.
- 11 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959). For a thoughtful appraisal see Bradford Perkins, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-five Years After," *Reviews in American History* 12 (March 1984): 1–18. Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY, 1963), is an early and impressive attempt to demonstrate the importance of ideology to policymaking.
- 12 A striking instance is the comments of Richard Pipes and Andrew Ezergailis, "Communications," *American Historical Review* 75 (December 1970): 2158–59. The comments were in response to Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s," *ibid.* (April 1970): 1046–64.

Over the past decade and a half, with the cooling of controversy over the origins of the Cold War, a new concern with ideology has infiltrated the field from a variety of directions. Of the various clusters of scholarship concerned with ideology, corporatism, discussed in this volume by Michael J. Hogan, is the most intimately connected to U.S. diplomatic history. By highlighting how organizational forms articulate economic needs and change the mentality of policymakers, corporatist historians have built on earlier efforts to link the economy to dominant policy conceptions. The resulting literature, much of it devoted to the 1920s, shows how a society dominated by corporate institutions and values gives rise to a corporatist outlook in foreign policy.¹³

Other clusters of work incorporating the concept of ideology fall on the margins of the field; scholars associated with these various clusters think of themselves as peripheral to, if not completely outside, the field of U.S. diplomatic history. Writings issuing from political and intellectual history have used the theme of republicanism to illuminate early American foreign policy. This work has helped break free of the older views of early foreign policy as a battle between "idealism" and "realism" or the expression of clear-cut marketplace needs. The work of specialists in American culture wrestling with the meaning of the Vietnam War has uncovered ties between the interventionist impulse and American society that the specialists, locked in the archives, were missing.¹⁴

Other work, also peripheral to the field, has issued from area studies with its multidisciplinary basis and strong orientation toward the study of culture. As the area studies approach has grown in range, resources, sophistication, and influence, it has encouraged U.S. diplomatic historians touched by it to reflect on the seemingly self-evident beliefs and long-hidden assumptions of their country and culture. Nowhere has the resulting attention to culturally grounded world views, both elite and popular, been more marked than in American-East Asian relations.¹⁵

13 For a broad application of the corporatist approach see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York, 1982). For key appraisals of corporatism see Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History," *Reviews in American History* 10 (December 1982): 318-30; John Braeman, "The New Left and American Foreign Policy during the Age of Normalcy," *Business History Review* 57 (Spring 1983): 73-104; and Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Fall 1986): 363-72.

14 On republicanism see Drew R. McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, 1980); and Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, NY, 1985). On the Vietnam War the prime example is Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York, 1985). See also John Hellman, *American Myths and the Legacy of Vietnam* (New York, 1986).

15 John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986); Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States*

A fifth cluster of relevant work comes from political scientists who examine the policymaking process and contemporary international relations. This work has shown a fascination with the intellectual underpinnings of U.S. Cold War policy and with the post-Vietnam War breakdown of foreign policy consensus.¹⁶ A last identifiable cluster is associated with British and British Commonwealth historians, who have the advantage of both distance from and familiarity with the United States. Those informed outsiders have brought into sharp relief racial thought, nationalist ideas, and imperial attitudes familiar from the earlier British experience. Shy on theory, these works have been notably strong in exploiting comparisons.¹⁷

If a concern with ideology has developed within diplomatic history, resistance remains – for good reasons as well as bad. Some diplomatic historians are troubled by concerns that have long worried intellectual historians. Any attempt to assign ideology its proper influence and to anchor it in a specific social and economic context is attended by a daunting array of pitfalls. Reductionism is the most frequently mentioned. Stressing one complex of ideas, the anxious contend, not only will fail to illuminate the complexity of policymaking but may also divert attention from other, more eligible kinds of explanations.

Although these concerns are justified, diplomatic historians should take them not as a deterrent but (as they have proved for intellectual historians) as a spur to try fresh approaches and rethink old ones. Historical writings that take risks in order to analyze ideological assumptions and structures deserve to be judged by the standards that we usually apply, in other words (as one intellectual historian has put it), according to “the clarity, the ingenuity, and the soundness and spread of documentation with which the argument is advanced.”¹⁸ The best test of an interpretation is not whether it can withstand a sweeping dismissal but whether it

and China to 1914 (New York, 1983). Training in area studies provided much of the impetus for my own *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. On the rise of area studies see Robert A. McCaughey, *International Studies and Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning* (New York, 1984); and Paul M. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of China* (New York, 1988).

- 16 Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, 1973); D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, 1988); Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus* (Boston, 1984); Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, *America's Quest for Supremacy in the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London, 1988).
- 17 Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York, 1978); Philip Darby, *Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870–1970* (New Haven, 1987); David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine,” *Diplomatic History* 10 (Winter 1986): 25–42.
- 18 Laurence Veysey, “Intellectual History and the New Social History,” in Higham and Conkin, eds., *New Directions in American Intellectual History*, 19.

can help illuminate specific cases, perhaps even by revealing complexities not previously recognized.

Yet other critics of efforts to study ideology in U.S. foreign policy have reacted with barely disguised hostility, prompted by a well-founded sense that important interpretative notions face vivisection under the knife of ideology. "Power politics," "international realities," "containment," and "geopolitics" are all terms that often assume a privileged interpretative role. But they are also terms with strong ideological dimensions. To recognize those dimensions is to advance revisionism at the expense of the long-dominant view of the Cold War to which most critics of ideology are still attached. By calling into question fundamental categories preferred by historians who identify with the views underlying U.S. policy, the ideological approach threatens to reawaken slumbering Cold War controversies.

Still other historians, wedded to a narrow conception of the policy process and devoted to closely researched archival studies, have proved indifferent, if not averse, to the historical study of ideology. They ask: "What has intellectual history to do with diplomatic history?"¹⁹ Committed to the herculean task of assimilating a mountain of materials from government archives and presidential libraries, such scholars want their job of reconstructing the day-by-day development of policy made simpler, not more complex and time consuming. Among social science approaches, they have chosen those that highlight bureaucratic behavior and decision making, prizing their help in making sense of the mass of paper generated by the Cold War state. A concern with ideology, by contrast, threatens to increase the scholar's burden as archival texts become denser and questions of societal context proliferate.

Whatever objections or misgivings may exist, the concept of ideology is an invaluable tool whose versatility can help expand the concerns and methods of diplomatic historians, whatever their topic or orientation. Ideology forces us, as no other approach does, to focus on the consciousness of policymakers and the cultural values and patterns of privilege that shape that consciousness. Reflecting its broad application, the study of ideology overlaps with several approaches discussed in this book. It has important connections to culture, gender studies, and corporatism. Ideology also encompasses the study of national security, which is an intellectual construct created and defended by bureaucrats and policymakers as well as intellectuals closely identified with them. That study is also a valuable auxiliary to dependency and world systems approaches as they develop the claims to dominion that issue from centers of imperial power

19 This very question was the focus of an inconclusive discussion at a panel at the 1989 annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

alongside the attitudes of collaboration and resistance that spring up in response among subjugated and dependent peoples.

The preceding observations (first published in 1990) were mainly concerned with making the case for the importance of ideas in U.S. policy in the face of interpretive approaches that either narrowed or demeaned ideology. Studies that have appeared since then have raised the visibility of beliefs, assumptions, and discourses in the field's general interpretive schema. This new literature has extended a loose, culturally informed notion of ideology beyond policy to consider how a wide variety of peoples caught up in the wash of international forces have imagined their situation and tried to deal with it. Thus the prospect noted at the end of my 1990 essay that ideology as an interpretive tool could "help expand the concerns and methods of diplomatic historians" has been realized to a degree and in a fashion almost impossible to imagine a decade ago.

This new work, much of it is animated by a strong interest in theory, falls into five thematic clusters – nationalism, Americanization, race, gender, and empire. That these clusters bear no resemblance to those noted in my 1990 observations suggests how much the past decade has extended and reconfigured thinking about the role of ideas in foreign relations. It is the dramatically expanded scope given ideology and the implications for the field that this update addresses. The sheer volume of the work over the last decade poses one problem: it threatens to turn the notes of this follow up into an inventory of almost everything published over the last decade. I have drawn selectively from that literature even at the risk of seeming arbitrary.

Of the various thematic clusters, nationalism is the most venerable and perhaps still the most central. U.S. foreign relations is after all to a large extent about the outlook and behavior of a nation-state with a powerful sense of identity and purpose. Little wonder then that diplomatic and other historians have remained fascinated with the special character and persistence of the "redeemer nation" idea. Helping to sustain their interest has been a renaissance in writings on nationalism, including notably the influential constructivist position that makes national identity not a matter of timeless essence but of construction by historical actors. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* is the most oft-cited articulation of this position.²⁰ The range and sophistication of the theoretical literature

20 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London, 1991). See also the critiques of Anderson by Partha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community?" in Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, 1993), 3–13; and by Robert Wiebe, "Imagined Communities, Nationalist Experiences," *Journal of the Historical Society* 1 (Spring 2000): 33–63. For a compelling alternative constructivist

seem likely to sustain historical scholarship on expressions of nationalism in U.S. foreign relations.²¹

A look at a few exemplary works will highlight the prominence that nationalism has continued to occupy while also suggesting the vitality and diversity of the resulting insights. Anders Stephanson's slim but ambitious synthesis, *Manifest Destiny*, is a good place to start for its fresh reading of a familiar nineteenth-century nationalist discourse.²² Drawing on his training as an intellectual historian, Stephanson emphasizes the importance of religious ideas in creating a national identity marked by unusually universalist claims and by unusual durability such that it persisted well into the twentieth century. Stephanson can be read alongside other studies that focus on formative nationalist notions such as Olivier Zunz's *Why the American Century?*, Matthew Jacobson's *Barbarian Virtues*, Tony Smith's *America's Mission*, and Frank Ninkovich's *The Wilsonian Century*.²³ Zunz, for example, makes much of the rise of a consumer society during the interwar period. His account has a highly productive, technologically driven economy coupled with high levels of mass consumption defining a distinctly American path to modernity. As an ideological creation, this American model reshaped national identity and by extension visions of the nation's role in the world. This model might be seen as bridging two eras: It built on while significantly modifying notions of manifest destiny, and it no less significantly informed American notions of the Cold War struggle and the globalist ascendancy that would follow it.

New writings on nationalist ideas in play during the Cold War have added nuance to that much-studied conflict by revealing the multiple roles that those ideas played. They served as important weapons in the hands of policy elites combating communism abroad, as Michael Latham shows

interpretation see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, UK, 1992).

- 21 For general orientation to the nationalism literature, see Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narrative and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58 (July 1997): 525–45; Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York, 1996); and John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford, UK, 1994).
- 22 Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995).
- 23 Olivier Zunz, *Why the American Century?* (Chicago, 1998); Matthew F. Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York, 2000); Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994); and Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago, 1999), which builds on his *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994). See also the roundtable assessing Henry Luce's eminently nationalist text, "The American Century," in *Diplomatic History* 23 (Spring and Summer): 157–370 and 391–537.

in *Modernization as Ideology*. He in effect carries forward Zunz's thesis by showing how an American way of development shaped the presumptions within the early Cold War social science community and inspired a doctrine of modernization that flourished in the early 1960s thanks to its strong "common sense" appeal to policymakers.²⁴

Nationalist ideas also served as a means of reshaping domestic society and politics the better to accommodate to the requirements of the Cold War struggle. Mobilizing popular consent to a potentially costly and risky contest taking shape in the late 1940s was one front in the domestic Cold War battle. Silencing dissenting voices was another. Bringing race relations into closer harmony with the principles of freedom and equality ostensibly informing U.S. policy was a third. Ending institutional racism within the government, including within the very agency charged with the conduct of diplomacy, was a fourth.²⁵ The contradictions generated at home by the Cold War crusade had, so the new literature is telling us, profound, lasting consequences for national life.

Finally, nationalist ideas served to define the terms of elite debate over the Cold War. John Ehrman's *The Rise of Neoconservatism* drew attention to the deep fissures over national identity and mission that Cold War policy choices could create.²⁶ This adroit piece of intellectual history traces the discontents aroused by Richard Nixon's policy of détente. His shift toward accommodation with the Soviet Union along with the Vietnam debacle signaled to Norman Podhoretz and others in the Committee on the Present Danger a moral collapse within the foreign policy establishment and even the onset of moral decay within the country. Their response was an ideological movement that became influential under Ronald Reagan.

24 Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000). In closely related studies, Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, 2001), shows how social science behavioralism hitched its wagon to Cold War tasks, and Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997), follows the attempt by U.S. policymakers to use the appeal of consumer culture to court "captive peoples" in the Soviet bloc.

25 See for example John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston, 1998); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2000); and Michael L. Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969* (Armonk, NY, 1999). For explorations of the multifaceted links between Cold War ideology and the domestic sphere, see Christian G. Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, 2000); Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds., *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington, DC, 2001); and Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1996).

26 John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994* (New Haven, 1995).

The issue of Americanization, a second cluster closely related to nationalism, has burst on the scene over the last decade as part of a growing interest in globalization and especially its cultural ramifications. As the central organizing theme for the post-Cold War world, the globalization discourse has become pervasive – a popular trope no less than a flourishing academic subject.²⁷ Historians were surprisingly slow to respond to the loose assemblage of issues raised by a process of globalization unfolding for a century and more. But over the last decade global history has emerged as a flourishing new specialty.²⁸ One of the main issues has been what happens when a multifaceted American model sweeps around the world and becomes the preeminent, insistent, and often resisted and sometimes resisted form of modernity. The growing confidence of historians as well as anthropologists and sociologists in tackling this topic and the growing sophistication of their work suggest a maturing research field.²⁹ Discussions of Americanization have long since moved from

- 27 David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (Cambridge, UK, 2000), captures the extraordinary range of controversy in an exploding literature. For notable interventions in the debate, see David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK, 1999); Frederick Buell, *National Culture and the New Global System* (Baltimore, 1994); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY, 1996); Fred Halliday, *The World at 2000* (Basingstoke, UK, 2001); and James H. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, 2000).
- 28 For good introductions to the new field of global history, see A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London, 2002); Ross E. Dunn, ed., *The New World History: A Teacher's Companion* (Boston, 2000); Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," *American Historical Review* 100 (October 1995): 1034–60; and Raymond Grew, "On the Prospect of Global History," in *Conceptualizing Global History*, eds. Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (Boulder, 1993), 227–49. The *American Historical Review* has begun to feature global history issues on a regular basis, but see also the *Journal of World History*, published by the World History Association since 1990.
- 29 The bulk of the work on Americanization focuses on Europe: Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York, 1994); Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (March 1989): 53–87; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, 1994); Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999); Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); and Richard Kuisel, "Not Like Us or More Like Us: America and Europe" [review essay], *Diplomatic History* 22 (Fall 1998): 617–21. For more general treatments and attention to other regions, see Rob Kroes, "American Empire and Cultural Imperialism," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999): 463–77; Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., "Here,

simple “either/or” terms and sweeping generalizations oblivious to time and place, and are finding all sorts of interesting sites in which American influences play out with all sorts of unexpected results. It seems a safe bet that intellectual as well as cultural and economic historians, particularly those with international training, will continue to explore the complex American role in a globalizing world.

Racial codes and the resistance they inspire constitute a third thematic cluster. Attention to race thinking has been, like nationalism, no stranger to diplomatic historians. But some of the new literature in this cluster has brought a fresh dimension by including the voices of those subject to subordination and prejudice. Penny Von Eschen's *Race Against Empire* and Brenda Gayle Plummer's *Rising Wind* offer good examples of this trend.³⁰ Von Eschen, for instance, traces the rise of black internationalism from the late 1930s. World War II brought to a pitch African American hopes for a new deal not only for themselves but also for Africans and peoples of African descent everywhere. Rising Cold War pressures in the late 1940s crushed those hopes and marginalized such impatient advocates for black freedom as W. E. B. Du Bois. Yukiko Koshiro's *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* and Thomas Borstelmann's *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle* complement Von Eschen by demonstrating the continuing potency of racial constructs in an era supposedly dominated by the U.S. defense of individual freedom against collectivist visions. Koshiro and Borstelmann show that these constructs were an essential part of tacit international agreements on the legitimacy of race thinking, serving as a basis for U.S. cooperation with occupied Japan no less than apartheid South Africa.³¹

A fourth cluster has sprung up around issues of gender. Between 1987 and 1992, even as such leaders of women's studies as Joan Scott and Nancy Cott were making the case for women's place in a more inclusive rendition of European and American history, gender came with a rush to diplomatic history. Edward Crapol, Elaine Tyler May, Emily Rosenberg,

There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover, NH, 2000); Timothy W. Ryback, *Rock Around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York, 1990); and Gilbert M. Joseph et al., eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998). Notable examples of Americanization work from other disciplines that historians will find helpful: James L. Watson, ed., *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia* (Stanford, 1997); and Joseph J. Tobin, ed., *Re-Made in Japan: Everyday Life and Consumer Taste in a Changing Society* (New Haven, 1992).

30 Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca, 1997), and Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996).

31 Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999), and Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York, 1993).

Judith Papachristou, Rosemary Foot, and Geoffrey Smith took the lead.³² Their breakthrough works and a rush of studies that followed them found gendered dimensions theretofore neglected in such well-worn topics as late-nineteenth-century expansion, progressive and interwar foreign relations, and the Cold War. These new works moved along two fairly distinct lines. One, focusing on gender discourse and representation, showed how notions of manhood shaped policymakers' self-image as well as their views of other peoples while also informing popular discussions of foreign affairs.³³ The second line opened to study the neglected role of women in U.S. foreign relations.³⁴ Studies of the latter sort began examining the ways women engaged in international affairs "figured out" their position and the kinds of categories and language that resulted from that effort. By considering how gender ideology and the experience of women, for

- 32 Edward Crapol, ed., *Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders*, rev. ed. (Wilmington, DE, 1992); Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York, 1988); Emily S. Rosenberg, "Gender" in "A Roundtable: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations," *Journal of American History* 77 (June 1990): 116–24; Judith Papachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy, 1989–1905," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Fall 1990): 493–509; Rosemary Foot, "Where Are the Women? The Gender Dimension in the Study of International Relations," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Fall 1990): 615–22; and Geoffrey S. Smith, "National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States," *International History Review* 14 (May 1992): 221–40. Anticipating even these works were missionary studies such as Jane Hunter's *The Gospel and Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven, 1984). See also Cynthia Enloe's influential *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, 1990), which marked a distinct turn within the international relations field.
- 33 Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago, 1995); Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1309–39; Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 163–83; Michelle Mart, "Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948–1960," *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1996): 357–80; Robert D. Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Winter 1998): 29–62; and Emily S. Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 59–70.
- 34 Laura McEnaney, "He-Men and Christian Mothers: The America First Movement and the Gendered Meanings of Patriotism and Isolationism," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 47–57; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1997); Linda K. Schott, *Reconstructing Women's Thoughts: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom before World War II* (Stanford, 1997); Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s* (Chicago, 1993).

examples as wives and mothers, may have influenced their outlook, these studies engaged a fascinating debate in feminist studies over (to borrow Karen Offen's phrase) "the sociocultural significance of physiological difference."³⁵

The last cluster is best denominated "orientalism," that sprawling set of approaches to empire that has begun in only the last few years to find application to U.S. diplomatic history. Edward W. Said's brilliant but frustrating *Orientalism* is the foundational text.³⁶ Said applied literary theory to an emerging body of scholarship on European perceptions of the Middle East. What he found was a marked tendency among French and British observers and policymakers to create civilizational and geographic categories that essentialized and defamed the region's peoples and cultures. The novels, memoirs, and travel accounts as well as state papers of these Western observers evoked a picture of their colonial subjects as weak, irrational, effeminate dependents. So powerful and pervasive were these "orientalist" views that they survived the end of colonialism in the heads of many of the former subjects no less than in the minds of Westerners, including Americans under the sway of lingering orientalist notions. Orientalism thus at its heart depicts imperialism (in the words of one recent hard-headed appraisal) as "an epistemological system" of great power and persistence.³⁷

Said's stress on the orientalized "other" and his emphasis on colonial manliness and colonized effeminacy has had an impact well beyond work on the Middle East. Orientalism first found a warm reception among some students of nationalism and gender. His work also proved the herald for what is described as "colonial discourse analysis" – what practitioners tend to dub "post-colonial theory." They follow Said in finding inspiration in poststructuralist approaches to colonial studies, in tracing the Western use of myth and invention to smother other peoples and legitimize dominance, and in lamenting the degree to which elites in subordinate countries came to accept Western categories and judgments as their

35 Karen Offen, "Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Perspective," *Signs* 14 (Autumn 1988): 139n42. Offen's comparison of European and Anglo-American strains of feminism in "Defining Feminism," 119–57, and the exchange between Offen and her critics, Ellen Carol DuBois and Nancy F. Cott, in *Signs* 15 (Autumn 1989): 195–209, bring the debate over women's roles into sharp focus. For discussions that turn from first to third world women, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," in *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, ed. C. T. Mohanty et al. (Bloomington, IN, 1991), 51–80; Lois A. West, ed., *Feminist Nationalism* (New York, 1997); and Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí, *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (Minneapolis, 1997).

36 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (originally published 1978; reprint with a new afterword, New York, 1994).

37 The phrase is from Dane Kennedy, "Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24 (September 1996): 347.

own. But work done under Said's influence has also sparked sharp rejoinders and dissents from those who find the scholarship sloppy and the preoccupation with subjectivity excessive.³⁸

If orientalism is (as Said has put it) "a box of utensils for other people to use," then diplomatic historians have been slow to take them up.³⁹ This is true (as Andrew Rotter has noted⁴⁰) even though orientalism seems perfectly suited to exploring how dependency is created in U.S. relations first with native Americans and then with peoples in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and beyond (including the Middle East itself). One possible reason for this reticence is that what literary scholars found so novel in the 1980s and 1990s historians of foreign relations or at least those with an area studies background have taken for granted: ideas about other peoples and cultures frequently cast them in subordinate positions and in extremity dehumanize them and justify otherwise unthinkable brutality. In any case, a more explicit engagement with orientalism now seems well underway if recent work by Rotter himself on U.S.-Indian relations, by Matthew Connelly on Algeria in the Cold War, and by Mark Bradley on the roots of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam is taken as a telltale.⁴¹

This mounting and multi-faceted concern with ideas, now one of the defining features of diplomatic history, has significantly transformed the field over the last decade. Who is a diplomatic historian and what topics and approaches define diplomatic history – already blurring by 1990 – has become even less clear. With this blurring has gone a reorientation of the

38 Good introductions and critical appraisals can be found in Kennedy, "Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory"; D. A. Washbrook, "Orientalism and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British Empire," in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5: *Historiography*, ed. Robin W. Winks (New York, 1999), 596–611; Fred Halliday, "'Orientalism' and Its Critics," in Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London, 1996), 195–217; and Bernard Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," in Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York, 1993), 99–118. For a sense of the diverse approaches that grew out of "orientalism," see Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York, 1994); Francis Barker et al., eds., *Colonial Discourse, Postcolonial Theory* (Manchester, UK, 1994); and Bill Ashcroft et al., eds., *The Post-colonial Studies Reader* (London, 1995).

39 Quote from "Orientalism Revisited: An Interview with Edward Said," *Middle East Reports* 18 (January–February 1988): 33.

40 Andrew J. Rotter, "Saidism without Said: Orientalism and U.S. Diplomatic History," *American Historical Review* 105 (October 2000): 1205–17.

41 Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000): 739–69; and Mark Bradley, "Slouching toward Bethlehem: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War in Vietnam," in *Cold War Constructions*, 11–34. Bradley draws from his *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000). See also John Foran, "Discursive Subversion: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah," in *Cold War Constructions*, 157–82.

lines of affiliation cultivated by diplomatic historians. The once close ties to political scientists have attenuated as diplomatic history draws more than ever on such fields as cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology.⁴² Divergent understandings of ideology and culture have helped to erode the old alliance. While historians have moved away from a notion of ideology as a belief system that is both formally articulated and pointedly political, the political science/international relations field has by and large clung to that older, more restrictive, less supple definition.⁴³

The greater attention given ideas in an altered diplomatic history field has proven a challenge to some older, well-established approaches. Historians with a new left and corporatist bent have on the whole accommodated with ease. Ideas have always occupied an important place in their interpretive schema, so it has been relatively easy to expand the interpretive framework to make room for insights from the new scholarship. A suggestive example is Walter LaFeber's inclusion of racial constructs in his recent *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* in contrast to his earlier, starker stress on economic ideas in his interpretation of the same subject thirty years earlier in *The New Empire*.⁴⁴

For realist historians, who have long made Cold War studies their special preserve, the adjustment has been more difficult. Ideas for them have been not natural parts of the historical landscape but rather inconvenient eruptions that cloud the minds of policymakers and lead them away from sound policy paths.⁴⁵ The strong cultural turn of the past decade has challenged that understanding, and a new international history of the Cold War taking shape at the same time has reinforced the challenge. Historians working with new Soviet, East European, and Chinese sources such as Odd Arne Westad have made ideology a more important feature of our overall picture of the Cold War. They suggest that struggle was not between two neatly divided, ideologically monolithic camps. Rather the Cold War contained a great cacophony of ideas as old nationalist self-conceptions on both sides warred with internationalist commitments and loyalties. The result is a picture of Cold War policymakers imprisoned

42 Stephen Haber et al., "Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations," *International Security* 22 (Summer 1997): 34–43, laments the divorce while also confusing a perceived decline in diplomatic history with what is in fact a significant shift in interest.

43 For a telling contrast between the approach to ideology now predominating in the two fields, see Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U. S. Ideology," and Douglas J. Macdonald, "Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis," both in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London, 2000), 81–100 and 180–204.

44 Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* (New York, 1993).

45 Anders Stephanson develops this point in "Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors," *Diplomatic History* 17 (Spring 1993): 285–95.

in their own particular and often tension filled set of assumptions and preoccupations.⁴⁶

Melvyn Leffler offers one example of the mixed results of this encounter between realists on the one side and new cultural approaches and international history findings on the other. Leffler took a step toward giving ideas their due by emphasizing American anti-bolshevism in his *The Specter of Communism*, a condensed and more interpretively forthright rendition of his exhaustive study of the U.S. policy during the origins of the Cold War, *A Preponderance of Power*.⁴⁷ However at the same time, Leffler continued in both books to privilege an essentialist national security code that bears a striking resemblance to an older, ahistorical realist preoccupation with deriving definitions of national interest from the supposed objective requirements of the international system. By seeing some (deplorable) ideas such as anti-bolshevism developing in history and other (admirable) ones such as national security standing outside of history, Leffler has created a puzzling double standard that has confused some readers and annoyed others.⁴⁸

John Gaddis has also tried to accord ideas fuller play in his conception of the Cold War. In his most recent work he accords them prominence in explaining the Cold War outcome but in a way that naturalizes fundamental assumptions that shaped U.S. Cold War thinking. He tells us that Marxism-Leninism on the one side betrayed the leaders of the socialist bloc into "authoritarian romanticism" and saddled their peoples with a system that they ultimately realized was bankrupt. On the other side, democratic values proved an effective basis for building and maintaining a winning coalition. These long-familiar Cold War axioms ("their values are bad, ours are good, and subjugated people will eventually see the difference") do not alter the story laid down in Gaddis's earlier work but rather serve to heighten the moral pitch of his triumphalist interpretation.⁴⁹ Subjectivity and the constructed nature of people's outlooks are not welcome witnesses in the courtroom of the realist historian.

46 For recent, pointed remarks on the ideological dimension of Cold War policies in general, see Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 552–56. See also the pioneering exploration of ideas in Soviet policy by Albert Resis, "Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1946" (University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1988). The importance of ideas to policy is also the burden of my own *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York, 1996).

47 Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1953* (New York, 1994); and Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, 1945–1952* (Stanford, 1992).

48 For a cogent critique of Leffler's position, see the review essay by William O. Walker, III in *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 663–73.

49 See John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997), chap. 10, for a summary of his more recent views. Gaddis struck the theme of

There is good reason to think that theoretically and culturally informed questions of ideology will remain to the fore for some time. Attention to theory has created an environment within the historical profession and especially history graduate programs that has had a major impact on a new generation of historians. An eclectic interest in theory is likely to persist. The personal experience of that generation will also play a role. The Cold War was not a lived experience. It stands rather as a puzzling phenomenon, especially the assumptions and intellectual frameworks that made it possible. Of the contemporary trends that have left an impress, none may be more salient than the multi-cultural currents associated with globalization. Those currents have inculcated a sensitivity to the amazingly diverse views of peoples around the world on international affairs and a fascination with the effects of the culture industry on popular consciousness. For all these reasons, ideas should continue to loom large in historical work.

By demonstrating the manifold ways in which ideas can be important, new work has encouraged a diversity and eclecticism of inquiry friendly to new departures in the intellectual and cultural history of U.S. foreign relations. There remain, however, pitfalls that are as potentially serious today as they were when I wrote in 1990. Attention to ideology helps historians to give subjectivity its due and thus to underline the constructed and contingent nature of individual and group outlooks. But this shift to subjectivity also runs the danger of making ideas elusive will of the wisps – vague, free-floating abstractions perpetually in flux and without clear correspondence to patterns of behavior, social and economic structures, or the changing character of historical epochs. Interpretations that stress “the plurality of discourses” (to draw on Stuart Hall’s phrasing) can in turn highlight “the perpetual slippage of meaning” and end up on an interpretively dangerous slope greased by “the endless sliding of signifiers.”⁵⁰ Ideas do have impressive explanatory power. They have helped diplomatic historians better understand what makes influential individuals tick (especially those running the apparatus of the

Soviet and especially Stalin’s responsibility for the Cold War in his first monograph, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972), and he has returned to it insistently – for example, in his inflammatory “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” *Diplomatic History* 17 (Winter 1993): 1–16.

- 50 Stuart Hall, “Significance, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,” in *Critical Perspectives on Media and Society*, ed. Robert K. Avery and David Eason (New York, 1991), 89. See also the cautionary observations by Arif Dirlik in “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Winter 1994): 328–56; and the clarifying discussion of ideology in relation to its conceptual siblings, culture and hegemony, that appears in Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*: vol. 1: *Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago, 1991), 13–32.

state) and how groups of people dimly visible if at all in our older state-dominated accounts think and cohere. To protect that explanatory power, historians need to be careful to anchor ideology, not just to look at text but also to keep in sight the broad context of cultural practices and beliefs and the specific relationships of power. This is an intellectually challenging agenda but also one that the work of the last decade shows is rewarding.

Culture and International History

AKIRA IRIYE

In December 1978, at a gathering of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, I presented a paper titled "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations."¹ Then, ten years later, at the 1988 annual convention of the American Historical Association, I gave an address on the theme of "Internationalization of History."² These two essays were amalgamated into one and published in the June 1990 issue of the *Journal of American History*, under the title "Culture and International History."³ That was the version that was included in the first edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*.

Culture and international history – these two themes, it seems to me, have become ever more closely incorporated into the study of American foreign relations since the first publication of the above book. My 1978 and 1988 papers were in essence calls for adding a cultural dimension to the study of international relations and, at the same time, for internationalizing this field of inquiry through an active interchange among historians of different perspectives and backgrounds across national and regional boundaries. Nowadays it seems to be taken for granted that cultural relations and policies form an important part of any nation's foreign affairs and that historians from all countries share a commitment to open inquiry about the past on the basis of unrestricted access to information. What remains less clear is the extent to which these two themes, culture and internationalization, may be further integrated so that they will develop into a new field of international cultural relations, or of global cultural history.

That cultural studies of international affairs have been among the most notable achievements in the study of American foreign relations since the 1980s can be easily demonstrated. In part this seems to have been due to the vogue of culture studies in literature, sociology, and other disciplines, as well as the popularity of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and other new approaches to the study of the past. These developments have

1 *Diplomatic History*, 3 (Winter 1978): 115–28.

2 *American Historical Review*, 94.1 (1989): 1–10.

3 *Journal of American History*, 77 (1990): 99–107.

affected the study of foreign relations not least because specialists in gender studies, linguistics, and the like have been interested in applying their theories and perspectives to international affairs. The growing body of literature that adopts a cultural approach to international history may also reflect the fact that, since at least the late 1970s, world affairs have been increasingly convulsed by cultural issues, broadly put: religious fanaticism (often involving terrorism), abuses of human rights, environmental degradation, the frightening spread of AIDS, the transnational trafficking in drugs, and, in order to respond to these crises, the myriad activities by non-state actors, in particular nongovernmental organizations. These are all cultural phenomena in that they are not directly involved in state-to-state political, strategic, or economic affairs, the traditional definition of diplomatic history.

As is evident from such examples, culture is a broad, even porous term that may be used to include all human activities. It defies precise definition, and for this reason, there are still historians who shy away from using the term or from making a cultural study of foreign affairs. To do so, however, is to condemn oneself to a narrow, and increasingly irrelevant, understanding of the world.

If culture is an ambiguous term, so are such other words that historians have not hesitated to use: power, security, ideology, order, the market, society, and many others. In a revised edition of *The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, edited by Alexander DeConde and soon to be published, I explain my understanding of cultural relations this way: "Cultural relations may be defined as interactions, both direct and indirect, among two or more cultures. Direct interactions include physical encounters with people and objects of another culture. Indirect relations are more subtle, involving such things as a person's ideas and prejudices about another people, or cross-national influences in philosophy, literature, music, art, and fashion."⁴ Such an explanation still leaves the question of what culture is. For the purposes of this essay, I shall use the term "culture" in the same way that I did in the first edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*: "Culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries."⁵ A nation is a culture in that its inhabitants share certain consciousness – of their land, of their history, and of who they are. Since all nations are in this sense cultures, international relations become inter-cultural relations. At this level, nations and peoples deal with each other not so much in terms of political calculations,

4 Akira Iriye, "Cultural Relations and Policies," in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2002).

5 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1991): 215.

strategic considerations, or economic interests – although these, too, can be said to be derived from certain assumptions that are produced by their respective cultures – as through images, assumptions, emotions, the arts, and popular entertainment as well as through material goods such as food and fashions. Nowadays, in the age of technological globalization, writers of various persuasions have been fascinated by the question of whether these cultural interactions result in a more interdependent, shared world, or in a more antagonistic, fragmented world. Historians of cultural international relations will be in a very good position to explore such a question because of their knowledge of intercultural affairs in the past.

As mentioned at the outset, the corpus of this knowledge has grown impressively since the 1980s. Perhaps nowhere is this fact more clearly demonstrated than in the collection of essays that Michael J. Hogan put together and published in 1999 under the title *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century."* In this volume the authors consider large themes that characterized American foreign relations during the twentieth century, and many of the themes deal with the cultural dimension broadly put, such as "Tension between Democracy and Capitalism," "Philanthropy and Diplomacy," and "Images of Americanization in the American Century."⁶ Cultural phenomena now seem to permeate most, if not all, studies of United States (and other countries') foreign affairs, to such an extent that it is no easy task to list and summarize even a fraction of them. In the following pages I shall consider some of the recent achievements in this field by dividing them roughly into three groups: those dealing with the cultural foundations of the country's behavior in the world, with cross-national cultural activities, and with global cultural developments. This tripartite scheme was adopted in my original essay for this volume and still seems useful.

First of all, even before the 1980s, several important studies of U.S. foreign affairs had been published that probed into what Paul Ricoeur called "the layers of images and symbols that make up the basic ideals of a nation."⁷ The best known example of this genre was Felix Gilbert's *To the Farewell Address*, which examined the intellectual equipment of the American leaders in the late eighteenth century as they coped with the nation's external affairs.⁸ Without explicitly proclaiming the cultural approach, Gilbert was paving the way for a new way of looking at the history American foreign policy through a focus on the nation's shared ideas and assumptions, its "ethico-mythical nucleus," to use Ricoeur's

6 Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century"* (New York, 1999).

7 Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, 1965): 282.

8 Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1961).

words. Gilbert's book was followed by such important studies as Hugh DeSantis's *Diplomacy of Silence*, Reginald Horsman's *Race and Manifest Destiny*, and Michael H. Hunt's *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*.⁹ The first of the three studied the ideas and attitudes held by some key Foreign Service officers who specialized in Soviet affairs during the 1930s and the 1940s, while the second showed how American race consciousness (in particular, the idea of white supremacy) during the first decades of the nineteenth century had prepared the ground for the idea of manifest destiny, and the third, taking the whole span of American history, pointed to certain underlying themes – such as the promotion of liberty and the preference for reform, not revolution – that had sustained the nation's attitudes toward other countries.

These pioneering works have been followed by additional monographs in the recent years. For instance, Frank Ninkovich's *Modernity and Power* argues that a rather pessimistic response to modern civilization was at the core of what is usually called Wilsonian foreign policy; seeing modernization as inevitable, Woodrow Wilson and other architects of U.S. foreign policy sought to contain the damage such transformation could bring to world order.¹⁰ Anders Stephanson's *Manifest Destiny* examines the idea of manifest destiny as a discourse, that is, as a fundamental ideology through all periods of U.S. domestic and diplomatic history.¹¹ Emily S. Rosenberg's *Financial Missionaries to the World* builds upon her earlier and still extremely influential book *Spreading and American Dream*, and shows that certain impulses – in particular, an eagerness for reforming the world – were behind U.S. economic foreign policy known as dollar diplomacy.¹² Michael E. Latham's *Modernization and Ideology* offers a superb analysis of the ideology of modernization that underlay U.S. foreign policy during the 1960s.¹³

9 Hugh DeSantis, *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (Chicago, 1980); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny* (Cambridge, MA, 1981); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987).

10 Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994). Besides this book, several important studies of Wilsonianism have been published in recent years, including Frederick S. Calhoun, *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy* (Kent, OH, 1986); Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, 1992); and Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago, 1999).

11 Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995).

12 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982); Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

13 Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000).

Taking ideas seriously distinguishes the works thus far cited – and many more could be added – from the more traditional studies of foreign policy that focus on security and national interests. In such studies, balance-of-power calculations and considerations of national interests are the key to understanding interactions among nations, and there is little room in such a “realist” (or “rational actor”) analysis for “soft” or “irrational” factors like ideals, visions, or prejudices. That few historians today subscribe to a narrowly constructed “realist” perspective is due in no small degree to the impact these important studies have made. It is interesting to note that Henry Kissinger’s widely-read book *Diplomacy* recognizes the importance of ideology and idealism by devoting as much space to the discussion of Wilsonianism in the chapters dealing with U.S. foreign policy as to realistic calculations of power.¹⁴

The books stressing ideas and visions have forced scholars and readers of international affairs to be aware of the “imagined” nature of a given “reality.” All realities in a way are imagined realities, products of forces and movements that are mediated through human consciousness. Perhaps owing to the recent developments in cognitive psychology, the word “imagination” has entered the vocabulary of international history. Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* has been enormously influential and served to familiarize the notion that the nation is an imagined construction.¹⁵ So are other human collectivities, including the whole world. One consequence of the popularity of the notion of imagined communities has been to refine the study of images a nation has of another. In 1967 I published *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*, a study of how Americans, Chinese, and Japanese had viewed each other throughout history.¹⁶ By the time I revised the book in 1992, bringing the story to the early 1990s, so many studies of mutual perceptions across the Pacific had been published that it was virtually impossible to do justice to all of them in rewriting the volume. Among the more valuable recent studies of images are T. Christopher Jespersen’s *American Images of China* that covers the 1930s and the 1940s, Mark Bradley’s *Imagining Vietnam and America*, dealing with the period between the 1920s and the 1950s, and Joseph M. Henning’s *Outposts of Civilization*, an examination of how Americans viewed the Westernization of Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁷

14 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994).

15 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, 1983).

16 Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York, 1967; rev. ed., Chicago, 1992).

17 T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China, 1931–1949* (Stanford, 1996); Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Joseph M. Henning, *Putposts of Civilization: Race, Region, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations* (New York, 2000).

An important scholarly development of the recent years has been a vogue of what may be termed memory study, an examination of how a nation remembers history. Memory, as Benedict Anderson argues, is part of the imagination, and an imagined community such as a nation is built upon some shared memory of the past. Historians have produced several significant works in this area, perhaps reflecting the fact that at the end of the twentieth century, there was a national (even a world-wide) interest in remembering the horrendous wars and atrocities of the century. John Bodnar's *Remaking America* is an important landmark; the book details how the nation's wars have been commemorated in various parts of the country.¹⁸ Ron Robin has made a major contribution to the study of national memory in his *Enclaves of America*, an account of war memorials and official buildings that the United States has built abroad.¹⁹ In *Ghost of War*, Roger Dingman offers a fascinating study of how Americans and Japanese have remembered their war, and James William Gibson has written a provocative account of the memory of the Vietnam war as it shaped American culture during the 1970s and the 1980s.²⁰ But as Tom Englehart shows in his *Memory Wars*, people's memories are often in sharp conflict with one another, a subject that is in need of further careful analysis.²¹

If it is difficult to develop a consensual memory of the past within a country, it will be nearly impossible to generate shared memories across national boundaries. But that, too, is a subject worthy of scholarly inquiry. If international relations are also intercultural relations, it must be asked whether nations have (or have not) developed an image of the past that they all find acceptable. Do peoples develop compatible ideas about the history of their mutual relationship? If they do not, are their divergent perspectives on history likely to generate a sense of misunderstanding and mistrust, even of incompatibility? Have adversaries in a war been able to create some common understanding about the conflict, or have they persisted in sharply contrasting views?

To explore such questions, it will, of course, be necessary to familiarize oneself with the languages and cultures of other societies. This is an

18 John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1992).

19 Ron Robin, *Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Culture Abroad, 1900–1965* (Princeton, 1992).

20 Roger Dingman, *Ghost of War: The Sinking of the Awa Maru and Japanese-American Relations, 1945–1995* (Annapolis, 1997); James William Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in Post-Vietnam America* (New York, 1994).

21 Edward T. Lillenthal and Tom Englehardt, eds., *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past* (New York, 1996). See also Martin Harwit, *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of Enola Gay* (New York, 1996), a detailed account of how an exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of atomic bombs aroused so much controversy.

extremely difficult undertaking, but certain valuable monographs that span several cultures have been published, indicating the possibility of further research in this area. The above cited book by Bradley offers a careful and comparative study of how Americans and Vietnamese viewed one another on the basis of research in French and Vietnamese as well as U.S. and British archives. Few scholars are as linguistically talented, but there do exist monographs that deal with cross-cultural relations on the basis of multilingual research. Intellectual historians have led the way by publishing some excellent monographs that discuss the ways in which Americans and Europeans cooperated, directly or indirectly, in developing certain ideas so as to cope with the challenge of modern civilization: James Kloppenberg's *Uncertain Victory* and Daniel T. Rodgers' *Atlantic Crossings* are notable examples.²² While these studies focus on the Progressive era, the 1920s have also attracted historians interested in tracing the impact of American culture overseas. Frank Costigliola's pioneering study of European responses to American material culture, published in 1984, has been followed by such important monographs as Kristin Thompson's *Exporting Entertainment* that looks at the internationalization of the movie market after the First World War, and Mary Nolan's *Visions of Modernity* that examines German views of the United States in the same period.²³

The question may still be raised: Do these books, however interesting, have any relevance to the study of foreign policy? Do they really demonstrate that certain ideals and visions determine a given state's dealings with another? Do decisionmakers actually produce policies on the basis of their ideas? If a country is confronted with a grave crisis, such as a foreign invasion, a terrorist attack, the rise of a formidable neighboring power, or a sudden drop in the value of its currency, does it matter what image of modern civilization its leaders have?

Several historians have grappled seriously with these problems and offered various responses to them. Some of the essays contained in *On Cultural Ground*, edited by Robert David Johnson, are good examples.²⁴ Rudolf V. A. Janssens's "What Future for Japan?" details American images of Japan during the Second World War, paying particular attention to the way scholarly perspectives on the nature of Japanese culture and society provided a basis for Washington's policy toward the defeated

22 James Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York, 1986); Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

23 Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–34* (London, 1985); Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York, 1994).

24 Robert David Johnson, ed., *On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History* (Chicago, 1994).

enemy.²⁵ More recently, Andrew Rotter has squarely confronted the question of the relationship between culture and foreign policy in his *Comrades at Odds*, an analysis of U.S. relations with India after the Second World War.²⁶ A political scientist, Matthew Evangelista, has presented convincing evidence, in his *Unarmed Forces*, that contact and exchanges between American and Soviet scientists made an impact on the negotiations between the two governments for restricting nuclear tests and armament.²⁷ In my own essay for the original edition of *Explaining*, I stated, "it would be best to say that at certain times and in certain circumstances ideas and assumptions do become crucial." That now sounds too weak. I would revise the statement and suggest that, while the culture-power relationship is obviously an important subject of inquiry, that is not the only way cultural relations may be analyzed. This is so because formal policies and decisions are just one among many possible frameworks for the study of international relations. Traditionally, diplomatic history has consisted of close examinations of decisions by policy-makers. The new cultural international history considers many other phenomena besides policy decisions, looking at cultural factors even when they may play no direct role in the formulation of policies. International history, after all, consists of much more than what one decision-maker does or says to another.

Among the best examples of the broadened scope of international history are Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914*, and Daniel Pick, *War Machine*.²⁸ They all focus on European thought in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries and show how certain images of inevitable war had developed by 1914. This does not necessarily mean that these images were shared by European statesmen or that they caused the critical chain of events that produced the July crisis of 1914. Indeed, a fascinating recent study of the origins of the war, Niall Ferguson's *The Pity of War*, argues that such foreboding had little or nothing to do with the actual decisions made in Berlin, Paris, or London.²⁹ But that is not the point. The point is that, quite apart from their relevance to specific policy decisions, cultural forces and phenomena are worthy of study for their own sake, if only because cultures define their own realities, quite separate from the realities that

25 Rudolf V. A. Janssens, "What Future for Japan?": U.S. Wartime Planning for the Post-war Era, 1942-1945 (Amsterdam, 1995).

26 Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000).

27 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1999).

28 Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London, 1975); Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1979); Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New Haven, 1993).

29 Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York, 1999).

confront decision-makers. I argue this point in the concluding chapter of *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*.³⁰

However, there is one area where culture and policy do come together: cultural foreign policy. This concerns a state's defining an approach to its dealings with other states at the cultural level. Most typically seen in propaganda (what was called "ideological warfare" during the Second World War and during the Cold War), cultural foreign policy may also entail exchange programs of various kinds. Frank Ninkovich's seminal work *The Diplomacy of Ideas* showed how the U.S. government came to control cultural exchange programs during the early years of the Cold War.³¹ The book has inspired other, equally important studies of U.S. cultural policies. Examples would include Walter Hixon, *Parting the Curtain*, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, and Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*.³² Hixon's volume examines officially sponsored cultural exchange programs between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1950s; Gienow-Hecht's looks at an attempt in U.S.-occupied Germany after the war to transform German journalism; and Berghahn's scrutinizes the ways in which the Ford Foundation and other organizations engaged in massive efforts to improve European perceptions of American society and civilization, often in close cooperation with the federal government.

These studies deal mostly with officials, intellectuals, and other members of the nation's elite. For this reason, it may be asked: How about the masses? When studying intercultural relations, whether at the official or the private level, are we talking about the ideas and images of the elite or of the masses? Are there such things as "masses," or should we be talking about "subcultures" defined by race, class, gender, or other categories?

First of all, hegemonic theory, which gained popularity during the 1980s, suggests that the elite imposes its perceptions on the rest of the population, and that certain views held by dominant groups who control power determine the way the nation behaves in the world. Good examples

30 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997).

31 Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York, 1981).

32 Walter Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999); and Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, 2001). There is a growing scholarly literature on the postwar Americanization of Germany and Japan. See, among others, Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1991); Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945–1949* (New Haven, 1995); and John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999).

of this approach are the essays contained in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, edited Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease.³³ The editors and the authors argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between the United States' domestic and external affairs; those that wield power domestically seek to project the nation's power overseas. The idea of a power elite defining the society's priorities is an old one, but it has been restated with vigor by other recent works, including Michael Sherry's *In the Shadow of War* that examines how the nation's leaders perceived an external threat and made it the core value of American politics and culture during the 1930s and the subsequent decades.³⁴

However, that the elite is not always in agreement about national and international affairs is clearly demonstrated by Kristin Hoganson's *Fighting for American Manhood*.³⁵ The book is an important addition to the literature in that it incorporates gender issues into the discussion of U.S. external affairs. It argues that the concern with preserving the nation's vigor ("manhood") permeated the debate on empire at the turn of the twentieth century. At the same time, however, the author is careful to document that the American elite (overwhelmingly male, white, and Protestant) did not speak with one voice but were seriously divided on the relevance of gender rhetoric to foreign policy. Likewise, certain recent works on gender and foreign affairs, such as Harriet Hyman Alonso's *Peace as a Women's Issue*, show that, while female activists were self-conscious about their role as mothers and wives in the pursuit of peace, they did not always take a consensual stand on specific foreign policy questions.³⁶ Books like Paul Boyer's *By the Bomb's Early Light* and Spencer Weart's *Nuclear Fear* indicate the elite and the public shared many, often contradictory, ideas regarding the development and use of nuclear weapons.³⁷ John Dower's careful studies of American images of Japan have demonstrated that some images are not only held by the vast majority of the American people but that they remain virtually constant, regardless of changing circumstances.³⁸

33 Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993).

34 Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (New Haven, 1995).

35 Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998).

36 Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, NY, 1993).

37 Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York, 1986); Spencer R. Weart, *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images* (Cambridge, MA, 1988).

38 John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1987); Dower, "Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in U.S.-Japanese Relations," in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler, eds., *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001* (Tokyo, 2001).

In addition to these works, there have begun to appear studies that focus on specific ethnic groups or classes to determine how they have related to the nation's external affairs. Alexander DeConde has confronted the question of ethnicity and foreign policy head on in his *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*, Marc Gallicchio has focused on the attitudes and images held by African Americans in *The African American Encounter with Japan and China*, and Christian G. Appy has examined, in *Working-Class War*, the thought and behavior of American combat soldiers during the Vietnam war, the majority of whom were of working-class origin.³⁹ These are cultural studies of U.S. foreign affairs in the sense that ethnic groups and classes are analyzed through their cultures. However, how the specific attitudes and worldviews held by these groups of people are (or are not) reconciled to develop a coherent national mentality, and how they affect specific policies are important questions that await extensive investigation.⁴⁰

Whether, and in what circumstances, ideas and images change is a related and interesting question. Given that ideas and images are cultural productions, created and developed in a cultural context – the nation's educational system, religious orientation, race consciousness, and so on – it is not surprising that many studies stress continuity rather than discontinuity. At the same time, however, we need to recognize that cultures do change as a result of their interactions. As Warren Cohen notes in his new book *The Asian American Century*, American society and culture today are not what they were a few decades ago in large part because of the influx of Asian immigrants, but also because the nation has become enveloped in the larger transnational drama known as globalization.⁴¹ Both these phenomena – intercultural interactions and transnational developments – are important objects of scholarly inquiry and form the second and third sub-fields in the study of cultural international affairs.

Historians of American foreign relations have published a large number of monographs dealing with cultural encounters and activities abroad. After the nation achieved independence, individual traders, missionaries,

39 Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston, 1992); Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, 1993).

40 A recent study by a political scientist, Tony Smith's *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), contains important and provocative observations on some recent trends. See also Izumi Hirobe, *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act* (Stanford, 2001), a careful analysis of the ways in which some American individuals and groups sought to combat their countrymen's racism in order to improve U.S.-Japanese relations.

41 Warren I. Cohen, *The Asian American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2001). See also the same author's pioneering study, *East Asian Art and American Culture* (New York, 1992).

scientists, teachers, and travelers were often the first to establish contact with people in other lands, preceding even consuls and naval officers. What they saw, experienced, and reported home constituted a rich legacy of American foreign affairs, and it would be no exaggeration to say that until the beginning of the twentieth century these activities defined the nature of U.S. relations with the rest of the world. Even in the twentieth century, when the state (governmental bureaucracies, armed forces) increasingly came to determine the shape of U.S. foreign affairs, individuals and non-governmental organizations remained active, and their endeavors abroad often constituted a distinct layer of international relations.

These encounters and endeavors have long been examined by historians. Among the pioneering works, one would need to recall Merle Curti's *American Philanthropy Abroad*, as well as some of the essays included in *Culture and Diplomacy*, edited by Morell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan.⁴² American missionary encounters with foreign cultures have been a fruitful area of historical inquiry, as attested to by such landmarks as Jane Hunter's *The Gospel of Gentility* and William R. Hutchison's *Errand to the World*.⁴³ The former offers a gender-based account of American missionary activities in China during the early years of the twentieth century, while the latter provides an inquiry into the meaning of cross-cultural encounters when American missionaries proselytized abroad. These volumes have been followed by a number of impressive monographs in the last several years. A selective list would include Bruce Kuklick's *Puritans in Babylon*, David Reynolds's *Rich Relations*, Leila Rupp's *Worlds of Women*, Jon Thares Davidann's *A World of Crisis and Progress*, and Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman's *All You Need Is Love*.⁴⁴ Kuklick's book, reflective of a significant scholarly trend, a concern with the institutionalization of

42 Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick, 1963); Morell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., *Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience* (Westport, CT, 1977).

43 Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven, 1984); William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago, 1987).

44 Bruce Kuklick, *Puritans in Babylon: The Ancient Near East and American Intellectual Life, 1880–1930* (Princeton, 1996); David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (New York, 1995); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1997); Jon Thares Davidann, *A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890–1930* (Bethlehem, PA, 1998); Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA, 1998). See also Craig M. Cameron, *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), an excellent combination of military history and cultural history. William R. Hutchison provides a thoughtful inquiry into the meaning of cross-cultural encounters when American missionaries proselytized abroad in *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago, 1987).

knowledge, traces how the travels and explorations by American academics in the Middle East led to the creation of a field of knowledge, Near Eastern studies. Reynolds' study deals with an altogether different sort of Americans, some three million soldiers who "occupied" Britain during the Second World War. For most of them, this was their first experience out of the country, and although the two nations shared much in common, the encounter was nevertheless a cross-cultural engagement, as is amply documented by the author. Davidann's volume makes a good companion to Hunter's above-noted study and traces the drama, often the trauma, of American who sought to spread Christianity in Japan through the establishment and activities of YMCA. Rupp's work, echoing another trend, toward internationalizing national histories, shows that from the beginning women's activists recognized the importance of internationalizing their movement. And Hoffman's careful examination of the Peace Corps suggests that there was, during the 1960s, an intercultural dimension to U.S. foreign relations that had little to do with geostrategy.

There has grown a rich body of scholarly literature on trans-Atlantic cultural interchanges. This obviously has to do with the growth of Atlantic history as a field, embracing the history of the entire region including the east coast of the American continent, the Caribbean, western Europe, and western Africa. Trans-Atlantic slavery, of course, has long been a subject of extensive study, but more recently the intermingling of ideas and cultures among various regions of the Atlantic world has begun to be carefully examined. Particularly impressive have been studies of cultural interactions between America and Europe, all suggesting that these interactions have never been uni-directional. Among the recent examples are Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 1997), tracing American cultural policies and influences in postwar Austria; Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French* (Berkeley, 1993), analyzing layers of French responses to American power and culture; Rob Kroes, *If You Have Seen One, You've Seen the Mall*, juxtaposing the phenomena of Americanization of Europe and America's own "cultural creolization"; and Richard Pells, *Not Like Us*, documenting the fact that the massive infusion of American ideas, artifact, and personnel never transformed Europe into something "like us."⁴⁵

Some of these monographs reveal an awareness that there is a world that is not divided into sovereign national units but is an open arena for

45 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-colonization and Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, 1994); Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall* (Urbana, IL, 1996); Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997).

the interplay of certain interests and aspirations. Historians are paying increasing attention to cross-national forces and movements even when they discuss issues that originate in a domestic setting. They are in a sense asking whether certain developments are of transnational, even global, scope. This is the third of the three sub-fields of international history, exploring the question of whether there exist worldwide concerns that transcend national boundaries. International affairs as traditionally conceptualized take place within a world that is defined geopolitically and economically, but the global approach posits that there may also be a world of shared conceptions, dreams, and problems. Just as historians write about the rise and fall of the great powers or about the emergence and erosion of a world economic system, they can also inquire into the development of global cultural trends as well as counter-trends.

Is there in fact a global cultural order? Can there be said to exist certain principles, values, or standards that are accepted throughout the world? Historians of international relations have tended to focus on the evolution of the idea of peace and on the development of international law when discussing these questions. Among the notable recent works are Dorothy Jones, *Code of Peace*, and Robert David Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations*.⁴⁶ These volumes deal with efforts by jurists (Jones) and politicians (Johnson) to define peace at certain points in time. But there are many other problems in the world for which the establishment of international norms have been sought. The protection of the natural environment, the preservation of endangered species, the cure of AIDS and other diseases, the promotion of human rights, and even the survival of civilization against terrorism are examples. The essays included in Alan K. Henrikson's *Negotiating World Order* deal with international cooperation in areas such as health and communications, and my *Global Community* touches on the activities of international organizations in these and other fields.⁴⁷ As the title of this latter book suggests, it is possible to conceptualize the emergence of a global community as a key theme in the study of international relations.

It may be objected that just because some recent developments suggest the emergence of a global cultural awareness, one should not automatically transpose that pattern onto the past. But at least it is worth asking whether, even in a period of time when international relations may seem

46 Dorothy Jones, *Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States* (Chicago, 1989); Robert David Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

47 Alan K. Henrikson, ed., *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy* (Wilmington, DE, 1986); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, 2002).

to have been defined by geopolitical factors, there may not also have existed a layer of global affairs that were culturally shaped. As Jeremy Black suggests in *War and the World*, European warfare during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may have concealed a parallel intellectual development that postulated the emergence of a world order where people shared a sense of "politeness and cultivation," in Edward Gibbon's words.⁴⁸ In his time, such a vision may not have been widespread outside Europe or North America, but throughout the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, the idea of an interdependent, culturally interconnected world spread to other parts of the world. This was clearly a byproduct of modernization; as different regions of the world began to transform themselves, they became aware of certain patterns of development that seemed to be universally applicable. Modern states and societies, whatever their languages, religions, or histories, seemed to share certain global outlooks. Many observers went so far as to argue, as the sociologist Robert Park did in the 1920s, that modern civilization was "steadily bringing all the peoples of the earth measurably within the limits of a common culture and a common historical life" so that there was already evidence of "the existence of an international society and an international political order."⁴⁹ World order, in other words, appeared to be becoming interchangeable with shared cultural consciousness. In reality, of course, the 1920s were to be followed by a period of a catastrophic economic crisis, aggressive wars, and atrocities that would belie any sense of common culture across nations. But that does not mean that we may not take note of these important developments during the 1920s – or in the subsequent decades. Indeed, if the growing body of literature on globalization suggests anything, it is that, despite the setbacks experienced during the 1930s and the Second World War, cultural globalization has continued to this day. If so, students of international history would seem to have an obligation to reexamine the past with this new perspective in mind.

This is a big project, however, beyond the capabilities of any single historian. A comprehensive study of international cultural relations must turn on the collaboration of scholars from various countries and cultures. Fortunately, such collaboration has become quite notable in the recent years. That in itself may suggest the development of a cultural

48 Jeremy Black, *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450–2000* (New Haven, 1998), 7.

49 Robert Park, *Race and Culture* (Boston, 1945), 144, 148–49. For an extremely valuable examination of U.S.–European cultural interactions during the 1920s, consult Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984). See also Thomas J. Saunders, *Hollywood in Berlin: American Cinema and Weimar Germany* (Berkeley, 1994).

consciousness, according to which shared historical perspectives are an important key to a better world order. Historians from around the world now periodically come together to organize symposia, and cultural themes have been quite conspicuous at gatherings of international relations scholars.⁵⁰ At the same time, it has to be admitted that the field of global cultural history is still in its infancy, and it is to be hoped that historians of American foreign relations will contribute to the growth of that field by vigorously promoting trans-national collaborative endeavors.

50 A good example was a conference organized in Paris in 2000 on the theme of "transmission of national values." The participants came from the United States, Europe, and Australia, and some of the essays they presented have been published as *Transmission des Valeurs Nationales: Théories, Individus, Institutions*, Barbara Karsky and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds. (Paris, 2000). Among the major works by European historians that stress the cultural aspect of U.S.-European relations are Jacques Portes, *Une Fascination Réticente: Les États-Unis dans l'Opinion Française, 1870–1914* (Nancy, 1990), and Daniela Rossini, *Il Mito Americano nell'Italia della Grande Guerra* (Rome, 2000).

Cultural Transfer

JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT*

Since World War II, the analysis of cultural transfer has formed a powerful tool for the investigation of the United States' interaction with other nations. But unlike other approaches discussed in this volume, scholars have never devised a clear-cut terminology. Nor have they agreed on a single line of argument. Originating in political think tanks, the analysis of cultural transfer has meandered through university departments around the globe before finally reaching the public sphere, in the 1980s. By far the most pervasive concept has been "cultural imperialism," a term and an ideology that gained a considerable amount of momentum in the 1960s and after, and that due to its longevity and powerful impact deserves our attention. Recently, however, scholars from a variety of disciplines suggested that the term "cultural imperialism" should be replaced with a broader, more inclusive word that avoids the simplistic active-passive dominator-victim dualism such as "cultural transmission."

What does cultural transfer mean? Cultural transfer does not form a single, static "school" or a set of criteria. Similar to the New Left historians, most historians of cultural transfer probably would deny that they all belong to one school. The specific meaning of the term is not timeless but generated out of its various discourses, its use. In the past fifty years, the research on cultural transfer has been subjected to cycles, thus its significance must be viewed through historical lenses. First, the "cold warriors" lamented the absence of an aggressive cultural foreign policy among U.S. officials. Their successors, the "critics of cultural imperialism" identified the export of American culture as thinly veiled global economic exploitation. Finally, a group of counter critics then defied the concept of cultural imperialism. Today, a rather heterogeneous group of scholars argue that local resistance either modified or completely stymied imports as part of a global process. These three trends mirror a general intellectual trend far beyond the realm of the history of international relations. Started as a political issue, the debate has turned into an increasingly academic dispute

* This chapter is based on an earlier piece that appeared in *Diplomatic History*. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War: A Critical Review," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 465–94.

over culture as an instrument of power that either “worked” or “did not work.”

Students of U.S. cultural imperialism or cultural transmission are primarily concerned about the United States’ impact in the world but also about foreign influences in the United States. Unlike scholars interested in political power, they look beyond the level of decisionmaking processes to find out how culture, notably the export and shift of culture, can be understood as an instrument of political or economic power, a means of international communication, and a force on its own. Specifically, they ask how governmental and nongovernmental actors exerted abroad by exporting and importing material goods and ideas as well as by creating international networks and organizations. In this context, culture, and American culture in particular, does not connote a specific meaning but rather a conglomeration of aspirations, emotions, and identities shared by men and women living within geographically fixed boundaries. “*Culture*,” writes Akira Iriye, “determines what the ends of a nation are; *power* proves the means for obtaining them.”¹

In its most basic form cultural imperialism comprises the assumption that one nation deliberately attempts to impose its culture, ideology, goods, and way of life on another country. In the United States, critics of cultural imperialism as an instrument of diplomacy investigate if, why, and how much American culture reached and influenced foreign shores under governmental and private auspices. On the most radical end, scholars interested in cultural imperialism argue that postwar U.S. policymakers made a conscious effort to export pure American culture abroad in order to gain access to raw materials, cheap labor and new markets for U.S. consumer products. On the other end of the spectrum, historians have proposed to replace the notion of “cultural imperialism” with “cultural transmission” which seeks to neutralize the question of agency and, instead, allows for a more fluid concept of interaction.

What distinguishes the significance of cultural imperialism and cultural transmission from many other theoretical approaches discussed among diplomatic historians is its appeal to both scholars and the broader public. Regardless over whether they liked or hated it – since World War II journalists, politicians, and intellectuals have worried about the power and meaning of American culture abroad. And since at least the 1960s, “cultural imperialism” has proved to be an enormously popular and durable concept. It has introduced culture as a variable into the study of foreign relations and thereby significantly enriched the field. It has created the foundation upon which more than one generation of historians have built their research strategies and arguments. It has permeated many

1 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997), 12.

academic disciplines, including musicology, sports, sociology, and political science. Today, politicians the world over lament the manipulative influx of U.S. movie reels. Tiny nations, remote people, and unknown tribes find their way into the headlines of international journals through their vocal protest against Western cultural imperialism. From Iceland to Latin America, Central Africa to the Philippines, local spokesmen reportedly deplore the demise of their cultures with the rising influence of Anglo-American television and culture.²

In tune with the public discourse, several generations of scholars and intellectuals have grappled with questions of cultural transfer. Despite the participants' intergenerational hostility and despite historians' increasing urge to abandon old approaches for new configurations, students who wish to work in the field of cultural transfer need to consider these interpretations. Each of the three major trends discussed in this essay still finds its way into current historiographical debates – and it should. For despite all ideological baggage, these trends all offer feasible methodological insights for contemporary research on questions pertaining to the significance and shortcomings of American culture in a global context.

After World War II policymakers and intellectuals became increasingly convinced that culture and cultural images in the international arena really “mattered,” an assumption that seemed radical if not revolutionary for most observers at the time. Still in 1938, when the State Department established the Division for Cultural Relations, many U.S. officials continued to criticize the use of culture as a diplomatic tool. Their reluctance reflected a consensus that culture belonged to the realm of creativity, public taste, and free enterprise.³ How and why should one win diplomatic chess games with paintings, shows, and musicals? Besides, cultural programs were expensive and there were no voters abroad to justify such expenses.

After World War II, the situation was reversed when both American diplomats as well as intellectuals started imagining that the United States needed to sell the American way of life abroad. Public figures as well as policymakers exhorted the authorities to exert more influence through culture around the world. Consequently, in the years following VE-Day, the U.S. government created a number of proselytizing organizations and

2 Jack Lang, “The Higher the Satellite, the Lower the Culture,” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 8 (Fall 1991): 42–44; “Dix ans de culture avec Jack Lang” [Ten Years of Culture with Jack Lang], *Ecoute* (January 1994): 55.

3 J. M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London, 1986), 22–27; J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936–1948* (Washington, DC, 1976), 3f, 4, 18, 25; Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934* (New Brunswick, 1971), 6, 14, 135; Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin, TX, 1984), 240ff, 252.

programs, such as the United States Information Agency and the Fulbright exchange program, that aspired to export American culture, including literature, music, and art, abroad. The "Campaign of Truth" designed in 1950 to form a psychological counterattack against Soviet propaganda, targeted explicitly public opinion leaders and other "multipliers" with books, brochures, exhibitions and lectures.⁴

Why did policymakers grow so interested in the American way of life? Why did they suddenly seek to impart it to others? First, on the ideological level, American culture was dizzily democratic; anything was allowed. It was also essentially resistant to autocracies on the left or the right, as reflected in the postwar consensus on liberalism manifest in the writings of intellectuals like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Daniel Boorstin, and Louis Hartz. In line with this rationale, U.S. policymakers and scholars believed that the promotion abroad of an enterprise-based culture would spread more democracy around the world and contain fascism, communism, and other unpalatable foreign ideologies.⁵

Second, Communist regimes, notably in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), made *Bildung* (knowledge, education) and *Kultur* (high culture) central points of their own propaganda. Since the GDR government, too, claimed to be a democratic one, it attacked American culture as a manifestation of a corrupt democracy. Communist officials realized that Europeans identified strongly with their high culture. Public opinion polls taken between 1945 and 1950 revealed that Germans feared the adaptation of democratic values at the expense of their cultural heritage: Communists listened to Tchaikovsky, democratically inclined audiences, in contrast, numbed their minds with jazz.⁶

Third, in the 1950s, many Americans felt a deep apprehension over what they perceived as their worsening reputation in a world of new nations, new cultures, and new weapons. Shortly after the launching of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik*, Franz M. Joseph, an international lawyer and chairman of the American European Foundation, and Raymond Aron edited a collection of essays titled *As Others See Us*, in which twenty

4 Henry R. Luce, *The American Century* (New York, 1941), 23; Howland H. Sargent, "Information and Cultural Representation Overseas," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, ed. Vincent M. Barnett, Jr. (New York, 1965), 73f; Hansjörg Gehring, *Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1953: Ein Aspekt des Re-Education-Programms* [American literary policy in Germany, 1945–1953: One Aspect of the Reeducation Program] (Stuttgart, 1976), 93, 112.

5 Daniel J. Boorstin, *America and the Image of Europe: Reflections on American Thought* (Gloucester, MA, 1976); Henry J. Kellermann, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Germany, 1945–1954* (Washington, DC, 1978), 209, 212.

6 D. G. White, *U.S. Government in Germany: Radio Reorientation* (Karlsruhe, 1950), 114–17.

representatives from nations throughout the world described their countries' impression of U.S. society. Frenchmen Aron wrote he detested America's "big industry, mass production, the lowering of standards in favor of the masses," as well as race problems, superficiality, industrial barbarism, and "the intellectual fodder offered to the American masses, from scandal magazines to digests of books." For most observers around the world, the bottom line ran, "Americans had done remarkable things in production and they had technical 'know-how,' but America itself was ... [a] giant with the head of a lout."⁷

Scholarly and journalistic analyses of U.S. cultural transfer abroad in the late 1950s and 1960s reflected the belief that American information and exchange efforts represented a timid reaction to bold Soviet propaganda. "America is the greatest advertising country in the world," the journalist Peter Grothe complained in 1958. "Yet when it comes to the most important advertising campaign of all – that of advertising ourselves and the democratic way of life – we run a poor second to the Communists." Grothe blamed U.S. policymakers for not having made the most of cultural relations programs after World War II because of the stinginess and ignorance of the President, Congress, and the American public. And sociologists like Princeton University's W. Phillips Davison, called for more effective programs with clear values, detailed purposes, and a rigorous selection and training of personnel. They urged policymakers to use books, movies, and information programs as tools to familiarize people the world over with American history, politics, and entertainment.⁸ The world, in short, needed more American culture, and it was the government's job to provide it.

The participants in this debate, it should be added, remained vague in their definition of American "culture." A look at the programs of the United States Information Agency designed in 1953 to convince people abroad that U.S. goals were in harmony with their hopes for freedom, progress, and peace, underscores this uncertainty. As Laura Belmonte and Walter Hixson have shown, USIA's programs focused on artifacts that were regarded as typical for American culture and society, including consumer products, high living standards, and the advantages of a free market economy. Throughout the 1950s, however, the agency suffered

7 Franz M. Joseph and Raymond Aron, eds., *As Others See Us: The United States through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, 1959), 65, 101, 112–23, 260, 346–53; William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York, 1958), 271–85.

8 Peter Grothe, *To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of the Communist Propaganda in East Germany* (Palo Alto, CA, 1958), 234; Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York, 1968); John Boardman Whitton, ed., *Propaganda and the Cold War: A Princeton University Symposium* (Washington, DC, 1963); W. Phillips Davison, *International Political Communication* (New York, 1965).

from internal and external quarrels over the content of its agenda and its mission. At the World's Fair of 1958, for example, disputes over how to address the United States' "Achilles' Heel" of race relations almost stalemated the organization of the exhibit.⁹

Until the 1960s, the U.S. debate over the transfer of American culture abroad remained primarily a political one, led by civil servants, writers, and journalists who regarded their developing cultural programs abroad as worthy weapons to eliminate totalitarianism in the world. They did not question whether foreign recipients would welcome such endeavors. Only in the late 1950s, did the concern over the implications of American culture bounce back to Europe where it stimulated a scholarly debate that would dominate academia for the next thirty years.

In the 1960s, academics increasingly appropriated the debate on U.S. culture abroad but they also dramatically revised previous assessments. A nascent leftist movement identified capitalism as representative of a host of things describing twentieth-century society, such as consumerism, modernity, organization, and the conflict between society and the individual.¹⁰ Their findings would blaze the trail for the study of U.S. "cultural imperialism."

The theme itself was not entirely new. Since the early 1900s, European conservatives like D. H. Lawrence and Adolf Halfeld had rejected U.S. civilization due to its soulless culture. Americans, the argument went, held little esteem for high culture; their essential identity and values, such as productivity, efficiency and rationality, contradicted the most fundamental characteristics of *Kultur*, including quality work, contemplation, and the creative use of leisure. To many observers, American civilization was not just different but constituted a subversive threat to European culture.¹¹

9 Laura Belmonte, "Defending a Way of Life: American Propaganda and the Cold War, 1945–1959" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1996; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997); Thomas Klöckner, *Public Diplomacy: Auswärtige Informations- und Kulturpolitik der USA. Strukturanalyse der Organisation und Strategien der United States Information Agency und des United States Information Service* [Foreign Information and Cultural Policy: A Structural Analysis of the Organization and the Strategies of the United States Information Agency and the United States Information Service] (Baden-Baden, 1993), 82–89; Michael L. Krenn, "Unfinished Business: Segregation and U.S. Diplomacy at the 1958 World's Fair," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 591–612.

10 Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York, 1992), 54–57, 337, 339.

11 D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (New York, 1923), 9–21; Adolf Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus. Kritische Betrachtungen eines Deutschen und Europäers* [America and Americanism: Critical Observations of a German and a European] (Jena, 1927); Nolan, *Visions of Modernity*, 26, 113–14; Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984), 19ff, 167–83, 264ff; Alexander Schmidt, *Reisen*

Interestingly, in the 1940s and 1950s European leftists also started worrying about American influences, such as McCarthyism and consumerism. Horror-stricken at the term "mass," the Frankfurt School regarded the United States as a mass society with a mass culture that annihilated liberty, democracy, and individualism. Americans, sociologist Herbert Marcuse stated, represented a prime example of how human existence in advanced industrial societies remained passive, acquiescent, and unaware of its own alienation. Marcuse subsequently drew the image of *The One-Dimensional Man*, an individual who was unable to think dialectically and question his society, who had subordinated himself to the control of technology and the principles of efficiency, productivity, and conformity.

The Frankfurt School was particularly concerned about the decline of *Kultur*. Intellectual leaders such as Max Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, and Leo Lowenthal developed a Marxist theory that generally stressed the subliminal totalitarianism of the media. Fostered by the media, American capitalism had become an economically and culturally repressive force. High culture ceased to function as a foreign, opposing, and transcendental sphere contrasting with reality. Instead, in the struggle between East and West *Kultur* (that is, the individual philosopher, the preservation of theory, art and high culture) deteriorated to a propaganda tool and, thus, to a consumer good. By materializing high culture, man had perverted its identity and function.¹²

The Frankfurt School had a profound impact on American thinkers. Disillusionment originating from the Vietnam War and domestic urban and student revolts mesmerized a culturally influential segment of Americans who came to despise the free market economy as well as the federal government. U.S. professions of democracy seemed empty and hypocritical in the age of napalm bombs and the Watts Riots. Journalists and scholars such as David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Vance Packard, and William H. Whyte investigated the issue of mass media in the 1940s and 1950s.¹³ They agreed that the United States was a dominant example and global

in die Moderne. Der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürgertums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich [Traveling into Modernity: Middle Class Discourses on America before World War One. A European Comparison] (Berlin, 1997), 163–69.

- 12 Herbert Marcuse, *Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft* [One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society] (Neuwied, 1970), 19, 24, 76–78.
- 13 C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York, 1951); Vance O. Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York, 1957); David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, 1950); William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956); Paul Lazarsfeld, "Mass Culture Today," in *Culture For the Millions?*, ed. Norman Jacobs (Princeton, NJ, 1961), ix–xxv; Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists* (Port Washington, NY, 1973).

promoter of capitalism. Criticism of U.S. involvement in the Third World, notably Vietnam, therefore automatically involved a critique of U.S. capitalism per se. Capitalism was evil because it undermined wholeness, true individuality, the sense of community, social bonds, self-realization, and authentic values.

This perception of U.S. capitalism deeply affected the study of U.S. foreign relations. Dissatisfied with the realist approach of scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and others, a new generation of "revisionists" shifted the study of the international system to the impact of domestic ideas as well as economic and social forces on U.S. diplomacy. As American society grew more affluent, critics turned their attention away from the American working class to the "people of color," the Third World where they found that U.S. capitalism, in search of new markets, profits, raw materials and cheap labor, acted as a victimizer, brutalizer, and exploiter. American diplomacy had to be interpreted as part of the U.S. capitalist political economy, argued New Left historians such as William Appleman Williams, a former naval officer and graduate of Annapolis, because the survival of the domestic economy depended on ever-expanding markets. By stressing the economic motivations of U.S. diplomacy, Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and others turned the investigation of the East-West conflict into a struggle between capitalism and socialism, a struggle they blamed on U.S. policy-makers whose actions were blinded by their quest for open markets that the Soviet Union did not even want.¹⁴

This new historiography of U.S. economic and political imperialism formed the cradle for the study of cultural imperialism. Although the catchword "cultural imperialism" had popped up before, it is only in the 1960s that this critique came to be known as a catchword if not a coherent argument. The 1977 edition of *The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* defines "cultural imperialism" as "the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture."¹⁵ What unites critics of cultural imperialism is their portrayal of Western culture as an expansive, predatory force, and their association with structuralism, which interprets ideas as part of an underlying structure of discourse embedded in a culture. In sharp contrast to the debate on American cultural transfer in the

14 Howard Zinn, "The Politics of History in the Era of the Cold War: Repression and Resistance," in Noam Chomsky et al., *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years* (New York, 1997), 35–72; Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories*, 16–17, 23–49; William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, OH, 1959); John Paul Diggins, *Rise and Fall of the American Left* (New York, 1992), 306–41.

15 Allan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, eds., *The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* (New York, 1977), 303, quoted in *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, ed. Robert F. Arnove (Bloomington, IN, 1982), 2.

1950s, they admonish the U.S. government and the business community for exporting U.S. culture abroad.

Based on John Tomlinson's insightful critique, we may identify four different discourses of cultural imperialism focused on the media, national domination, the global dominance of capitalism, and the critique of modernity.¹⁶ *Media imperialism* is the oldest and by far most widely debated trend because it relates most obviously to current political issues. The study of media imperialism originated in Latin America among students of communication research. In the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American economists attempted to analyze their countries' economic relations to Europe and the United States by developing a theory of dependency. Communication scholars in Chile who, during the time of the Allende election in 1970 began to criticize U.S. involvement in Latin American affairs, appropriated the concept. One of the most dramatic and path breaking accounts came from Armand Mattelart, professor of mass communications and ideology at the University of Chile, and Ariel Dorfman, a literary critic and novelist. The two authors believed that in an effort to protect U.S. economic interests in Chile, the CIA financed and fostered an arsenal of psychological warfare devices to conquer the minds of the Chilean people. In *Para leer al pato Donald* (How to Read Donald Duck), Dorfman and Mattelart excoriated Hollywood's distorted version of reality and cautioned Latin Americans against U.S. manipulation. The threat of Walt Disney, they believed, consisted of the manner in which the United States "forces us Latin Americans to see ourselves as they see us." The authors vociferated that the Chilean people would liberate their own culture and kick out the Disney duck: "Feathers plucked and well-roasted. . . Donald, Go Home!" Written shortly before the Chilean revolution, this pamphlet struck a sensitive chord among readers far beyond the borders of Chile; it went through more than fifteen editions and was translated into several languages.¹⁷

In the United States, scholars quickly picked up the concept of media imperialism. Richard Nixon's effort to cover up the Watergate scandal fostered suspicions of a conspiracy between the government and the media and abuses of executive power. In a number of studies, the communication scientist Herbert Schiller identified a strong link between the domestic business, military, and governmental power structure on the one

16 Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories*, 115, 118; John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (Baltimore, 1991), 7.

17 Robert A. Packenham, *The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 7–32, 199, 202–3; Armand Mattelart and Ariel Dorfman, *Para leer al pato Donald* (La Habana, 1971) (translated edition: *How To Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in Disney Comic* [New York, 1975], 10, 95).

hand and the “mind managers” (that is, leaders of U.S. communications) on the other, who had conspired to manipulate minds at home and abroad. As he had it, nineteenth-century Anglo-American geopolitical imperialism had been replaced in the twentieth century by an aggressive industrial-electronics complex “working to extend the American socio-economic system spatially and ideologically” across the globe. “What does it matter,” he asked in 1976, “if a national movement has struggled for years to achieve liberation if that condition...is undercut by values and aspirations derived from the apparently vanquished dominator?”¹⁸

A second group of critics interpreted cultural imperialism as *the domination of one country by another*. Their discourse grew out of UNESCO’s increasing concern with the protection of national cultures, as well as the rising interest in the study of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s as represented by Benedict Anderson and others. In this context, “culture” reflects a natural and static heritage of traditions that are akin to a certain country. It also serves as a tool of social control as important as controlling material resources. Hence, cultural imperialism connotes the sublime efforts of a country to undercut another country’s cultural heritage by imposing its own.

Frank Ninkovich’s analysis of the State Department’s efforts to establish an art program between 1938 and 1947, for example, showed that during the war policymakers sought to utilize artifacts of American culture in order to promote “a sense of common values among nations of varied traditions,” just as free trade would have a liberalizing effect by contributing to their economic well-being.¹⁹

For a third group of scholars, cultural imperialism came to be a synonym for *the expansion and sometimes global dominance of U.S. consumer capitalism*. Scholars like Ralph Willet attributed imperialist motivations to the U.S. business community and the government. Others, such as Emily Rosenberg, claimed that in the twentieth century U.S. foreign policymakers had consciously begun to “spread” American culture, information, and the concept of a free and open economy in order to expand the national market abroad. Here, culture delineates capitalism in its most materialist form: it embodies goods and ideas associated with such

18 Herbert I. Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York, 1969), 14; idem, *The Mind Managers* (Boston, 1973); idem, *Communication and Cultural Domination* (White Plains, NY, 1976), 1, 24–45; idem, *Culture Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression* (New York, 1989).

19 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983); Arnone, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, 2–3; Ninkovich, “The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy,” 221; Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge, MA, 1981).

goods, both of which foster homogenization. Culture thus becomes a tool to integrate different societies into one international economic system. For example, Edward Brown denounced U.S. medical and health education programs sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation in pre-1949 China. They were a "Trojan horse," guided "in their conception and development by imperialist objectives." These programs "*were more concerned with building an elite professional stratum to carry out cultural and technological transformation than with meeting the health needs of each country.*" They served primarily as a gateway for American access to markets and raw materials.²⁰

The most enduring criticism of U.S. cultural imperialism originated among those scholars who turned the debate into a *critique of modernity*. The representatives of this group, such as Jürgen Habermas, Marshall Berman, and others, were among the obvious followers of the Frankfurt School that had originally triggered the investigation of cultural imperialism. Based on the earlier writings of Marcuse and others, they portrayed cultural imperialism as the imposition of modernity. They investigated how the principal agents of modernity, that is, social and economic institutions of the West such as the media, bureaucracy, and science, transmitted the "lived culture" of capitalism on non-Western cultures. These scholars conceded that members of a recipient society had choices but that their choices were conditioned by the values of a global capitalist modernity. Culture and modernity became a global fate.

To Habermas and others, "modernity" denotes the "main cultural direction of global development." Culture in this sense encompasses capitalism but also mass culture, urbanism, a "technical-scientific-rationalist dominant ideology,"²¹ nation-states and a certain one-dimensional self-consciousness. The dominance of these features characterizes Western "imperialism."

The critics of modernity were the first to direct their critique not against a set of agents but against the actual process. They broadened the analysis from "American" to "Western" cultural imperialism that spared no field,

20 Ralph Willet, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London, 1989), 21f, 27; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY, 1963); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982); E. Richard Brown, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism," in Arno, ed., *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, 123–146 (emphasis in original); Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (March 1989): 86–87; William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative* (New York, 1980), 220.

21 Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of the Communicative Action* (Boston, 1984–87); Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, 27, 140–72.

no people, and no culture.²² This approach, while still insisting on the terminology of "imperialism," served as a precursor to later trends in the debate over cultural transfer because it managed to shift emphasis from the question of agency to the process of cultural imposition. Much of the critique of modernity consequently remains en vogue after most critics of cultural imperialism have lost influence, as we will see below.

Nonetheless, students interested in the concept of cultural imperialism need to be aware of its unresolved pitfalls. A number of scholars have argued that the cultural imperialists "have shown remarkable provincialism, forgetting the existence of empires before that of the United States." Since the Renaissance, European powers have fostered a variety of cultural exchange programs, though they did not always hope to spread their empire by exporting their culture. The British in India and the Middle East, the Germans in Africa, and the French in Indochina all imposed their own culture abroad as a powerful tool to strengthen trade, commerce, and political influence and recruit intellectual elites for their own purposes abroad. As Lewis Pyenson has shown, between 1900 and 1930, "technological imperialism" in which state officials utilized scientific learning to form an international network of communication and prestige abroad skillfully complemented German expansion in China, Argentina, and the South Pacific. Likewise, recent studies on U.S. policies in Asia and Europe have also shown that U.S. officials were often ready to sacrifice economic (and ideological) objectives for the pursuit of geopolitical interests.²³

Case studies on the efforts of various private groups such as philanthropic foundations, the American Library Profession, and the press corps, demonstrate that not policymakers or businessmen but nongovernmental U.S. organizations were often the most active (and voluntary) promoters of American culture and values abroad. Congress and the State

22 Alan J. Bishop, "Western Mathematics: The Secret Weapon of Cultural Imperialism," *Race and Class* 32 (October–December 1992): 50–65.

23 Frederick Buell, *National Culture and the New Global System* (Baltimore, 1994), 1–3; Gunnar Sorelius and Michael Srigley, eds., *Cultural Exchange between European Nations during the Renaissance* (Uppsala, 1994); Kurt Düwell and Werner Link, eds., *Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871* [German Foreign Cultural Policy Since 1871] (Cologne, 1981); Rüdiger vom Bruch, *Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbürgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* [World Policy as a Cultural Mission: Foreign Cultural Policy and the Middle Class in Germany on the Eve of World War I] (Paderborn, 1982); Edward Graham Norris, *Die Umerziehung des Afrikaners: Togo 1895–1938* [The Reeducation of the African: Togo, 1895–1938] (Munich, 1993); Lewis Pyenson, *Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences: German Expansion Overseas, 1900–1930* (New York, 1985); Corine Defrance, *La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin: 1945–1955* [French Cultural Policy Left of the Rhine, 1945–1955] (Strasbourg, 1994); Gabriele Clemens, *Britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland (1945–1949). Literatur, Film, Musik und Theater* [British Cultural Policy in Germany, 1945–1949: Literature, Film, Music, and Theater] (Stuttgart, 1997).

Department often required pressure to pursue an active policy of cultural diplomacy, or were omitted from the process altogether.²⁴

The strongest onslaught against the critics of cultural imperialism came recently from John Tomlinson, Frederick Buell, and others, who criticize authors such as Schiller for using a rhetoric that replicates what it wishes to oppose: "it repeats the gendering of imperialist rhetoric by continuing to style the First World as male and aggressive and the Third as female and submissive." In doing so, Schiller had adapted an imperial perspective that regarded Third World cultures as fragile and helpless and served Western interests of modernity. Employing a theory that suffered from an inaccurate language of domination, colonialism, coercion, and imposition, the critics of cultural imperialism turned out to be the worst cultural imperialists.

Cultural imperialism, Tomlinson claims, is simply the spread of modernity, a process of cultural loss and not of cultural expansion. There had never been a group of conspirators who attempted to spread any particular culture. Instead, global technological and economic progress (and integration) lessened the importance of national culture. It is therefore misleading to place the blame for a worldwide development on any one culture. The notion of imperialism (that is, purposeful cultural conquest) must be dropped; instead, all countries are victims of a global cultural change.

Recent scholarship has paid closer attention to both global and local aspects of the "Grand Debate." Sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have become increasingly fascinated with the peculiarity of individual cultures in the context of a nonbipolar world. Under the influence of resurfacing nationalism the world over, one group has studied the periphery in greater detail, producing analyses of individual communities that came in contact with American (or Western) culture after World War II. Inspired by a vision of the global village, another group of scholars has taken the opposite approach, broadening the concept of a unilateral imperialism into a concept of global modernization.

The first group has investigated individual case studies, weighing resistance against acceptance. Borrowed from both psychology and literary criticism, response theory investigates the preconceptions influencing the reactions of human beings exposed to an external impression such as a

24 Gary E. Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book: The American Library Profession and the Origins of United States Cultural Diplomacy* (London, 1985); Margaret Blanchard, *Exporting the First Amendment: The Press-Government Crusade of 1945-1952* (New York, 1985), 5, 40, 68ff, 168, 402; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der Westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie. Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-1952* [The Roots of West German Postwar Democracy: The American Contribution, 1945-1952] (Opladen, 1993).

text, a sound or a visual perception. It shifts the center of research from the intention of cultural transfer to, for example, the audience of TV programs like *Dynasty*.

Spurred by the public debate abroad over U.S. cultural imperialism, in the past decade response theory has affected virtually all studies of cultural transfer in the realm of history, sociology, and cultural studies. Jongsuk Chay's *Culture and International Relations*, along with many other authors, analyzes particular aspects, such as literature, music, religion, or TV programs, in order to calibrate the effects of U.S. culture abroad. Their findings differ regarding the breadth of impact made by American culture but they agree that native people never passively accepted U.S. consumer goods. Reinhold Wagnleitner, for example, finds that Austrian youth translated the original meanings of jeans, Coke and rock 'n' roll into something fitting their own needs: those goods promised not only promise comfort but freedom as well.²⁵

Some scholars have indeed detected a considerable appeal of Western culture to non-Western countries, but they question the manipulative intention on the part of U.S. policymakers and businessmen.²⁶ Other studies investigating the effects of cultural imperialism stress the distinction between foreign people and foreign governments. James Ettema and Charles Whitney and others suggest in their studies on the media that audiences make very conscious choices concerning what they listen to, read, and watch. The investigation of underground movements in China and Eastern Europe in 1989 showed that in more than one case, Western television programs encouraged viewers to revolt against their own governments.²⁷

Another group of scholars found that foreign audiences did not passively accept the fruits of Western cultural imperialism but, in some instances, displayed a high level of active and passive resistance to American

25 Reinhold Wagnleitner, "The Irony of American Culture Abroad: Austria and the Cold War," in *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War*, ed. Lary May (Chicago, 1989), 285–301; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 3.

26 Christine Mangala Frost, "30 Rupees for Shakespeare: A Consideration of Imperial Theatre in India," *Modern Drama* 35 (1992): 90–100.

27 Victoria de Grazia, "Nationalizing Women: The Competition between Fascist Commercial Cultural Models in Mussolini's Italy," in *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective*, ed. de Grazia (Berkeley, 1996), 337–58; Hans-Dieter Schäfer, *Das gespaltene Bewußtsein: Deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933–1945* [The divided consciousness: German culture and the reality of life], 3rd ed. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1983); Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung* [America in the Third Reich: Ideology, propaganda, and public opinion] (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997); James S. Ettema and D. Charles Whitney (eds), *Audience-making: How the Media Create the Audience* (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994); James Lull, *China Turned On: Television, Reform, and Resistance* (London, 1991); Will Hermes, "Imperialism: Just Part of the Mix?" *Utne Reader* 66 (November–December 1994): 19–20.

products and culture. Scholars of Islamic societies have consistently emphasized the stark opposition of orthodox Muslims to Western influences. Individual studies in drama, cinematography, cultural studies, and literature among local groups in Latin America, Asia, and Africa reveal that in spite of the influence of Western goods, during the past two decades locals have begun to resist Western culture.²⁸

In some cases, a closer analysis of the motivations behind local resistance reveals that particular local perceptions and conditions informed it more than an outright condemnation of American culture. Take, for example, the case of France. Under the intriguing title *Seducing the French*, Richard Kuisel investigated economic missions, foreign investment, and U.S. consumer products in postwar France. He emphasized that French opposition to U.S. culture “was (and is) about both America and France,” because it exacerbated French anxieties and sense of self-identity. The French underwent a process of Americanization but they also managed to defend their “Frenchness.” They found some American consumer products appealing but continued to cherish and idealize French national identity, including the notion of a superior Gallic high culture.²⁹

Moreover, in the case of the Federal Republic the average German citizen traditionally tended (and tends) to adhere to a narrower image of culture than his or her American counterpart. German *Kultur* traditionally stressed high culture and was closely linked to the enhancement of *Bildung* (knowledge, education), ethnically bound, deeply rooted in German history, and – in the case of the arts, music, and performance – dependent on state funding. Postwar West Germans did not necessarily view the invasion of American popular culture as “cultural imperialism” because to them, American culture was incompatible with *Kultur*.³⁰ Adoption of cultural artifacts, that is, does not necessarily encompass cultural and political adaptation.

If resistance and cultural identity do indeed play such a powerful role in the perception of American culture abroad, if U.S. officials were indeed uncertain about the scope and nature of cultural exports, and if we

28 Bassam Tibi, “Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-Westernization,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 12 (1995): 1–24.

29 Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993), xi, xii; Irwin M. Wall, *L'influence américaine sur la politique française, 1945–1954* [The American Influence on French Policy, 1945–1954] (Paris, 1989); Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Etienne Balibar, *Les frontières de la démocratie* [The Borders of Democracy] (Paris, 1992).

30 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism As Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999), 10–11, 55–60, 65–68, 129.

compare their actions to the effort of cultural diplomats in other countries, then the model of a unilateral attempt to force consumer products and ideas on foreign nations does not hold. Perhaps, Will Hermes recently concluded in *Utne Reader*, "American pop culture isn't conquering the world." Perhaps American cultural imperialism is "just part of the mix."

In line with the poststructuralist approach, scholars from a variety of disciplines have lately suggested that the term "cultural imperialism" should be replaced with one that avoids the simplistic active-passive, dominator-victim dualism. Musicologists and anthropologists, for example, have offered a variety of consensual patterns for our understanding of worldwide music interaction that can easily be transferred into other fields as well. Among those are "artistic sharing" and "transculturation."

One of the most convincing concepts developed, for example, is "cultural transmission." The term originates from the vocabulary of psychology where it describes the interaction between cultural and genetic influences on human behavior. For historians, one of the most important books recently published is a collection of essays entitled *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe*, edited by R. Kroes, R. W. Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher. It addresses such diverse issues as rock music in Italy and the reception of Disneyland in Europe. It demonstrates ways in which different social groups accepted, altered, or rejected American culture.³¹

Inspired by the notion of a "global village" another group of scholars has developed a theory of "globalization." Globalization refers both to the compression of the world and to the growing perception of the earth as an organic whole. Although many speak of globalization as simply an economic phenomenon, it is multidisciplinary in its causes and its effects. The rather vague term includes many characteristics of modernization, such as the spread of Western capitalism, technology, and scientific rationality.

Again, the theme itself is not really new. It dates back at least to turn-of-the-century German sociologists, such as Max Weber, who offered various conceptual frameworks of universalism beyond political borders. In "Soziologie des Raumes" (The Sociology of Space, 1903), the philosopher/sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918) asserted that a border is not a geographical fact with sociological consequences but a sociological fact that then takes a geographical (and political) shape.³²

31 Richard Pells, "American Culture Abroad: the European Experience Since 1945," in *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe*, ed. Rob Kroes, Robert W. Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher (Amsterdam, 1993), 82–83.

32 Georg Simmel, "Soziologie des Raumes" [Sociology of Space] (1903), *Gesamtausgabe*, Mike Bal and Inge Boer, *The Point of Theory: The Practice of Cultural Analysis* (New York, 1994); Verner Bickler, Parampil Puthen, and John Philip, *Cultural Relationships in the Global Community: Problems and Prospects* (New York, 1981); Paul Duncum,

That theme was picked up again in the late 1980s when sociologists came to believe that socio economic relations everywhere were undergoing a dramatic change, similar in scope to the industrial revolution. They concluded that cultures and societies could no longer be analyzed in the framework of the nation-state because, first, any society is in a constant exchange with other societies; second, most countries consist of a multitude of cultures; and third, cultures do not necessarily align with the borders of a nation-state. One of the most prominent advocates of a global theory, sociologist Roland Robertson, proposed that a new concept replace the prevalent social scientific system of "mapping" the globe into three different worlds developed after the end of colonialism in the 1960s. The current discourse of "mapping," Robertson stated, melds geography with "political, economic, cultural and other forms of placements of nations on the global-international map." In lieu of a three-world view, he proposed that we begin to see the world as a more organic interconnected single network.³³

In line with this development, much of the cultural imperialism argument has moved away from its anti-American line to a more global level, with no one identifiable enemy. While some insist on calling Americanization the "evil twin" of Westernization or the "lowest stage" of globalization,³⁴ many scholars have replaced the concept of U.S. cultural domination with the study of Western cultural influence. They disagree, however, over the relationship between manipulation and globalization. Some, such as Orlando Patterson, claim that the modern process of worldwide cultural interaction could be interpreted as a surreptitious U.S. push for global uniformity. For others, like Peter Beyer, globalization comes "quite as much at the 'expense' of" Western as of non-Western cultures since both are entrenched in a dramatic change.³⁵

Scholars such as Karen Fog Olwig have used the global approach in order to explain the tension between local and supranational cultural and

"Approaches to Cultural Analysis," *Journal* vol. 7 (Frankfurt a.M., 1995), 138–46; Otto Gerhard Oexle, "Geschichte als Historische Kulturwissenschaft" [History as Historical Cultural Studies], *Kultugeschichte Heute* [Cultural History Today], ed. in Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Goettingen, 1996), 14–40.

33 Roland Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept," *Theory, Culture and Society* 7 (June 1990): 15–30, esp. 24–25; Anthony D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" *ibid.*, 171–91.

34 David Engerman, "Americanization: The Lowest Stage of Globalization?" *H-Diplo*, 7 August 2000, commentary by David Engermann on the Roundtable, "Cultural Transfer or Cultural Imperialism?" *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 465–528; Walter L. Hixson, "Whose World Is It, Anyway?" *Diplomatic History* 26 (Fall 2002): 645–47.

35 Orlando Patterson, "Ecumenical America: Global Culture and the American Cosmos," *World Policy Journal* 11 (Summer 1994): 103–17; and David Rieff, "A Global Culture?" *ibid.*, 10 (Winter 1993–1994): 73–81; Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (London, 1994), 8–9.

political developments. Some of these analyses paint a despairingly bleak picture of the future cultural world order. Samuel Huntington, for example, invokes the specter of a "clash of civilizations," a World War III, where Western and Eastern societies battle not because of political and ideological reasons but out of cultural conflicts. In the future, Huntington argues, people will define themselves by their faith, food, and local traditions rather than by ideas and national political systems.³⁶

A more optimistic outlook characterizes Charles Bright and Michael Geyer's 1987 interpretation of the shift from Westernization to globalization as the fusion of tradition and modernity: "This is not Spengler's Decline of the West, but the beginning of a global reordering in which the West seeks its place in a world order it must now share with radically different societies. It is the beginning of a truly global politics." John Urry and Scott Lash even speculate that the globalization of economic, political, and social relationships indicates the "end of organized capitalism." In a completely interconnected global economy, no one country will be able to dominate the market. Frederick Buell states in his recent book *National Culture and the New Global System* that for almost every academic discipline the "world of hybrid cultural production" is becoming the norm.³⁷

Even major critics of U.S. cultural imperialism have aligned their earlier reproaches along these lines. Herbert Schiller, conversely, later reframed his argument in terms of world-systems theory. In a 1991 article he portrayed an expansive, transnational corporate authority that has replaced an autonomous United States in influencing all economic and cultural activity. Edward Said, who analyzed the image of orientalism in Western society, argued in his first book, in 1978, that the West culturally dominated the Orient by creating an artificial cultural vision of the latter "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience." His recent study, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), details how Western authors and audiences developed a literary perspective on imperial geography distinguishing between "us" (the West) and "them" (the Third World). "Western imperialism and Third World nationalism feed off each other," Said concludes, "but even at their worst they are neither monolithic nor deterministic."³⁸

36 Karen Fog Olwig, *Global Culture, Island Identity: Continuity and Change in the Afro-Caribbean Community of Nevis* (Philadelphia, 1992); Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

37 Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, "For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century," *Radical History Review* 39 (Fall 1987): 69-90; John Urry and Scott Lash, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK, 1987); Buell, *National Culture*, 6-7.

38 Arturo Torrecilla, "Cultural Imperialism, Mass Media and Class Struggle: An Interview with Armand Mattelart," *Insurgent Sociologist* 9 (Spring 1990): 69-79; Herbert Schiller, "Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era," *Critical Studies in Mass-Communication*

Most recently, the events surrounding 9/11 have given the notion of cultural transfer yet another turn. Though terrorism figured as a sort of “negative” multinational NGO in the study of globalization before, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have demonstrated to everyone (and not just academics) that there are, in fact, competing visions of globalization, not only between the West and Islam but also within regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. C. A. Bayly, for example, advances the notion of “archaic globalization.” Sugata Bose, in turn, shows how poets such as Rabindranath Tagore, soldiers and others were part of a widespread multinational intercultural network spanning across the Indian Ocean, searching for greater Indian identity. Westernization is hence as one-sided a concept as the idea of U.S. cultural imperialism used to be.³⁹

It would be wrong to dismiss the notion of cultural imperialism and simply replace it with another, equally exclusive term. The scholar who becomes involved in the study of cultural transfer needs to understand that culture, just like power, may be used to obtain any number of goals and to pursue any number of policies. In this respect, cultural imperialism is as appropriate or inappropriate a notion as any other one for they all merely provide one perspective on the chaos of cultural interaction. To understand and participate in the research in this field is to grasp that there is no central paradigm. Instead, scholars must borrow insights from all three discourses retraced above: Originally begun as an almost “public” debate among politicians, journalists, and scholars, the discussion focused on the political advantage of cultural diplomacy and actually called for more information on the United States and cultural artifacts abroad. In the 1960s and 1970s, the topic became integrated in the nascent discussion over U.S. imperialism emphasizing the economic and psychological implications of culture; there was too much American culture abroad, scholars implied. Turning increasingly academic, the debate represented a typical case of what observers have commented on as “the widening gap between the political talk of gown and the political practices of town.”⁴⁰ But under the impact of public resistance against U.S. cultural imperialism and the influence of poststructuralism in the late 1980s, leading scholars in the field revised their findings or changed their approach. Today, many

8 (March 1991): 13–28; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978), 1, 2, passim; Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1994), xxiv.

39 Sugata Bose, *The Indian Ocean Rim: An Inter-Regional Arena in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, MA, forthcoming); A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London, 2002). “The Road to and from September 11th: A Roundtable,” *Diplomatic History* 26 (Fall 2002): 541–644.

40 Berndt Ostendorf, “‘Cultural Studies’: Post-Political Theory in a post-Fordist Public Sphere,” *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 40 (1995): 709–24.

scholars no longer interpret the spread of American and Western culture exclusively as unilateral "imperialism" but as a continuous process of negotiation among ethnic, regional, and national groups.

The review of these various "schools" of thought reveals what the concept of cultural transfer allows us to do. It has modified both interpretations and significantly altered our understanding of what it means to influence, infiltrate, remake or reform a society. By looking at the efforts to manipulate cultural artifacts for diplomatic purposes, historians have come to terms with the limitations of political influence. The research on cultural transfer exposes the independent power of culture, notably the power of cultural preferences and conditions in the context of international relations. The benefit of this approach is that it allows us to glance at a crucial dimension of international relations that virtually no other approach can grasp. On the downside, it can and should not be confused with or replace analyses of the policy making process.

Where does the debate on American cultural transfer abroad stand now and where should students of cultural transfer turn next? Five points merit attention. First, the revolution in cyberspace is one of many phenomena pointing to both globalization and multiculturalism that suggest that Americans may no longer be able to agree on the substance of their culture, or rather agree enough to export the idea of U.S culture. Carried to the extreme, this discord echoes the original conviction that Americans have no culture apt to export.

Yet simultaneously, and this is my second point, the U.S. public has started once again to worry over the image of American culture abroad, thus reinventing the discussion of the 1950s. In a gesture to Franz Joseph and Raymond Aron's 1959 publication, in June 1997 the *New York Times* published a special issue titled "How the World Sees Us." International intellectuals grudgingly admitted the prevalence of American power and culture but underlined their respective countries' dissension. "American movies have achieved the impossible," said playwright Edvard Radzinsky. "Russians are so sick of them that they have started watching films from the days of Socialist Realism." American observers concurred. "Some of America's cultural exports are so awful that you begin to suspect that we're using the rest of the world as a vast toxic waste dump," editor Michiko Kakutani commented cynically.⁴¹

Third, in the United States the entire debate hitherto has focused almost exclusively on the post-1920 if not the post-1945 period. With a few exceptions, most participants agree that the transfer of American culture had no history before the formal establishment of a program and then

41 Edvard Radzinsky, "Lowbrow Go Home (Fleeting)," *New York Times Magazine*, 8 June 1997, 82; Michiko Kakutani, "Culture Zone (Taking Out the Trash)," *ibid.*, 32.

an agency that was in charge of projecting American culture abroad. Yet bureaucratic formations follow rather than pave the way for a political trend or need. In detaching the notion of cultural transfer from formal government programs, scholars have realized that cultural transmission existed everywhere and much earlier in time, and often preceded formal diplomatic ties. For years students have been investigating nineteenth-century ambassadors of American culture abroad, including missionaries in China, soldiers in Cuba, or the encounter between American settlers and Indian nations. Recent analyses have focused on actors, such as the exodus and exchange of private groups including businessmen and artists, as well as ideas and products, as transmitted for example by scientists, poets, tourists and museum curators.⁴² These studies suggest that there was quite a lot of cultural transfer prior to World War I but they still need to be conceptually integrated into the debate on U.S. cultural transfer. We need to know much more about the significance of such alliances, transmitters and cultural flows to understand their significance for the concept and the history of cultural transfer. Did these actions represent a mere interlude in world affairs, a prologue to post-World War II programs, or a qualitative turning point in America's relationship with the world?

Fourth, the focus of the debate is shifting. Until recently, the discussion centered on the nation-state save for a few significant exceptions. After the breakup of the bipolar world system, however, more attention has been paid to the individual entrepreneur. In other words, the debate has moved

42 Frank Trommler, "Inventing the Enemy: German-American Cultural Relations, 1900–1917," in *Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900–1924*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Oxford, 1993), 99–125; Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, "Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur: Der deutsch-amerikanische Professoren Austausch 1904–1914" [The Political Use of Culture: The German-American Academic Exchange, 1904–1914], in *Zwei Wege in die Moderne: Aspekte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1900–1918* [Two Paths into Modernity: Aspects of German-American Relations, 1900–1918], ed. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Jürgen Heideking (Trier, 1997), 45–88; Schmidt, *Reisen in die Moderne*; Patricia Neils, ed., *United States Attitudes and Policies Toward China: The Impact of American Missionaries* (Armonk, NY, 1990); Joyce E. Chaplin, *Subject Matters: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier, 1500–1676* (Cambridge, UK, 2001); Eckhardt Fuchs, "Der Mythos von der internationalen Gelehrtenrepublik: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der internationalen Wissenschaftskooperation am Beispiel der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg" [The myth of an academic republic: Possibilities and limitations of international academic cooperation in the example of German-American relations prior to World War I], forthcoming, Humboldt Universität, Berlin; Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Sound Diplomacy: Music, Emotions, and Politics in European-American Relations, 1850–1920," in Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "Music and Emotions in German-American Relations Since 1850," Habilitationsschrift, Martin-Luther-Universität, Summer 2003; Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, CA, 2002).

from a nation-centered critique to an analysis of the impact of private business. This change of argument has not only obscured if not obliterated national boundaries; it has also moved the object under investigation from politics to capitalism in ways very different from the 1960s and 1970s.

Finally, the emergence of multinational activists who are not economically motivated, have had a profound impact on the debate. Whether they are environmentalists, tourists or terrorists, their presence further questions the notion of a one-sided cultural transfer as well as the significance of the nation-state in the scenario of globalization. In the context of 9/11, this recent turn in the debate for the first time presents the United States (or the West, for that matter) not as a unilateral and aggressive exporter but as both a competitor for visions of the future and, at its most extreme, a victim of cultural confrontation.

These five points, the fracturing cultural consensus within the United States, the revitalized worry on the part of many Americans regarding their image abroad, the integration of research on cultural transfer during the decades before World Wars I and II, the global shift of the cultural debate from politics to capitalism, and the impact of jihad on western interpretations of globalization may serve as inspirations for future research in the field of American culture abroad. They not only show that the scholarship on the United States' cultural relations with other nations has come full circle but also reveal the promises that researchers may find in a synthesis of three generations of scholarship.

Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor

FRANK COSTIGLIOLA*

Let us start with two sentences that interpret an event. First, “the missile struck the target in a clean hit.” Second, “The ceiling of the factory burst open, and most of the people working there burned to death in the ensuing blaze.” Although both accounts describe the same event, the nature of the event appears wholly different in each. There are no people in the first account, and the described action is positive: targets are *supposed* to be hit, and this target was hit “cleanly.” The second account describes, with emotion-provoking detail, what happened inside the target, and it is likely to prompt feelings of horror rather than of satisfaction at a job well done. To observers inside the factory, the target would appear anything but “clean.” A historian writing from one point of view will write a very different story from the historian writing from another point of view. “Just facts” are never “just.”

Facts reflect in various ways the vantage point and the identity of who is compiling or describing them. What we might otherwise dismiss as “just words” constitutes language, a system that reflects and creates meaning. Scholars can discern historical evidence in the assumptions and the logic (rational and emotional) in embassy telegrams, diaries, films, and other texts. Moreover, our stories about the past and the present and our stories about our experiences and the experiences of others are not real in some ultimate way, but rather are cut out of, or fore-grounded in, a reality that can be perceived only through our culturally and historically conditioned perspectives. What we might pass over as “normal” or as “common sense” values and practices constitute our own culture, whose assumptions and logic can also be analyzed. Individually, these concepts are familiar to many historians. Some historians have examined the layers of meaning in language.¹ Taken together and pursued with greater self-awareness,

* I would like to thank Molly Hite, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth Gouwens, and Andrew Rotter for their assistance.

1 See, for example, Michael Hunt’s chapter on “Ideology” in this volume.

however, these and related concepts can be called "critical theory," or simply, "theory."²

The word theory, as it is increasingly used in the humanities, crosses interdisciplinary boundaries. It entails taking multiple, often contradictory, perspectives and it undermines beliefs and certainties. Theory draws heavily from literary criticism, cultural criticism, cognitive linguistics, gender studies, anthropology, and the philosophy of emotion. Without getting bogged down in jargon, historians of foreign relations can utilize its analytical concepts.³ Theory aims to make the familiar strange, to disrupt the taking for granted that blinkers our thinking and reading. Theory extends our sensibility, helping historians read for meanings that are not *between* the lines but rather are already *in* the lines of what they read. Theory helps make explicit the logic and emotions that might otherwise remain unnoticed or underanalyzed.⁴ Theory offers analytical tools for discerning

- 2 In this essay, I am concerned not with interpreting original works of theory, but rather with applying to historical analysis some concepts and techniques that reflect the thought of theorists and that are borrowed from literary criticism, cognitive linguistics, cultural criticism, and the philosophy of emotions. I do not examine the considerable body of theory based on psychoanalysis. For some basic works of the kinds of theory to which I allude in this essay, see Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization* (New York, 1973); *ibid.*, *Discipline and Punish* (New York, 1995); Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd, *Bakhtin and Cultural Theory* (New York, 1989); Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, MA, 1991); Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin, TX, 1981).
- 3 Studies that apply literary and cultural theory to history include Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry*, 17 (Summer 1991): 773–97; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse* (Cambridge, MA, 1997); Emily S. Rosenberg's essay in this volume and *ibid.*, "Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness," *Diplomatic History*, 22 (Spring 1998); forum in *ibid.*; Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative, Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, 1987); Dominick LaCapra, *History and Criticism* (Ithaca, NY, 1985); *ibid.*, *History and Reading* (Toronto, 2000); Lloyd S. Kramer, "Literature, Criticism, and Historical Imagination: The Literary Challenge of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra," in Lynn Hunt (ed.), *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, 1989), 98–128; Frank Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourses in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History*, 13 (Spring 1989), 135–61; Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (ed.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998); Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (ed.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993). For other theoretical approaches, see Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994); Andrew J. Rotter, "Saivism Without Said: Orientalism and U.S. Diplomatic History," *American Historical Review*, 105 (October 2000): 1205–17.
- 4 There are more sources for foreign relations history than just written documents. As recent issues of *Diplomatic History* attest, certain novels, films, paintings, and other cultural expressions can constitute significant evidence. See for example, Kristen Hoganson, "Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865–1920," *The American Historical Review* 107 (February 2002): 55–83. Theory posits that all these official and unofficial sources are *texts*, that is, interpretations of reality or imagination, which can be analyzed for their historically and culturally specific meanings. See Berkhofer, Jr.,

evidence, such as word choices and the emotional tone in language. The purpose of analyzing the language of, say a written document, is to explain the impact that the language makes: why it means what it does, and why it gives the particular impression that it does. Although language does not determine, language shapes meaning as it is conveying meaning.

For instance, when President John F. Kennedy announced the blockade of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, he and his speech writers wanted to persuade the world that the United States was acting in a defensive way against unprovoked Soviet aggression. Kennedy described the United States as exercising "patience and restraint," while affirming "our courage and our commitments." Kennedy depicted Soviet actions, in contrast, with a string of threat-words signaling crisis: the Soviets stood responsible for the "secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles" and their "clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."⁵ When listing the military and political actions underway, Kennedy used the passive voice to announce the most invasive U.S. action, the naval blockade: "a strict quarantine . . . is being initiated." (*Quarantine* indicated isolating a disease, while the metaphor *communism is a disease* went back at least to the Bolshevik Revolution.) In contrast, Kennedy used mostly the active voice with *I*- or *We*-statements to describe other U.S. actions that appeared more defensive or that were political initiatives: "I have directed the . . . surveillance"; "I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate. . . ." Kennedy also employed the passive voice to warn that should the Soviets' "offensive" preparations continue, "further action will be justified."⁶ Using the passive voice obscures the subject of the sentence, that is, the agency that is initiating the action – in this case, the perilous action of ordering the stopping and possible boarding of Soviet ships, in international waters and contrary to international law. Although it would be clear to anyone who thought it through that *Kennedy was* ordering the blockade, his passive voice and euphemism *quarantine* helped blunt the thinking that the U.S. might also be taking offensive steps.

According to the literary critic Jonathan Culler and the historian Dominick LaCapra, theory is interdisciplinary. Theory is made up of a

Beyond the Great Story: History; Stuart Hall (ed.), *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London, 1997).

5 Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 278–79.

6 *Ibid.* Probably the most hazardous step couched in the active voice was: "I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities." Although "any eventualities" could mean nuclear war, the language was also vague. A portentous sentence that would be quoted by future scholars had the quasi-biblical and therefore elevated, prophetic tone made famous in Kennedy's Inaugural address: "It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba . . . as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States. . . ."

changing, sometimes contradictory set of concepts that are used outside their original disciplines. For instance, when techniques of close reading for metaphors and syntax are used in disciplines other than literary criticism and cognitive linguistics, they are commonly referred to as *theory*. Theory also borrows from anthropology and sociology. It is speculative, asking more questions than it can answer. It challenges definitive proof, and proof in general, because it emphasizes how the researcher's background, ideas, and implicit agenda influence (although they do not determine) what that researcher finds and subsequently argues. This does not mean that theory need mire history writing in endless relativism. Rather, theory can encourage historians to become alert to the limits of their objectivity and rationality – and to open, on occasion, dialogues with their sources, and with other scholars. Theory tends to challenge concepts and beliefs that are conventionally taken for granted.⁷ For those foreign relations historians who critique the “grand narrative” of the U.S. as an exceptional nation and a beneficent hegemon, reading for the implicit assumptions and the logic in metaphors can indicate how imperial policies and contrary thinking were subsumed into the dominant story.

Although concepts associated with theory go back in some respects to Plato and Aristotle, they have more recently been formulated by mostly French intellectuals, writing after the turbulence of 1968. Theory's tenets conflict with the positivism that prevailed in Anglo-Saxon academia, and that still resonates with much of U.S. society. Some diplomatic historians still accept as positive beliefs the assumptions that historians *can* discover “just facts,” can shed their cultural baggage, and can write history similar to what the past “was really like.” Some scholars who reject a wholesale positivism are also too quick to dismiss the kind of literary and cultural theory discussed in this essay, perhaps because of their concern with relativism.⁸ I would argue, however, that historians can take their traditional skepticism about “true” interpretations a step further and still not fall into the pit of relativism. Seventy-odd years ago, Carl Becker, referring to his AHA presidential address “Everyman His Own Historian,” explained that although the “facts may be determined with accuracy . . . ‘the interpretation’ will always be shaped by the prejudices, biases, [and] needs, of the individual. . . . Hence history has to be re-written by each generation.”⁹

7 Jonathan Culler, *Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction* (New York, 1997), esp. 1–17; LaCapra, *History and Reading*, 1–72, 169–226, esp. the footnotes.

8 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York, 1994); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, UK, 1988).

9 Carl Becker to William E. Dodd, January 27, 1932, in Michael Kammen (ed.), *What Is the Good of History?* (Ithaca, NY, 1974), 156. For Becker's address, see Carl L. Becker, *Everyman His Own Historian* (New York, 1935), 233–55; Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 256–60.

Theory takes Becker's argument a big step further by positing that "facts" that go beyond the barest meanings, such as *the Korean War occurred*, are also shaped by the prejudices and needs of individuals, cultures, and eras.

Whether theory offers foreign relations history intellectual enrichment or what one historian has called "intellectual junk [food]" has been hotly debated in academic journals, books, conferences, listservs, departments, and organizations, including the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the popular press has sensationalized the "Theory Wars."¹¹ Controversy over theory heated up in the late 1990s after nearly two decades of criticism that "diplomatic history" had focused too narrowly on "high politics" and on elite white males.¹² Historians of foreign relations responded with some self-examination, with some pooh-poohing of this criticism, and with many impressive efforts to broaden the field. Nevertheless, at least until September 11, 2001, foreign relations history remained on the defensive in the historical profession, particularly because of the rise in popularity and influence of social history in the 1970s and because of the rise of cultural history in the 1980s–1990s. Social history emphasizes class, race, and gender, categories of analysis previously not emphasized by most foreign relations historians. Cultural history, which has embraced aspects of theory, emphasizes culture, language, and meaning, categories of analysis that are even newer to foreign relations history.¹³ The tight job market and sharp, sometimes gendered and generational divisions within some academic departments heightened the stakes and the emotion. Some anger and perhaps fear has arisen that "solid" analysis of political, economic, and military foreign policy issues was being displaced by "lightweight" cultural studies that were not real diplomacy history. Meanwhile, some historians perceived the field as marginal in major historical journals, at national conferences, and in academic job notices. These trends may well reverse. As the essays in this edition of *Explaining* demonstrate, foreign relations history is already a revitalized field of study.

10 Bruce Kuklick, "Commentary" in *Diplomatic History*, 18 (Winter 1994), 122. There is a huge literature. One can begin with Keith Jenkins (ed.), *The Postmodern History Reader* (New York, 1997); David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis, 1992) and with a number of threads on H-Diplo. See also the "Primer" essay in this volume.

11 See, for example, "Redundant Men; Overdoing Gender Equity; Postmodernism's Political Cost; a Conversation with Reality; Academically Licensed Poets," *Chronicle of Higher Education* (July 2, 1999), B10; "Saying Their Field Is in 'Disarray,' Historians Set Up a New Society; Founders say focus will be ideas; critics see a longing for the past," *Chronicle of Higher Education* (May 8, 1998), A12.

12 For a public discussion, see Jeff Sharlet, "Why Diplomatic Historians May Be the Victims of American Triumphalism," *Chronicle of Higher Education* (September 24, 1999); letters to the editor in *ibid.* (October 29, 1999), B3.

13 See the "Primer" essay in this volume.

In public discourse, *deconstruction* has become a term to trivialize all of theory as an impractical, overly intellectual French import. Culler, however, argues that literary philosopher Jacques Derrida, who popularized deconstruction, intended the term as “a critique of the hierarchical oppositions that have structured Western thought,” such as mind/body, rational/emotional, male/female, tough/soft, the West/“the rest.” Culler writes that “to deconstruct an opposition is to show that [the opposition] is not natural and inevitable,” but rather a set of assumptions that break down upon analysis.¹⁴

For instance, the notion of an opposition between reason and emotion says more about traditional Western concepts about the division of mind and body than it does about the nature of thought, which integrates more rational and more emotional modes of cognition. According to the neurologist Antonio Damasio, emotions arise not from a simple, unidirectional engagement of the body, but rather from constant feedback and fine-tuning between the brain and bodily states and perceptions.¹⁵ Emotions are culturally conditioned, that is, they are expressed in ways that interpret the customary values and categories of a society. Discerning the role of emotions in shaping the judgments of policy makers at particular instances can yield a more nearly complete understanding of foreign relations history. Foreign relations, particularly for a major power such as the United States, entails acting on matters that are judged important. Emotions typically are part of the reasoning process that assigns importance, sometimes disproportionate, to events, problems, or goals. Issues of diplomacy have often been conditioned by pride and by cravings for respect, dignity, and gratitude. Although foreign relations historians have written about fear, they have reckoned less with the fear of appearing fearful or deferential, or with the emotions summoned by calls for courage and strength – all of which are associated with how leaders (male or female) construct their “resolute,” conventionally masculine identities. Foreign

14 Culler, *Literary Theory*, 127. See Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca, NY, 1982), especially 89–110; LaCapra, *History and Reading*, 177–78.

15 Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York, 1999), 35–81; *ibid.*; Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (New York, 2003), 6–8, 27–95. See also the essay by Richard H. Immerman in this volume; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* (New York, 2001); Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (Cambridge, MA, 1990), 126–50; Paul E. Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are* (Chicago, 1997); William Ian Miller, *The Anatomy of Disgust* (Cambridge, MA, 1997); Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Rose Markus (eds.), *Emotion and Culture* (Washington, DC, 1994); Susanne Niemeier and Rene’ Dirven (ed.), *The Language of Emotions* (Philadelphia, 1997). Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis (eds.), *An Emotional History of the United States* (New York, 1998) deals with the emotions of the public but not of elites.

policy crises are also crises of emotion. Homosocial attraction, bonding, rivalry, and disappointment can further intensify the emotions invested in foreign relations.¹⁶

Scholars can read documents for what the historian William M. Reddy has termed “emotives.” Emotives are performative statements that translate into language – and in the process clarify, reinforce, and communicate – emotions that often were previously inchoate.¹⁷ Consider the apparent thinking of U.S. ambassador to Moscow W. Averell Harriman, who in March 1945 cabled President Franklin D. Roosevelt: “I am outraged” at the Soviet government.¹⁸ Harriman’s use of the first person pronoun indicated that he had become personally and viscerally absorbed in post-Yalta tensions, or wished to appear as though he had. Whether the proclamation of “outrage” was indeed an emotional outburst or, rather, a strategic representation of such an outburst, Harriman signaled his conviction that a highly emotional response to the Soviets was appropriate. His cable interpreted as clear-cut those issues on which Yalta had remained ambiguous, such as access to U.S. and British ex-POWs in Poland and the makeup of the Polish government. Although Harriman wanted his viewpoint respected, he saw no contradiction in acknowledging his wrought-up emotions because he probably sensed that he was working within foreign policy discourses, in which anger is often interpreted as signaling masculine-coded “toughness” and “realism.” After Roosevelt died, Harriman flew to Washington to brief the new President and other officials. The British ambassador to Moscow observed that Harriman had developed “something like hate [toward the Soviets] and he was determined to advise his government to waste no more time on the effort to understand and cooperate with the Russians.”¹⁹ Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson hoped to “restrain” U.S. officials, whom he observed “getting . . . irritated” with the Soviets. Although emotions were probably important at most points in the formation of the Cold War, and in most other foreign policy decisions, they remain tricky to discern.

16 On gratitude, see Louis A. Pérez, “Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of United States Hegemony in Cuba,” *American Historical Review*, 104 (April 1999): 356–98; for toughness, see Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front* (New York, 1992), 119–38; for a variety of emotions that conditioned U.S.-Indian relations, see Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); for homosocial emotions, see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York, 1985); Frank Costigliola, “‘I Have Come as a Friend’: Emotion, Culture, and Ambiguity, 1943–45,” *Cold War History*, 1 (August 2000): 103–28.

17 William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling* (New York, 2001).

18 Harriman to Roosevelt, March 8, 1945, box 34, Map Room Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.

19 Archibald Clark Kerr to Christopher Warner, June 21, 1945, N8417/77/38, F.O. 371/47862, Public Record Office, Kew, UK.

The impact of emotions depends on their intensity and on cultural and personal differences in expression.²⁰

What Culler calls “thinking about thinking” and what LaCapra terms “dialogic reading” can facilitate richer exchanges with ourselves, with historical sources, and with other scholars.²¹ Historians can allow themselves to reflect on their own assumptions and emotional investments, and not just in the preface and occasional footnote. In writing, we should feel free to interrupt our third person narrative with explicitly subjective comments in the first or second-person voice. Such self-consciousness, however, rubs up against a prevailing discourse in academic history: the authoritative narrator, who is assumed to have mastered the subject matter. If historians did not feel compelled to assume an authoritative voice in order to write serious history, they could incorporate some acknowledgment of their own cultural, ideological, interpretive, and emotional preferences. A more open history would encourage greater frankness: about historical contingency; about alternatives to the historical arguments that we have chosen; and about the selection, destruction, and fabrication of historical evidence, both at the historical moment and later by editors, historical actors, and heirs sorting through papers.

Theory emphasizes contingency and variability, positing that the meanings of an object, event, or experience are not intrinsic but rather are assigned or formed in ways conditioned by our preconceptions. Further, theory contends that our stories about the past and present, and about our own experiences, are not “real” or “true” in some ultimate way, but rather are fashioned by our particular way of seeing, a way of seeing that we learn growing up within the perspectives of our culture or cultures. Reality can be interpreted in many ways. Since readers examine writing and other signs with their own values and agendas, reading, like writing, is interpretive and interactive. Consequently, documents, films, paintings, and other texts can mean different things to different people at different times. Although historians cannot recover the actual past as it was lived in a former time, they can analyze the changing and often conflicting depictions and images – what theory terms the *representations* – of the past.

To *represent* something is to depict it within the context of one’s cultural framework (even if that framework reflects a mix of cultures or

20 Henry L. Stimson diary, April 23, 1945, Sterling library, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Stimson observed further that Harriman and liaison to the Red Army General John R. Deane had been “suffering *personally* from the Russians’ behavior on *minor matters*.” The two men “were evidently influenced by their past bad treatment and they moved for strong words by President [Truman].” (emphasis added) *Ibid.* On the intensity of emotions, see Philip Fisher, *The Vehement Passions* (Princeton, 2002).

21 Culler, *Literary Theory*, 15; LaCapra, *History and Criticism*, 36–38; *ibid.*, *History and Reading*, 64–77.

is in some other way contradictory). For instance, seemingly clear-cut issues in post-World War II U.S.-Indian relations, such as foreign aid or national frontiers, were *represented* differently by Americans and by Indians. As Andrew Rotter has demonstrated, while Americans regarded food and other aid as a generous gift that merited open gratitude, Indians regarded gratitude as unnecessary humiliation and aid as the right of a poorer nation. While Americans, because of their history, considered frontiers as opening out toward opportunity and an extended defense, Indians considered their national frontier as a boundary to be defended against the hostile outside.²² In her book on dollar diplomacy, Emily Rosenberg shows how U.S. private loans and financial advice to Liberia, Guatemala, and other poor nations were *represented* in books and in magazines as manly Americans bringing rational self-control to over-emotional, primitive, and often feminized Latin Americans and Africans. The popular *Tarzan* books and movies *represented* "darkest Africa" as a site for proving the superiority of white civilization, while also titillating Americans with fantasies of an exotic land.²³

Underlying historians' focus on representation is a key premise: although written history cannot encapsulate ultimate reality, such history can analyze the changing, culturally conditioned images of reality. Applying theory need not mire written history in endless relativism. Rather, theory can enable fresh topics and new ways of thinking about the past. New historicist Steven Greenblatt writes: "It is, I think, a theoretical mistake and a practical blunder to collapse the distinction between representation and reality, but at the same time we cannot keep them isolated from one another. They are locked together in an uneasy marriage in a world without ecstatic union or divorce."²⁴

I suspect that many scholars would, on a first reading, find Greenblatt's statement good sense. That was my first reaction, and I still think his advice is helpful. Yet how can historians actually apply the metaphor *uneasy marriage* to figuring out the relations between reality and representation? My point here is not to disparage Greenblatt's advice, but rather to illustrate how effective language can influence our thinking, especially our initial thinking, about something we read or hear. Much of the persuasive power in Greenblatt's sentence arises from his metaphor *an uneasy*

22 Rotter, *Comrades at Odds*, 37–48; *ibid.*, "Feeding Beggars: Class, Caste, and Status in Indo-U.S. Relations, 1947–1964," in Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions* (Amherst, 2000), 67–85.

23 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), especially 187–218. See also Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti* (Chapel Hill, 2000).

24 Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions* (Chicago, 1991), 7. For new historicism, see Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism* (Chicago, 2000); H. Aram Veese (ed.), *The New Historicism* (New York, 1989).

marriage. This language uses a concrete image to help us think about the abstract relation between reality and representation. Yet Greenblatt's metaphor, like all metaphors, makes an unavoidable "leap" in meaning in order to create meaning. We sense the imprecision of the leap when we try to apply the advice. As I discuss later in this essay, historians can discern evidence in the particular direction of such "leaps in meaning."²⁵ Further, Greenblatt's metaphor has meaning because the conditions of "uneasy marriage" and "divorce" and the aspirations toward "ecstatic union" all reflect cultural values current in the Western world. Language is made up of metaphors, live and dead. Metaphors are almost necessary to convey meaning, and we need to be aware of their effects.

Meaning

The kind of theory that I discussed in the first section of this essay posits that "meaning" is not intrinsic to an object or an event, but rather that people, acting within their respective cultural and historical frameworks, *assign* meaning to that object or event. A round leather object that you throw and bounce on the ground is a physical thing – a ball. But it is only a "basketball" within the context of the rules of the game, which is a social concept or construction. The word *construct* emphasizes that the concept is made rather than found as part of a reality that somehow preexists society.²⁶ Consider the struggles to assign a meaning to the Vietnam War. Presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon tried to make people understand Vietnam as another "good war," like that of 1941–45. While many opponents charged that the war violated America's best traditions, New Left historians thought that the Vietnam war actually illustrated America's history of open door imperialism. Similarly, whether World War II started in 1931, 1937, 1939, or 1941 – and whether it should be understood as the Great Patriotic War, the Japanese Pacific war for survival, Britain's finest hour, a war for *Lebensraum*, the war that began with Pearl Harbor and featured D-Day and Hiroshima, or the war that boosted California's development – depends on the meaning that various people, strongly conditioned by their respective interests and cultures (which include ideologies), assign to it.

25 I interpret Greenblatt as advising that scholars keep in mind a number of representations as they note how each representation approaches, from an different perspective, a forever elusive reality. Although this image makes sense to me, it also relies on another metaphor – that is, another imperfect leap in meaning in order to create meaning. *Leap in meaning* is still another metaphor.

26 See Scott, "The Evidence of Experience" for how experiences and identities are constituted, or constructed.

As we can see from the above examples, meaning is revealed and reinforced in how a society classifies or categorizes things. As the legal theorist Anthony Amsterdam and the cultural critic Jerome Bruner write, “categories are neither arbitrary or out-of-the-blue. They are derived, consciously or unconsciously, from some larger-scale theory or narrative about the canonical or desirable state of things in the world.”²⁷ When we assign something to a category, we give it a meaning and place it in a particular context. For instance, when President Harry Truman in his Truman Doctrine speech referred to “democratic Greece,” he was categorizing Greece with the United States, which self-identified as democratic.²⁸ Truman’s language “democratic Greece” assigned to the Athens government meaning that Americans could understand – thereby undercutting notions that the U.S. was aiding an unpopular monarchy in a civil war. The association of ancient Greece with democracy reinforced the notion of “democratic Greece.” Governments and other opinion makers such as the media have enormous influence over how meaning is assigned.

During the period of tense relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that we still call by the name the *Cold War*, the phrase the *Free World* and *Iron Curtain* clearly articulated the values that were assigned to Us and Them. U.S. policy and opinion-makers could create, at least initially, and within the “Free World,” the public meaning of a foreign situation by labeling that situation a “crisis” or the site of “communist influence and subversion.” Once U.S. leaders categorized a nation as part of the *Free World*, Americans and others had a harder time discerning unfree elections or the suppression of civil liberties in that nation. *Free World* elided the differences between what Woodrow Wilson had called “freedom of enterprise” and political and social freedoms. Even after the Cold War ended, U.S. commentators often still referred to the President as “the leader of the Free World.” The term lived on, perhaps because the term reassured people that the U.S. still led, and always would lead, the free (here read “worthwhile” or “civilized”) parts of the world. Similarly, in the postwar Cold-War era, categorizing a movement as “terrorist” made it much less likely that CNN, or other opinion-makers, would examine seriously the grievances and the aspirations of those “terrorists.”

The French sociologist Michel Foucault has argued that even more powerful than governments is the pervasive power of discourse. Discourses are the unquestioned beliefs, practices, and rules that restrict (but of course do not wholly determine) how people think and act – including how they write history. Although objects and events exist as real things, their most

27 Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, *Minding the Law* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 22.

28 *Public Papers of the Presidents Harry S. Truman 1948* (Washington, DC, 1963), 177.

significant meanings are not intrinsic or essential. Whether assigned meanings are accepted, contested, or allowed to remain ambiguous, struggles over these meanings are part of struggles over power, whether waged through war, revolution, diplomacy, parliamentary politics, protest, personal discussion, or other arenas. Finally, people who are more privileged in terms of class, race, gender, and other markers have more say in assigning meanings to objects and events, including those in the past. In sum, what people in society “know” is heavily influenced by relations of power.

Culture

Culture entails shared meanings and values that are not “natural” or universal, but rather are produced, exchanged, challenged, and altered by people operating within (and increasingly across) societies. Ideology reduces or condenses culture to an easily understood and promulgated formula.²⁹ An anthropological understanding of culture emphasizes the collective meaning-making or significance-making activities of people.³⁰ Borrowing from Max Weber, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz describes human beings as “suspended in webs of significance” that give meaning to peoples’s identities, actions, and the perceived world.³¹ The sociologist Stuart Hall explains that culture is “not so much a set of *things*,” such as movies, newspapers, or novels, “as a process, a set of *practices*.” Employing a metaphor that recalls that theory developed, in part, among ex-Marxists, Hall writes that “culture is concerned with the production and exchanging of meanings – the ‘giving and taking of meaning’ between members of a society or a group.”³² Culture involves a dynamic process, including challenging and changing meanings. People who belong to similar cultures make sense of the world and organize their perceptions in roughly similar ways, and generally have consonant or at least mutually understandable values. Historians of foreign relations can discern the cultural assumptions in reports from embassies, memoranda of official conversations, overseas court records, tourists’ and soldiers’ diaries and letters, films, and television shows.

29 See the essay by Michael Hunt in this volume.

30 See the essay by Akira Iriye in this volume. For studies of how cultural norms affect foreign relations, see Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security* (New York, 1996).

31 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), 5. For a critique, see Adam Kuper, *Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

32 Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London, 1997), 2.

More subtle cultural patterns help account for U.S. relations with Germany and with France after the two world wars. Similar attitudes toward cleanliness, business, order, and machines, along with the Germans' readiness to play up to the powerful Americans, made it relatively easy for U.S. soldiers after the two world wars to feel affinity with light-skinned, blue-eyed German civilians, and thereby foster reconciliation from the ground level up. In contrast, many American soldiers depicted the French as ungrateful, dirty, disorganized, and grasping. Many French saw the GIs as rough, rich, insensitive, and ignorant, too easy on German prisoners and too aggressive in pursuing French women. The Germans' defeat and fear of the Soviets after 1945 made them more willing to accept American guidance than were the French. Nevertheless, in both postwar periods, cultural affinities helped account for the U.S.'s smoother relations with Germany, particularly in terms of coopting each other's power in international relations. Even today, "Those *French!*" connotes ridicule of perceived French peculiarities and pretensions, and Gallic culture continues to abrade many Americans.³³

Language

Like meaning and culture, language approaches reality, but there remains always a certain gap between reality and descriptions of reality. Language is a system of signs, such as written words, that stand for or represent something else. As Hall puts it, "spoken language uses sounds, written language uses words," body language uses gestures and posture; "traffic lights use red, green and amber to 'say something.'"³⁴ The written word *tree*, the sound "tr-ee," an obscene hand gesture, and a green traffic light all signify meaning not because of what they intrinsically *are*, but rather because of what they *do* in communicating.

By evaluating the word choices of historical actors in describing their perceived reality, historians can learn something about the assumptions and agendas of those historical actors. Historians can also read the narrative of, say, an embassy telegram or a film, for evidence of what is being assumed, emphasized, and ignored. Such evidence can help reveal the author's (or the director's) perspective and agenda as well as assumptions about what audiences understand and want. Words and signs *denote*, that

33 Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York, 1992); *ibid.*, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–33* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Petra Goedde, "From Villains to Victims: Fraternization and the Feminization of Germany, 1945–47," *Diplomatic History*, 23 (Winter 1999): 1–20.

34 Hall, *Representations*, 4–5.

is, indicate primary, explicit meaning, and they *connote*, that is, signify secondary, suggested meanings. Both denotations and connotations can change as history and cultures change. Let us consider the word *crusade*, which in English has partially lost its older denotation of Christian Europe's military efforts to retake the Holy Land. References to a *crusade against drugs* or to the *Campus Crusade for Christ* do not denote religious war. Nevertheless, the power in a *crusade against Islam* indicates that the historical denotation remains, even if faded into connotation. Meanwhile, the word or words in Arabic and in other languages equivalent to *crusade* still retain, or have gained, a powerful historical denotation, to the point where Osama bin Laden could rally many with talk about "expelling the crusaders." Soon after the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, when President George W. Bush called for a global "crusade" against terrorism, he may have had the *crusade-against-drugs* denotation in mind. An observer noted that the Bush "administration has to understand that language that might hearten a domestic audience might also serve to strengthen our enemies."³⁵ Particularly in a globalized world, language matters, in all its various denotations and connotations.

Metaphors and Other Figures of Speech

Perhaps the most important figure of speech in Western languages is the metaphor. Languages are so inherently metaphorical that we often miss the metaphors. The linguist George Lakoff and the cognitive philosopher Mark Johnson explain that "*the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.*"³⁶ Johnson adds that through metaphor, "we use patterns from our physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding."³⁷ Metaphors enable us to understand a situation in terms of "connections across domains of our experience."³⁸ Nevertheless, understanding and experiencing through

35 Joe Klein, "Closework," *The New Yorker* (1 October 2001): 49.

36 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, 1980), 5 (emphasis in original). A major theoretical work is Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (Toronto, 1975).

37 Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (Chicago, 1987), xv.

38 *Ibid.*, 103. Everyday metaphors based on spacial orientation abound: "things are looking up" assumes that happy is up; "high-level discussion" and "the discussion fell to an emotional level" assume that rational is up and emotional is down. "I've invested a lot of time in this project" assumes that time is money. "Diplomacy is war by other means" achieves much of its logical force from the Western metaphor that "argument is war" ("Your claims are *indefensible*." His criticisms were *right on target*.) The metaphor "argument is war" is not intrinsic to the nature of argument, but rather is culturally based. As Lakoff and Johnson suggest, "imagine a culture where an

metaphor is imperfect, because the metaphor is unavoidably skewed in its representation of abstractions. *Understand* is itself a dead metaphor with a forgotten meaning: physically to *stand under*. Vivid, new metaphors communicate layers of meaning, sparking multiple connotations and feelings. The more vivid the metaphor, moreover, the more pronounced are the feelings and the intended and unintended connotations of that metaphor.

For instance, *Cold War* is a metaphor for a struggle that resembled traditional war in some ways but that also differed from *war* in that the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not kill each other's people on a large scale.³⁹ Even before the 1991 end of the Soviet Union, the metaphor *Cold War* had lost much of its punch from the 1940s–50s, when the emotional tag *War* had helped justify arms budgets, nuclear weapons tests, violations of civil liberties, and militarization of U.S. society. This is not to say that the term *Cold War* determined these developments. Rather, the widespread usage of *Cold War* reflected the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and China, while also insinuating the notion that war had replaced diplomacy, and therefore an end to tensions required a Soviet surrender.⁴⁰

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government's immediate labeling of its actions as a *war on terrorism* (rather than as, say, an anti-criminal effort) reflected, and helped justify, the mobilization of military forces, internal security measures, higher budgets, and overseas alliances – and the talk of eliminating what the U.S. President, using one of the most value-laden and emotional terms available in the language, called “evil” and “evil-doers.” The U.S. government's *war on drugs* in South America had earlier normalized the concept that non-Americans could be killed in a *war* against an abstraction. Language usage responds to societal and cultural changes, while also facilitating those changes.

Metaphor helps structure not only language, but also thought. Mark Johnson writes that metaphor “does not merely mean figure of speech, but rather a pervasive, indispensable structure of human understanding by

argument is viewed as a dance,” where the object would not be to win, but rather to strike a balance. Lakoff and Johnson's title indicates that the metaphors in a given culture are the ones that people “live by” – that is, metaphors are shaped by people's physical and culture experiences, and metaphors add coherence to those experiences. Just as cultures are often contradictory, so, too, can metaphors be contradictory. *Metaphors We Live By*, 4–6.

39 For a discussion of the proliferation of war metaphors in the U.S., see Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, 1995).

40 Another metaphoric expression, the *long peace*, highlights the restraint and the strategic stability in U.S.-Soviet rivalry while de-emphasizing the many Koreans and Vietnamese who died in civil wars abetted by that rivalry. The metaphor *Soviet-American condominium* offers still another representation of U.S.-Soviet relations, one reflecting a North-South rather than an East-West perspective. John L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace*.

means of which we figuratively comprehend the world." Metaphor "influences the nature of meaning and *constrains our rational inferences*."⁴¹ If metaphor "constrains our rational inferences," then metaphor can also influence how foreign affairs are perceived, thought about, and acted upon. Foreign relations historians are familiar with the Cold War metaphor *communism is a flood*, as in *the rising red tide* and *the spread of communism*.⁴² These metaphors fit with the metaphor *containment*, and they promoted the assumption that serious diplomacy with the Soviets was unrealistic: how could the U.S. communicate with, let alone compromise with, a flood? Referring to the Soviets, Dean Acheson said: "There is no way to argue with a river. . . . You can channel it; you can dam it up. But you can't argue with it."⁴³ Metaphoric logic also helped substitute for careful thinking about Southeast Asia: *falling dominoes* meant that certain, implicitly inferior nations were interchangeable units, whose particular history, culture, and will to independence counted for little; and which needed the U.S. to prop them up. As these metaphors indicate, the language of policy makers can clue historians to how those policy makers were thinking and then acting.

For an example of how language can offer such clues, let us read a document in the U.S. Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on Laos. At a June 8, 1964 meeting, President Lyndon B. Johnson and top advisers discussed whether the U.S. should bomb an anti-aircraft battery in Laos after the Pathet Lao had shot down two U.S. fighters escorting reconnaissance aircraft.⁴⁴ The retaliation would escalate the fighting and, as Johnson worried, "would be violating the Geneva Accords."⁴⁵ Although the minutes of the meeting have the flattened tone of an official record, that language still conveys evidence of emotional reasoning and influential metaphor. General Marshall S. Carter, deputy director of the CIA, pointed up the prevailing feelings for revenge when he twice criticized the proposed bombing as "precipitous" and as "motivated by a *desire* to retaliate."⁴⁶ In national security discourse, military actions were supposed to be rational and deliberate, not emotional and overhasty, as *desire* and *precipitous* respectively indicated. When Carter

41 Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, xx, xii (emphasis added). Theory posits that reason is not transcendent, but rather grounded in culture, emotions, and various presuppositions.

42 See also Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, 1987).

43 Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895* (Boston, 2000), vol. 2, 248. My thanks to J. Garry Clifford for this reference.

44 For the background of the incident, see David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 325.

45 FRUS, 1964-1968: 38, 152-60. Johnson's remark is on p. 157.

46 *Ibid.*, 154, 160 (emphasis added).

said that CIA director John A. McCone also opposed the bombing, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara "disagreed sharply," citing his own meeting with McCone.

McNamara's sharp feelings were also evident in the exaggerated meaning that he assigned to the retaliation issue. According to the minutes, "McNamara said we cannot go on as we now are. . . . He said he was even ready to give up Southeast Asia . . . but we cannot continue talking tough and acting weak."⁴⁷ The use of such polarities as *tough vs. weak* or *tough vs. soft* often signaled that officials felt they had to reaffirm masculine strength by demonstrating power, resolve, and "toughness." The rhetoric of toughness tends to polarize and overcharge foreign policy issues. Even if we grant that North Vietnam was watching for Washington's response, and that the Johnson administration was searching for a coherent policy in Southeast Asia, McNamara was exaggerating the stakes of bombing an anti-aircraft battery in Laos. It was either "act firmly" or prepare "to give up Southeast Asia." In a conversation three days after this meeting, President Johnson underscored the link between masculine identity and the commitment to Vietnam. Johnson said that even if the original commitments to Vietnam had not been wise, the U.S. was now there. "And being there, we've got to conduct ourselves like men. That's number one."⁴⁸ The issue of masculine identity was also evident in an unidentified official's remark that unless the U.S. retaliated, a pro-U.S. Canadian diplomat "would be going to Hanoi with a broken stick."⁴⁹ We need not delve into Freudian analysis to perceive the association of a "broken stick" with a broken baseball bat, a missile, or a penis. Indeed, since President Johnson often couched political issues in terms of sexual organs and sexual acts, it is possible that he or an adviser actually spoke a word denoting *penis*, perhaps a word rhyming with *stick*, and the official minutes substituted the oblique *broken stick*. Emotions associated with the perceived need to prove one's masculine status could override other feelings: President Johnson concluded the meeting by deciding to approve the bombing, although "he was bothered" by it.⁵⁰

Sharp feelings also conditioned the discussion of what Acting Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman termed "the absolute requirement to send a firm signal to Hanoi." *Firm* sparked many of the same associations as *tough*. *Signal* reflected a basic, metaphoric logic of post-World War II U.S. foreign policy: the undeniably real destruction of an exploding bomb would communicate the more abstract message that the nation bombed

47 *Ibid.*, 159.

48 Michael R. Beschloss (ed.), *Taking Charge* (New York, 1997), 403. See also Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood* (Amherst, 2001), 201–40.

49 *FRUS, 1964–1968*: 38, 154.

50 *Ibid.*, 157.

should change its behavior. "The air attack was visualized as a signal to Hanoi," the minutes read.⁵¹ Harriman emphasized: "We have to get a message to Hanoi to convince Ho Chi Minh that we are serious, that we haven't backed down, and that we are not scared off by attacks on our planes." Although their message was complex, neither Harriman nor other officials doubted that Ho would interpret the bombing as they expected. (Recall the point in the first paragraph of this essay, that bombing has very different meanings if one is bombing or one is being bombed.) Bombing seemed a means to communicate because, as Harriman said, "the air attack was the only way that we could signal Hanoi."⁵² (Ironically, a few years later Harriman himself would champion less bellicose modes of communication with Hanoi.) The metaphor *a bomb is a signal* was so central to this discussion about bombing – and so constraining to these officials' thinking – that *signal* or a close synonym appeared thirteen times in eight and one-half pages of minutes. The only official who did challenge the logic of the metaphor was Carter, who, significantly, also saw through the rhetoric of strategy and foreign policy to the feelings of revenge that were spurring the retaliation.

Other figures of speech also channeled thinking about the war in Southeast Asia. Johnson and his advisers regarded bombs exploding on Laos as a precise signal to Ho in North Vietnam because they assumed that they were escalating the war in a rational way, and that Ho's rational perceptions and cultural values were congruent with theirs. State department official U. Alexis Johnson, who would soon become deputy ambassador to South Vietnam, used a simile to explain how the bombing of Laos influenced North Vietnam: The "problems" in Laos and North Vietnam were "exemplified by two chess boards, some plays being made on both boards." Another assistant secretary of state, William Bundy, described bombing of Laos as "only a bump in the upward curve of the military actions proposed in the scenario."⁵³ Chess is a game of rational, calibrated moves in which both players know and adhere to a set of rules. The agreed-upon practices of chess include signals, whose context is mutually understood even if the signals involve bluffing. Although chess players can become emotionally involved in their game, this aspect was probably obscured by the prevailing association of chess with rationality (especially in the period before the notorious emotionalism of chess champion Bobby Fisher). Alexis Johnson's reference to chess plays reflected and reinforced the confidence of Johnson administration officials that they had rational choice over whether they were risking a pawn or king in Southeast Asia.

51 *Ibid.*, 155.

52 *Ibid.*, 157, 159.

53 *Ibid.*, 155. The language *exemplified* did not introduce a metaphor, but rather a simile, which indicates a lesser degree of equivalence.

The metaphor *a bump on the upward curve* of military actions also fit the model that foreign relations and even war were problems suited to systems analysis. Systems analysis, a prevailing discourse in the 1960s and a favorite of McNamara, presumed that almost all challenges could be managed rationally, especially once the targeted people and institutions were homogenized into their appropriate categories.⁵⁴ Although language alone did not determine America's deepening war in Southeast Asia, metaphoric language, and the emotions often discernible in language, influenced how options were appraised. All the talk at this meeting about demonstrating toughness and signaling Ho Chi Minh made it easy to pass over someone's brief mention that "the antiaircraft battery to be attacked was 7/10 of a mile from a village."⁵⁵ We see over and over how choice of language conditions not only the written histories, but also the actual decisions being made.

Like myths and memories, metaphors and other figures of speech are the "imaginative structures of understanding" with which we form images of abstract things, like black holes and foreign policies.⁵⁶ Metaphors invoking race, gender, pathology, primitivism, and other hot-button issues can spark emotions and influence how policy makers and others perceive, discuss, and judge issues. Certain language, like *spreading communism* or *the domino theory* can help make a policy seem like "common sense" or inevitable. Language can help persuade, and persuasion is central to foreign relations. Foreign relations involve convincing others: foreign ministry officials make their case to, say, a U.S. diplomat; diplomats try to shape the State Department's policy toward their host nation; desk officers and the secretary of state try to influence higher-ups; the President exhorts Congress and the public.

Let us examine the persuasive rhetorical strategies in George F. Kennan's 5,540-word "long telegram," sent from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to the State Department in February 1946, and in Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published anonymously in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947 and often referred to as the *Mr. X article*.⁵⁷ These writings catapulted Kennan from talented but obscure diplomat to a top State Department adviser and publicly acclaimed "Soviet expert." Kennan's fluency in Russian, his long study of Soviet affairs, and his service in the U.S. embassy in Moscow during the 1930s and 1940s gave credence to his writings. A master at persuasive writing, Kennan helped construct the paradigmatic

54 See J. Garry Clifford's essay in this volume on bureaucratic pressures and the impetus to escalate the war in Southeast Asia.

55 *FRUS*, 1964-1968, 38: 155.

56 Johnson, *Body in the Mind*, xi.

57 *FRUS*, 1946, 6: 697-709; Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947): 566-82.

belief of the Cold War that the Soviet Union was not a far away, regional power, but rather an immediate menace to the United States, its allies, and their way of life. The long telegram and the Mr. X article became much-read, canonical documents. Nevertheless, until recently these documents were read only for their supposedly rational reasoning and their straightforward content.⁵⁸ In the context of 1946–47, Kennan's alarmist metaphors and other rhetorical strategies encouraged snap judgments and delegitimated efforts to try for a settlement with the Soviets. Received by sympathetic Washington officials, the long telegram argued that the wartime alliance was dead, and that U.S. policy should oppose rather than try to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The long telegram converted the confusing pattern of Soviet advances and retreats in 1945–46 into an easy-to-understand, though frightening story of a pathologically driven force bent on world domination.

The preamble of a narrative often contrasts, either explicitly or implicitly, the ordinary state of affairs with the break from the ordinary that makes the narrative worth telling. The assumptions embedded in this break, analogous to the leap of a metaphor, can indicate the author's slant or agenda. The tone in the first sentence of Kennan's long telegram made the Soviet Union seem almost eerie. Analysis of Soviet intentions "involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought" that they required a long telegram to answer. *Intricate* questions presumably could be answered only by experts such as Kennan. *Delicate* likewise referred to the fineness of perception that Kennan could offer. *Delicate* also alluded to the precarious sanity of the Soviets, a theme emphasized by Kennan, who referred to the "Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs" and to Soviet leaders as "afflicted" with acute insecurity.⁵⁹ Perhaps *delicate* also seemed apt to Kennan because of its association with *subtle*, *exquisite*, and its older meaning of *sensuous*. Kennan's complex feelings about the Soviet Union and its people included a deep attraction to Russian culture and language and a yearning for pre-Soviet Russia.⁶⁰ *Strange to our form of thought* suggested that not only was the Soviet

58 A recent book refers to the analysis of the long telegram as "both elegant and prolix" with "lucid language." Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain* (Boston, 2000), 3. Studies that analyze Kennan's language include Alan Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (Durham, 1995), 15–17, 29–33; Paul A. Chilton, *Security Metaphors* (New York, 1996), 137–55; Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration,'" 1309–39.

59 FRUS, 1946, 6: 699–701.

60 Years later in a "flashback," he remembered: "I drink it all in, love it intensely, and feel myself for a time an inhabitant of that older Russia." (George F. Kennan, *At a Century's Ending* (New York, 1996), 31.) For how Kennan's emotional involvement with Russia influenced his views of Soviet policy, see Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration,'" 1309–39.

Union situated beyond the norms of the U.S. and the international environment, but also that ordinary Americans could not trust their judgment in appraising Soviet intentions. Kennan's preamble primed his readers.

Even the syntax of a sentence can pack emotional force. An often-quoted sentence of the long telegram is: "In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure." Because the agency here was through an abstract "political force" and because much of the sentence was in the passive voice and the archaic subjunctive, readers would find it difficult to challenge the sentence's underlying premises by asking whether the leaders of the Soviet Union did in fact have such designs, how capable they were of achieving them, and how Kennan came to *know* of these purportedly secret designs. The prospects for American resistance to this assault appeared particularly grim when the reader had little idea of how, specifically, America would "be disrupted" and "be destroyed." Other sentences had a similar construction: "Poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old . . ." "No effort will be spared to discredit and combat. . . ." and so on.⁶¹ The repetition of sentences with this unusual syntax – all in the passive voice, all with an archaic and cryptic tone, and all conveying the message of unlimited action by an evil force – suggested the discourse of a religious text or of a fairy tale.

Kennan's metaphors in the Mr. X article also rang alarm bells. The "whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force."⁶² Kennan's language worked to move readers, too, along a prescribed path. If the Soviet government was an inhuman "machine" moving "inexorably" until stopped by another "force," the metaphoric logic of this sentence ran, then U.S. leaders had little reason to consider Soviet interests or try to negotiate a deal. Like a flood, a machine was impossible to compromise or even to talk with. Redundancy heightened the frightening impact: Kennan had written the "*whole* governmental machine" and the "*prescribed* path."⁶³ Despite this rhetoric, however, the Soviet government was not a "machine," a "mechanism," or a "toy automobile," no matter how determinedly Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov pursued Soviet aims. Kennan's language created

61 FRUS, 1946, 6: 706, 705.

62 "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 574.

63 *Ibid.*

persuasive structures for imagining the Soviet Union, structures that made it difficult to take seriously, or even perceive, Soviet behavior that was not menacing. Because Kennan's emotional language remained camouflaged by his expertise on Soviet affairs and his claim to realism, this language could demonize the leadership of the Soviet Union in a supposedly dispassionate analysis.

Amsterdam and Bruner write that metaphor "locks the multiple denotations [and connotations] of a word in a bond that resists analytic detachment and causes the use of the word in any one of its senses to trigger the thoughts and feelings that attend the others."⁶⁴ Metaphors are most effective in triggering thought and meaning when we are unaware that we are making such associations. For instance, in the long telegram, Kennan discussed the Soviet Union's supposedly aggressive foreign policy in terms of the Soviets' "unceasing pressure for penetration and command." He repeated the word "penetration" five times in reference to the Soviets' insistent intrusions and in juxtaposition to representations of the West as dangerously accessible.⁶⁵ The repeated metaphor *penetration* created the association of *Soviet Union as rapist* regardless of how intentional Kennan was in using this evocative language. Since at least Shakespeare's time, *penetration* has referred to combinations of political intrusion, military invasion, economic infusion, and sexual insertion. In trying to be persuasive, Kennan used inflammatory language. *Penetration* triggers multiple associations, including rape. Figures of speech involving gender and pathology are powerful because they can spark deep emotions: those associated with the body, with innermost fears and desires, with conceptions of health and sickness, and with basic, often unexamined beliefs about "natural" relationships that are in fact socially constructed.⁶⁶

Binary Oppositions

Metaphors of gender and pathology resonate in foreign policy contexts because, at least in Western culture, policy makers, whether they are men or women, are expected to act in ways that are conventionally associated with masculinity: rational, realistic, sound, and "tough."⁶⁷ When

64 Amsterdam and Bruner, *Minding the Law*, 190.

65 *FRUS*, 1946, 6: 702–06.

66 For discussion of the tendency to represent the political situation with bodily symbolism and vice versa, see Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 115–22; *ibid.*, *Natural Symbols* (London, 1970), vii–ix, 63–71.

67 See Robert D. Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Policy of Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History*, 22 (Winter 1998): 29–62. Historical

Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II belittled the independent-minded, Free French leader Charles de Gaulle as the reluctant "bride" or as "Joan of Arc," he was depicting de Gaulle (and to some extent France) as inadequately masculine or as negatively feminine.⁶⁸ During the Cold War, Washington officials often trivialized the opposition of an ally with language that depicted that ally as unreasonable or incapable. A former U.S. diplomat with experience in Europe observed that U.S. policy tended to regard "the political fears and ambitions of our allies . . . as passing irrationalities."⁶⁹ When France resisted postwar German rearmament in the early 1950s, the U.S. ambassador referred to the "weak sister" of the Western alliance.⁷⁰ U.S. analysts responded to West Germany's security fears by remarking that Washington wondered whether to "send an ambassador or a psychiatrist to Bonn" since the West Germans were "candidates for a nervous break down."⁷¹ Such images of the needy also suggested U.S. altruism and so helped portray Washington's control as caring.

Derogatory language is particularly powerful because it taps into the emotional logic of binary oppositions, which we discussed earlier in connection with deconstruction. It is common in Western language usage to construct meaning by conceptualizing things in terms of pairs that require one item to be not just dissimilar, but less valued than the other. In other words, we tend to organize, define, and evaluate things according to what they are *not* or to what they are opposed. When other nations resisted Washington's aims, U.S. officials often reacted with emotion-evoking language that drew much of its force from such binary oppositions as self/other, we/them, healthy/sick, sane/crazy, masculine/

sociologist Carol Cohn uses the term gender to refer to the constellation of meanings that a given culture assigns to biological sex differences. She writes: "I use gender to refer to a symbolic system, a central organizing discourse of culture, one that not only shapes how we experience and understand ourselves as men and women, but that also interweaves with other discourses and shapes *them* – and therefore shapes other aspects of our world such as how nuclear weapons [or foreign relations] are thought about and deployed." Cohn, "Wars, Wimps, and Women," 228. See also Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance," *Diplomatic History*, 21 (Spring 1997): 163–84; Rosenberg, "Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy."

68 Francois Kersaudy, *Churchill and de Gaulle* (New York, 1983), 243, 256; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, 22–23.

69 Harold van B. Cleveland in Ninth Steering Committee Meeting, "Atlantic Policy Studies," February 18, 1964, 9, Records of Groups, vol. 111, Council on Foreign Relations Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

70 Costigliola, *France and the United States*, 101.

71 Costigliola, "The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin," in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory* (New York, 1989), 37; Shane Maddock, "The Ideology of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," manuscript.

feminine, rational/emotional, logical/illogical, moral/corrupt, disciplined/uncontrolled, sound/foolish, civic/selfish, trustworthy/unreliable, good/wicked, active/passive, objective/subjective.⁷² (Of course, U.S. officials were not alone; such formulations were probably also repeated by the leaders of other powerful nations with similar cultural values.) The first term in each binary set is more highly valued by Western and other societies, usually by both women and men. The masculine/feminine polarity refers to conventional assumptions about masculine/feminine, not to the behavior of actual people. Indeed, a woman may act or talk “like a man” and a man may act or talk “like a woman.”⁷³ Because the terms in each of the pairs are mutually exclusive, binaries help accentuate differences, thereby underplaying the possibility of a position intermediate between the opposites. For example, if descriptive language coded French policy as sick, and coded American policy as healthy, such language undermined the view that each policy was the expression of legitimate, though different, national interests.⁷⁴

Conclusion

Theory, as I have used that term in this essay, emphasizes that there are multiple interpretations of reality and the past, and that language has meanings beyond those we might see upon first reading a text. But does such a theoretical perspective deprive historians of a firm grounding in objective truth? In terms of U.S. and Western society, do theory and other expressions of postmodernist thought lead to a paralyzing relativism and defenselessness? In the aftermath of the shocking terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, a number of commentators argued that in a time of crisis, critical positions had to give way to universal values. International terrorism was evil and irrational, while the U.S. was not. *Relativism* became a slur-word, and was often used inaccurately to describe analysis based on multiple perspectives. In a wartime atmosphere, inflammatory language easily aroused emotions while encouraging inordinately reductive rather than careful thought. But it is possible to make nuanced, precise judgments even when U.S. lives are at stake: indeed, when

72 Costigliola, “Tropes of Gender and Pathology,” 168–69; Helen Haste, *The Sexual Metaphor* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 85; Carol Cohn, “Wars, Wimps, and Women,” 229–30.

73 *Ibid.*, 228–29; Nancy Tuana, *Women and the History of Philosophy* (New York, 1992), 4–9; Haste, *Sexual Metaphor*, 32–34; Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1984), 2–16, 103–08; Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven, 1985), 7–9, 87–89.

74 See note 72.

U.S. lives are at stake, the tendency to propose absolutes like “evil” or “freedom” constricts our judgment. Describing an enemy as “evil” makes it more difficult to understand, and so counter, the beliefs and goals of that enemy. Historians of foreign relations can appreciate the value of calm thinking in trying, despite cultural and historical blinders, to see issues as they look to people with different values and agendas. After all, foreign relations are *relations*. To understand even an avowed adversary, both leaders and astute historians need to acknowledge and attempt to comprehend other points of view.

What's Gender Got to Do with It?

Gender History as Foreign Relations History

KRISTIN HOGANSON

The request to write this essay came the day I submitted my tenure papers. These had forced me to articulate why I considered myself both a women's historian and a historian of U.S. foreign relations. As I struggled to explain my research interests in the allotted three pages, I imagined the assorted deans, chemists, and engineers who would eventually read my file shaking their heads and asking: "What's gender got to do with it?" This was a question I had confronted quite often in the early nineties, when I was a graduate student in women's history embarking on a dissertation on the Spanish-Cuban-American and Philippine-American Wars. But the ascent of cultural and social history meant that in the past decade I have heard this question less and less from my colleagues.

Roughly half the faculty in my department characterize themselves as cultural historians – a term that obscures as much as it illuminates, for their interests could also be categorized as social, economic, political, and other subsets of history. In the academic circles I frequent, my disparate interests rarely raise eyebrows. After all, it's been over fifteen years since Joan Scott published her influential article "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" that made the case for using gender to understand issues of power. Drawing on contemporary feminist scholarship, Scott maintained that gender did not refer to fixed biological differences between men and women but to socially-determined symbols, norms, and identities. Scott posited gender as an analytical category akin to class and race in its potential to elucidate social and institutional relationships. Gender, she argued, should be regarded as "one of the recurrent references by which political power has been conceived, legitimated, and criticized."¹

I owe thanks to Antoinette Burton, Elizabeth Pleck, Michael Hogan, Charles Gammie, and Jerome Hoganson for their comments.

1 Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *American Historical Review* 91 (December 1986): 1053–75; reprinted in Joan Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, revised ed. (New York, 1999), 28–50, 48.

Since Scott's call to consider *all* history, not just women's experiences, in light of gender, women's history has indeed added gender history to its compass. Following Scott's vision, women's and gender historians have devoted considerable energy to illuminating the formation and manipulation of gender ideologies. In a related development, they have paid more rigorous attention to men and masculinity, so that the field is often characterized now as women's, men's, and gender history. Whereas earlier scholarship treated men as the "unmarked sex," that is, as a normative social group untouched by sex-role ideologies, the new men's history has marked men as men, showing how gender has profoundly mattered to them too.² The shift in the field over the last decade has resulted in an avalanche of scholarship highlighting the importance of gender to political, economic, and yes, even foreign relations history. Gender historians have achieved a hold in the center of the profession (at least in the United States), just where Scott called for them to be.

So why was I so worried about explaining myself to the deans? This exercise reminded me that what may seem self-evident in some circles may not yet seem intuitive in others. The linking of gender and foreign relations still seems incongruous in a way that, say, the study of ideology and foreign relations or domestic politics and foreign relations do not, never mind that ideology and politics both have gendered dimensions. Looking back over the last ten years, it may appear that we've come a long way toward recognizing the usefulness of gender as a historical category, but in making that assessment, I am reminded of the dismissive "baby" of the "long way" slogan. Just how far have we come? What *does* gender have to do with it?

When I started graduate school in the late 1980s, approaching foreign relations history through a gendered perspective was a novel idea. True, one could find occasional references to policymakers' macho self-images, terror of being seen as unmanly, and tendency to understand power in terms of patriarchal family relations, but the foreign relations literature contained few sustained analyses of gender.³ This reflected the assumption that gender referred specifically to women. Just as class was thought to apply particularly to workers and race to people of color, gender history often served as a synonym for women's history. And with the prominent

2 Nancy F. Cott, "On Men's History and Women's History," *Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America*, Mark C. Carnes and Clyde Griffen, eds. (Chicago, 1990), 205–11.

3 Some exceptions include Michael Paul Rogin, *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian* (New York, 1975); Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: 1978); Jay Fliegelman, *Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800* (New York, 1982).

exception of women's peace activism, foreign policy was understood as male (and hence ungendered) terrain.

But then, in an important article in the *Journal of American History*, Emily Rosenberg helped scholars conceptualize how gender might transform foreign relations history. Rosenberg listed four major ways to account for women and gender in the study of foreign relations. The first was the study of the exceptional woman – the Jeanette Rankin, Eleanor Roosevelt, or Clare Boothe Luce – who had influenced foreign policy. A second approach was to study missionaries, nurses, peace activists, and other women doing “women’s work” across national boundaries. A third was to pay attention to discourses related to gender, that is, to analyze how gendered imagery has legitimated international hierarchies by making them seem natural. Echoing Scott, Rosenberg argued that gender could help historians understand “systems of power.” Near the end of her essay, Rosenberg discussed a fourth approach: the women in international development (WID) scholarship, by which she meant scholarship focusing on women and global production. Rosenberg ended with an epistemological insight stressed by feminist theorists and other postmodernists: the importance of recognizing local knowledge and situational vantage points.⁴

Although Rosenberg’s essay was ostensibly about future directions for foreign relations history, it can also be read as a history of women’s history – a field that had gone from an emphasis on sex discrimination and remarkable women, to women’s culture, to using gender as a category of historical analysis, to paying more attention to women of color and to questioning the unity of women as a category. Well aware of women’s historians’ sense of their accomplishments and shortcomings, Rosenberg alerted foreign relations historians to potential strengths and pitfalls of each approach. Not surprisingly, she was warier of the first two approaches she delineated and especially of the great woman approach. She warned that focusing on exceptional women might underscore the marginality of women to the field. Even emphasizing “women’s work” might sideline women by suggesting that they occupied a separate sphere, less central to the field than the predominantly male sphere of diplomacy and policymaking.

Rosenberg’s article helped a generation of feminist scholars interested in the history of U.S. foreign relations to position and justify their work. Given the subsequent outpouring of literature on gender and foreign

4 Emily S. Rosenberg, “Gender. A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,” *Journal of American History* 77 (June 1990): 116–24, on systems of power, 120. For a more recent consideration of the topic, see “Culture, Gender, and Foreign Policy: A Symposium,” *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 71–124.

relations, it appears that it also motivated scholars to pursue the research possibilities she set forth. Recent scholarship has made it easier to explain what gender has to do with it because the answer need not be so hypothetical. Rather than talking about what a gendered approach might do, we can say much more about what it has done. In 1990, Rosenberg drew on a smattering of pathbreaking scholarship to envision the creation of a field; now that field is thriving.

Reviewing how the field has developed since 1990 shows the continued usefulness of Rosenberg's schema. Historians have continued to write on exceptional women, broadening this approach beyond wealthy white women to include women such as Maida Springer, a pan Africanist and international labor leader.⁵ They have continued in the "women's work" vein as well. Some of the most innovative assessments of activist women have taken a transnational approach. Studies such as Ian R. Tyrrell's *Woman's World, Woman's Empire*, Leila J. Rupp's *Worlds of Women*, Margaret H. McFadden's *Golden Cables of Sympathy*, and Bonnie S. Anderson's *Joyous Greetings* have revealed international dimensions to U.S. women's domestic reform efforts. Furthermore, this emerging transnational scholarship has highlighted women's (or more specifically, white, wealthy, Western women's) roles in advancing international civil society.⁶

- 5 Yvette Richards, *Maida Springer: Pan Africanist and International Labor Leader* (Pittsburgh, 2000); Mary L. Dudziak, "Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 81 (September 1994): 543-70; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917-1994* (New Brunswick, 1995); Robert Shaffer, "Women and International Relations: Pearl S. Buck's Critique of the Cold War," *Journal of Women's History* 11 (Autumn 1999): 151-75; James A. Miller, Susan D. Pennybacker, and Eve Rosenhaft, "Mother Ada Wright and the International Campaign to Free the Scottsboro Boys, 1931-1934," *American Historical Review* 106 (April 2001): 387-430; Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York, 2001); Kathryn S. Olmstead, *Red Spy Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth Bentley* (Chapel Hill, 2002). See also Nancy E. McGlen and Meredith Reid Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders* (New York, 1993); Karen M. Booth, "National Mother, Global Whore, and Transnational Femocrats: The Politics of AIDS and the Construction of Women at the World Health Organization," *Feminist Studies* 24 (Spring 1998): 115-39.
- 6 Ian R. Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill, 1991); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1997); Margaret H. McFadden, *Golden Cables of Sympathy: The Transatlantic Sources of Nineteenth-Century Feminism* (Lexington, KY, 1999); Bonnie S. Anderson, *Joyous Greetings: The First International Women's Movement, 1830-1860* (New York, 2000). For more nationally oriented examples of "women's work" scholarship, see Judith Pappachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy, 1898-1905: Exploring Gender in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Fall 1990): 493-509; Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s* (Chicago, 1993); Harriet Hyman Alonso, *The Women's Peace Union and the Outlawry of War, 1921-1942* (Syracuse, NY, 1997); Shannon Smith, "From Relief to Revolution: American Women and the Russian-American Relationship, 1890-1917," *Diplomatic History* 19 (Fall 1995): 601-16; Glen Jeansonne, *Women of the Far Right: The Mothers'*

In keeping with Rosenberg's enthusiasm for the analytical potential of gender ideology, there has been an outpouring of scholarship assessing how gender has affected U.S. perceptions of other countries and, conversely, world perceptions of the United States. The former has tended to emphasize the perceived effeminacy and domestic disarray of non-Westerners and nonallies; the latter, the icon of the American woman. When self-perceptions are added to the mix, writings on gender ideologies (generally recognized as being entangled with racial ideologies) have illuminated how individuals and the nation have positioned themselves in an international context.⁷

The outpouring of identity studies has led some foreign relations historians to question their relevance to the field.⁸ This view seems related to a conviction that government documents provide adequate explanations for international relations matters and to a tendency to portray policymakers as fully rational creatures who stand aloof from the surrounding culture. Yet as Frank Costigliola has shown, government documents can be rich sources of gendered discourse and policymakers have

Movement and World War II (Chicago, 1996); Rachel Waltner Goossen, *Women Against the Good War: Conscientious Objection and Gender on the American Home Front, 1941-1947* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, "Enfranchising Women of Color: Woman Suffragists as Agents of Imperialism," *Nation, Empire, Colony: Historicizing Gender and Race*, Ruth Roach Pierson and Nupur Chaudhuri, eds. (Bloomington, 1998), 41-56; Kristin Hoganson, "'As Badly off as the Filipinos': U.S. Women's Suffragists and the Imperial Issue at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Women's History* 13 (Summer 2001): 9-33.

- 7 On U.S. perceptions of other nations, see Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York, 1992); Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins, *Reading National Geographic* (Chicago, 1993); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire," *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, Ricardo Salvatore, eds. (Durham, NC, 1998), 69-106; Kelvin A. Santiago-Valles, "'Higher Womanhood' Among the 'Lower Races': Julia McNair Henry in Puerto Rico and the 'Burdens' of 1898," *Radical History Review* 73 (Winter 1999): 47-73; Emily S. Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 59-70; Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (New Haven, 2003); On gendered perceptions of the United States, see Emily S. Rosenberg, "Consuming Women: Images of Americanization in the 'American Century,'" *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999): 479-97, 497; Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, 2000); Mona Domosh, "Pickles and Purity: Discourses of Food, Empire, and Work in Turn-of-the-Century United States," *Social and Cultural Geography* 4 (March 2003): 7-26; Manuela Andrea Thurner, "Girlkultur and Kultur Feminismus: Gender and Americanism in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1999.
- 8 For a revealing look at the emotions and anxieties elicited by gendered approaches to foreign relations history, see "Gendered Discourse" online discussion, April 16-May 27, 1997, H-Diplo, <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=lm&list=h-diplo>.

been swayed by feelings. In an article on gender, pathology, and emotion, Costigliola has argued that George Kennan's Long Telegram "portrayed the Soviet government as a rapist, exerting 'insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command' over Western societies." Kennan figured the Russian people as feminine, the Soviet government as a cruel masculine authority, and himself as the "unrequited but true lover of the Russian people." The emotive force of this document delegitimated what Kennan called "intimate collaboration" with Moscow. According to Costigliola, Kennan's claims to realism camouflaged his emotion-laden tropes, thereby making his writings all the more powerful.⁹

Costigliola's findings suggest that culturally-oriented scholars could do more to link the milieus and mindsets they portray to specific decisions and events. But diplomatic historians can learn something even from analyses of the cultural contexts that inform foreign-policy decision making. Recognizing that culture is not determinative does not mean dismissing it as irrelevant. Michelle Mart's investigation of popular representations of Israel can serve as an example of a cultural study with foreign policy implications. Mart has found that "images of Jewish masculinity – the depiction of Jews as fighters, as masculine sex symbols, as underdogs who triumph over their enemies, and as protective father figures" – were applied to the nascent state of Israel as a whole. According to Mart, these favorable images, especially in juxtaposition to images of licentious and effeminate Arab men, helped foster the close political and military relationship between the U.S. and Israel.¹⁰ Melani McAlister also provides a cultural lens, heavily inflected by gender, for understanding the development of U.S. interests in the Middle East. One of the topics she covers in *Epic Encounters* is the Iranian hostage crisis. McAlister contends that the U.S. media focused on the familial positions of the U.S. hostages, thereby characterizing them as private individuals. This depoliticization of American officials "worked to construct the United States as a nation of innocents, a family under siege by outside threats and in need of a militarized rescue that operated under the sign of the domestic." Another superb study that joins cultural productions and U.S. foreign relations is Christina Klein's *Cold War Orientalism*. As part of her effort to illuminate the sentimental "global imaginary of integration" that existed alongside

9 Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1309–39, 1310. See also Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998).

10 Michelle Mart, "Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948–1960," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Summer 1996): 357–80, 361.

the “global imaginary of containment,” Klein discusses the rise of international adoptions. These, she argues, advanced a sense of international political obligation. Her reading of the interracial relationships in *South Pacific* probes the connections between antiracism and global expansion; her reading of *The King and I* links domestic ideology to political ideology, song and dance to ideals of international integration and Third World modernization.¹¹ Such analyses of popular culture remind us that the conduct of foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum. To focus only on the wranglings and high level meetings of the political, diplomatic, and military elite is to skim the surface of the past, to assume that earlier generations understood their world as we understand ours. To appreciate what seemed to be at stake in policy disputes and what assumptions officials brought to their meetings, we need to understand something of their culture.

What about the last vein of scholarship discussed in Rosenberg’s essay, on women in the global economy? Although searching under “women in development” is more likely to turn up policy papers than historical studies, social and economic historians have written numerous accounts of women’s productive and reproductive work. These have shown the importance of women to export-oriented production, national development, and the global political economy. Not only have “Third World” women, often stereotyped as submissive and nimble-fingered by employers, filled many of the low-paid positions on the global assembly line, but their household labor and other unpaid work has subsidized low wages, thereby enhancing the profits reaped by global capital.¹² In keeping

11 Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000* (Berkeley, 2001), 201; Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, 2003), 13, 23, 143–90, 210–11.

12 Kathryn Ward, ed., *Women Workers and Global Restructuring* (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 8. For some relatively contemporary studies, emerging from sociology, economics, and anthropology as well as history, see Edna Bonacich, Lucie Cheng, Norma Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton, and Paul Ong, eds., *Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim* (Philadelphia, 1994); Naila Kabeer, *Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought* (London: Verso, 1994); Christine E. Bose and Edna Acosta-Belén, eds., *Women in the Latin American Development Process* (Philadelphia, 1995); Eileen Boris and Elisabeth Prügl, eds., *Homeworkers in Global Perspective: Invisible No More* (New York, 1996); Nalini Visvanathan, Lynn Dagan, Laurie Nisonoff, and Nan Wiegertsma, eds., *The Women, Gender, and Development Reader* (London, 1997); Samita Sen, *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); Piya Chatterjee, *A Time for Tea: Women, Labor, and Post/Colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation* (Durham, NC, 2001); Ellen Israel Rosen, *Making Sweatshops: The Globalization of the U.S. Apparel Industry* (Berkeley, 2002); Nancy A. Naples and Manisha Desai, eds., *Women’s Activism and Globalization: Linking Local Struggles and Transnational Politics* (New York, 2002).

with the shift from women's to gender history, some scholars now prefer gender and development (GAD) to WID. This reconceptualization has made the field more receptive to studies of gender ideologies and the interrelationships between men and women.

In sum, Rosenberg's categories continue to be useful in characterizing the field. But are they sufficient? Or has the field taken unexpected turns over the course of the last decade?

As the shift from WID to GAD indicates, one significant development since 1990 is the growing attention to men and masculinity. The rise of men's history has provided the tools to systematically reappraise the men who have taken a leading role in foreign policy formulation. Diplomatic historians long have valued biographical and psychological studies of powerful men. But such approaches have emphasized unique personality characteristics and thereby deflected attention from larger patterns. Reassessing leaders with gender in mind has added greater historical depth to such studies by positioning individuals in a larger social and cultural context.

The growing attention paid to men as men has been uneven, insofar as the most militant (that is, stereotypically masculine) leaders have received the most coverage. Feminist historians have turned Theodore Roosevelt into a virtual poster boy for the utility of gender in foreign relations history.¹³ Yet, however nuanced, an emphasis on male pugnacity runs the risk of reifying the persistent gender gap on foreign policy issues. Before jumping to the conclusion that men are inherently and immutably warlike and women are inherently and immutably peaceable (and hence that gender analyses of foreign policy will reveal only the obvious), it is important to note that there have been innumerable instances in which the dichotomy between warlike men and peaceable women has not held true. Nor can a rigid dichotomy between warlike men and peaceful women explain why men have hotly debated foreign policy issues among themselves or why there is no significant gender gap on contemporary issues between male and female foreign policy insiders.¹⁴

In recent years, scholars such as Frank Costigliola, Emily S. Rosenberg, Carol Cohn, and Robert D. Dean have gone beyond Theodore Roosevelt and other markedly bellicose leaders to consider a broader range of

13 Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago, 1995); Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*; Alexander DeConde, *Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations* (Boston, 2000); Kathleen Dalton, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life* (New York, 2002); Sarah Watts, *Rough Rider in the White House: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of Desire* (Chicago, 2003).

14 McGlen and Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy*, chaps. 4–6.

diplomats, congressmen, financial advisors, and servicemen in light of gender.¹⁵ One of the most thoughtful treatments of masculinity in U.S. foreign relations is Mary A. Renda's *Taking Haiti*. Rather than merely categorize the U.S. marines who figure so prominently in her account as white men, Renda investigates how region, class, ethnicity, race, family relations, Marine Corps training methods, and more informal means of military socialization shaped their self-understandings. The result is a subtle analysis of white manhood that serves as a useful corrective to more monolithic treatments of this category. Although white manhood is not determinative in Renda's rendition, neither do white men exercise self-determination, for they face what she calls "cultural prescription" – the mobilizing power of dominant discourses. Renda regards paternalism as the most salient discourse shaping the U.S. occupation of Haiti. According to Renda, "paternalism should not be seen in opposition to violence, but rather as one among several cultural vehicles for it." If, on the one hand, paternalism encouraged U.S. occupiers to view their role as protective, on the other, it promoted violent "discipline." It fostered sympathy for the Haitians, but it also helped draw boundaries. In enabling U.S. Marines to act violently without losing a sense of their own righteousness, paternalism functioned as a military technology.¹⁶

By showing the importance of personal identities and social norms to decisionmaking and behavior in a variety of contexts, historians such as Renda have made the men involved in foreign relations seem less like disembodied agents of the state. Their gendered approaches have shown how men, like women, are culturally-situated human beings whose personal lives cannot be disentangled from their professional decisions. (This is not to say that personal lives should be regarded as deterministic. Historians need to assess whether and how personal experience affected public positioning in any given context.)

Along with the literature on masculinity, there has been an outpouring of scholarship on sexuality. Just as the growing interest in masculinity

15 Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1999); Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration"; Stanley D. Rosenberg, "The Threshold of Thrill: Life Stories in the Skies over Southeast Asia" (43–66); Lynda Boose, "Techno-Muscularity and the 'Boy Eternal': From the Quagmire to the Gulf" (67–106); Carol Cohn, "Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War" (227–46); all in *Gendering War Talk*, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds. (Princeton, 1993); Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, 2001). For an important non-U.S. study, see Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, UK, 1995).

16 Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, 2001), 15.

reflects the rise of men's studies, the growing attention to sexuality reflects the ascendance of queer theory, which has legitimated sexuality as a historical topic. Following the lead of John D'Emilio, several scholars have written on the McCarthy-era paranoia about homosexuality, efforts to purge homosexuals from the State Department, and the resulting imperative among the foreign policy elite to appear to embody heterosexual, hardline, anti-Communist masculinity. In one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Cold War "lavender scare," Robert D. Dean finds that the "sexual inquisition" made "respectable masculinity and sexual orthodoxy . . . the basis for political legitimacy and participation in the agencies of government."¹⁷

Scholars working on frontier, borderlands, and imperial history have produced a wide range of narratives stressing the significance of sexuality. In *Sex and Conquest*, Richard C. Trexler investigates how Iberians' views on sodomy affected their relations with Native Americans.¹⁸ Ramón A. Gutiérrez considers the sexual relations between pueblos and spaniards in *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away*. He argues that Pueblos interpreted their initial sexual liaisons with Spanish men as a means to transform Spanish malevolence. For their part, the Spaniards regarded sexual liaisons as a means to assert their power. Gutiérrez interprets the ensuing Spanish struggles to impose monogamy and control marriage as a key part of the colonial endeavor. In a more recent history of the southwest borderlands, James F. Brooks analyzes the exchange of women through captivity, adoption, and marriage. He discovers that "customs of captivity and servitude in pains Indian and New Mexican Society alike . . . facilitated economic and cultural exchanges that contributed directly to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations."¹⁹ In *Intimate Frontiers*, Albert L. Hurtado maintains that reproduction was of pivotal importance in struggles over what is now the U.S. West. "Family

17 Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*, 164. John D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940–1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1998); Geoffrey S. Smith, "National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States," *International History Review* 14 (May 1992): 307–37; K. A. Cuordileone, "'Politics in an Age of Anxiety': Cold War Political Culture and the Crisis in American Masculinity, 1949–1960," *Journal of American History* 87 (September 2000): 515–45. The topic of gays and lesbians in the military also has attracted historical attention. See Randy Shilts, *Conduct Unbecoming: Lesbians and Gays in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf* (New York, 1993); Allan Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two* (New York, 1990).

18 Richard C. Trexler, *Sex and Conquest: Gendered Violence, Political Order, and the European Conquest of the Americas* (Ithaca, NY, 1995).

19 Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846* (Stanford, 1991), 51, 76–77; James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, 2002), 79.

formation had much to do with who would control California," he declares.²⁰ The relevance of sexuality and family formation to imperial endeavors did not disappear with the coming of the twentieth century. Eileen J. Suárez Findlay deems the dissolution of marriage important to a later colonial encounter, the U.S. colonization of Puerto Rico. Colonial officials, she contends, strove not only to facilitate civil marriage but also to legalize divorce as part of their Americanization campaign. Also writing on Puerto Rico, Laura Briggs investigates how prostitution, birth control, over population, and sterilization became matters of colonial concern, means of colonial control, and points of colonial contention.²¹ Much of the writing on sexuality in a colonial context pays close attention to race. Kathleen M. Brown's *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs* broke ground in this respect by demonstrating the centrality of sexuality to constructions of racial difference in colonial Virginia. Similarly, Ann Laura Stoler has insisted that investigating the "tense and tender ties of empire" can lead historians to produce better histories of imperial racial politics.²²

Other scholars interested in sexuality have written on the significance of prostitution, fraternization, and sexual assault for U.S. relations with countries where it had a large military presence. Maria Höhn, for example, maintains that paying attention to the anxieties that surrounded sexual contacts between German women and U.S. GIs (particularly African-American GIs) can provide a counterpoint to triumphant accounts of West Germany's "Americanization." Petra Goedde, in contrast, concludes that relations between U.S. GIs and German civilians "made a significant contribution to the rapidity of U.S.-German rapprochement."²³

20 Albert L. Hurtado, *Intimate Frontiers: Sex, Gender, and Culture in Old California* (Albuquerque, 1999), xxi.

21 Eileen J. Suárez Findlay, *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870–1920* (Durham, NC, 1999), 111; Laura Briggs, *Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico* (Berkeley, 2002).

22 Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Ann Laura Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies," *Journal of American History* 88 (December 2001): 829–65, 865. See also Gary B. Nash, "The Hidden History of Mestizo America," *Journal of American History* 82 (December 1995): 941–62; Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 'History of Sexuality' and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC, 1995); Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, 2002).

23 Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill, 2002), 234; Goedde, *GIs and Germans*, xiv; Katharine H. S. Moon, *Sex among Allies: Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York, 1997); Mire Koikari, "Rethinking Gender and Power in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952," *Gender and History* 11 (July 1999): 313–35; Robert Shaffer, "A Rape in Beijing,

The topic of rape and other forms of sexual torture as instruments of war has garnered attention, as have efforts to mobilize public support for military intervention via reports of sexual violence.²⁴ As these studies reveal, sexuality has served both as an analytical tool for understanding U.S. foreign relations and as an international relations issue on its own accord. Historians covering the international components of issues such as abortion, contraception, prostitution, gay identity, female circumcision, and sexually transmitted diseases, have shown that the history of sexuality spills over national borders.²⁵

This brief, and by no means complete, overview of recent scholarship suggests that Rosenberg was on to something when she argued that gender has quite a lot to do with it. Yet in spotlighting scholarship sensitive to gender, I do not mean to exaggerate its significance to the field. Of the 224 dissertations touching on foreign affairs listed in the March 2002 *SHAFR Newsletter*, only fourteen allude to women, gender, or sexuality in their titles.²⁶ Nor do I wish to imply that gender should become *the* central analytical category for U.S. foreign relations history. Any topic as expansive as the United States in the world demands a multiplicity of approaches. My point is that an increasing number of foreign relations historians are recognizing the relevance of gender to their field. Even scholars whose primary interests lie outside gender history have paid attention to women and gender in their efforts to be comprehensive. In *To End all Wars*, an account of Woodrow Wilson's quest for a new world order, Thomas Knock stresses the importance of the women's peace lobby to the rise and fall of what he calls "progressive internationalism."²⁷ In *Embracing Defeat*, a study of the U.S. occupation of Japan, John Dower analyzes prostitution and the gender transformations wrought by the occupation, including the women's rights provisions written into the postwar Japanese

December 1946: GIs, Nationalist Protests, and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Pacific Historical Review* 69 (February 2000): 31–64.

24 Trexler, *Sex and Conquest*; Lynda Boose, "Techno-Muscularity and the 'Boy Eternal': From the Quagmire to the Gulf," *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds. (Durham, NC, 1993), 581–616; Nicoletta F. Gullace, "Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law during the First World War," *American Historical Review* 102 (June 1997): 714–47, 716.

25 Leslie J. Reagan, "Crossing the Border for Abortions: California Activists, Mexican Clinics, and the Creation of a Feminist Health Agency in the 1960s," *Feminist Studies* 26 (Summer 2000): 323–48; Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942* (New York, 2001); Dennis Altman, *Global Sex* (Chicago, 2001).

26 Edward A. Goedecken, "23rd Annual U.S. Foreign Affairs Doctoral Dissertations List," *SHAFR Newsletter* 33 (March 2002): 14–34.

27 Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, 1992).

constitution.²⁸ In *Comrades at Odds*, a book on U.S./India relations in the early Cold War, Andrew J. Rotter considers gender alongside strategy, economics, governance, race, religion, and other topics. He finds that Americans stereotyped Hindu men as weak, cowardly, emotional, flighty, and “given to talk rather than action.” In sum, they regarded them as effeminate. “Not so Hindu women, who had admirable backbone,” he writes. One result was that American leaders related better to their Pakistani counterparts, who struck them as “real men.”²⁹

The growing receptivity to gender analysis suggests that the challenge facing those who are interested in connecting gender to foreign relations history is shifting from demonstrating the relevance of gender to situating gender alongside strategic, economic, political, and other factors. Like approaches sensitive to class and race, gendered approaches to foreign relations history remind us that we cannot fully understand policymaking if we abstract it from the surrounding society and culture. Gender has had bearing on who has participated in international relations, what they have done, and why and how they have done it. But what is the “it” we are talking about? Gender is not the only thing that calls for explanation.

Whereas a decade ago gender historians had reason to regard themselves as interlopers, positioned on the margins of foreign relations history, now those who have guarded the gates of the foreign relations citadel have grounds to feel that their territory is being overrun by the social and cultural history hordes. Studies concerned with the International Council of Women, the hazing practices in boys’ boarding schools, and the intimacies between GIs and *Fräuleins* represent a departure in U.S. foreign relations history – a shift from state-to-state policy-oriented accounts to a more encompassing consideration of what should fall within the purview of U.S. foreign relations. As gender historians (along with other cultural and social historians) have tackled foreign relations topics, foreign relations historians have started to add new subjects, including human migration, international nongovernmental organizations, cultural expansion, borderlands contacts, and intellectual and imaginative engagement with other peoples and nations to their traditional focus on diplomacy and war. (I should note that each of these issues has a gender component.) As foreign relations history is drawing closer to cultural and social history, the boundaries between it and the rest of the discipline are becoming less clear. Gender historians deserve part of the credit for this change in the

28 John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999), 123–38, 380.

29 Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY, 2000), 191, 219.

field, but they have been working in tandem with several important allies: feminist international relations theory, postcolonial studies, and the movement to internationalize the study of U.S. history.

Like feminist historians, feminist international relations theorists have pushed their discipline to recognize gender as a useful analytical category. Shortly before Rosenberg's essay appeared in the *Journal of American History*, Cynthia Enloe's *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases* made a case for the importance of women in international politics. Where were these women to be found? In her quest to make women visible, Enloe challenged assumptions about what constituted international politics. She proposed that tourists, diplomatic wives, immigrant domestic servants, and seamstresses employed by multinational corporations should all be considered as part of an international political system. "The international is personal," she insisted. What did this imply? "That governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than secrecy and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military hardware, but a steady supply of women's sexual services to convince their soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculine dignity and feminine sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood."³⁰

Other feminist international relations theorists have followed in Enloe's footsteps, urging the field to reach past the high politics of security policy to encompass transnationalism, world society, and the gendered effects of international processes. Feminist international relations theorists have called for an end to reifying nation states as actors, instead calling for an appreciation of the multiple voices and interests they encompass. They have advocated paying greater attention to the ways that masculinity has affected the conduct of international politics, assessments of the links between violence and gendered hierarchies, more scrutiny of the sex discrimination practiced by organizations such as the United Nations, an understanding of women's rights as human rights, and a rethinking of national security so that it truly means the well-being of all those who live within a given nation.³¹

30 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, 1990), 196–97. See also Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley, 1993).

31 V. Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in*

Policymakers may regard these studies as somewhat utopian, insofar as they tend to cast feminism as a panacea for military, economic, ecological, and other international insecurities, but historians can and have benefited from their efforts to reconceptualize international relations. By suggesting new topics and approaches and by framing some of the recent historical scholarship, feminist international relations theorists have worked in tandem with feminist historians to enlarge understandings of what counts as international relations. The stakes are high. As Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland have argued: "The exclusion of women's experience from the conceptualization of international relations has had negative consequences both for the discipline and for male and female inhabitants of the real world. A central hypothesis is that this exclusion has resulted in an academic field excessively focused on conflict and anarchy, and a way of practising statecraft and formulating strategy that is excessively focused on competition and fear."³²

The tremendous influence of postcolonial studies also has helped broaden the scope of international relations history. Postcolonial scholarship has manifested as much (if not more) interest in subalterns as in imperial overlords, in the daily negotiation of empire as in pivotal political moments, in individual consciousness as in governmental policy. The result has been a field international in orientation and yet not limited to (nor, perhaps, particularly interested in) interactions between nation-states. In its cast of characters and range of topics, it has cast a more inclusive (some might say less discriminating, others, less discriminatory) net than the imperial history it displaced. Although power is still central, it is also more diffuse in postcolonial accountings which are as likely to concern relations within households as among householders and the state. Along with race and class, gender lies at the heart of this field, for rather than regarding nations as coherent actors, it approaches them as internally divided constructions. Like feminist international relations theory, postcolonial studies teaches us that international history extends far beyond the halls of government, reaching even into

International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York, 1992); Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions* (London, 1994); Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, eds., *The "Man" Question in International Relations* (Boulder, 1998); Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations: An Introduction* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender Issues*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 1999); Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prügl, eds., *Gender Politics in Global Governance* (New York, 1999). See also Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds., *Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives* (New York, 1995).

- 32 Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, "Introduction," *Gender and International Relations*, Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds. (Buckingham, UK, 1991), 1-7, 5.

health clinics and bedrooms, involving not only officials but ordinary people, be they immigrants, suffragists, factory workers, or harem residents. Postcolonial scholarship reminds us to be wary of the master narratives (and narratives of mastery) from the past and to recognize that power and human agency have operated in many ways and in many contexts.³³

A third line of scholarship that has played a major role in redefining what the foreign relations "it" is all about is the scholarship aimed at internationalizing U.S. history. Recognizing that nation-centered approaches have failed to provide a historical basis for understanding contemporary transnational developments, U.S. historians have called for less provincial outlooks. Just as significantly, historians of the United States – particularly cultural and social historians – have been waking up to the ways in which the nation-centered historiographical tradition has obscured the importance of empire in shaping U.S. history. The result has been a new kind of U.S. history, greatly influenced by postcolonial studies, that mixes the local and global.³⁴ Like the postcolonial scholarship, this literature has foregrounded class, race, and gender. And like feminist IR theorists and postcolonial scholars, the internationalizing U.S. history movement has shown that international history cannot be limited to diplomatic exchanges and corporate boardrooms. To find international history, historians have turned to places like movie theaters, department stores, women's clubs, schools, and homes. In 1990, Rosenberg expressed concern that too much attention to women's work would underscore women's marginality to the male "it" of foreign relations history. But the end of the Cold War has lessened foreign relations historians' obsession with superpower conflict and led them to devote more energy to explaining globalization. As the foreign relations "it" has changed in response to academic currents and international developments, the traditional stuff of women's history

33 The postcolonial literature and the related literature from the new imperial history is far too vast to do justice to here, but a few examples that foreground gender include: Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill, 1994); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York, 1995); Kumari Jayawardena, *The White Woman's Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia during British Rule* (London, 1995); Reina Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and Representation* (New York, 1996); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997); Antoinette Burton, ed., *Gender, Sexuality, and Colonial Modernities* (New York, 1999).

34 Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC, 1998); C. Richard King, ed., *Postcolonial America* (Urbana, IL, 2000); Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, 2002); Paul Kramer, "Making Concessions: Race and Empire Revisited at the Philippine Exposition, St. Louis, 1901–1905," *Radical History Review* 73 (Winter 1999): 74–114.

has moved from the marginalized edge to the cutting edge of international history.

Domesticity as international history? Absolutely. Rosenberg's 1990 coverage of the WID scholarship suggested that women's daily life in Africa should count as foreign relations history. So why not daily life everywhere? Recent scholarship has shown that households have served as more than workplaces in a global economy. They have served as points of encounter for cosmopolitan consumers and sites of contestation in imperial endeavors. Kitchens became zones of contention in Cold War propaganda struggles *because* of their association with domesticity, not in spite of it.³⁵ There can be no international history without nations, and scholars working on nationalism have shown the importance of domestic imagery and norms in determining national identity and national belonging.³⁶ Going a step further, Amy Kaplan has argued that in the age of manifest destiny, "imperial domesticity" helped propel national expansion. "When we contrast the domestic with the market or political realm, men and women inhabit a divided social terrain, but when we oppose the domestic to the foreign, men and women become national allies against the alien . . . Thus another part of the cultural work of domesticity might be to unite men and women in a national domain and to generate notions of the foreign against which the nation can be imagined as home . . . Domestic in this sense is related to the imperial project of civilizing, and the conditions of domesticity often become markers that distinguish civilization from savagery."³⁷ In a similar vein, Laura Wexler maintains that images of the daily life on Admiral Dewey's flagship helped justify U.S. imperial

35 Rosemary Marangoly George, "Homes in the Empire, Empires in the Home" *Cultural Critique* (Winter 1993–94): 95–127; Deena Gonzalez, *Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820–1880* (New York, 1999); Vicente Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham, NC, 2000); Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, *Doméstica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence* (Berkeley, 2001); Kristin Hoganson, "Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865–1920," *American Historical Review* 107 (February 2002): 55–83; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997).

36 On the nation-as-woman trope, see Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger, eds., *Nationalisms and Sexualities* (New York, 1992); Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley, 1998); Nancy F. Cott, *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Lois A. West, ed., *Feminist Nationalism* (New York, 1997); Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcón, and Minoo Moallem, *Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State* (Durham, NC, 1999); Katrina Irving, *Immigrant Mothers: Narratives of Race and Maternity, 1890–1925* (Urbana, IL, 2000). On women and nation-building in diasporic communities, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

37 Amy Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," *American Literature* 70 (September 1998): 581–606, 582.

expansion at the turn of the twentieth century by deflecting attention from the violence of war and casting the imperial enterprise in terms of peaceful domesticity.³⁸ (Such analyses reflect the growing interest among U.S. women's historians in going beyond the women-as-victims paradigm to illuminate the class, racial, and national power wielded by wealthy, white, American women.) Before civil defense became known as "home-land defense," it still centered on homes.³⁹ Even diplomatic history, the old mainstay of foreign relations history, has a domestic component. Catherine Allgor has argued that in the eighteenth-century Russian court, when access to the royal person was everything, the social endeavors of women such as Louisa Catherine Adams were central to diplomacy.⁴⁰ Thanks to the influence of feminist international relations theory, postcolonial scholarship, the internationalizing U.S. history movement, and the post-Cold War redirection of foreign relations history, domestic history – sometimes in a very literal sense – is becoming international history.

If the domestic cannot be separated from the foreign, where should we look for international relations scholarship that touches on gender? Not just in *Diplomatic History* (although it has made an earnest effort to cover this topic) and not just in histories of policymakers, activist groups, military personnel, and chief executive officers. We need to look in family studies such as Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc's *Nations Unbound*, Aihwa Ong's *Flexible Citizenship*, and Linda Gordon's *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction*, all of which have shown the importance of diasporic family linkages to transnational practices and identities.⁴¹ We need to look in cultural and literary studies such as Vicente Rafael's *White Love*, Mari Yoshihara's *Embracing the East*, and Amy Kaplan's *The Anarchy of Empire* to discover gendered analyses of orientalism and the cultures of U.S. imperialism.⁴² We need to pay more attention to the people around the world (many of them women)

38 Laura Wexler, *Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill, 2000), chap. 1.

39 Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, 2000).

40 Catherine Allgor, "'A Republican in a Monarchy': Louisa Catherine Adams in Russia," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Winter 1997): 15–43.

41 Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne, PA, Gordon and Breach, 1994); Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC, 1999); Linda Gordon, *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction* (Cambridge, MA, 1999). See also Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago, 2001); Erika Lee, *At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943* (Chapel Hill, 2003).

42 Rafael, *White Love*; Mari Yoshihara, *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (New York, 2002); Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 2002).

whose lives have been touched by U.S. policies and practices. We need to follow the history of consumption, transnational history, world history, immigration history, borderlands histories, and histories of empire and displaced peoples. And don't forget women's, men's, and gender history and the history of sexuality.⁴³

Foreign relations historians may be concerned about their professional liminality in a discipline now dominated by cultural and social historians (gender historians among them). But they are faced with a moment of great possibilities, for foreign relations historians in tandem with their area studies colleagues can offer the discipline something that is in great demand – the rest of the world. Manuela Thurner ended a 1997 essay on the state of women's history by urging U.S. women's historians to look abroad, so that an international dialogue would enrich U.S. theoretical debates. I would posit that they should look abroad not only for methods and analytical insights, but also for subject matter.⁴⁴ It is profoundly ironic, given the long history of women's exclusion from full citizenship rights, that women's history (despite the examples cited above) is still largely bounded by the nation-state. Just as women's and gender history has helped revitalize foreign relations history over the past decade, bringing it into dialogue with leading concerns within the discipline, foreign relations history now can help women's and gender history go international.

This brings me back to the deans. To me, gender and international relations has come to seem intuitive. From AIDS to world population, gender has plenty to do with it. Why did a group of young men fly planes into skyscrapers on September 11? Why did the administration trot out Laura Bush to talk about the Taliban's treatment of women?⁴⁵ Why has the White House let it be known that Condi Rice pumps iron with the president? Who made the shoes on your feet and under what conditions? For those who continue to be skeptical, I would say that a lack of intuitiveness is what generates knowledge. Trying to fit things into categories that do not contain them neatly can lead us to reconsider those categories. That reconsideration is what has made recent work in gender and international relations history so vital.

43 See, for example, Louise Michele Newman, *White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States* (New York, 1999); Peter N. Stearns, *Gender in World History* (London, 2000); Estelle B. Freedman, *No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women* (New York, 2002).

44 Manuela Thurner, "Subject to Change: Theories and Paradigms of U.S. Feminist History," *Journal of Women's History* 9 (Summer 1997): 122–46. Thurner did look abroad for subject matter when writing her dissertation on gender and Americanism in Weimar Germany.

45 Emily S. Rosenberg addresses this point in "Rescuing Women and Children," *Journal of American History* 89 (September 2002): 456–465.

Race to Insight: The United States and the World, White Supremacy and Foreign Affairs

GERALD HORNE

"Race" has assumed an anomalous status in the historiography of foreign relations. Although scholars freely acknowledge that "race" is a "construction," an unscientific rendering at best, with little or no deeper meaning, it is nevertheless gaining prominence as a useful lens through which to view U.S. foreign relations – and the world itself.¹ This point is evident in the explosion of literature on "whiteness," which purports to explain how those who were warring "ethnically" on the shores of Europe are constructed racially as "white" upon landing on these shores. As race gains prominence as a useful tool of analysis, our thinking on this crucial subject becomes somewhat inverted. Whereas we once focused on how race and race relations shaped U.S. policy abroad, we are now concerned as well with how foreign affairs influenced race relations at home. Whatever our perspective, almost all scholars would agree that race, in the words Glenn C. Loury, "is a mode of perceptual categorization people use to navigate their way through a murky, uncertain social world."²

Most would agree also that we have only begun to scratch the surface of our subject. Scholarship needs to expand in time and space, whether our focus is on race, which is a slippery and elusive concept, or "racism," which is a stunning, multi-dimensional reality. It needs to incorporate more carefully the all-important realm of economics, especially economic development. It needs to move beyond Africans and African Americans (and the idea of whiteness) to the other victims of U.S. racism, including Native Americans, who were the first victims on this soil. In the realm

1 See e.g., Audrey Smedley, *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview* (Boulder, 1999); George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, 2002); Jan R. Carew, *The Birth of Paradise: Columbus and the Birth of Racism in the Americas* (Brooklyn, NY, 1994); Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore, 1996); Roger Daniels and Harry H.L. Kitano, *American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970).

2 Glenn C. Loury, *The Anatomy of Racial Inequality* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 17.

of foreign affairs, this scholarship needs to show more clearly that white supremacy was an impediment to U.S. national security and how the need to overcome this impediment, along with the militant struggle against domestic apartheid, began to erode white supremacy in the United States.

At the same time, moreover, scholars of race and of race and foreign affairs need to reach out to their counterparts in allied fields, particularly in the field of military history, where there is much to be gained from a careful analysis of how race and racism influenced war-fighting strategies and occupation policies, notably during the Spanish-American War and the subsequent U.S. rule over the Philippines and Cuba.

* * *

It is difficult to discuss American history intelligently without reference to the international context and to the question of race, especially the important role that slavery and Jim Crow played in the American political economy and the global pressure that forced both to retreat.³ At the same time, it is becoming increasingly common to view race as a factor in the global context and as one reason why certain nations have lagged behind the development of the United States. At times, these two notions are rather vaguely linked, with the rise of the United States and its partners in the charmed circle loosely, though not accurately, known as the West,⁴

3 See e.g., Jay Coughtry, *The Notorious Triangle: Rhode Island and the African Slave Trade, 1700–1807* (Philadelphia, 1981); David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (New York, 2000); Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York, 1954); Abram Harris, *The Negro as Capitalist: A Study of Banking and Business Among American Negroes* (Philadelphia, 1936); Herbert Klein, *The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Princeton, 1978); John McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British North America, 1607–1789* (Chapel Hill, 1978); Douglas C. North, *The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790–1860* (New York, 1966); Barbara L. Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (New York, 1991); John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (New York, 1992); Mira Wilkins, *The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1989). On Jim Crow see e.g., C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877–1913* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1951); Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (Charlottesville, VA, 1995); Adam Fairclough, *Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915–1972* (Athens, GA, 1995); Neil R. McMillen, *Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow* (Urbana, IL, 1989); Catherine Barnes, *A Journey from Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit* (New York, 1983); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930* (Urbana, IL, 1993); Steven Lawson, *Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969* (New York, 1976).

4 As an African American teaching at the University of Hong Kong a few years ago, it dawned on me that when the “West” or “Westerners” was being discussed, a person such as myself was not necessarily included, though Australians and New Zealanders to the east and the British to the West were (not to mention my Euro-American colleagues). Thus, it seemed to me that a geographic term was being enlisted in aid of shrouding a “racial” reality.

connected in a kind of reverse synergism to the underdevelopment of a good deal of Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁵

More typically, however, these various discourses often operate on separate tracks and even disparate chronologies. Much of the recent justly acclaimed work on race and foreign relations has – overwhelmingly – concerned African Americans over the past seven decades or so; when it has concerned Africa or other parts of the globe, it is usually as an adjunct of African American interest. This exciting branch of scholarship has taken various forms, including an insightful overview of the participation of African Americans in the global arena;⁶ a careful case study of one of the more profound intersections between Africans and African Americans on the global stage;⁷ a close and stimulating analysis focusing heavily on the Council on African Affairs, a black-led lobbying group on Africa that fell victim to the Red Scare;⁸ a well-researched study suggesting that the retreat of Jim Crow was a Cold War imperative;⁹ an intriguing examination of how the Cold War intersected with the Color Line at home and abroad;¹⁰ an eye-opening study of how a black religious denomination confronted the rise of U.S. imperialism,¹¹ and a solid and evocative examination of how African Americans in the U.S. State Department grappled with their often untenable position.¹²

5 See e.g., Joseph E. Inikori, *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development* (New York, 2002); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London, 1972); Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, 1944); Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, 2000); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, 1998). For a contrary viewpoint see e.g., David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some are So Poor* (New York, 1998).

6 See e.g., Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996).

7 William R. Scott, *The Sons of Sheba's Race: African-Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1941* (Bloomington, IL, 1993).

8 Penny von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997). See also Ruth Reitan, *The Rise and Decline of an Alliance: Cuba and African American Leaders in the 1960s* (East Lansing, MI, 1999).

9 Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2001).

10 Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

11 Lawrence S. Little, *Disciples of Liberty: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the Age of Imperialism, 1884–1916* (Knoxville, TN, 2000).

12 Michael Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969* (Armonk, NY, 1999). See also Gerald Horne, *Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963* (Albany, NY, 1986); Thomas Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia, MO, 1985); Elliott P. Skinner, *African Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Africa, 1850–1924* (Washington, DC, 1992); Sudarshan Kapur, *Raising up a Prophet: The African-American Encounter with Gandhi* (Boston, 1992); Ronald Walters, *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern*

Moreover, the reach of race in the U.S. has extended far beyond these shores. The African colony once known as Southern Rhodesia, for example, was settled early on by emigrating Euro-Americans, following the "closing of the frontier." Some of the staunchest Indian-fighters became even fiercer African-fighters. Of course, this colony also represents a useful example of the value of scrutinizing whiteness, particularly abroad, as this region was wracked with conflict between the British and the "Boers," which hampered the construction of a form of whiteness that would have bolstered white supremacy immeasurably. In any case, as the global climate on race began to change after World War II, U.S. backing of a racial tyranny of a small minority was clearly inconsistent with Washington's new posture as a paragon of human rights. Newly enfranchised African Americans helped to ensure that this inconsistency would be highlighted then resolved in favor of majority rule.¹³ Something similar occurred in neighboring South Africa.¹⁴

These works have helped to re-map the terrain of diplomatic history, even as they provoked a myriad of new questions that will keep scholars busy for some time. Of late, there has also developed an invigorating body of scholarship that looks at race in the Pacific, detailing African Americans' attempt to take advantage of China's and especially Japan's struggle against white supremacy.¹⁵ Likewise, the titanic pre-1945 struggle between Tokyo and Washington on the racial front and its contradictory aftermath has received rapt attention.¹⁶ This illustrious work suggests

Afrocentric Political Movements (Detroit, 1993); Alusine Jalloh and Stephen E. Mai-zlish, *The African Diaspora* (Austin, TX, 1996); Karink L. Stanford, *Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs* (Albany, NY, 1997).

13 See e.g., Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980* (Chapel Hill, 2001).

14 See e.g., George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York, 1981); George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa* (New York, 1995); George M. Fredrickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism and Social Movements* (Berkeley, 1997).

15 See e.g., Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000). See also Gerald Horne, "The Asiatic Black Man? Japan and the 'Colored Races' Challenge White Supremacy," *Black Renaissance* 4 (Number 1, Spring 2002): 26–38; Gerald Horne, "Tokyo Bound: African-Americans and Japan Confront White Supremacy," *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society* 3 (Number 3, Summer 2001): 11–28; Ernest Allen, Jr., "When Japan was 'Champion of the Darker Races': Satokata Takahashi and the Flowering of Black Messianic Nationalism," *Black Scholar: Journal of Black Studies and Research* 24 (Number 1, 1994): 23–46.

16 See e.g., John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986); Joseph Henning, *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations* (New York, 2000); Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999).

again that seeking to explain the retreat of Jim Crow in the United States without reference to the global context is misguided at best. It also reveals the insight to be gained when *race* is discussed beyond the usual confines of the Atlantic Basin. Moreover, because previous scholarship generally ignored the salient issue of race and the Pacific, the United States and the world were taken aback when this question erupted stunningly as the Cold War was winding down, in a muted replay of the Pacific War decades earlier.¹⁷

A fruitful branch of this scholarship on race has been post-colonial studies. Though veering in various directions, this work – as Emily Rosenberg notes cogently in this volume – has brought to the fore insights that diplomatic historians ignore at their peril.¹⁸ Fundamentally, this branch of writing has enriched our understanding of colonialism in the first place but inevitably has influenced our conceptions of race as well.

In any case, post-colonial scholarship on race and foreign affairs has garnered substantial attention not least because it is so revelatory concerning the United States itself. By placing race near the center of their analysis, many post-colonial scholars not only have ratified the critical and strategic importance of this construction to the fate of the United States but have also noted, given the outsized role Washington has played in the world, how race needs to be integrated into our conceptions of global development.

Nevertheless, this body of work generally has not engaged the discourse foreshadowed in a previous reference, that is, the work of Walter Rodney, Joseph E. Inikori, Eric Williams, Kenneth Pomeranz, Andre Gunder

17 See e.g., Pat Choate, *Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System* (New York, 1990); Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation* (New York, 1989); Clyde V. Prestowitz, *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York, 1988); Marvin J. Wolf, *The Japanese Conspiracy: Their Plot to Dominate Industry World-Wide and How to Deal with It* (New York, 1983); R. Taggart Murphy, *The Weight of the Yen: How Denial Imperils America's Future and Ruins an Alliance* (New York, 1996); Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York, 1997); Ivan P. Hall, *Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop* (New York, 1998); Stephanie Epstein, *Buying the American Mind: Japan's Quest for U.S. Ideas in Science, Economic Policy and the Schools* (Washington, DC, 1991); Ivan P. Hall, *Bamboozled! How America Loses the Intellectual Game with Japan and its Implications for our Future in Asia* (Armonk, NY, 2002).

18 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 1–56, 30, 38; see also Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London, 1992); Anthony Kwame Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York, 1992); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, 1961); Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca, NY, 1991).

Frank, and others. This work speaks much more directly to issues pertaining to economic development – or the lack thereof – in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia; it ranges further back in time than the twentieth century; and engages the construction that is race. Indeed, this literature helps us to understand how race itself was – and is – grounded in economic inequality and attempts to construct and maintain economic hegemony. The scholarship of Walter Rodney, in particular, sheds light on the symbiotic relationship between Europe and Africa, whiteness and blackness, development and underdevelopment. More precisely, as Rodney sees it, modernity and Euro-American wealth itself – and the subliminal racial baggage that it carries – was built upon the foundations of slavery, the slave trade, and its hand-maiden, colonialism.

Unfortunately, the reverse is also true: although there are obvious parallels and confluences between these two schools, those with an economic bent who have engaged more directly events beyond the shores of the United States typically have not confronted the scholarship pertaining to African Americans and/or U.S. foreign policy toward Asia and Africa, particularly as it pertains to the frontal engagement with race. This is unfortunate, especially because African Americans, whose hyphenated designation signifies their presence in more than one camp, are a logical window through which to view the antipodes of the planet – the developed United States and the lagging continent that is Africa. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the underdevelopment of a nation such as Angola (to cite one example among many) without comprehending how its advance was retarded as a result of intrigue spearheaded by Washington and apartheid South Africa, the former welterweight champion of white supremacy.¹⁹

The school of thought represented by Rodney, Inikori, Williams, and others has the benefit of economics on its side, whereas post-colonial scholarship and the work that draws heavily on the African-American experience has the advantage of a socio-political and even cultural analysis. A betrothal between these two schools of scholarship would be a happy event. Such a wedding would serve multiple purposes. It would expose more sharply the reality that the rise of the West was tied inextricably to the decline of Africa particularly and the exploitation of enslaved

19 See e.g., Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, 2002). See also David Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago, 1991). For comparative purposes see e.g., Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York, 1995); Nancy Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

Africans more generally. It would suggest further that the climb out of economic torpor by those left behind in Africa was connected closely to the rising freedom struggle of peoples of color in the United States, especially African Americans, whose successful claim to the rights of full citizenship enabled them to press the cause of decolonization more effectively. Finally, such a marriage would also link more closely the course of economic development in Africa and Asia, a linkage that exists but is hardly acknowledged in the extant scholarship.

However, a nonexclusive relationship might be the optimal way to proceed. For if a grand, unified theory of race and development is to emerge, we must engage yet another school of thought that has escaped close scrutiny both by scholars of foreign affairs who engage race and by scholars who plumb the lagging economic development of the planet's majority. In short, before race goes to the altar, it should be expanded to cover more than the usual areas of Asia, Africa, and African America. Indeed, we must not forget that when European settlement began in the Americas, there were numerous independent nations with independent foreign policies on this territory. These indigenous nations often clashed sharply with the colonists, then Washington, and were quite willing to align with London or Paris or Berlin. Indigenous Americans, too, were subject to the ideology and practice of race and racism and, in many ways, formed the template that was to be deployed by the United States against enslaved Africans and others.²⁰

Likewise, because the scholarship on "race" and foreign affairs generally has been limited chronologically, there has not been a satisfactory scrutiny of the portentous words of Founding Father Benjamin Franklin, who remarked that "the number of purely white People in the World is proportionately very small." Even among Europeans, he continued, "the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes are generally of what we call a swarthy complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who with the English, make the principal body of White People on

20 See e.g., Vine Deloria and Baymond J. DeMallied, eds., *Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, 1175-1979*, 2 volumes (Norman, OK, 1999); Robert Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York, 1978); Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagisms and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (Berkeley, 1983); Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building* (Minneapolis, 1980); Benjamin Ringer, *"We the People" and Others: Duality and America's Treatment of its Racial Minorities* (New York, 1983); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA, 1982). See also Alison R. Bernstein, *American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs* (Norman, OK, 1991); Ward Churchill, *Fantasies of the Master Race* (Monroe, ME, 1992); Ward Churchill, *Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North America* (Monroe, ME, 1994).

the Face of the Earth.”²¹ Our insufficient plumbing of the busy intersection where race collides with foreign affairs leaves us today with an insufficient understanding of the meaning of Franklin’s words and how they may have influenced foreign affairs. Certainly race was a major factor in relations between the colonists, then Washington, and the indigenous population, helping to explain why the latter often was more inclined toward alliances with Europeans than accord with those with whom they shared the soil of North America.²² Just as the United States assumes that the minority and besieged Kurds of Iraq will lend Washington a willing ear, antagonists of the United States have felt similarly about this nation’s minorities. Thus, an exploration of race provides deeper insight into diplomacy, and vice versa.

Similarly, Benjamin Franklin’s exclusion of so many Europeans from the hallowed halls of whiteness should remind those who may have forgotten that this particular racial construction is far from being static. It has evolved and, in fact, has been quite elastic. This peculiar body of scholarship on race and whiteness has various permutations but essentially these scholars have engaged a fundamental question: How was it those who had warred on the shores of Europe – English vs. Irish, French vs. German, Russian vs. Pole, and so on – were constructed as white upon reaching these shores and becoming assimilated?²³ This work

- 21 This quotation is taken from Liam Riordan, “‘The Complexion of My Country’: The German as ‘Other’ in Colonial Pennsylvania,” in Colin G. Calloway, Gerd Gemunden and Susanne Zantop, eds., *Germans and Indians: Fantasies, Encounters, Projections* (Lincoln, NE, 2002), 97–119, 99. See also R. L. Bieseke, “The Relations Between the German Settlers and Indians in Texas, 1844–1860,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 31(1927): 116–129; Terry G. Jordan, *German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in Nineteenth-Century Texas* (Austin, TX, 1966); Harry Liebersohn, *Aristocratic Encounters: European Travelers and North American Indians* (New York, 1998); George Allyn Newtown, “Images of the American Indian in French and German Novels of the Nineteenth Century,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1979; Christian F. Feest, ed., *Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays* (Lincoln, NE, 1999).
- 22 See e.g., Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (New York, 1995); Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore, 1997); Bernhard Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1980); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991).
- 23 See e.g., David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York, 1991); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Ian Haney-Lopez, *White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race* (New York, 1996); Louise Newman, *White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of American Feminism* (New York, 1998); Grace Elizabeth Hale, *Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890–1940* (New York, 1998); Theodore Allen, *The Invention of the White Race. Volume I, Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York, 1994); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995); Alexander Saxton, *The Rise*

has shed new light on the curbing of inter-ethnic antagonism in this nation (the decline of bigotry directed against Irish Catholics, to cite one example), on how "racism" was constructed, and other allied inquiries. It has been less successful in shedding light on how the polyglot European population of this nation may have complicated Washington's relations with European powers during World War I and other tense moments.²⁴ In other words, the fact that this race scholarship has not confronted adequately the scholarship of foreign affairs has weakened both fields.

Similarly, the rise of U.S. imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, an epochal turning point in American history, has been addressed from many angles but race has not been centrally conspicuous among them.²⁵ This is surprising because U.S. imperialism resulted in newly minted "neo-colonial" relationships with "non-European" peoples in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific, more specifically, Cuba and the Philippines. It is also surprising in light of the explosion of new scholarship on Asian Americans and Latinos that is quite sensitive to racial matters.²⁶ And it is even more troubling given the outsized role played by

and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1990).

24 See e.g., John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New York, 1978).

25 See e.g., David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1970); David Creighton Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903" (New Haven, 1982); H.W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York, 1992); Richard Welch, *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902* (Chapel Hill, 1979); Daniel Schirmer, *Republic or Empire? American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA, 1972); Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (New York, 1968); Philip S. Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–1902* (New York, 1972); Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); see also Richard Graham, ed., *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940* (Austin, TX, 1990).

26 See e.g., Mae Ngai, "Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens: U.S. Immigration Policy and Racial Formation, 1924–1945," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1998; Robert Lee, *Oriental: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia, 1999); Gary Ok-ihito, *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture* (Seattle, 1994); Oscar Campomanes, "Filipino-American Post-Coloniality and the U.S.-Philippines War of 1898," Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1999. See also Rubin Weston, *Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893–1946* (Columbia, SC, 1972). Tomas Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley, 1994); Mario Barera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (South Bend, IN, 1979); Arnold De Leon, *They Called them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821–1900* (Austin, TX, 1983); Robert J. Rosenbaum, *Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest: "The Sacred Right of Self-Preservation"* (Austin, TX, 1981); Neil Foley, "Becoming Hispanic: Mexican Americans and the Faustian Pact with Whiteness," *Reflexiones* (1997): 53–70; Bruce A. Glasrud, "Enforcing White Supremacy in Texas, 1900–1910," *Red River Valley Historical Review* 4 (Fall 1979): 65–74.

African American soldiers in the U.S. military. This role was a byproduct of several factors, including a dearth of opportunities for this racial minority elsewhere, the reluctance to commit to battle European immigrants with questionable loyalties, and the reluctance of Euro-Americans generally to endure the hardship and low pay of the military. Whatever the factors involved, the heavy reliance on Negro troopers was one of the major, although little acknowledged, reasons why the system of white supremacy they were bound, ironically and paradoxically, to protect, was compelled to retreat.²⁷ This became clear when the approach of World War I was coupled with unrest along the Mexican border. This unrest included the spectacular and apocalyptic "Plan of San Diego," which involved an attempt to take back the vast territories seized by the United States from its southern neighbor decades earlier, liquidate the "Anglo" men, and construct independent Native American and African American republics. Supposedly, Mexico, Germany, and Japan were all involved in this ominous plot.²⁸

Simultaneously, white supremacy endured one of its most searching and far-reaching crises since the halcyon days of Nat Turner and John Brown when armed Negro soldiers slated for combat went on a rampage in Houston in 1917 as the Mexican border was aflame and Europe was ablaze.²⁹ This was not the first time that gun-wielding African Americans had been accused of subverting the racial order by demanding equality at gunpoint. Indeed, the inflamed incident along the border in Brownsville, Texas in 1906 was said to have spurred a campaign to remove Negro troopers from this sensitive location. And this campaign in turn facilitated the ability of Mexican revolutionaries to push forward their campaign to dislodge Porfirio Diaz from power, which took place less than five years

27 See e.g., James N. Leiker, *Racial Borders: Black Soldiers Along the Rio Grande* (College Station, TX, 2002); Arthur Barbeau and Florette Harris, *The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I* (Philadelphia, 1974); Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York, 1986); Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC, 1982); John M. Carroll, ed., *The Black Military Experience in the American West* (New York, 1971); Garna L. Christian, *Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899–1917* (College Station, TX, 1995); Marvin E. Fletcher, *The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891–1917* (Columbia, MO, 1974); Jack D. Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective* (New York, 1974); Willard Gatewood, *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana, IL, 1975); Willard Gatewood, *'Smoked Yankees' and the Struggle for Empire* (Urbana, IL, 1971).

28 James A. Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego, 1904–1923* (Norman, OK, 1992). See also Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago, 1981).

29 See Robert V. Haynes, *A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1976). See also Richard O. Hope, *Racial Strife in the U.S. Military* (New York, 1979).

later.³⁰ These developments, combined with the inability of U.S. elites to treat Mexicans as anything more than inferior racial subjects, accelerated the radicalization process south of the border. In this sense, the issue of race, however submerged, goes a long way toward explaining one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century: the Mexican Revolution.³¹

The searing contradiction of relying upon Negro soldiers to defend a white supremacist state was becoming intolerable, and increasing numbers of Americans came to recognize this. Inevitably there was a response. The level of racial integration and affirmative action in the institution most responsible for maintaining U.S. national security, the military, now dwarfs that in other major institutions, including big business, universities, and the press.³² General Colin Powell is merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Once again, one espies the value of comprehending domestic realities by peering through the lens of race and foreign affairs and vice versa, which presupposes comprehending how white supremacy at home was coming to jeopardize U.S. national security.

It took a while for this simple truth to dawn. One of the many lessons of the conflict in Vietnam³³ that has not been fully digested is that it will be quite difficult for the United States to become embroiled in a lengthy foreign conflict as long as the military here is heavily reliant on African Americans and other aggrieved minorities, and as long as these groups retain unresolved grievances. Although somewhat attenuated, the fundamental conflict between white supremacy and national security also continues to resonate.

Still, this worthwhile focus on race should not distract us from similarly nettlesome matters. Tony Smith has been among those scholars who have sought to place the matter of race in a larger context. He writes of those who "often assert that black, Asian or Hispanic Americans may have very different agendas for U.S. foreign policy from that which

30 See Ann J. Lane, *The Brownsville Affair: National Crisis and Black Reaction* (Port Washington, NY, 1971); John D. Weaver, *The Brownsville Raid* (New York, 1971); John D. Weaver, *The Senator and the Sharecropper's Son: Exoneration of the Brownsville Soldiers* (College Station, TX, 1997).

31 Michael J. Gonzales, *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1940* (Albuquerque, NM, 2002); Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920*, 2 volumes (New York, 1986); Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, *The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905–1924* (New York, 1982).

32 Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and John Sibley Butler, *All that We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York, 1996); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military* (New York, 1970).

33 See e.g., James Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York, 1997); Clyde Taylor, ed., *Vietnam and Black America: An Anthology of Protest and Resistance* (Garden City, NY, 1973); Stanley Goff, *Brothers: Black Soldiers in the Nam* (Novato, CA, 1982); Robert W. Mullen, *Blacks and Vietnam* (Washington, DC, 1981).

Euro-Americans have established as in the national interest.” These groups, he writes, may actually “contest the notion of ‘the national interest’ itself, alleging that it is permeated with ethnoracial considerations” they do not share. This has often been the case with African Americans, for example, whose “hopes for U.S. foreign policy did not meld with geopolitical thinking in Washington as easily as did the concerns of Jewish or Euro-Americans. For many blacks, the problem of racism and white rule in Africa outweighed concerns about the dangers of communism and Soviet expansion [sic] in that region – a perspective not shared by many others in Washington”³⁴ Certainly those in the United States who have backed Israel are not acting in a manner inconsistent with the hegemonic tendencies of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, unlike those who questioned the primacy of anti-communism, and unlike African Americans who challenged Washington’s policy in South Africa. Again, this could be of major domestic consequence, reinforcing the idea in the minds of some that African Americans were not sufficiently “patriotic.”

African-Americans have not only been in inherent conflict with the foreign policy establishment. They also have not been in total accord with what one might think of as their natural allies in the anti-corporate globalization movement. Of course, being mostly working class, African Americans and Latinos in particular have had good reason to complain about the export of jobs said to be brought by the mania toward “free trade,” or more precisely, “free investment.” On the other hand, those who oppose corporate-led globalization have done so frequently in the name of protecting U.S. sovereignty against the encroachments of foreign bodies, even though it is the international community that often has had to step forward to compel U.S. authorities to retreat from Jim Crow and other ills. In this sense, encroaching on U.S. sovereignty is not necessarily viewed as baneful by many minorities.³⁵

34 Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 43, 60; see also Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston, 1992); Nadav Safran, *The United States and Israel* (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Louis L. Gerson, *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy* (Lawrence, KS, 1964); Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994* (Baltimore, 1996); Yossi Shain, *Marketing the Democratic Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (New York, 1999); Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (Cambridge, MA, 1993); Paul Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Westport, CT, 1984).

35 Alan Tonelson, *The Race to the Bottom: Why a Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled Free Trade are Sinking American Living Standards* (Boulder, 2000). Jeffrey E. Gartein, *The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How they Will Change our Lives* (New York, 1997); Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Koster, eds., *Trade and Wages* (Washington, DC, 1994); William Wolman and Ann Colamosca, *The Judas Economy: The Triumph of Capital and the Betrayal of Work* (Reading, MA, 1997).

This illustrates once more that insight into race and foreign affairs illuminates not least our understanding of the domestic. Above all, insight into race sheds critical light on the planet we inhabit. Hence, it is apparent that the scholarship on race could benefit mightily from a deeper engagement with the scholarship of diplomacy and foreign affairs, and vice versa. These fields of scholarship have been operating on parallel tracks but have intersected all too infrequently. Now is the time for this to change.

*Memory and Understanding U.S. Foreign Relations**

ROBERT D. SCHULZINGER

It used to be obvious. History happened. People's memories were true or false or some mixture of the two. The historian's task consisted of discovering what happened and shaping a coherent narrative. That job often involved exploring participants' memories of actual events. But historians regularly affirmed that contemporaneous, documentary (customarily written) evidence gave a truer, more faithful, or more accurate account of what actually happened than did individuals' fallible memories. Historians considered the written record produced at the time to be rich and immutable. Traditionally-trained historians did not dismiss or ignore personal memories, but they were on their guard to consider them malleable, fragile, and, worst of all in the positivist tradition, inaccurate.

We now know that this traditional view of the relationship between events, documents, memories and history is not so much obvious as it is simplistic. As Peter Burke, a historian who made uses of popular and collective memories, observed in 1989 "both history and memory are becoming increasingly problematic." Where once remembering the past and writing about it were considered to be straightforward, transparent activities, now "neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer." Historians and others engaged in recollecting the past consciously and unconsciously make judgments about what is important, and therefore worth recalling, and what is trivial. History and memory are both considered socially conditioned.¹

Historians have become alert to three different, interrelated phenomena: 1) How people have remembered, distorted and forgotten the past; 2) How these memories affected present thought and actions; and 3) How people in power have made use of their own and others' memories in the conduct of their affairs. Memories form a bridge between past and

* I gratefully acknowledge the help of the following friends and colleagues who read and commented on earlier drafts of this chapter: Colin Dueck, David L. Gross, Diane B. Kunz, Roland Paris, Michael Schaller, and Thomas W. Zeiler.

1 Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," Thomas Butler, ed., *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind* (Oxford and New York, 1986), 97-98.

present. What people choose to recall, forget and change in the process set the context of what people think is important in the present. Historians of foreign relations have traditionally focused their attention on people in power.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations are likely to be familiar and comfortable with the substantial literature on how officials use their own personal recollections and collective memories in conducting affairs of state. These studies explain how policy-makers' personal or borrowed memories of the past affect their conduct of foreign affairs. Memories sometimes change with changing circumstances.

Several examples of the way policy-makers make use of memories come from the works of political scientists who make use of historical information. Robert E. Jervis noted in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* that personal experiences often "exercise too great an influence over a person's predilections." He cited numerous examples of political leaders blinded by their own past experiences to present realities. But he also turned this analysis upside down and showed how leaders changed what they remembered having happened in the past based on present circumstances. He explained that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's beliefs about the causes of the failure of the League of Nations changed as he received new information about the shape of the postwar world."²

Another good example of the role of memory in policy-making appeared in the work of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. In *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (1986), Neustadt and May provided a series of cases studies on ways in which policy-makers have made use of their past experiences. One of their cases explained the ways President Lyndon B. Johnson and his principal lieutenants made use of their own memories of the experiences of President Harry Truman and his advisers during the Korean War in deciding on escalation in Vietnam in 1965. Neustadt and May observed the many differences in the personal experiences of Johnson and his primary advisers. Johnson did not personally feel Truman's anguish during Korea, since LBJ had actually profited politically from Truman's difficulties. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy had been teaching at Harvard when the Korean War undermined the Democratic Party's prospects in 1952. That did not bother the Republican Bundy, who supported Dwight Eisenhower for president in 1952. Secretary of State Dean Rusk remembered Chinese intervention during the Korean War and stressed the importance of keeping China out of Vietnam. For Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,

2 Robert E. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 239, 225.

who was a Ford Motor Company executive in the 1950s, Neustadt and May commented, the Korean War “might as well not have occurred.” Vice President Hubert Humphrey did have first-hand personal experience of how devastating the Korean War had been for Truman and other Democrats, and the Vice President objected to escalation. But Humphrey was not one of Johnson’s favorites, and the president paid little attention to his advice.³

Other political scientists have also explored how events in the living memory of policy-makers have shaped their conduct of affairs. Yuen Foong Khong examined the way in which policy-makers used the analogies of the Korean War, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and the Munich Crisis in deciding upon escalation of American participation in Vietnam. Khong distinguished between public and private lessons. The former involved the statements officials made to the public, the latter contained the personal recollections policy-makers had of earlier events.⁴ Similarly, Richard Melanson investigated the way in which foreign policy-makers in the Carter administration applied their personal recollections and what they had read about the early Cold War and the Vietnam War to reformulate foreign policy.⁵

Roland Paris has described the debate over the role the United States should play in Kosovo in 1999 as a “metaphor war.” Members of the Clinton administration and Congress promoted certain metaphors and discredited others as they justified or opposed NATO bombing of Serbia. As participants framed the debate over American policy in Kosovo they made use of their own memories. They also asked others to recall the recent past. Supporters of the policy referred to the Holocaust. President Bill Clinton likened Serb atrocities to those of the Nazis. “Let me remind you,” Clinton told the nation before commencing bombing Serbia, “when President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia seven years ago, the world did not act quickly enough to stop him. Let’s not forget what happened. Innocent people were herded into concentration camps.” Opponents referred to Vietnam. Republican Senator Slade Gorton warned against involvement in a war “with less justification than there was in Vietnam.” Another opponent urged Congress to “remember Dien Bien Phu, when many of his key advisers pressured President Eisenhower to send our armed forces to help bail out the French.”⁶

3 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York, 1986), 160–64.

4 Yen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, 1992), 97–117.

5 Richard Melanson, *Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam and Revisionism* (Lanham, MD, 1983).

6 Quoted in Roland Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 117, 3 (Fall 2002) 426–28.

The debate over the Clinton administration's conduct in the Balkans is an excellent case for future historians of American foreign relations to explore the role of memories in setting policies. Everyone brought certain personal and political memories to the debate. The memories were not, however, immutable. People used different memories of that previous century to buttress their cases. The biographies of the principals played a role in what they thought, did, and said. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, soaked in the history of East Central Europe, heard echoes of Nazi barbarism in the Balkans. President Clinton remembered his own opposition to the war in Vietnam. Yet as president, he also expressed greater sympathy for the dilemma's confronting Lyndon Johnson as he escalated the American role in Vietnam. "I now see how hard it was for Johnson," Clinton said en route to a visit to Vietnam in November 2000.⁷ Opponents of Clinton's bombing of Serbia, mostly but not exclusively among opposition Republicans, gleefully recalled how congressional opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policies helped wreck his presidency. All the participants in the debate over Kosovo called on others to remember.

While historians of U.S. foreign relations have regularly explored the ways in which officials use their personal memories to conduct statecraft, they have had less experience explaining the role of popular or collective memories. But recently historiography generally has become more alert to voices of ordinary people. As writers have produced history from the bottom up, the role of popular memories has taken on greater significance. Studies of memory and forgetting (often considered memory's opposite), have exploded.

The serious study of memory as a social phenomenon began in the 1920s in the work of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. He argued that social groups determined what is worth remembering and how it should be remembered. The social construction of memory is so powerful, Halbwachs contended that individuals often "remember" events that they themselves have not experienced directly.⁸

In 1989 Paul Connerton explained in *How Societies Remember* how memory, often considered an individual faculty, could also be a social process. Groups of people had shared memories. The recollections served either to fortify or weaken the existing social order. Social memory became a powerful political force. Connerton also noted how some of the central themes of psychoanalysis applied to the political importance of memory. People brought the past into the present either by acting out or

7 "Clinton Softens Views on Vietnam War," http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20001114/pl/clinton_interview_1.html.

8 Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la memoire* (Paris, 1925); Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*. Translated by Francis Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazda Ditter (New York, 1980); Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*. Translated by Lewis Coser (Chicago, 1992).

remembering. Instead of seeking out or explaining the origins of events, people relived the past in the grips of unconscious wishes or fantasies. When someone acts out, he or she repeats an old experience – usually without acknowledging – in other words, willfully forgetting the origin. Acting out actually repressed memories. Remembering, on the other hand, often had a healing or therapeutic effect. By acknowledging past events, either painful or pleasant, people are able to place the past appropriately and go on living in the present. Connerton stressed that public commemorative ceremonies, at which ordinary people reenacted the past, looked at historical artifacts, or paid homage at memorials were for centuries a primary way in which people remembered the past. He also noted a sacred, religious or mystical quality to many public commemorative ceremonies that delivered emotional meaning to participants.⁹

Since 1989 studies proliferated on memory in politics, literature, film, and art.¹⁰ There is a journal edited at Tel Aviv University titled *History and Memory*. As Wojciech H. Kalaga and Tadeusz Rachwał, a literary theorist and a cultural theorist respectively at the University of Silesia, observed in 1999, “at the turn of the millennium, memory has emerged as one of the key notions of the contemporary paradigm.”¹¹ Dominick LaCapra, an intellectual historian surveying the fascination with history and memory, wrote in 1998, “recently the concern with the problem of

9 Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, MA, 1989). See chapter 1, “Social Memory,” 6–40 and chapter 2, “Commemorative Ceremonies,” 41–71.

10 Among the most useful for students of foreign relations is David Lowenthal, *The Past Is Another Country* (Cambridge, UK, 1985). Lowenthal speculated on why people in contemporary America, a country usually thought to be unburdened by the past, seemed to be “saturated with ‘creeping heritage.’ . . . Once confined to a handful of museums and antique shops, the trappings of history now festoon the whole country.” The answers were complex. A subject involving personal and social recollections, the changing boundaries of writing history, new forms of literature, the nostalgic sense of loss of a better past, and new techniques of preserving artifacts of the past required explanations ranging over understandings of power, psychology, hopes and fears for the future, regrets and longing for an imagined past, and techniques of preservation. Lowenthal did comment on why Americans in the 1980s might seek solace in nostalgia: “Long uprooted and newly unsure of the future, Americans *en masse* find comfort in looking back,” xv. The other theoretical works on memory useful to scholars of American foreign relations are: Marie-Noelle Bourget, Lucette Valensi and Nathan Wachtel, eds. *Between Memory and History* (Chur, Switzerland, 1990); John R. Gillis, ed., *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, 1994); David Gross, *Lost Time: On Remembering and Forgetting in Late Modern Culture* (Amherst, 2000); Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, NH, 1993); Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory* (New Brunswick, 1993); David Ferrell Krell, *Of Memory, Reminiscence and Writing: On the Verge* (Bloomington, IN, 1990); Susanne Kuchler and Walter Melion, *Images of Memory: On Remembering and Representation* (Washington, DC, 1991); Erna Paris, *Long Shadows: Truth, Lies and History* (New York, 2001).

11 Wojciech H. Kalaga and Tadeusz Rachwał, *Memory – Remembering – Forgetting* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 7.

memory has become so widespread and intense that one is tempted to take a suspicious view and refer to fixation." LaCapra warned that the most negative sort of the popular preoccupation with memory sometimes descended into schmaltzy sentimentality. Notwithstanding the danger that popular memories could slide into a prettified past – a sort of cultural Disneyland – expressions of memory also showed that the past lived in the present.¹²

Just as much of the theoretical work on history and memory developed in Europe before it came to the United States, a large literature has appeared on specific aspects of the interplay between popular memory, the writing of history, and current public policy in places other than the United States. A brief survey of this writings helps place in perspective the way in which studies of memory can enhance the understanding of the history of U.S. foreign relations.

The most relevant works on popular memory outside the United States involve the impact of dramatic and traumatic events on people living in the present. Most dramatic and traumatic of all such events are wars, and World War II stands out. Tens of millions of people survived the war with personal memories, and the legacy of the war determined many of the political developments of the Cold War. Ian Buruma, a Dutch historian of modern Japan, provided a good example of the ways in which memories of World War II affected latter events in *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*. Buruma found that deep feelings of guilt affected Germans from the 1960s to the 1990s. In Japan, on the other hand, far fewer ordinary people or political leaders expressed remorse for their country's misdeeds during the war. Buruma discusses how a sense of victimization at Allied behavior took hold in Japan. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave many Japanese the perceived right to accuse the victors of barbarous atrocities. Buruma noted a reluctance of Japanese authorities after the war to express regrets. Post-World War II Japanese school textbooks also rarely acknowledged Japan's responsibility for wartime atrocities.¹³

12 Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 8.

13 Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York, 1994), 47–69, 177–200. Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, "Japanese Education, Nationalism and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," Laura Hein and Mark Seldin, eds, *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (Armonk, NY, 2000), 96–126. The textbook controversy in Japan continued. In May 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, the new Japanese prime minister, opposed efforts to include in school textbooks more explicit expressions of regret for Japan's aggression and atrocities in China and Korea during the Second World War. Koizumi also announced a visit to the Yakusone Shrine in his official capacity. "Japan's New Leader Hews to Austerity," *New York Times*, 8 May 2001; "South Korea Scraps Military Exercise with Japan," *idem.*, May 9, 2001; "Japan's leader Seeks Constitutional Reform," *idem.*, May 14, 2001. See also Paris, *Long Shadows*, chapter 1 "The Stone

Buruma also contrasted the German and Japanese approach to war memorials, museums and monuments. Germans constructed Second World War memorials that stressed their country's responsibility for inhumanity and war crimes. The Japanese stressed the heroism of their fighting men and downplayed or ignored their responsibility for crimes. The Yakusuni Shrine in Tokyo became the most prominent war museum in Japan. Buruma decried the way the shrine glorified the spirits of the millions of Japanese fighting men who gave their lives for the Emperor. In 1986 and 2001 Japanese prime ministers prayed at the shrine, much to the dismay of Japanese leftists and pacifists and the governments of China and South Korea.¹⁴

Memories of survivors of the Holocaust have become central ways of understanding the politics of war and violence in the twentieth century. Paradoxically, the destruction of Europe's Jews helped promote interest in the intersection of memory and history in the United States. The uses of survivors' memories are more important than a sterile debate over whether the Holocaust was unique, or pivotal in twentieth century history.¹⁵

Across Europe, Israel and the United States survivors of the Holocaust started telling their stories after the mid-1960s. Thousands of them sat for video taped interviews, which were archived at the Yale University Library and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum opened in 1993. The survivors told of their harrowing experiences during the war. They also let interviewers know how painful it had been for them to recall these memories. The Holocaust survivors' stories provided rich examples of the fluctuations in memory and forgetfulness. Many survivors did not

of Sysiphus: *Germany*, 10–73 and chapter 3, "Erasing History: Pretense and Oblivion in *Japan*", 122–64. Paris also investigated the way memories of World War II appeared, changed, and were repressed in France. As a nation both defeated by Germany and one of the eventual victors in the war, France had reasons to exaggerate and glorify its resistance to Germany. Even more powerful was the need to suppress, repress and deny memories of active and passive French support for Germany from June 1940 until August 1944. Chapter 2, "Through a Glass Darkly: *France*", 74–120.

- 14 Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt*, 219–20. Jeffrey Herf noted in *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies* (Cambridge, 1997), the Cold War played a major way in which the FRG (West Germany) and the DDR (East Germany) remembered the war. In the West there was a greater willingness to acknowledge responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era. In the East, the government sought to portray their country as double victims, first of the Nazis and then of the West, which in East German historiography, succeeded the Nazi regime.

- 15 Omer Bartov, *Mirrors of Destruction: War Genocide and Modern Identity* (New York, 2000). Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (New York, 1998). Arno Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken: The "Final Solution" in History* (New York, 1988). LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz*, especially, chapter 1, "History and Memory: In the Shadow of the Holocaust," and chapter 2, "Revisiting the Historians' Debate: Mourning and Genocide." Saul Friedlander, *Memory, History and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe* (Bloomington, IN, 1993); Friedlander, *Nazi Germany and the Jews* (New York, 1997).

tell their stories for decades after the Holocaust. The delay in setting down Holocaust survivors' memories vexed scholars who debated the "validity," or "accuracy," or "usefulness" of such recollections. Some students of the Holocaust expressed caution about using long buried memories. In Arno Mayer's history of the Holocaust, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken*, Mayer contrasted what he called the Muse of history with the Muse of memory. For historians "the authenticity and reliability of their evidence" was primary. Personal recollections, decades after the events, were harder to verify than were documents recorded at the time. In contrast, Lawrence Langer, who interviewed and video taped many of the survivors, believed it was misguided to inspect too closely the factual accuracy of these memories. He said that the testimonies were "human documents rather than merely historical ones." Langer asserted that the stories told by former victims of the Nazis' cruelty may have contained factual errors or inability to recall specific event, but they seemed "trivial in comparison to the complex layers of memory" that helped define the identities of the witnesses.¹⁶ Significantly, Mayer's most important early works were traditional diplomatic history. His methods consisted of finding and interpreting contemporary textual records. Langer, on the other hand, was a literary critic for whom texts stood outside of time.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations interested in understanding the uses of memory have an opportunity to explore the complexities of the relationship between the past and the present. Memories take place in the present, but they are related in complex ways to things that happened in the past. By explaining what happens when the present collides with the past through the lens of memory historians can better comprehend what has been important about foreign affairs and how and why notions of what is important have changed.

A great deal of the discussion of the role of memory in shaping historical understanding has explained historical sites, museums and commemorations. These sites of cultural memory have provided excellent evidence for historians of U.S. foreign relations. Historians have explained the significance of the establishment of the U.S. Holocaust Museum. The thousands of Holocaust survivors in the United States helped create the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Commission in 1977. The greater prominence of Jews in American public life contributed as well to the creation of the Commission. In 1993 the United States Holocaust Museum opened adjacent to the Mall in Washington, DC. On one level it is surprising that a museum dedicated to explaining an event in European history would be established

16 Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?*, 17. Lawrence L. Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory* (New Haven, 1991), xv.

the American capital. A 1977 TV mini-series, "Holocaust," heightened popular awareness.

As Edward T. Linenthal showed in *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum*, his fine account of the building of the museum, its creation owes much to historical reevaluation of U.S. complicity in the atrocities of the Second World War. President Jimmy Carter, an advocate of making the expansion of human rights a focus of United States foreign policy, signed the legislation creating the museum. Whatever concerns might have originally existed about the incongruity of an American museum devoted to European events dissipated after it opened in April 1993.¹⁷ It quickly became one of the most visited sites in the capital. A multiethnic audience treated it as a shrine.

Historians have explored the secular religion of public commemorations. Linenthal and others have remarked upon this tendency of visitors to a variety of battlefield, monuments and memorials to treat them as sacred spaces.¹⁸ In his survey of such memorials from Lexington and Concord, through the Alamo, Gettysburg and the Little Bighorn, and culminating with Pearl Harbor, Linenthal observed how these sanctified sites take on political purposes. They often are constructed and preserved to "ensure continued allegiance to patriotic orthodoxy." Visitors to battlefield sites come with the reverence, faith and awe of religious pilgrims. Such devotion has the value of emotional immediacy. But it also comes at some cost to the sort of understanding, reinterpretation, and reevaluation historians consider their duty. Linenthal noted that the forms of veneration present at battlefield memorials "are both an articulation of patriotic orthodoxy and a symbolic defense against various forms of ideological defilement (heresy)."¹⁹

17 Edward T. Linenthal, *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum* (New York, 1995). Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, discussed the increasing prominence of Jews in American life. Novick was critical, or at least skeptical, of the value of giving precedence (or "privileging" in contemporary literary parlance) to the destruction of Europe's Jews in either Jewish or American life. Others were even harsher in their criticism of what they perceived to be the overemphasis on and commercialization of memories of the Holocaust. See Tim Cole, *Selling the Holocaust: From Auschwitz to Schindler, How History Is Bought, Packaged and Sold* (New York, 2000).

18 David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal, eds. *America's Sacred Space* (Bloomington, IN, 1995). See Chidester and Linenthal, "Introduction," 1–42; Linenthal, "Locating Holocaust Memory: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum," 230–60 (a shorter version of his book, *Preserving Memory*); and Rowland A. Sherrill, "American Sacred Space and the Context of History," 313–39. Just as new work on memory has caused historians to question their earlier positivist assumptions about the clear relationships between actual events in the past, memories of them and the writing of history, a postmodern geography has challenged earlier assumptions about geography. See Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London, UK, 1989), 10–42.

19 Edward T. Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields* (Urbana, IL, 1991), 5.

The political clash between historical reinterpretation and personal and collective memories reverberated in the controversy surrounding the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum's failed effort to produce an exhibit called "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Historians of American foreign relations have applied a great deal of the theoretical literature on memory in explaining this controversy. In 1993 and 1994 Martin Harwit, the director of the Air and Space Museum, and the museum's curatorial staff tried to incorporate the most recent findings of historical scholarship in an exhibition on the atomic bomb. They wanted the narrative and visual material to portray what happened among both the Japanese and the Americans. Veterans groups, professional historians and public officials reviewed drafts of the exhibit's scripts.

As several historians who studied the controversy have pointed out, however, the exhibit touched off a firestorm of complaint. Political conservatives in Congress soon took up the call of some veterans' groups that the exhibit dishonored their accomplishments. Critics of the exhibit charged that the incorporation of material from the Japanese side fostered a sense of American misdeeds bordering on atrocities and war crimes for having attacked the civilian population of Hiroshima. When Republicans won both houses of Congress in the 1994 election, they forced the Smithsonian to abandon plans for the exhibition. Instead, the Air and Space Museum displayed part of the fuselage of the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 that carried the atomic bomb. The only text was a plaque listing the crew of the *Enola Gay*. Gone were the pictures of the devastation of Hiroshima and the long narration about the developments of the war in the Pacific, the concepts of strategic bombing and the science behind the atomic bomb. C. Michael Heyman, the Director of the Smithsonian, said that the museum should have mounted an exhibit that commemorated the "valor and sacrifice" of the veterans of the Pacific war. Heyman provoked outrage among historians by observing that a national museum was not a place to present complex scholarly analysis.²⁰

History and memory are related, but they are not identical. Their relationship is complicated; sometimes it is contentious. In a very real sense,

20 Quoted in Michael J. Hogan, "The Enola Gay Controversy: History, Memory and the Politics of Presentation," Hogan, ed., *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (New York, 1996), 230. See other essays in this volume by J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," 11-37 and Walker, "History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb," 187-99. Also the essays in Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Englehart, eds. *History Wars: The Enola Gay and other Battles for the American Past* (New York, 1996), especially Linenthal, "Anatomy of a Controversy," 9-62; Michael Sherry, "Patriotic Orthodoxy and American Decline," 97-114; and Paul Boyer, "Whose History Is It Anyway: Memory, Politics and Historical Scholarship," 115-139. Also Martin Harwit, *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of Enola Gay* (New York, 1996).

the Smithsonian's cancellation of "The Last Act" represented a victory of popular memory manipulated by political interest groups over historical scholarship. One of the more sobering lessons of the controversy for historians of U.S. foreign relations was that their careful examination of material in the archives made so little impression upon the public's views of decisions taken at the end of the Second World War.²¹ A pivotal issue concerned the number of U.S. casualties the Truman administration expected would result from a ground invasion of the Japanese islands. The higher the number of American casualties, the more weight would be given to Truman's assertion in his memoirs that the dropping of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands of American lives. The lower the number, the more moral discomfort might arise in American minds about the loss of more than 150,000 Japanese lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Careful scholarship in the 1980s demonstrated that the larger numbers were never seriously considered at the time. In fact, the number of one million U.S. casualties probably arose a few years *after* the end of the Second World War as a post facto justification of the atomic bomb. It hardly mattered, though. The idea of one million American casualties from the invasion of the home islands became fixed in the public imagination as a sort of urban historical legend impervious to change by professional historians. Moreover, some veterans of World War II assailed as unpatriotic the efforts of historians of U.S. foreign relations to make use of documentary records revising earlier, erroneous ideas about the decisionmaking of the use of the atomic bomb.²²

Not only does the study of history have a complicated and occasionally adversarial relationship with popular memories; these memories themselves change with the times. The ways in which current events alter memories of the past is a fruitful and somewhat less explored avenue of understanding the role of memory in U.S. foreign relations. For example,

21 Mark A. Stoler, "The Second World War in U.S. History and Memory, *Diplomatic History*, 25, 3 (Summer 2001): 383–92 argues that participants' memories of World War II, often at odds with events documented in the archives, persisted for decades after 1945. Other essays in this *Diplomatic History* roundtable on the future of World War II studies address various aspects of the problem of memory and explaining American foreign relations, notably: Warren F. Kimball, "The Incredible Shrinking War: The Second World War, Not (Just) the origins of the Cold War, 247–66; Anders Stephenson, "War and Diplomatic History," 393–404; and Omer Bartov, "Germany's Unforgettable War: The Twisted Road from Berlin to Moscow and Back," 405–24.

22 Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," Hogan, ed, *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, 38–79; Walker, "History, Collective memory and the Decision to Use the Bomb," *idem.*, 187–99; Sherry, "Patriotic Orthodoxy and American Decline," Linenthal and Engelhart, eds. *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past*, 97–114.

the fluctuations in the popular conception of the experience of World War II offer insights. In the decades after 1945 memories of World War II affected ideas about the present. Conversely, present events altered memories of the World War II experience. For most of the half century since the end of the Second World War veterans have been lauded as heroes who saved civilization. For much of the period the recollection of the Second World War was not only heroic but also clean and sanitized. Men died, sweethearts collapsed and widows grieved in war films. But it was all in a good cause. Pain seemed less than real or at least bearable. Starving, sick, wounded soldiers and prisoners of war looked like actors.²³

But the sanitary view of World War II changed in the turmoil of the Vietnam War. Studs Terkel did the research for *The "Good War"* in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. He put quotation marks around *The Good War*, because he doubted whether any war could be considered good. The men and women who offered their wartime recollections remembered the dirt, the grittiness, the hardships and the absurdities of war even more than the glorious cause. When the literary critic Paul Fussell wrote *Wartime* in 1989, the entire book was an assault on what he believed to be the phoniness, the cloying optimism, the lying and the propaganda of American and British authorities during the Second World War. The Vietnam War experience suffused every chapter of Fussell's *Wartime*. He noted that in the 1970s a Higher Skepticism, "fueled by the assassinations of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King . . . and by the Vietnam War" kept the public from believing much, if anything, officials said about the war. Looking back on his and others' Second World War experiences, he denied any sort of higher cause. The only things that mattered were people's personal experiences, and those were, almost exclusively cramped, dirty and mean.²⁴

Philip Biedler, another literary critic, built upon his earlier explorations of Vietnam War literature to mount a full-scale assault upon the literary,

23 For example, Colonel Nicholson (Alec Guinness) in *The Bridge on the River Kwai* (1957) looks well fed and possessed of excellent muscle tone when he emerges from "the oven." He does not even need a drink of water; instead he gulps down about three ounces of scotch. His Japanese captors had kept him in this tiny, tin roofed shed for over a week.

24 Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York, 1989), 167. Fussell's views also figured in the controversy over the Smithsonian's "Last Act" exhibit. His own recollections as a GI in Europe frightened at the prospect of having to invade the Japanese home islands in 1945 became a standard of the argument against the exhibit. Fussell, *Thank God for the Atomic Bomb and Other Essays* (New York, 1988), 16–29. The essay originally appeared in *The New Republic* in 1981. Martin J. Sherwin wrote an extensive critique in "Hiroshima and Modern Memory," *Nation*, October 10, 1981, 1, 349–53. Paul Boyer also criticized Fussell's views in "Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory," Hogan, ed., *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, 146–48.

film and television recollection of World War II. In his 1998 study, *The Great War's Greatest Hits*, Beidler argued that executives of the publishing, movie and television industries offered a sentimental view of the Second World War. Vietnam changed that, however. After the public watched the ugliness of war on their TV screens and comprehended the randomness of those who went to Vietnam and who stayed safely at home, it seemed less likely that World War II could ever again be presented as so wholesome an event.²⁵

Just as Beidler was writing that the shock of Vietnam meant that World War II could no longer be regarded as something glorious, a revival of the heroic view of World War II emerged. The movie *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) used contemporary technology to show the horror of battle. Characters died in real pain. Audiences saw how dirty, noisy, and confused battles were. But the higher cause remained. Tom Brokaw's *The Great Generation* (1998) also presented the men and women of the Great Depression and the Second World War as heroes committed to a cause larger than themselves.²⁶ The heroic recollection of World War II reinforced a movement to construct a World War II Memorial on the Mall in Washington, DC. Brokaw, Stephen Spielberg, the producer of *Saving Private Ryan*, Tom Hanks, the star of the film, the historian Stephen Ambrose, author of numerous books praising the heroism of World War II GIs, former Senator Robert Dole, and thousands of World War II veterans petitioned Congress to pass legislation hastening construction of the memorial. Congress acted during the Memorial Day weekend of 2001 as the movie *Pearl Harbor* opened. Reviewers savaged it, and one columnist noted how the movie had replaced the event of the attack Pearl Harbor itself in the public consciousness. One public opinion survey revealed that nearly everyone had heard of the movie while fewer than half had knowledge of the historical events of December 7, 1941.²⁷

25 Philip D. Beidler, *The Good War's Greatest Hits: World War II and American Remembering* (Athens, GA, 1998), 151. Compare Michael S. Molaskey, *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory* (London, UK, 1999) and Tadao Sato, "Japanese Films about the Pacific War," Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., *America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory* (Armonk, NY, 1998), 51–64.

Beidler turned his attention to World War II literature after publishing two excellent books on Vietnam literature: *American Literature and the Experience of Vietnam* (Athens, GA, 1982) and *Re-Writing America: Vietnam Authors in Their Generation* (Athens, GA, 1991).

26 Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York, 1998); Bob Greene, *Duty: A Father, His Son, and the Man Who Won the War* (New York, 2000); James Bradley with Ron Powers, *Flags of Our Fathers* (New York, 2000).

27 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Japan, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945* (New York, 1994); Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II* (New York, 1997). "Bush Signs Bill to Speed World War II Memorial," *New York Times*, May

Of course, memories of Pearl Harbor surged in American consciousness in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001.²⁸ As people searched for ways to come to grips with the meaning of September 11, the war against Japan after Pearl Harbor, when the United States compelled the attackers to surrender unconditionally, offered comfort at a time of national grief. Arguments over the proper way to remember September 11 arose within a year of the September 11 attacks. Schools scrambled to teach the meaning of the attacks. What did they say about American relations with the Muslim world and the Middle East? What were the implications for American foreign policy, civil liberties at home, or a multicultural society? Some, mostly politically conservative, critics charged that the lesson plans created to study September 11 represented a weak-minded defeatism in the face of unspeakable evil. William Bennett, a prominent conservative, scolded, urged school teachers to encourage feelings of patriotic resolve, rather than emphasize cross-cultural misunderstandings or threats to civil liberties.²⁹

Public expressions of personal memories of the Vietnam War have provided a rich vein for scholars to mine the ways in which events of the past are reconstructed in the present. The historian Robert J. McMahon has argued that in the twenty-five years after 1975 numerous American political leaders sought to repress memories of American mistakes, misdeeds and crimes committed during the Vietnam War. They did so in order to justify an assertive American foreign policy in the present.³⁰ Christian Appy has written that the effort to recapture the memory of the Vietnam War came at a significant cost of historical understanding. He noted in *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* that "Vietnam is not . . . merely a memory; it is a fundamental part of our history."³¹ The rest of his book supplied numerous examples of the ways in which working class young men accumulated numerous psychological and physical wounds in Vietnam. Appy believed that this devastation could not be healed by the act of memorialization.

29, 2001; "Stories from Silence," editorial, *idem.*, May 28, 2001; Frank Rich, "The Best Years of Our Lives," *idem.*, May 26, 2001. Arthur G. Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century* (Armonk, NY, 1998), chapter 4, "The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor," 60–78.

28 Peter L. Hahn, "Comment: 9/11 and the American Way of Life: The Impact of 12/7 Revisited," *Diplomatic History* 26, 4 (Fall 2002): 627–34. "The Information Age Processes a Tragedy. Books and More Books Analyze, Exorcise and Merchandise the Events of Sept. 11," *New York Times*, August 28, 2002: B1.

29 "Lesson Plans for Sept. 11 Offer a Study in Discord," *New York Times*, August 31, 2002: A1.

30 Robert J. McMahon, "Presidential Address: Contested Memory: The Vietnam War and American Society, 1975–2000," *Diplomatic History*, 26, 2 (Spring 2002): 159–84.

31 Christian Appy, *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, 1993), 10.

Yet the Vietnam Veterans Memorial focused the discussion of remembering Vietnam. Numerous historians, sociologists, art historians and cultural scholars have explained the way in which the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, or more simply, The Wall, was dedicated adjacent to the Lincoln Memorial.³² The efforts of the organizers of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial to construct a memorial listing the names of the Americans who had died during the Vietnam war gathered support from the public and office holders after 1978. But the design process soon became mired in political controversy. Once a design submitted by Maya Lin, a twenty-one year old art student, won the competition for the memorial, many political conservatives who had supported U.S. participation in the war angrily denounced it as a celebration of the views of the antiwar movement. Tom Carhart, one of the most strident critics, called Lin's V-shaped, polished black granite Wall, a "black gash of shame."³³ A smaller but significant criticism of the design of the Memorial came from people still angry with American political leaders for having wrecked so many Vietnamese and American lives by involving the U.S. in the war. Some of these veterans or supporters of the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era Lin's design was flawed precisely because it allowed visitors to the site to bring their own memories and opinions about the war.³⁴

The public success of the Wall overcame many of the controversies over Lin's design. Millions visited the Vietnam Veterans Memorial each year. It became one of the foremost sacred sites in the secular religion of patriotism. People treated it as a shrine. They became hushed and reverent as soon as they began to descend the gentle slope of the walkway in front of the Wall. They poured out their souls in the mementos and the scraps of paper they left at the Wall. The National Park Service, which cared for the Memorial, soon began collecting and preserving these relics of memory. It became customary for visitors to the Wall to leave something. Scholars noted that even school children, born long after the end of the Vietnam War who could have no personal recollections of the experience,

32 John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1992), 13–20; Albert Boime, *The Unveiling of National Icons: A Plea for Patriotic Iconoclasm in a Nationalist Age* (Cambridge, UK, 1998), 307–34; Kristin Ann Hass, *Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (Berkeley, 1998), 14–20; Patrick Hapgood, "The Social Memory of the Vietnam War," Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1994, 288; Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory*, 143–46; Jan C. Scruggs and Joel L. Swerdlow, *To Heal a Nation: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (New York, 1985), 7; Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley, 1997), 52, 56.

33 Hass, *Carried to the Wall*, 16.

34 Larry Heinemann, *Paco's Story* (New York, 1987), 158–59. Keith Beattie, *The Scar that Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War* (New York, 1998), 44–50. B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley, *Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed of Its Heroes and History* (Dallas, TX, 1998), 580–96.

were encouraged, even obliged to write something and leave it at the Wall.³⁵

Social scientists, historians and other authors also noted how the personal memories of veterans followed certain standard formats. Veterans recalled events in ways that became socially expected. This social conditioning of memories of the Vietnam War validated some of Maurice Halbwachs early work on social memory. Halbwachs noted how people sometimes expressed as their own memories of events they had not personally experienced. In 1980 the American Psychological Association added a new category, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, to the accepted diagnoses of psychological disorders. Many Vietnam veterans sought treatment for PTSD at Veterans Administration facilities. The standard mode of treatment involved veterans talking about their wartime experiences in group therapy sessions. Men would tell of the recurring horrors of their combat experiences. Sometimes they would confess to having committed atrocities. Therapists serving as group leaders customarily accepted all recollections as valid. Memories are memories, they stated. If someone offered a memory, it is real. The veterans in the groups, however, keenly distinguished between what they characterized as made up or embellished "war stories," and true recitals of what they called "events."³⁶

The domestic unpopularity of the war at the time it was fought, and the uncovering of American atrocities, provided a context for men to proclaim their own involvement in war crimes. These public confessions occurred at a time when therapists paid ever-greater attention to recovered memories of long suppressed traumas.³⁷ Later in the 1990s, a backlash developed against the idea of recovered memories. Several scholars uncovered examples of false or implanted memories. Often these cases of false memory syndrome involved false accusations of early childhood sexual abuse.³⁸ Some writers turned an equally skeptical eye to some

35 Hass, *Carried to the Wall*, 26–30. Patrick Haggopian, review of "Personal Legacy: The Healing of a Nation," *Journal of American History*, 82, 1 (June 1995): 159–60.

36 Allan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, 1995), 101–17. Harry Summers, Jr., "Through American Eyes: Combat Experiences and Memories of Korean and Vietnam," West, Levine and Hiltz, eds., *America's Wars in Asia*, 172–82.

37 Christine A. Courtois, *Recollections of Sexual Abuse: Treatment Principles and Guidelines* (New York, 1999); Kenneth S. Pope and Laura S. Brown, eds., *Recovered Memories of Abuse: Assessment, Therapies, Forensics* (Washington, DC, 1996) Susan L. Riviere, *Memory of Childhood Trauma: A Clinician's Guide to the Literature* (New York, 1996).

38 Robert A. Baker, ed., *Child Sexual Abuse and False Memory Syndrome* (Amherst, New York, 1998); Martin A. Conway, ed. *Recovered Memories and False Memories* (Oxford, UK, 1997); Steven J. Lynn and Kevin M. McConkey, eds., *Truth in Memory* (New York, 1998); Kathy S. Pedzek and William Banks, eds., *The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate* (San Diego, CA, 1996); William Rogers, "Recovered Memory" and Other Assaults upon the Mysteries of Consciousness: Hypnosis, Psychotherapy, Fraud and the Mass Media (Jefferson, NC, 1995).

Vietnam veterans' recollection of shocking events. Jerry Lembcke, who opposed U.S. participation in the war, took a look at the often-repeated tale of howling mobs of antiwar protesters spitting on veterans at airports when they returned from Vietnam. He could not find a single contemporary account of such events and concluded that they were urban legends.³⁹ Writing from the other side of the political spectrum, W. E. Burkett, a supporter of the U.S. involvement in the war, provided numerous examples of U.S. veterans falsely confessing to atrocities that never took place.⁴⁰

The question of how properly to verify memories of wartime events persisted. In 2001 Gregory L. Vistica, a journalist, wrote about a massacre committed by a U.S. Navy SEALs squad led by Lt. Bob Kerrey in the Mekong Delta in 1969. Vistica published his story in the *New York Times Magazine* and the CBS News program *60 Minutes II* followed up. Kerrey spoke of his own continuing traumas and the sanctity of memories. "Part of living with the memory," he told Vistica, "some of the memories, is to forget them. . . . I carry memories of what I did, and I survive and live based upon a lot of different mechanisms." When Vistica relayed to Kerrey the accusation of one of the men in his squad that Kerrey had murdered an old man, Kerrey denied it. He added that the other man's account was "his memory," and it was no one's business to question it.⁴¹

Questioning memories, though, is one task of historians. Such inquiries go beyond discovering the factual accuracy of later recollections, although this is an important activity. Historians of U.S. foreign relations will try to sort out the tangled relationships between popular memory, political issues, leaders' memories, and actions. On every level, from members of the public concerned mostly about their private lives to the highest foreign policy decision makers, memories help frame what people consider to be important. As a team of historians associated with Indiana University learned when they interviewed approximately 1,500 Americans on their views on popular memories and personal histories "the past exists not as a distant land but in the here and now." The people they interviewed "turned to the past to build relationships and communities, to make themselves at home in the present tense. And they turned to the past to envision tomorrow, to gather legacies they wanted to leave behind."⁴² Historians of U.S. foreign relations will also gain greater understanding when they study the continuing conversation between past and present and the role that memories play in determining how people conduct their affairs.

39 Jerry Lembcke, *The Spitting Image Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam* (New York, 1998), 71–83.

40 Burkett and Whitley, *Stolen Valor*, 36–73.

41 Gregory L. Vistica, "What Happened in Thanh Phong," *New York Times Magazine*, April 29, 2001, 51, 66. CBS News *60 Minutes II*, May 1, 2001.

42 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelan, *The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life* (New York, 1998), 63.

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